University of Michigan Law School

University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository
Michigan Legal Studies Series

Law School History and Publications

1942

Torts in the Conflict of Laws
Moffatt Hancock
University of Toronto

Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/michigan_legal_studies
Part of the Conflict of Laws Commons, Jurisprudence Commons, and the Torts Commons

Recommended Citation
Hancock, Moffatt, Torts in the Conflict of Laws. The University of Michigan Press, 1942.

This Book is brought to you for free and open access by the Law School History and Publications at University of
Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Michigan Legal Studies Series
by an authorized administrator of University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. For more information,
please contact mlaw.repository@umich.edu.

MICHIGAN LEGAL STUDIES

TORTS IN THE
CONFLICT OF LAWS

PUBLISHED UNDER THE AUSPICES OF THE UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN I.AW
SCHOOL (wHICH, HOWEVER, ASSUMES NO RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE VIEWS
EXPRESSED)

WITH THE AID OF FUNDS DERIVED FROM GIFTS TO THE
UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN BY WILLIAM W. COOK

MICHIGAN LEGAL STUDIES

DISCOVERY BEFORE TRIAL

George Ragland, Jr.
ToRTs IN THE CoNFLICT oF LAWS

Moffatt Hancock
THE AMENDING oF THE FEDERAL CoNsTITUTION

Lester B. Orfield
REVIEW oF ADMINISTRATIVE AcTs

Armin Uhler

TORTS IN THE
CONFLICT OF LAWS
by
MOFFATT HANCOCK
ASSISTANT PROFESSOR OF LAW, UNIVERSITY OF TORONTO

Foreword
by
HESSEL E. YNTEMA

Ann Arbor
THE UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN PRESS

Chicago
CALLAGHAN

& CoMPANY

1942

CoPYRIGHT,

1942

BY
UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN

To my

Father and Mother

Foreword

T

HERE has been in recent years a marked development of interest in the diversities of laws and their
attendant conflicts. While modern facilities of communication accelerate the spread of culture and thus augment
the need of uniformity in the laws affecting commerce, they
also reveal the significance of local needs, customs, and legal
institutions. Indeed, it would seem that multiplication of
jurisdictions and progressive diversification of laws in both
space and subject matter is an unavoidable concomitant of
increasing specialization in the international, interstate, or
local economy. If these circumstances serve to justify the
perennial effort to simplify the law, they also argue that the
effort is Sisyphean. Meanwhile, determination of the competent court and the appropriate law in the juridical conflicts
arising in the course of commerce is requisite.
It is sometimes objected that the resolution of conflicts of
laws through rules guiding the selection of the applicable
law is, as contrasted with the method of unification, a pis aller.
But it would seem that, for the substantial group of problems
engendered by the necessary division of judicial business and
the variation of law according to the peculiar needs of particular communities, there is no feasible alternative. Indeed, it may be said that, while a substantial measure of legal
unity may be attainable in homogeneous culture areas, particularly when united under a common government, and
unification of law is particularly desirable in the field of international commerce, the notion of eradicating the sources
of diversity through universal standardization of local customs
and enactments, is under existing conditions palpably vain
and, in certain respects, even vicious. A common law is suitvii
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able only for common conditions and in any event does not
obviate the inevitable issues of jurisdiction. It can scarcely
be doubted that clearer perception of this situation has stimulated the current interest in conflicts of laws. For, in the degree that uniformity appears unattainable, the bases determining the applicable law in cases of conflict assume consequence.
Of this increased interest, the literature respecting conflicts of laws that has appeared in the United States during
the past two decades is ample testimony. On the one hand,
there has been a major endeavor to systematize the field
through the Restatement of the Law of Conflict of Laws,
which has been supplemented by a monumental treatise and
two valuable, if less extensive, manuals. On the other hand,
there has been prolific consideration of specific problems in
the law reviews, and the courts have concurrently provided
an unusually rich casuistry of judicial opinion. In addition,
the general theoretical issues have attracted attention, and
more recently a degree of emphasis has been given to the
value of comparative study in this field. There have, however,
appeared relatively few exhaustive monographic studies of
topics adequate in scope to afford a testing-ground for the
more general or theoretical developments and at the same
time carrying sufficient detailed consideration of specific
problems to serve the needs of the practitioner.
From this point of view and on several counts> the present
study deserves attention. It comprizes a comprehensive survey of the reported Anglo-American cases in an area of great
practical interest, which at the same time throws into relief
the principal fundamental issues respecting the selection of
the applicable law in cases of conflicts. A distinctive, if not
indeed unique, feature of this survey is that it compares in
detail the historical and doctrinal developments not merely
in England and the United States but in the chief British

FOREWORD

ix

Dominions as well; it thus provides an illuminating perspective of the evolution of legal theory and practice in these
related areas of legal culture. The technique followed is in
refreshing contrast to the prevailing predilection for logistics
in dealing with conflicts of laws; its significant premise is to
relate and criticize the recorded cases in terms of the fundamental policies involved in preference to more formal consideration. On this basis, the author develops a mode of
approach to the central theoretical problems concerning characterization (otherwise known as qualification or classification)
and the primary distinction between substance and procedure,
which, while of course indebted to prior critical studies, is
nevertheless both original and practical. In this connection,
emphasis is given to an aspect of the matter too little developed
in the current literature, namely, that of alternative or
multiple reference, involving the potential applicability of
laws emanating from several jurisdictions in what the author
appropriately designates as "multiple contact situations."
Moreover, the treatment is in a style lucid and exact, which,
the substance considered, is something of an achievement and
a deceptively modest advertisement of incisive analysis.
It is not for a foreword to forestall too much what is to
follow. Nevertheless, the central feature of the present study
from the theoretical point of view-the proposed emphasis
upon standards of policy in the resolution of conflicts of lawsinvites brief comment. As specifically formulated in Chapter
III, the policy criteria proposed are (a) uniformity and
(b) the degree of interest of the State concerned in the particular situation. As intimated in the previous paragraph,
this mode of approach is a commendable advance upon techniques that seek to secure certainty in formal casuistry. And
the corollarial proposal to obviate the intricacies of current
theories of characterization by reference to such standards
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has not merely the virtue of simplicity but, as the treatment of
specific questions substantiates, also recommends itself from
a practical point of view. Not the least of its merits is to
suggest the futility of the question-begging and mechanical
distinction by some proposed between primary and secondary
classification. While the present study does not purport to
explore the wider theoretical implications of this approach,
it is worth noting that the thesis advanced may find comfort
in the increasingly significant tendency to resolve or even to
dissolve the problems of characterization in comparative law.
This tendency (which of course assumes that conflict of laws
rules are rules of positive and not of international law and,
therefore, are technically a part of the lex fori in the broader
sense of that ambiguous term) stresses the need of intelligent
and forward-looking interpretation of these rules, for which
purpose, and more particularly as a means to uniformity,
comparison of the analogous doctrines in the various legal
systems is essential.
In this connection, a further consideration deserves notice,
namely, the desirability of reaching the proper solution from
the viewpoint of the substantive subject matter. It would not
need to be emphasized, were it not so frequently overlooked
in the theory of the subject, that conflict of laws cases (as
diffe:·entiated from conflicts of jurisdiction) involve as a rule
not only the selection of the proper law but also the basic
issues of such law, whether lying in the field of torts, contracts,
commercial instruments, or whatever other branch of substantive law may be concerned. By the very nature of such
cases, there is typically presented an underlying divergence
of views or policies respecting the proper substantive solution, not infrequently representing a conflict between an
obsolescent doctrine and a more liberal trend. Even in the
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latter type of situation, uniformity is admittedly a prime
desideratum. But what of the instances, more frequent than
is commonly supposed, where the law to be applied is undecided or obscure or, as in situations involving the possibility of
alternative or multiple reference, where the arguments for
the application of one law in preference to another are far
from compelling? In the resolution of such situations, the
contributions of critical comparative scholarship have illuminating pertinence and, absent countervailing considerations,
will serve to indicate and justify determinations in accord
with modern views of justice. In short, in the sphere of conflict of laws, the function of comparative law is not only to
establish bases for the unification of the conflict rules as
such but also, if only within the limits suggested, to promote
and explore the possibilities of uniformity in the treatment
of the basic substantive issues.
In a related aspect, the implications of the point of view
developed in this study are significant. Recently, in considering the possibility of unification of the subject matter in the
Americas, a distinguished student of Anglo-American law
from the comparative point of view, Professor Edouard
Lambert, has directed attention to the excessive emphasis
upon particularistic autarchy in the Restatement of the Law
of Conflict of Laws, as evidenced notably by the comment to
§ s, construing the accepted principle that conflict of laws
rules are part of the internal law of each State in the sense
that the courts in each State must apply, respectively, their
own conceptions of conflict of laws. In this connection, he
also remarks the corresponding doctrine enunciated in Kryger
v. Wilson 1 and other federal decisions to the effect that misconceived applications of these rules by the State courts are
1

242 U.S. 17r, 37 Sup. Ct. 34 (r9r6).
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not usually reviewable on constitutional grounds, since they
concern solely the locallaw. 2 The same conception, it may
be added, underlies the recent decision of the Supreme Court
in Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Electric Mfg. Co., in which it is declared, applying the doctrine of Erie R. R. Co. v. Tompkins,S
that it is not for the federal courts to enforce "an independent
'general law' of conflict of laws," since, subject to review on
any federal question, each State is "free to determine whether
a given matter is to be governed by the law of the forum or
some other law." 4 In the face of this insistence on the supremacy of local law in the interpretation of conflict of laws
rules and the narrow construction correspondingly given to
the Full Faith and Credit Clause and other applicable constitutional provisions by the Supreme Court, consideration
of this problem is peculiarly pertinent. As the historical
survey of the decisions involving foreign torts in the initial
chapters of this study indicates, the courts in the United
States in the course of the past hundred years have developed
a progressively liberal attitude with respect to the sphere of
application of foreign law in such cases, with a converse restriction upon recourse to the internal lex fori on grounds of
so-called local policy or the "procedural" nature of the issue.
It is a real service to have traced this important trend and
to have substantiated its direction by logical exposition of
the fundamental policies thus evolved to deal with conflict
of laws.
The fact is that, on the crucial issue of the significance of
the lex fori for the solution of conflicts of laws, the official
• Bulletin de l'Institut de Droit Compare de Lyon, March, I94o, at pp. II :ff.,
referring to Professor Lorenzen's magistral discussion, "The Federal Constitution as a Source of Private International Law," 3 Recueil d'etudes sur les
sources du droit en l'honneur de Franc;ois Geny, I934, 437, at p. 452.
8
304 U.S. 64, 58 Sup. Ct. 8I7 (I938).
• 6I Sup. Ct. Io2o (I94I).
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theories are both anachronistic and confused. The doctrine
of the Restatement, noted above, respecting the nature of
conflict of laws rules (which are also characterized in the comment to § 4 as "part of the general system of the common
law") is not merely apparently self-contradictory and inconsistent with the supposed purpose of the Restatement; it is
hostile to the historic function of the law of conflict of laws.
And the corresponding failure of the federal courts to define
the ambit of local policy in conflict cases involving the laws
of sister States, including even the so-called uniform laws,
is out of line with the delimitation of State police power in
other respects by the same federal tribunals and the recent
adoption of uniform federal rules of civil procedure, antipathetic even to the premises of the unprecedented decision
in Erie R. R. Co. v. Tompkins 5 by which the doctrine has
been most recently supported, and in effect incompatible with
the intent of the federal system. It countenances an incongruous, if not also otiose, atomization of the administration of justice in the United States in an area where uniformity is primarily desirable and its indicated instrument is the
federal judiciary. Indeed, for the purposes of a union such
as the United States, and only less so for the purposes of
international commerce, doctrines asserting the unconditional
claims of the lex fori, which consequently preclude consideration of the legitimate interests of other States than that of
suit in cases of conflict, obviously carry positivism to the
point of absurdity.
The time is ripe to recognize that, for the solution of conflicts of laws and indeed for legal science generally, neither
idealistic internationalism nor nationalistic positivism is an
adequate basis of theory. The doctrines of the former type,
once prevalent, have been superseded some time since, it hav• 304 U.S. 64, 58 Sup. Ct. 817 (1938).
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ing been perceived that substantially no effective international rules correspond to the inconsistent universal systems
they projected and that they did not account for the municipal origin of conflict of laws rules and their administration
by national courts. Nevertheless, it may be remarked that
these theories, even in the attenuated form of the comity
doctrine, represent an effort to define the objectives of the
law respecting conflict of laws. On the other hand, current
positivism, properly emphasizing the existent conditions and
procedure for the determination of conflicts of laws, has been
led into a cul de sac; it assumes the ultimate substantial
finality of the lex fori. As this assumption affords no rational
basis to determine in case of doubt what the lex fori should
be and is essentially inconsistent with the very purpose of this
branch of law (which is in stated measure to derogate from
the lex fori), positivism ends in autarchy eventuating in a
desperate struggle to escape the consequences of its primary
premise. If, in the field of conflict of laws, internationalism
has been characterized by unrealistic star-gazing, positivism is
in an inverted posture like that of the students of astronomy in
Aristophanes' comedy, engaged, their noses to the earth, in
observing the movements of the celestial bodies.
In addition, both types of theories commonly err in two
further respects. In the first place, they exaggerate the significance of sovereignty in the solution of conflicts of laws,
whether by conceiving the problems as distinctively international or as emphatically national, whereas, at least in
private disputes, it would seem that the primary desideratum
is to do justice to the private interests concerned. It does not
advance the issues much in such cases to envisage them in
terms of local policy or national honor, nor even, we might
add by way of parenthesis, to do so in cases of disputes
between States. In the second place, both types of theories
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excellently illustrate the dangers· of confusing ideal law
with existent conditions of justice. Internationalism, taking
a distant hope for significant actuality, is prejudiced by its
indifference to existing conditions; positivism, confusing the
traditional with the ideal, does not face the vital problems
of legal change, which have to do with the present and the
future, not the past alone.
It would seem, therefore, that, as Dean Falconbridge and
others have suggested, a via media is indicated, a synthesis
that will recognize the respective merits and compensate
for the faults, of the two extremes. An acceptable theory
for the solution of conflicts of laws must accordingly accept,
on the one hand, the local formulation and administration of
the rules determining the applicable law and, on the other
hand, the necessity to ascertain and apply the rules on rational
grounds consistent with their purpose. It must take account
of current conditions and under the limitations they impose
define the criteria that express most accurately and adequately
the substantial factors involved in the solution of conflicts
of laws. It must suppose the rules embodying these criteria,
national in their locale, to have an interstate or international
orientation and objective. These conditions, as above intimated, require a comparative or, in other words, a scientific
approach. In short, in this as in other branches of law, it
behoves legal science to have its feet on the ground and its
head in the air, so that it may both walk and see ahead.
With this and two companion volumes, the series of Michigan Legal Studies is inaugurated, the purpose of the series
being to facilitate and provide a suitable vehicle for the
publication of products of legal research, particularly at
the University of Michigan Law School, such as may be of
interest and value in the development of legal science. We
bespeak for the series the benison of the bar and others con-
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cerned with legal research and for the individual issues such
generous consideration as their respective merits deserve.
The present monograph is committed to the public with the
further hope that the objective treatment in the following
pages of the underlying purposes and scope of application
of conflict of laws rules as illustrated by the Anglo-American
cases involving torts may serve, among other things, to
stimulate reconsideration of this fundamental matter, not
only from the viewpoint of Anglo-Dominion law, the basic
theory of which seems to have been prematurely crystallized
by a very few leading precedents, but equally in the United
States where the historical background leaves less excuse for
illiberal theory.
HESSEL

E. y NTEMA

Preface

T

HE central theme of this study is the general choiceof-law principle that the law of the place where an
alleged wrong has occurred ought to determine questions of legal liability for that wrong. 1 We shall endeavour
to examine and discuss the general social problems and the
specific variations of those problems whose solution has
brought this choice-of-law principle into play. Our consideration of the solutions which courts and legislatures have.
adopted for these problems will embrace the materials of
both Anglo-American and Anglo-Dominion common law.
As a rule, common-law courts are primarily concerned with
cases arising within their respective territorial jurisdictions
which they decide according to the rules of their respective
internal or territorial laws. 2 But over a period of time
they have developed a number of theories concerning the application of foreign laws to cases which have a foreign setting.
The development of such theories within the field of our
study by English courts is briefly reviewed in the first chapter. The analogous development in the United States is
outlined in the second chapter.
In the United States, the association of the various states
in a federal system has further complicated the choice-of-law
problem. The Supreme Court of the United States has held
1
The expression "law of the place of wrong" or "lex loci delicti" is somewhat misleading because it suggests that a legal wrong has been committed.
But in a conflicts case the defendant may rely upon the so-called law of
the place of wrong to exonerate him of all legal liability. The expression
must be taken to mean "law of the place of alleged wrong" or "law of
the place where the facts of which plaintiff complains have occurred."
• In this study the expressions "internal law," "domestic law," "law of the
forum," "local law," all mean the body of legal rules normally applied by
the court of the forum to cases which are not significantly connected with any
other jurisdiction.
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that certain clauses of the federal Constitution impose limitations upon the power of individual states to apply their own
laws to transactions connected with other states. The federal
judiciary itself occupies a somewhat dubious position in relation to choice-of-law principles. These peculiarly American
problems are also considered in the second chapter.
It is trite learning that every rule of law has, or ought
to have, a purpose. What are the underlying social purposes
of the choice-of-law principle that the law of the place of
an alleged wrong determines questions of liability for that
wrong? Why should this principle be followed? An attempt
is made to answer these questions in chapter three. The operation of this principle is limited by a number of exceptional
rules. Foreign laws contrary to the public policy of the forum
are not enforced. Matters of procedure are governed by the
law of the forum alone. And there are various minor rules
which have a similar effect. Now it seems probable that a
large number of cases would raise the border-line issue: to
what extent should the application of the general choice-oflaw principle be modified by the application of one or more
of these rules which operate as exceptions to it? It is submitted that this question can only be properly answered by
taking into consideration the reasons for following the general choice-of-law principle and the reasons for following
the. exceptional rule or rules in question. The social policies
of the choice-of-law principle and the social policies underlying the exceptional rules ought to be weighed against one
another. Chapters four and five are therefore devoted to a discussion of the various exceptional rules with a view to ascertaining their social functions.
Having examined the social functions of the choice-of-law
principle and of its exceptions, we are now in a position to
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consider its relation to specific types of rules of internal law.
This is done in chapter six.
In a simple conflict of laws case all the legally significant
facts are connected with a single jurisdiction which is not
the forum. There is a more complex type of case in which
the facts are spread over two or more jurisdictions. Because
the operative facts are so connected with these jurisdictions
it is necessary to take their laws into consideration. Cases of
this type, called multiple contact cases, provide the theme
for chapter seven. Some specific problems of this type are
discussed in chapter eight.
Maritime torts require separate consideration. They raise
a number of multiple contact problems which are considered
in chapter nine.
The earliest steps in the preparation of this study were
taken in 1937 while I was a graduate fellow in the University
of Michigan Law School. It is a great satisfaction to me to be
able to record my deep gratitude to Mr. Henry M. Bates,
then Dean of the Law School, and his colleagues for their
inspiring instruction and their very great kindness.
MoFFATT HANcocK
School of Law
University of Toronto
September, 1941
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CHAPTER

I

Development of the Law Respecting
Foreign Torts in England
SECTION I
ASSERTION OF JUDICIAL JURISDICTION OVER FOREIGN TORTS

T

HE first step taken by the courts toward the development of a choice-of-law theory was the assumption of
jurisdiction to try actions for torts committed outside
England. The old rules relating to the venue of actions raised
an obstacle because they required the plaintiff to state carefully
the place or places in which the facts of the case occurred. These
rules had come into existence at a time when juries were supposed to decide issues of fact by their own personal knowledge.
It was therefore necessary to summon a jury from the very
place where the facts transpired. As the jury slowly became
a judicial body which elicited the facts from the evidence at
the trial, these rules ceased to have any purpose or value.
Their strict application was relaxed in what were known as
transitory actions. Distinguished from transitory actions were
local actions. Local actions have been defined as those in which
the facts have a necessary connection with a particular locality,
e. g., an action to recover possession of a house in Trumpington. In local actions, the plaintiff had to state the venue accurately. But in transitory, i. e., non-local actions, this rule was
not strictly enforced. Even in transitory actions the plaintiff
was required to state some venue for the facts. But although
the venue stated in a transitory action was not the true venue,
the court might refuse to permit the defendant to object.
This was the state of English internal law in the sixteenth
century. When the common-law courts decided to entertain
I
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actions arising out of contracts made outside England or
wrongs committed outside England, they faced the problem:
how should the venue be laid in such a case? The ancient law
of venue really forbade the trial of such an action. If the
facts occurred outside the realm, it would be impossible to
summon a jury to try the case. But the sixteenth century common lawyers hurdled the obstacle, as was their wont, with a
fiction. In cases where the operative facts occurred in a foreign place, the plaintiff was permitted to state their true locality, e. g., "in the city of Paris in France" and then to add, "to
wit in the parish of St. Mary le Bow in the Ward of Cheap."
Needless to say, the defendant was forbidden to question the
truth of this statement.
This extraordinary fiction was, however, only permitted in
transitory actions. The recital of a venue in such actions had
already come to be regarded as little more than a point of
form. An additional fiction was no great matter. But in local
actions, the fiction was forbidden. A true venue had to be
stated and if it was impossible to state a true venue within the
jurisdiction the action could not be brought. 1 For instance, an
action for trespass to land was considered to be a local action
because it involved a particular piece of land located in a particular place. Consequently it was impossible to sue a man in
England for trespass to land outside England.
The law was summed up to this effect in Skinner v. East
India Co. 2 (1665). Mr. Skinner, an independent trader in
'See HOLDSWORTH, HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW, Ed. 3 (I924) vol. 5, p. I40;
Sack, "Conflicts of Laws in the History of the English Law," (I937) 3 LAW.
A CENTURY OF PROGRESS 342; Mostyn v. Fabrigas, (1774) I Cowp. I6r, 9&
Eng. Rep. ro2I; British South Africa Co. v. Companhia de Mo~ambique,
[1&93] A. C. 6o2, 63 L. J. Q. B. 7o, 6 R. I, 69 L. T. 6o4; and section 21
below.
• Skinner v. East India Co., (1665) 6' How. St. Tr. 710.
A rather faint objection to the trial of foreign torts in England may be also
found in Dutton v. Howell, (1693) I Show. P. C. 24, 1 Eng. Rep. 17. An
action was brought for false imprisonment in the Barbados. For the defendant it
was argued that "this Action cannot lie because the Fact is not triable here;
the laws there may be different from ours." To which plaintiff's counsel retorted "that the Action lies, for that 'tis a transitory Action and follows the
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the Indies, complained at the bar of the House of Lords that
the East India Company had seized his trading post and confiscated his goods. The House asked the judges whether or
not the plaintiff would have a remedy in the common-law
courts. They gave the House a unanimous opinion:
"That the matters touching the taking away of the petitioner's ship and goods and the assaulting of his person, notwithstanding the same were done beyond the seas, might be
determined upon by his majesty's ordinary courts at Westminster; And as to the dispossessing him of his house and
island, that he was not relievable in any ordinary court of law."
A final and emphatic assertion of the jurisdiction to try
transitory actions for foreign torts was made by Lord Mansfield in the famous case of Mostyn v. Fabrigas 3 upon the
authority of which many American courts based their decisions to exercise a similar jurisdiction. The action was one
brought against an ex-governor of Minorca for false imprisonment and other injuries committed in the island; counsel for the defendant suggested at one point that "the cases
where the courts of Westminster have taken cognizance of
transactions arising abroad seem to be wholly on contracts
where the laws of the foreign country have agreed with the
laws of England, and between English subjects." This suggestion Lord Mansfield repudiated in his judgment, saying:
"But can it be doubted that actions may be maintained here,
not only upon contracts, which follow the persons but for injuries done by subject to subject; especially for injuries where
the whole that is prayed is a reparation in damages, or satisPerson wheresoever he comes under the Power of the Common Law Process:
And that a Man may as well be sued in England for a Trespass done beyond
Sea, as in Barbadoes or the like Place, as for a Debt arising there by Specialty
or other Contract: that no body but Prynne ever denied it and he did so only in
case of Bonds dated there: That many Actions have been maintained and tried
here for Facts done in the Indies notwithstanding special Justifications to them
and the Trials have been where the Actions were laid."
3
Mostyn v. Fabrigas, (1774) I Cowp. r6r, 98 Eng. Rep. rozr.
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faction to be made by process against the person or his effects
within the jurisdiction of the court? We know it is within
every day's experience. I was embarrassed a great while to
find out whether the counsel for the plaintiff really meant to
make a question of it."
Lord Mansfield explained the fictitious venue with his
characteristic common sense:
((The law," he said, ((has in that case invented a fiction and
has said that the party shall first set out the description truly,
and then give a venue only for form and for the sake of trial,
by a videlicet in the county of Middlesex or any other county.
But no judge ever thought that when the declaration said in
Fort St. George, viz., in Cheapside, that the plaintiff meant
it was in Cheapside. It is a fiction of form; every country has
its forms which are invented for the furtherance of justice;
and it is a certain rule that a fiction of law shall never be contradicted so as to defeat the end for which it was invented
but for every other purpose it may be contradicted. Now the
fiction invented in these cases is barely for the mode of trial,
to every other purpose therefore it shall be contradicted, but
not for the purpose of saying the case shall not be tried."
At this time the declaration in an action of trespass usually
recited that the defendant had done the acts complained of
"contra pacem domini regis." Lord Mansfield was a little
concerned over the propriety of these words in cases where the
trespass was committed outside His Majesty's Dominions:
((With regard to matters that arise out of the realm there
is a substantial distinction of locality too, for there are some
cases that arise out of the realm which ought not to be tried
anywhere but in the country where they arise; as in the case
alluded to by Serjeant Walker: if two persons fight in France
and both happening casually to be here one should bring an
action of assault against the other it might be a doubt whether
such an action could be maintained here; because, though it
is not a criminal prosecution, it must be laid to be against the
peace of the king; but the breach of the peace is merely local
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though the trespass against the person is transitory. Therefore, without giving any opinion, it might perhaps be triable
only where both parties at the time were subjects."
But in Raphael v. V erelst 4 ( r 776) the Court of Common
Pleas awarded damages for a trespass alleged to have been
committed in the dominions of an Indian prince. The court
said that "although in all Declarations of Trespass it is laid
contra pacem regis yet that is only Matter of Form and not
traversable."
Thus, on the eve of the American revolution, there was
substantial authority in the English cases for the view that,
for injuries inflicted outside England or even outside the
realm, an action might be maintained in an English court.
This idea had been reconciled with the strongly territorial
flavour of English procedure upon all points save one: the
strict rule requiring a proper venue for local actions.
SECTION 2
THE SITUATION IN WHICH THE LAW OF THE FORUM WOULD
ALLOW RECOVERY BUT THE LAW OF THE PLACE OF
WRONG WOULD NOT: THE JUSTIFICATION THEORY;
THE OBLIGATION THEORY

Having asserted their power to entertain these suits, the
courts were faced with the more difficult problem of determining in what measure the law of the place of wrong ought
to control their decision. There are two possible permutations
involving differences of local and foreign law which may
occur in an action upon a foreign tort. First, the law of the
forum 1 may allow a recovery although the law of the place
'Raphael v. Verelst, (r776) 2 Wm. Bl. ross, 96 Eng. Rep. 62r.
In this study the expression "law of the forum" means the internal law of
the forum, the body of rules applied by the courts of the forum in cases having
no contact with any other jurisdiction. The expression "law of the place of
wrong" means the internal law of the place of wrong.
1
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of wrong would not do so. Second, the law of the place of
wrong may allow a recovery although the law of the forum
would not do so. The former of these two situations was the
first one brought to the notice of English courts. In Blad's
case 2 ( 1 6 73) some English traders took proceedings against
Peter Blad, a Dane, who had seized their stock of goods in
Iceland. Blad petitioned the Privy Council for protection on
the plea that the seizures were authorized by the King of
Denmark. He apparently believed that this would be no defence in the ordinary English courts. Lord Nottingham (by his
own account) stood up and said "that it was an injury to the
subject to stay his proceedings at law and no injury to the
Dane to let the suit go on, for whatever was law in Denmark
would be law in England in this case and would be allowed
as a very good justification in the action."
This doctrine, that the defendant may "justify" his actions
under the law of the place of wrong, stands out very prominently in the subsequent case of Dutton v. Howell. 3 There
the House of Lords had occasion to pass upon a claim by
his deputy against an ex-governor of the Barbados, arising
out of an attempt on the part of the governor and council
to punish the deputy for his maladministration by imprisoning him. The arguments of counsel, reported at length, show
clearly that both parties admitted Governor Dutton might
rely upon the law of the islands to defend himself. The
plaintiff merely directed his argument to proving that English common law had been imported by the first settlers as
the law of the Barbados and ought therefore, to govern the
case in hand. If the Governor asserted that the Barbadian law
was different from the common law, let him prove it.
2
Blad's case, (I673) 3 Swan. 6o3, 36 Eng. Rep. 99I. Subsequent chancery
proceedings showed that the plaintiff relied upon certain treaties with the King
of Denmark. Lord Nottingham decided that a matter of state was involved
and enjoined the defendants from further proceedings at law. Blad v. Bamfield, (I674) 3 Swan. 6o4, Cas. Temp. Finch I86, 36 Eng. Rep. 992.
"Dutton v. Howell, (I693) I Show. P. C.. z4, I Eng, Rep. I7·
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"It was further said, That the justification of such a Tort
or Wrong ought to be according to the Common Law of
England for that Barbadoes is under the same Law as England;
For tho' the Matter may justify him for
an Act done there which would not justify him for the same
Act done here, yet he must shew that he hath pursued the
Rules of Law in that Place: or in case of no positive Laws,
the Rules of Natural Equity: For either the Common Law,
or new Instituted Laws, or Natural Equity must be the
Rule in those Places."
The House gave judgment in the Governor's favour,
without reasons.
In Mostyn v. Fabrigas 4 the questions of jurisdiction and
choice-of-law were both thoroughly discussed. To dispose
of the first question Lord Mansfield merely reaffirmed the
hundred-year-old doctrine of the Skinner case. 5 Similarly
his choice-of-law theory was couched in terms taken from the
seventeenth century cases. "For whatever is a justification in
the place where the thing is done, ought to be a justification
where the case is tried."
None of these early decisions make it clear just why the
English courts were ready to recognize foreign laws as a defence. But the fact that that recognition was directed to
assisting the defendant suggests that it was his interest
which claimed the court's attention. Perhaps it was felt that,
if he had complied with the laws and customs of the land
in which he found himself, it would be unfair to judge his
conduct by English rules and standards simply because he
happened to come "under the power of the common law
process." 6 Perhaps, too, the courts were concerned, in some
'Mostyn v. Fabrigas, (I774) I Cowp. I6I, 98 Eng. Rep. I02I,
• Skinner v. East India Co., (I66s) 6 How. St. Tr. 7IO,
• This idea appears in the argument of counsel in Mostyn v. Fabrigas, (I 774)
r Cowp. I6I, 98 Eng. Rep. I02I. They sought to have the plaintiff's action
dismissed because of the great inconvenience and difficulty which, they claimed,
would be encountered in appraising the defendant's conduct according to the
foreign law.
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degree, to respect the authority of the government ruling the
territory where the wrong was committed. 7
In I 8 70 Mr. Justice Willes attempted to restate the
English choice-of-law theory for torts in terms somewhat
more comprehensive than those of the seventeenth-century
formula. The case of Phillips v. Eyre,S which prompted
this attempt, itself presented a nice question for legal dialectics. The defendant, an ex-governor of Jamaica charged
"The inconveniences of entertaining such an action in this country are many,
but none can attend the rejecting it. For it must be determined by the law
of this country or by the law of the place where the act was done. If by our
law, it would be the highest injustice, by making a man who has regulated! his
conduct by one law amenable to another totally opposite. If by the law of
Minorca how is it to be proved?"
And in Phillips v. Eyre, (I869) L. R. 4 Q. B. 225, 239, 38 L. J. Q. B. IIJ,
Cockburn, C. J., explained the English choice-of-law rule as follows: "It appears to us clear that where by the law of another country an act complained
of is lawful, such act, though it would have been wrongful by our law if
committed here, cannot be made the ground of an action in an English court.
The rule, which obtains in respect of property and civil contracts-namely,
that an act, unless intended to take effect elsewhere, shall as regards its effects
and incidents, if a conflict of law arises between the lex loci and the lex fori,
be governed by the former,-appears to us to be applicable to the case of an
act occasioning personal injury. To hold the contrary would be attended with
the most inconvenient and startling consequences, and would be altogether contrary to the comity of nations in matters of law to which effect should, if
possible, be given. An act might not only be lawful but might even be enjoined
by the law of another country, which would be wrongful, and give a right of
action by our law, and it certainly would be in the highest degree unjust
that an individual who has intended to obey the law binding upon him should
be held liable in damages in another country where a different law may prevail.
Thus, an arrest and imprisonment might be perfectly justified by the law of a
foreign country under circumstances in which it would be actionable heFe.
It would be impossible to hold that in such a case an action could be maintained
in an English court."
7
The notion that foreign law should be recognized upon the ground of
comity or respect for the legal policy of the foreign state was made explicit
in the case of Scott v. Seymour (Lord), (I86z) I Hurl. & Colt. 2I9, 158
Eng. Rep. 865. At p. 232 counsel argued: "By the comity of nations the
Courts of this country respect the policy of the foreign law and if that provides that no civil action shall be maintained for an assault, none is maintainable
here." And at p. 236, Blackburn, J., said: "As at present advised, I think that
when two British subjects go into a foreign country they owe local allegiance
to the laws of that country and are as much governed by that law as foreigners."
See also WESTLAKE, PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW, Ed. I (I858) 222. 8
Phillips v. Eyre, (I87o) L. R. 6 Q. B. r, IO B. & S. Ioo4, 40 L. J. Q. B. 28,
zz L. T. 869.
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with assaulting and imprisoning the plaintiff in the course of
a rebellion in that island, pleaded for his justification a retroactive act of indemnity passed by the Jamaican legislature.
To this the plaintiff replied that, since the acts complained
of were not justified at the time they were committed, there
then accrued to him a vested right of action in the English
courts, of which the legislature of Jamaica could not deprive
him. It was, of course, a commonplace of English law in
r 870 that colonial legislation could have no direct extraterritorial effect. Mr. Justice Willes met the plaintiff's argument with these words:
"This objection is founded upon a misconception of
the true character of a civil or legal obligation and the
corresponding right of action. The obligation is the principal to which a right of action in whatever court is only
an accessory, and such accessory according to the maxim of
law follows the principal and must stand or fall therewith.
'Quae accessorium locum obtinent extinguuntur cum principales res peremptae sunt.' A right of action, whether it arise
from contract governed by the law of the place or wrong,
is equally the creature of the law of the place and subordinate thereto. The terms of the contract or the character of the subject matter may shew that the parties intended their bargain to be governed by some other law but
prima facie it falls under the law of the place where made.
And in like manner the civil liability arising out of a wrong
derives its birth from the law of the place and its character
is determined by that law. Therefore, an act committed
abroad, if valid and unquestionable by the law of the place,
cannot, so far as civil liability is concerned, be drawn in
question elsewhere, unless by force of some distinct exceptional legislation, superadding a liability other than and
besides that incident to the act itself. In this respect no sound
distinction can be suggested between the civil liability in
respect of a contract governed by the law of the place and
a wrong."
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His lordship discussed more particularly some of the
older decisions on foreign torts and crimes. He then alluded
to the well established rule in bankruptcy cases that "what
is a discharge of a debt in the country where it is contracted
is a discharge of it everywhere" and continued:
"So that where an, obligation by contract to pay a debt or
damages is discharged and avoided by the law of the place
where it was made, the accessory right of action in every
court open to the creditor unquestionably falls to the ground.
And by strict parity of reasoning, where an obligation, ex
delicto, to pay damages is discharged and avoided by the law
of the country where it was made, the accessory right of
action is in like manner discharged and avoided."
To this conception of tort liability as an obligation created
by the law of the place of wrong, a startling novelty in the
English line of cases, his lordship ascribed no specific source.
The analogy to a similar theory regarding contracts 9 is explicit in the excerpt quoted and in other parts of the judgment
as well. And the very same volume of reports contains the
cases of Godard v. Gray 10 and Schibsby v. Westenholz 11 in
which Mr. Justice Blackburn, following earlier decisions of
Baron Parke, explained at some length that foreign judgments were enforced in England because they constituted
binding obligations imposed by a court of competent jurisdiction. A similar approach to foreign tort liability had been
adopted by Sir Robert Phillimore throughout his exhaustive
and erudite opinion in The Halley .12 Another possible source
of the doctrine is the first edition of Westlake, published
in 1858, and cited before Mr. Justice Willes and his brothers
9
I

See also WESTLAKE, PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW, Ed.

I

(r858) §§ 171,

84.

10
Godard v. Gray, (r87o) L. R. 6 Q. B. 139, 40 L. J. Q, B. 6z, 24 L. T.
89, 19 w. R. 348.
"'Schibsby v. Westenholz, (r87o) L. R. 6 Q. B. rss, 40 L. J. Q. B. 73,
24 L. T. 93, 19 W. R. 587.
19
The Halley, (r867) 2 Adm. &Ecc. 3·
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in the Exchequer Chamber in I 862 13 for the proposition that
"every authority which traces the force of a contract, or of
an obligation quasi ex contractu, to the local law under
which the agreement or the act is made or done, must of
course be of equal avail to trace the obligation arising from
a delict to the local law under which it is committed." 14
But whatever its origin, this obligation theory now received the unanimous approval of the Court of Exchequer
Chamber. Nor was it incorporated in its judgment as a mere
ornamental display of academic learning; it stood as an integral part of the ratio decidendi. To succeed in a suit
based upon a foreign tort, the plaintiff must show an obligation to pay damages created by the law of the place of wrong.
·Here the obligation, if any, had been dissolved by the Jamaican act of indemnity. Hence the plaintiff failed. The
court did not reach this result by an interpretation or application of the justification principle. Nevertheless it was
duly rehearsed in an oft-quoted passage intermediate between the excerpts quoted above:
"As a general rule, in order to found a suit in England,
for a wrong alleged to have been committed abroad, two
conditions must be fulfilled. First, the wrong must be of
such a character that it would have been actionable if committed in England.
Secondly, the act must not
have been justifiable by the law of the place where it
was done."
Of these two conditions, the first summarizes the doctrine
of public policy announced in The Halley, 15 the second is
our traditional formula for the application of foreign law.
To reconcile that formula with the newer theory of enforc"'In Scott v. Seymour (Lord), (I862) I Hurl. & Colt. 2I9, I58 Eng. Rep.
S6s.
14

WESTLAKE, PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW, Ed. I (I 858) 222.
The Halley, (1868) L. R. 2 P. C. 193,5 Moo. P. C. C. N. S. 262, 16 Eng.
Rep. 514.
15
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ing an obligation no attempt was made by Mr. Justice Willes.
He let them stand side by side in his judgment where they
have ever since offered a doctrinal choice for court and jurist.
SECTION

3

THE SITUATION IN WHICH THE LAW OF THE PLACE OF
WRONG WOULD ALLOW RECOVERY BUT THE LAW
OF THE FORUM WOULD NOT: THE FIRST RULE
IN PHILLIPS V. EYRE

Hitherto in our survey we have considered only cases in
which the law of the place of wrong exonerated the defendant although the law of the forum would have imposed
liability upon him. In such situations the justification theory
permits the defendant to make use of the law of the place
of wrong as a defence. If it "justifies" him, he goes scot-free.
The obligation theory indicates the same result. If the law
of the place of wrong imposes no obligation upon the defendant there can be no liability.
There is, however, a second possible permutation of local
and foreign law; the law of the place of wrong may give
the plaintiff a cause of action although, under the law of the
forum, he would have none. How should the court of the
forum deal with this situation? The justification theory
does not offer any very definite answer to this question. But
the obligation theory clearly suggests that since the law of
the place of wrong has imposed an obligation upon the defendant, the court of the forum ought to enforce it.
In the case of The Halley 1 (decided two years before
Phillips v. Eyre2 ) the Privy Council laid down a sweeping
proposition which very seriously curtails the power of English courts to enforce affirmative obligations in the tort field
1
The Halley, (1868) L. R. 2 P. C. 193, 16 Eng. Rep. 514.
• Phillips v. Eyre, (1 870) L. R. 6 Q. B. 1, 10 B. & S. 1004, 40 L. J. Q. B. 28,
22 L. T. 869.
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created by foreign law. The court had before it an admiralty action arising out of a collision on the river Scheidt
in Belgium. Belgian law had obliged the defendant to put
his vessel in charge of a special river pilot whose careless
navigation had caused the accident. English common-law
rules of master and servant would have exculpated the defendant, but under Belgian law he was none the less responsible. The trial judge, Sir Robert Phillimore, in a lengthy
and scholarly judgment, observed that the Belgian rule,
far from being contrary to natural justice, seemed to him
rather more reasonable than the English one and that the
latter was "founded upon special considerations of public
policy applicable only to British territory." He accordingly
gave judgment for the plaintiff.3
The members of the Privy Council who heard the case on
appeal did not share Sir Robert Phillimore's views regarding
the Belgian law:
"It appears," said Lord Justice Selwyn, who spoke for the
board, "that the tort for which damages are sought to be
recovered in this cause was a tort occasioned solely by the
negligence or unskilfulness of a person who was in no sense
a servant of the Appellants, a person whom they were compelled to receive on board their ship, in whose selection they
had no voice, whom they had no power to remove or displace,
and who, so far from being bound to receive or obey their
orders, was entitled to supersede and had, in effect, at the
time of the collision superseded the authority of the Master
appointed by them."
Were they under these circumstances to be held liable in an
English court upon a principle unknown to English law?
Lord Justice Selwyn's answer was a quotation from Story:
"it is difficult to conceive upon what ground a claim can be
rested to give to any Municipal laws an extraterritorial effect
"The Halley, (1867) z Adm. & Ecc. 3·
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when those laws are prejudicial to the rights of other Nations
or to those of their subjects." And he added that the courts
of England would even disregard a foreign judgment inter
partes "if it appears on the record to be manifestly contrary
to public justice."
When a court renders a decision upon a particular set of
facts, it is always an interesting and difficult question to
determine the ambit of its effect as a juristic precedent.
In The Halley the Privy Council would appear to have decided that it was contrary to the policy of English law (as it
stood in the year I 86 8) to enforce a particular right of action
created by Belgian law. But the principle upon which this
decision was reached was stated in very broad terms:
"It is, in their Lordships' opinion, alike contrary to principle
and to authority to hold that an English Court of Justice will
enforce a Foreign Municipal Law and will give a remedy in
the shape of damages in respect of an act which, according
to its own principles, imposes no liability on the person from
whom the damages are claimed."
In the case of Phillips v. Eyre 4 Mr. Justice Willes laid
down two conditions governing actions for foreign torts,
which have since acquired an almost oracular prestige in
Anglo-Dominion jurisprudence. The second of these has already been discussed in the preceding section. The first epitomizes the doctrine of The Halley:
"The wrong," said Mr. Justice Willes, "must be of such
a character that it would have been actionable if committed
in England; therefore in The Halley the Judicial Committee pronounced against a suit in the Admiralty founded
upon a liability by the law of Belgium for collision caused by
the act of a pilot whom the shipowner was compelled by that
law to employ, and for whom, therefore, as not being his
agent, he was not responsible by English law."
• Phillips v. Eyre, (t 87o) L. R. 6 Q. B. t, 28.
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Criticism of this first rule in Phillips v. Eyre, and detailed
exploration of its boundaries must be reserved for a later
section. It may be of interest to note, however, that so far
as reported cases show, the rule has never been actually applied by any English court to deprive a plaintiff of rights
acquired under a foreign law. It has been frequently discussed in the courts of British Dominions.
SECTION

4

RECENT ENGLISH AND CANADIAN CASES

Although the English courts have, since 1870, enjoyed
the luxury of two distinct, general choice-of-law theories,
the specific problems to which these have been applied are
comparatively few in number. One of the most interesting
of these problems was presented by the case of Machado v.
Fontes. 1 This was an action for libel, alleged to have been
published in Brazil. The defendant sought to amend his
pleadings by stating that under the law of Brazil, no civil
proceedings for damages could have been maintained in
respect of such publication. The Court of Appeal rejected
this amendment as demurrable, on the ground that if the
libel were punishable as a crime in Brazil, it would still be
"unjustifiable" in the light of Brazilian law. Consequently
an action could be maintained for it in England.
The court professed to reach this result by a careful consideration of the significance of the words "not justifiable"
as used by Mr. Justice Willes in Phillips v. Eyre. Great emphasis was placed upon the two conditions which he laid
down in that case. Lord Justice Rigby said he could not doubt
but that the change from "actionable," in the first, to "not
1
Machado v. Fontes, [1897] 2 Q. B. 231, 66 L. J. Q. B. 542, 76 L. T. 588,
45 W. R. 565, 13 T. L. R. 407, 41 Sol. J. 507. For dicta on the problem of
this case, see Scott v. Seymour (Lord), (1862) 1 Hurl. & Colt. 219, 15 Eng.
Rep. 865.
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justifiable," in the second, was deliberate. From this he
inferred that the latter must have been intended to be more
comprehensive, covering acts which were criminal by the
law of the place of wrong as well as those which would give
rise to civil action. It seems rather improbable, however, that
Mr. Justice Willes could have had the problem of Machado
v. Fontes in mind when he formulated his famous sentences.
His use of the words "not justifiable" might be explained
more simply by the circumstance that they had been used by
British judges in similar cases for almost two hundred years.
Whatever may be its relation to the justification formula,
the decision in Machado v. Fontes can scarcely be reconciled
with the obligation doctrine expounded in Phillips v. Eyre.
What obligation did the court enforce in l'viachado v. Fontes?
Brazilian law would have imposed no civil liability whatever
upon the defendant. It might be argued that by attaching
criminal law sanctions to the defendant's conduct, Brazilian
law had set up an obligation on his part to abstain from
libelling the plaintiff. Such an argument strains the accepted
meaning of the concept obligation which, as used by Mr.
Justice Willes, connotes the duty to pay damages, not the
duty to abstain from harmful conduct. None o£ the judges in
the Court of Appeal made any attempt to .reconcile their
decision with the obligation theory, which, indeed, they
completely ignored.
Machado v. Fontes has been criticized in many quarters
chiefly because it is not consistent with the obligation theory. 2
But however useful that theory may be, as succinctly sum• See CHESHIRE, PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW, Ed. 2 (I 9 3 8) 30 5; DICEY,
CoNFLICT OF LAws, Ed. 3 (I922) 38; Keith, "The American Law Institute's
Restatement of the Conflict of Laws," (I936) I UNIV. OF ToRONTO L. J. 233,
257; Pollock, Note, (I 897) I3 LAW QUARTERLY REv. 233; MINOR, CONFLICT
OF LAWS (I90I) 479·
See Walpole v. Canadian Northern Ry. Co., (I92I) I5 Sask. L. R. 75, 79,
I W. W. R. 1232; Varawa v. Howard Smith Co., (I9Io) Viet. L. R. 509,
I3 Can. L. R. 35· Machado v. Fontes was followed by a Quebec court in
Howell v. Coupland (unreported) where the facts were identical. See JoHNSON,
CONFLICT OF LAWS (I937) vol. 3, p. 357•
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marizing the operation of choice-of-law rules in simple cases,
it does not contain within itself the satisfactory solution of
every problem in the field. Judicial experience shows that
the obligation doctrine must be taken with qualifications and
exceptions. 3 We should not say a decision is wrong, merely
because it cannot be subsumed under some sweeping principle. From a functional point of view, it might be objected
that the result reached in Machado v. Fontes was unfair to
the defendant. Although the law of the place of wrong
would not have required him to pay damages, he was forced
to do so because he happened to have assets in England.
On the other hand, the court had a good reason for not
letting him go free. He had (so the court assumed) broken
the criminal law of the place of wrong. Perhaps, in view of
this circumstance, Machado v. Fontes ought to be regarded
as a rather peculiar case which called for exceptional treatment. 4
In Machado v. Fontes the Court of Appeal indicated that
the plaintiff would recover damages measured by the ordinary rules of English law. The case has been regarded in
some quarters • as proving that in all actions based on foreign torts the law of the forum governs the measure of damages. But there is no need to draw this sweeping conclusion.
It must be remembered that in Machado v. Fontes· the law of
the place of wrong did not provide any rule at all for estimatIn M'Larty v. Steele (I 8 8 I) I 8 Scottish L. R. z66, 8 Rettie (Ct. of Sess.)
435, a case which was almost on all fours with Machado v. Fontes except
that the acts complained of were not shown to be criminal by the law of the
place of wrong, the second division of the Court of Sessions reached the same
result. But M'Larty v. Steele would appear to have been overruled by the
subsequent decision of the same court in Evans & Sons v. Stein & Co., (I904)
42 Scottish L. R. Io3, 7 Fraser (Ct. of Sess.) 65.
3
See below, section 8.
4
See Lorenzen, "Tort Liability and the Conflict of Laws," (I931) 47 LAW
QuARTERLY REV. 483. See also Gutteridge, Review of Cheshire, Private International Law, (I939) 55 LAW QUARTERLY REV. 131.
5
See Falconbridge, Note, (I939) 17 CAN. BAR REv. 546; Willis, "Two
Approaches to the Conflict of Laws," (I936) I4 CAN. BAR REv. r, 20.
See Story v. Stratford Mill Building Co. (I9I3) 30 Ont. L. R. 27I, 24
.-..
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ing damages. Having decided, in the special circumstances of
that case, to give a remedy notwithstanding, the court had
no alternative but to resort to the law of the forum for guidance in estimating its award. It does not follow that this course
would be adopted in a case where the law of the place of wrong
provided its own rule for estimating damages. Machado v.
Fontes, it is submitted, was an unusual case in which unusual
steps were taken.
In two recent Canadian appeals, the Privy Council has
found the brief justification formula equal to the complexities
of such a modern problem as that created by workmen's compensation legislation at the place of injury. 6 Walpole v.
Canadian Northern R. Co. 7 was an action arising out of the
death of a locomotive engineer. He was killed in British
Columbia while working for the defendant company. Under
the Workmen's Compensation Act of that province, his dependents were entitled to compensation to be paid by the administering board out of an accident fund. This indemnity was
granted in lieu of all their rights of action against the defendant. Here, however, the widow brought a common-law action
in Saskatchewan. Her claim was rejected by the Court of Appeal there upon the ground that British Columbia law did not
give her any rights capable of enforcement in another jurisdiction. The law of the place of wrong had provided her with
a special remedy which could only be satisfactorily implemented by a particular tribunal. But Lord Cave, in formulating the advice of the Privy Council, preferred to take as his
starting point the ancient precept: "the act must not have
been justifiable by the law of the country where it was done."
He proceeded to interpret it as follows:
"It is unnecessary for the purposes of this appeal to consider the precise meaning of the term justifiable, as used by
6

This problem is discussed at p. 2 I 3 below.
'Walpole v. Canadian Northern R. Co., [1923] A. C. 113.
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Willes J.; but, at all events, it must have reference to legal
justification, and an act or neglect which is neither actionable
nor punishable cannot be said to be otherwise than justifiable
within the meaning of the rule."
Since the widow had failed to show the defendants liable
to either a civil action or a criminal prosecution in British Columbia, he confirmed the Saskatchewan court in dismissing her
claim. While the result seems fair and practical, there is, as
Cheshire has pointed out,8 an unfortunate use of language
in saying that a railway company may be justified (even
technically) in causing the death of one of its employees.
Moreover, at no point does the reasoning of the Privy Council
make it clear why an act which gives rise to a claim for com. pensation out of a fund is "justified," whilst one giving rise
to a civil action for damages is not.
Even that distinction was removed in McMillan v. Canadian Northern R. Co} where, the facts being in other respects
similar, the compensation act of the place of wrong (Ontario)
substituted for the civil action, not a claim against the board,
but a special form of proceeding to be taken before it against the
individual employer. Yet the Privy Council again gave judgment for the defendant railway company. They pointed out
that, before the passing of the compensation act, the doctrine .
of common employment would have been a good defence to
an ordinary civil suit in Ontario. Hence, they argued, theliability now enforceable by proceedings before the board,
"is not to pay damages for a wrongful act but compensation
for an accident. The right to compensation is founded on accident simply, not on negligence or any other actionable
wrong. The act complained of in this case was the act of a
fellow servant which, by the law of Ontario, is neither wrongful nor unjustifiable so far as the employer is concerned and
8

CHESHIRE, PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW,

"McMillan

v.

C. N. R.

293, 39 T. L. R. 14·

Co., [1923]

A.

Ed.

2

C. 12o, 92

(1938) 301,

L.

J.P. C. 44, 128

L. T.
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in regard to which the employer may be justly said to be innocent or excusable."
The presence or absence of an antecedent common-law
liability seems a rather flimsy criterion for determining the
plaintiff's rights. Would the result really have been different
if the facts had not made the defence of common employment
available, or if that defence had been abolished in Ontario
prior to the passing of the compensation act? Would theresult in either of these cases have been different if the plaintiffs
had been able to show the defendant's negligence to be of a
criminal character? Strong reasons of policy and convenience
obviously demand a negative answer to these questions, but
in the light of the peculiar type of conceptualistic reasoning
employed by the Privy Council, such an answer is by no means
assured.
In these recent cases which we have just discussed, the
English courts seem to have taken great pains to make their
decisions appear as irresistible conclusions reached by a somewhat intensive interpretation of the justification formula.
One can scarcely read these cases without wondering just
why the judges were so anxious to produce this illusion of
automatic deduction, like a conjuror pulling a rabbit out of a
seventeenth century hat. One is also tempted to wish that
they had given a little more prominence to the practical
reasons of social policy which might be advanced in support
of their decisions. 10
10
See the remarks of Beckett in his "The Question of Classification ( 'Qualification') in Private International Law," (1934) 15 BRITISH YEAR BooK INT.
LAW 46, 6 3 (footnote).
For further discussion of the effect of the English choice-of-law theories,
see Carr v. Fracis, Times & Co., [19oz] A. C. q6, 71 L. J. K. B. 361, 85
L. T. 144, 50 W. R. z57, 17 T. L. R. 657; Livesley v. Horst, [19z4] Can.
L. R. 6os, 6II, [1925] I Dom. L. R. 159 (dictum).
See also Lorenzen, "Tort Liability and the Conflict of Laws," (1931) 47
LAW QUARTERLY REV. 483; Heighington, "Conflict of Laws in Automobile
Negligence Cases," (1936) 14 CAN. BAR REV. 389; Richardson, "Problems
in Conflict of Laws Relating to Automobiles," (1935) 13 CAN. BAR REV.
201; JoHNSON, CONFLICT OF LAWS (1937) vol. 3, p. 340.

CHAPTER

II

Development of the Law Respecting
Foreign Torts in the United States:
Special Constitutional Problems
SECTION

5

THE SITUATION IN WHICH THE LAW OF THE FORUM WOULD
ALLOW RECOVERY BUT THE LAW OF THE PLACE OF
WRONG WOULD NOT

W:

EN we turn to consider the development of
oice-of-law doctrine in the United States, we are
nfronted by a much more extensive collection of
decided cases. Yet up to a certain point, judicial experience
seems to have followed the same lines as that of the English
courts. The jurisdictional question is the first to be raised:
should the courts take cognizance of wrongs which have occurred in far-away foreign places? The American courts turned
for an answer to Lord Mansfield's vigorous discussion of the
question in Mostyn v. Fabrigas. 1 From that source they received the assurance that such actions were commonly entertained by English common-law courts. Hence they proceeded
to do likewise. 2
Many of these early American opinions upon the question
of jurisdiction say nothing at all about the application of
foreign law. Perhaps it was thought that the court would have
to apply the law of the forum to all cases coming before it.
1

Mostyn v. Fabrigas, (1774) r Cowp. r6r, 98 Eng. Rep. 1021.
"Watts v. Thomas, (r8rr) 2 Bibb. (5 Ky.) 458; Gardner v. Thomas,
(r8r7) 14 Johns. (N.Y.) 134, 7 Am. Dec. 445; McKenna v. Fisk, (r843)
r How. (42 U. S.) 240; Shaver v. White, (r8r8) 6 Munf. (zo Va.) uo,
8 Am. Dec. 730.
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More probably the point was not considered at all. Where
the incidents of which the plaintiff complained had occurred
in another common-law jurisdiction, the possibility of a difference between the law of the forum and the law of the place
of wrong would not· be very likely to occur to a lawyer of
that day. The common law was generally assumed to be the
same everywhere. None of the states had developed a
very extensive local jurisprudence. And statute law, which, at
a later date, produced many differences, still covered a comparatively small field.
But when the choice-of-law question was raised, it appears
to have been raised under the same circumstances as in the
early English cases. It is the defendant who claims the protection of the proper law. The court is asked to depart from
its usual course of decision because the defendant, though perhaps guilty according to local standards, is innocent in the
eyes of the law in force at the place of the alleged wrong. This
is a very interesting coincidence to whose significance we shall
recur at a later point. The problem was considered in a great
many American cases; almost unanimously the courts reached
the same conclusion as the English courts. The plaintiff who
could not make out a good cause of action under the law of the
place of wrong was not permitted to succeed elsewhere. 3
One might expect to find that the American courts, having
adopted Lord Mansfield's views in the matter of jurisdiction,
would take up the justification formula as a guide to the
solution of the choice-of-law problem. That formula had
been especially invented to deal with the situation where the
foreign law was pleaded as a defence. But there was no
general reception of the justification formula in the United
States. Most courts seem to have simply worked out their
8

Smith v. Condry, (I843) I How. (42 U.S.) 28; Wilson v. Rich, (I83I)
5 N.H. 455; Stout v. Wood, (I82o) I Black£. (Ind.) 7I; Holland v. Pack,
(I823) 7 Tenn. ISO; Shaver v. White, (I8I8) 6 Munf. (zo Va.) IIO. And
see the death cases cited below, note 5·
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own solution to this problem without any acknowledged assistance from the English line of cases. The ipsissima verba
of those cases made only a few fleeting appearances. In Shaver
v. White 4 (Virginia, I 8 I 3) for instance, the court said:
"In the case before us it was not improper for the defendant to plead that the trespass was committed in the State of
Tennessee, as he also pleaded that he was acting under the
authority of the laws of that State, in the instance in question.
These facts, however, do not go to the jurisdiction of the
court but only to the justification of the defendant; the principle being, as aforesaid, that if a party is justified, as to a
transaction, in the Country or placein which it was committed,
he is justifiable everywhere."
But, generally speaking, the justification formula made
slight impression on American jurisprudence. Nor was any
other set of symbols contrived to fill its place. Each court expressed itself as it pleased. A variety of language was used to
convey the general idea that the legal effect of acts and events
must be determined by the law in force where they took place.
Most of the cases in which a defendant sought to escape a
liability imposed by local law were based upon statutes which
gave a deceased person's dependents an enforceable claim to
damages for his death. When statutes of this type were first
enacted, strenuous attempts were made to have the courts apply them in cases where the deceased had been killed outside
the territory of the enacting state. These attempts were uniformly unsuccessful. Court after court held that its local statute
was not intended to have extraterritorial operation. 5 Some
courts expressly held that the law of the place of wrong gave
the plaintiff no cause of action. Others non-suited the plaintiff
•shaver v. White, (I8I8) 6 Munf. (2o Va.) IIO, II2.
"Campbell v. Rogers, (I855) 2 Handy (Ohio) III; Needham v. Grand
Trunk R. Co., (I86s) 38 Vt. 294; Nashville, etc., R. Co. v. Eakin, (I869)
46 Tenn. 582; Selma, etc., R. Co. v. Lacy, (I87I) 43 Ga. 46I; Allen v.
Pitts. & Conn. R. Co., (I876) 45 Md. 4I; Willis v. Missouri Pac. R. Co.,
(I884) 61 Tex. 432; Great Western R. Co. v. Miller, (I869) I9 Mich. 305.
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because he had failed to prove that the law of the place of
wrong gave him a cause of action.
Whitford v. Panama etc. R. Co. 6 (New York, I 861) is a
good sample decision. The action was brought in New York
by an administrator to recover damages for the death of his
decedent, who had been killed while riding on one of the
company's trains in New Grenada. The Court of Appeals
held that the action must be governed by the law of New
Grenada and emphatically refused to allow a recovery under
the New York death statute. The question had been much
discussed in the lower New York courts. 7 In writing the judgment of the Court of Appeals, Mr. Justice Denio emphasized
the importance of "comity," respect for the laws of New
Grenada in cases which had arisen there:
"It would be easy to illustrate the correctness of these
positions by referring to the preposterous results which would
follow from a different rule. Suppose the government of New
Grenada to have enacted that the proprietors of a railroad
company should not be responsible for the negligence of its
servants, provided there was no want of due care in selecting
them; it could not be pretended that its will could be set at
naught by prosecuting the corporation in the courts of another State where the law was different. Or suppose that government had passed a statute like ours, except that the amount
which might be received was unlimited, no one, I presume,
would deny that the full amount of damages which could be
proved might be recovered, though it might exceed the limit
in our statute, in whatever court the suit might be brought.
The true theory is, that no suit whatever respecting this injury could be sustained in the courts of this State, except
pursuant to the law of international comity. By that law foreign contracts and foreign transactions, out of which liabilities
"Whitford v. Panama R. Co., (r86r) 23 N.Y. 465.
'Whitford v. Panama R. Co., (1858) 3 Bos. (N.Y.) 67; Vandeventer v.
New York & N.H. R. Co., (1857) 27 Barb. (N.Y.) 244; Crowley v. Panama
R. Co., (1859) 30 Barb. (N. Y.) 99; Beach v. Bay State Steamboat Co.,
(1859) 30 Barb. (N.Y.) 433·
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have arisen, may be prosecuted in our tribunals by the implied
assent of the government of this State; but in all such cases
we administer the foreign law as from the proofs we find it
to be, or as without proofs we presume it to be."
The learned judge then referred to the English jurisprudence, saying:
"The cases of Rafael v. V erelst and Mostyn v. F abrigas were
decided upon the presumption respecting the foreign law to
which I have referred. Both cases were actions in the English
courts for the imprisonment of the respective plaintiffs in
foreign countries. The principle applicable to the present
question was not much discussed but Lord Mansfield said, in
the last case, that whatever would be a justification in the place
where the thing was done, ought to be a justification where the
case was tried; thus putting the liability of the defendant
upon the provisions of the foreign law."
SECTION

6

THE SITUATION IN WHICH THE LAW OF THE PLACE OF
WRONG WOULD ALLOW RECOVERY BUT THE LAW OF
THE FORUM WOULD NOT

Having applied the choice-of-law principle for the benefit
of defendants, American courts had then to decide how far
they were prepared to go in applying it for the benefit of
plaintiffs. That is to say, if the law of the place of wrong gave
a plaintiff a cause of action, could that cause of action be enforced in a forum where the local law would not have given
him any cause of action? The issue was raised in numerous
suits based upon the death statutes, which varied considerably
from state to state. For example, A causes B's death in state X.
Can B's dependents bring an action under the death statute
of state X, in state Y where a different death statute is in
force or where, perhaps, there is no death statute at all? For
a time the answer to this question was very uncertain. Both
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the courts and the textwriters hesitated to adopt the position
that a plaintiff could recover upon a cause of action created
entirely by foreign law and not in any way dependent upon
the law of the forum.
The first attempts to enforce foreign death statutes were
met by a bristling array of technical objections. Some courts
objected to the collection of a foreign claim by a local administrator.1 Some courts suggested, rather feebly, that perhaps foreign death statutes were penal or criminal laws and
so they ought not to be recognized outside their state of
Qrigin. 2
The textwriters took various views. 3 Wharton, whose first
edition appeared in I 872, appears to have thought that the
cause of action conferred by a death statute could not be enforced outside the state where the fatal injury occurred.
Rorer, in his "Interstate Law," laid down a rule to the same
effect in the baldest terms. In I 8 8o both the Supreme Court
of the United States (in Dennick v. Railroad Co.) 4 and the
Court of Appeals of New York (in Leonard v. Columbia
Steam Navigation Co.) 5 took an opposite view and allowed
actions based upon foreign death statutes to proceed to judgment. After these decisions, claims based upon foreign death
statutes became common in the courts. But this did not mean
that such claims were always and everywhere enforced. The
New York Court of Appeals, in the case mentioned, invented
1
See Richardson v. New York Cent. R. Co., (I 867) 98 Mass. 85; Mackay
v. Central R. Co., (C. C. N.Y., I 876) I4 Blatchf. 65; Woodard v. Michigan,
etc., R. Co., (I 859) I o Ohio St. I 2 I.
2
Richardson v. New York Cent. R. Co., (I867) 98 Mass. 85; McCarthy
v. Chicago, etc., R. Co., (I 877) I 8 Kan. 46.
3
See WHARTON, CONFLICT OF LAWS, Ed. I (I8p) 383; RoRER, INTERSTATE LAW, Ed. I (I879) I45> I55·
Rorer had a theory that the statute law of a state could not be enforced in
any other state. See Buckles v. Ellers, (I88o) 72 Ind. 220; Willis v. Mo. Pac.
R. Co. (I884) 6I Tex. 432; Ash v. B. & 0. R. Co., (I89o) 72 Md. I44, I9
Atl. 643.
4
Dennick v. Central R. Co., (I88o) I03 U.S. II.
"Leonard v. Columbia Steam Navigation Co., (I88I) 84 N.Y. 48.
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a flexible restrictive theory which became very popular. This
was the rule that the law of the place of wrong must be
"similar" to that of the forum:
"The rule here laid down," said the court, "is just and
reasonable and it is not essential that the statute should be
precisely the same as that of the State where the action is
given by law, or where it is brought, but merely requires that
it should be of a similar import and character. The statute in
this State is certainly of the same nature, and the similarity
is such as to authorize the conclusion that it is founded upon
the same principles and possesses the same attributes as the
statutes of Connecticut which have been cited. The same remedy was to be accomplished, and an examination of the different provisions evinces an agreement in both of the statutes
as to their main features, and that they are substantially alike
and to the same effect as to the survivorship of the action. In
fact, when there are similar statutes, instead of the common
law, the right to recover damages stands precisely the same
as if the common law in both States relating to the subject
prevailed."
As Mr. Justice Cardozo later pointed out, 6 this doctrine
had no more stable foundation than a misapprehended dictum
in an earlier case. Despite its spurious origin it spread rapidly
from state to state. In I 8 9 I it was applied with approval by the
Supreme Court of the United States. 7 No doubt its popularity
was due to the fact that it provided the courts with a flexible
tool for rejecting unfamiliar doctrines without unduly fettering their power to adopt foreign law.
The similarity doctrine is not unlike the first rule in Phillips
v. Eyre 8 that, "the wrong must be of such a character that it
would have been actionable if committed in England." The
similarity doctrine does not, perhaps, draw the line quite so
clearly between foreign law which should be rejected and
6

In Loucks v. Standard Oil Co., (I9I8) 224 N.Y. 99, I20 N. E. I98.
Texas, etc., R. Co. v. Cox, (I 89I) I45 U.S. 593, I 2 Sup. Ct. 905.
8
Phillips v. Eyre, (I87o) L. R. 6 Q. B. I, z8.

7
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that which should be accepted. Wharton, in his second edition
of I 8 8 I, attempted to introduce the English theory into
the United States but with small success. A few courts sponsored it but without enthusiasm. 9 In Huntington v. Attrill 10
the Supreme Court went out of its way to repudiate the English theory.
The similarity doctrine remained in vogue for a time. But
as the courts became accustomed to enforcing the laws of
other states, the similarity doctrine came to appear selfish
and provincial and its authority crumbled. As early as I 8 83
the Supreme Court of Minnesota watered it down in the following words: 11
"A few cases appear to lay some stress upon the fact that
the statutes of both states were similar, but rather as evidence
of the fact that the statute of the state giving the right of
action is not contrary to the policy of the laws of the state
But it by no means
where the action is brought.
follows that because the statute of one state differs from the
law of another state, therefore it would be held contrary to
the policy of the laws of the latter state. Every day our courts
are enforcing rights under foreign contracts where the lex
loci contractus and the lex fori are altogether different, and
yet we construe these contracts and enforce rights under them
according to their force and effect under the laws of the state
where made. To justify a court in refusing to enforce a right
of action which accrued under the law of another state, because against the policy of our laws, it must appear that it is
against good morals or natural justice, or that, for some other
such reason, the enforcement of it would be prejudicial to the
general interests of our own citizens."
"See WHARTON, CoNFLICT OF LAws, Ed. 2 (r88r) 523·
See The Lamington, (D. C. N.Y., 1898) 87 Fed. 752; Anderson v. Milwaukee & St. P.R. Co., (1875) 37 Wis. 321; Texas, etc., R. Co. v. Richards,
(r887) 68 Tex. 375,4 S. W. 627.
10
Huntington v. Attrill, (1892) 146 U.S. 657, 67o, 13 S. Ct. 224.
11
Herrick v. Minneapolis & St. L. R. Co., (1883) 31 Minn. u, 14, r6
N. w. 4IJ.
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This view of the similarity rule was adopted by court after
court. In Loucks v. Standard Oif1 2 (r9r8) that doctrine was
discarded by the New York Court of Appeals, the very court
which was the first to put it forward. At the present day it is
probably retained only in Texas and Maryland. 13 For most
American courts, the grounds upon which they may dispense
with the ordinary application of choice-of-law rules are the
same in tort cases as in others and are represented by the
same brief symbol,-"public policy," which is generally sup-;
posed to have the meaning attributed to it by the Supreme
Court of Minnesota in the passage quoted. To sum up the
story, American courts, in the I 8 70's, adopted a restriction
upon the affirmative enforcement of foreign tort obligations
almost as confining as the first rule in Phillips v. Eyre. But
in the following decades they rebelled at this confinement,
discarded the restrictive theory and replaced it with one which
gave more scope to the operation of choice-of-law principles
and the foreign rules thereby imported.14
SECTION

7

RECENT TENDENCY TO EXTEND THE APPLICATION OF
FOREIGN LAW

Another important trend in American jurisprudence deserves consideration in our historical outline. It is a wellrecognized doctrine in all branches of conflict of laws that
12

Loucks v. Standard Oil Co., (1918) 224 N.Y. 99, 120 N. E. 198.
"'See London Guar. & Ace. Co. v. Balgowan S. S. Co., (1931) r6r Md.
I4S, ISS Atl. 334; Davis v. Ruzicka, (1936) 170 Md. 112, 183 Atl. s69;
El Paso & Juarez Traction Co. v. Carruth, (Tex. 1923) 2SS S. W. IS9· See
Stumberg, "Conflict of Laws-Torts-Texas Decisions," (r93o) 9 Tex. L.
Rev. 21.
14
Dalton v. McLean, (Maine, 1940) 14 Atl. (2d) 13, is .an interesting case.
A New Brunswick statute was, by its express terms, given retroactive effect.
A Maine court refused to enforce it retroactively on the ground that retroactive
laws are contrary to Maine's public policy.
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courts, in applying doctrines of foreign law, follow the procedural or remedial rules of the forum. This theory operates
as an exception to all choice-of-law theories, as a limitation
upon their effectual application. It may prevent the foreign
law from taking effect as a defence. Or it may prevent the
foreign law from assisting the plaintiff to a recovery. There
are many aspects to the operation of this restrictive doctrine
which we shall examine later. For present purposes it is of interest to note a tendency toward a fuller and less restricted
application of foreign law. This tendency is not an obvious
one, but there are a number of decisions, most of them handed
down in the last two decades, which, taken together, would
seem to indicate that the courts are gradually limiting their
resort to local procedural rules. In cases involving the application of foreign law even local rules governing the burden of proof and trial by jury have been temporarily discarded.1 This general tendency has been approved by anumber of present-day writers. 2

SECTION

8

THE COMITY THEORY; THE OBLIGATION THEORY; THE
VESTED RIGHTS THEORY

Generally speaking, American courts have not shown the
tendency to cling to particular verbal symbols which characterizes English decisions in this field. English courts, in
rationalizing their results, have laid great stress upon the
term "justification." This term has been scarcely used at all
by American courts. But the American courts have had their
own favorite symbols. Let us consider some of them.
We have quoted an excerpt above in which comity, the
1

See sections 3 3, 35 below.
STUMBERG, CONFLICT OF LAWS (1937) 148; Cook, "'Substance' and
'Procedure' in the Conflict of Laws," (1933) 42 YALE L. J. 333, 343·
2
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respect of one state for another's sovereignty, is put forward
as a reason for enforcing other states' laws. 1 The word "comity" appears frequently in American opinions. 2 It has the
sparkle of a partial truth. Respect for the authority of a
friendly state with regard to acts and events which have occurred there is clearly a matter to be taken into account in
conflicts cases. "Comity" does represent one of the reasons
for recognizing foreign law. But to regard it as the alpha and
omega of the conflict of laws would lead to unfortunate results. There are other very important choice-of-law policies
to be considered too. A court which can see nothing behind a
choice-of-law principle except interstate courtesy seriously
underrates the significance of the principle. The due application of the principle may suffer thereby. In a word, the term
"comity" is incomplete and so misleading. But is this not true
of all the catch words and maxims used by lawyers? The word
"comity" expresses a measure of truth; surely that is all we
can reasonably demand of a juridical symbol.
In The Halley 3 Mr. Justice Phillimore described the application of the law of the place of wrong to a foreign tort
as the enforcement of an obligation. The same idea has been
expressed in numerous American decisions. 4 There is nothing
very original about it. But the obligation conception received
its most authoritative and emphatic recognition in the United
States when Mr. Justice Holmes delivered the Supreme
Court's opinion in Slater v. Mexican National R. Co. 5 The
action had been brought to recover damages for a wrongful
death which had occurred in Mexico. Under Mexican law the
1

Above at p. 24.
The popularity of the word comity was probably due to its use by Story.
See his CoMMENTARIES ON THE CoNFLICT OF LAWS (1 834) §§ 29-38.
"The Halley, (1867) 2 Adm. & Ecc. 3, (1868) L. R. 2 P. C. 193, 16 Eng.
Rep. 514.
•see, e.g., Alexander v. Pennsylvania Co., (1891) 48 Ohio St. 623, 30 N. E.
69. An interesting early example is Stout v. Wood, (1 820) 1 Black£. (Ind.) 71.
6
Slater v. Mexican Nat. R. Co., (1904) 194 U.S. 120, 24 Sup. Ct. s&x.
2
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deceased's dependents would have been entitled to a long
series of periodical payments. If certain specified events occurred the defendant would be relieved from the duty to
make further payments. The American court could not very
well give a judgment in accordance with the Mexican law.
The plaintiff requested an unconditional judgment for a lump
sum. The Supreme Court refused this relief on the ground
that it might impose a burden upon the defendant which
would be greater than that contemplated by Mexican law.
Speaking for the majority, Mr. Justice Holmes said:
"The theory of the foreign suit is that although the act
complained of was subject to no law having force in the forum,
it gave rise to an obligation, an obligatio, which, like othelr
obligations, follows the person and may be enforced wherever
the person may be found. But as the only source of this obligation is the law of the place of the act, it follows that that
law determines, not merely the existence of the obligation but
equally determines its extent. It seems to us unjust to allow
a plaintiff to come here absolutely depending on the foreign
law for the foundation of his case, and yet to deny the defendant the benefit of whatever limitations on his liability
that law would impose."
The reasoning of the Slater case is analogous to that of
Phillips v. Eyre. 6 Both opinions start with the premise that
the defendant's liability rests upon an obligation created by
the law of the state of wrong. In Phillips v. Eyre the legislature of that state had, by an act of indemnity, abolished the
obligation. So the action was dismissed. In the Slater case the
foreign obligation had not been abolished but it had been
qualified in such a way as to make its transitory enfor~ement
impracticable. Hence the action was dismissed there also.
Very similar to the obligation theory in its implications,
affirmative and negative, is the doctrine of vested rights. It
6

Phillips v. Eyre, (r87o) L. R. 6 Q. B. r.
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appears to have made its American debut in Beale's "Cases on
the Conflict of Laws" (I 902) where it was advanced as an explanation of the operation of choice-of-law principles. The
author's language is not specifically directed to the field of
torts but its application to tort cases is obvious.
"The topic called 'Conflict of Laws' deals with the recognition and enforcement of foreign created rights. In the legal
sense all rights must be created by some law. A right is artificial, not a mere natural fact; no legal right exists by nature.
A right is a political, not a social thing; no legal right can be
created by the mere will of the parties. Law being a general
rule to govern future transactions, its method of creating
rights is to provide that upon the happening of a certain event
a right shall accrue. The law annexes to the event a certain
consequence, namely, the creation of a legal right.
"A right having been created by some appropriate law, the
recognition of its existence should follow everywhere. Thus
an act, valid where done, cannot be called in question anywhere." 7
This terse and forceful terminology for explaining the
operation of choice-of-law rules has found its way into judicial
opinions. 8 For example, in Loucks v. Standard Oil Co} an
action brought in New York for a tort committed in Massachusetts, Mr. Justice Cardozo said:
"A foreign statute is not law in this state, but it gives rise to
an obligation which, if transitory, 'follows the person and
may be enforced wherever the person may be found.' [ Citations] 'No law can exist as such except the law of the land;
but
it is a principle of every civilized law that
vested rights shall be protected.' Beale, Conflict of Laws, 5 I.
The plaintiff owns something and we help him to get it."
7

Quoted from BEALE, CONFLICT OF LAWS (1935) vol. 3, p. 1968.
"See Chubbuck v. Holloway, (1931) 182 Minn. 225,234 N. W. 314, 868;
Gray v. Gray, (1934) 87 N.H. 82, 174 Atl. 5o8; Commonwealth Fuel Co.
v. McNeil, (1925) 103 Conn. 390, 130 Atl. 794·
9
Loucks v. Standard Oil Co., (1918) 224 N.Y. 99, IIo, 120 N. E. 198.
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Undoubtedly the theory of vested rights has exercised a
considerable influence upon the thinking of American lawyers
and judges.
Both the obligation theory and the vested rights theory
emphasize the notion that an injured person's claim to repantion depends upon the law of the territory where he was
injured. From this it follows that if the law of the place of
wrong would not allow him any compensation at all, courts
in other jurisdictions should do likewise. Courts in other jurisdictions ought to give him exactly what the law of the place
of wrong allows him-no more and no less. That is his vested
right. Attention has already been directed toward the marked
inclination of American doctrine and jurisprudence to accord
the fullest possible recognition to the law of the place of
wrong. 10 The category of procedure within which the rules
of the forum hold sway is being gradually limited. Rules of
the law of the place of wrong which might affect the relative
positions of the parties are sedulously observed by outside
courts. Perhaps this tendency, which seems to be very desirable, may be attributed to the obligation and vested rights
theories. By stressing the significance of the law of the place
of wrong they may have induced the courts to make a greater
effort to really enforce that law.
But like many other legal conceptions, the vested rights
and obligation doctrines are ambiguous and incomplete. They
reveal to us only a part of the conflict of laws picture. Foreign
obligations are not always and everywhere recognized. Their
recognition is frequently qualified by the operation of local
rules of procedure. Sometimes it is denied entirely for reasons of local policy. Sometimes it is denied for obscure and
insufficient reasons, as where the injury affects foreign land.
In short, there are a number of important conflict of laws prin10

Above, section 7.
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ciples which in practice modify and limit the enforcement of
vested rights. Although courts may say that they are enforcing
foreign vested rights, they are continually impeded and frustrated by the necessity of adhering, in some degree, to the
moral traditions and habitual technique of their own jurisdiction.11
Moreover, the vested rights and obligations theories can
scarcely be reconciled with one of the important phenomena
of the conflict of laws, the application to a single set of facts
of legal rules drawn from two or more foreign jurisdictions.12
To illustrate: an action is brought for a tort alleged to have
been committed in state X. The defendant pleads a release of
all claims executed by the plaintiff in state Y. The court will
look to the law of state X to decide whether or not the plaintiff
ever had any cause of action. But the law of state Y will
probably have to be consulted also, in order to determine the
validity and effect of the contract of release which was executed there. Each body of law governs a particular aspect of
the case. It cannot be said that either legal system determines
whether or not the plaintiff has a vested right. Both must be
considered. Suppose the contract of release is void according to the law of state X, the place of wrong, but valid by the
law of state Y where it was executed. The court allows the
law of state Y to prevail and dismisses the suit. 13 Here the
law of the place of wrong has created an obligation but the
substantive law of some other system has been permitted to
11

See Yntema, "The Hornbook Method and the Conflict of Laws," (1928)
37 YALE L. J. 468. For further and more detailed exposition of certain inadequacies in the vested rights and obligation theories, see: Cook, "The Logical
and Legal Bases of the Conflict of Laws," (1924) 33 YALE L. J. 457; Lorenzen,
"Territoriality, Public Policy and the Conflict of Laws," (1924) 33 YALE L. J.
736; Heilman, "Judicial Method and Economic. Objectives in Conflict of
Laws," (1934) 43 YALE L. J. 1082.
12
For further discussion of this phenomenon see below, section 3 7.
13
This result was reached by a court in Leach v. Mason Valley Mines Co.,
(1916) 40 Nev. 143, 161 Pac. 513·
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destroy it. Considerable interpretation and qualification of
the obligation theory would be required to make it consistent
with such a result.
Our final observation upon the vested rights and obligation
theories is that they fail to indicate why the law of the place of
wrong should be applied to cases which have arisen there.
They give us a guiding principle but without any raison d'etre.
When an action is brought based upon extraterritorial acts and
events, it would be much simpler to apply the ordinary law
of the forum than to learn and apply the law of the place of
wrong. Yet courts habitually take the latter course. There
must be some very good reason or reasons for doing so. Doubtless some important social policy lies behind the principle
that tort claims should be governed by the law of the place
of wrong. But neither the obligation theory nor the vested
rights theory throws any light on this aspect of the matter.
In the foregoing paragraphs an attempt has been made to
reveal certain inadequacies in the comity theory, the vested
rights theory, and the obligation theory. To recognize these
inadequacies is not to deprecate all reference to these theories
but only to warn against exaggeration of their significance.
Each of them contains a measure of truthful statement. Each
of them indicates some important conflict of laws policy or
practice. They are useful symbols, but it would be a mistake
to regard any one of them as an infallible guide to the solution of all conflicts cases. Indeed the suggestion is ventured
that the problems of the conflict of laws and the jurisprudence
which American courts have built up in dealing with them
are much too complex for comprehensive summary in any
single phrase or maxim. Much less is it possible to construct
a brief formula containing within itself the germs of a just
and satisfying decision for every case which might conceivably arise in this field.
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THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES AND CHOICE-OFLAW PRINCIPLES

We generally assume that the courts and the legislature
of an independent state are free to follow or to disregard
choice-of-law theories. There is no higher law which would
prevent the Parliament of the United Kingdom from abolishing the choice-of-law rule for torts, if it chose to do so. The
House of Lords might (within the limits set by the doctrine of
stare decisis) interpret English statutes, and mould the English common law in such a manner as to curtail the application
of the law of the place of wrong in cases where one person
has injured another in a foreign country, but there is no higher
court which could reverse the House of Lords' decisions because they had this effect.
The legislatures and courts of the states of the United States
occupy a somewhat different position. The states of the United
States are not autonomous units in the conflict of laws. Certain clauses of the federal constitution have been interpreted
as imposing limitations upon the power of the state governments to make their local law govern transactions which have
occurred in other states or in foreign countries. If a state court,
in determining the ambit of its local laws, oversteps these limitations, its decision may be reversed by the Supreme Court of
the United States. This means that the Federal Constitution,
as interpreted by the Supreme Court, sets the bounds within
which the state courts are free to depart from choice-of-law
principles. To a certain extent, choice-of-law principles are
compulsory for state courts. 1
1
See generally on the subject of this section: Dodd, "The Power of the
Supreme Court to Review State Decisions in the Field of Conflict of Laws,"
(1926) 39 HARV. L. REV. 533; Ross, "Has Conflict of Laws Become a Branch
of Constitutional Law?" (1931) 15 MINN. L. REv. 161.
See Annotations, (1931) 74 A. L. R. 710; (1936) 100 A. L. R. 1143.
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The principal clauses upon which the Supreme Court relies in exercising this corrective jurisdiction are the due process
clause and the full faith and credit clause. 2 The significance
of the full faith and credit clause is obvious. Suppose an action arising out of an alleged tort in one state is brought in
the courts of another state. The court, for one reason or another, refuses to enforce a statute of the state of wrong. Such
a refusal might, in some circumstances, constitute a refusal
to obey the command of the full faith and credit clause. The
court might be said to have denied full faith and credit to
the statute of the state of wrong. It should be noted, however,
that there is some ambiguity about the words "public acts,
records, and judicial proceedings." They have been held to
include the judgments and statutes of a sister-state. It seems
very doubtful whether they would be construed as including
rules of common law embodied in judicial decisions. Another
noteworthy point about the full faith and credit clause is
that it only requires full faith and credit to the law of a sisterstate. It does not affect the power of state courts to disregard
the law of a foreign nation.
Most of the cases related to the subject of this treatise which
involved the effect of the full faith and credit clause have been
somewhat complicated in their nature. They can be more advantageously analyzed after certain other preliminary questions have been discussed. For present purposes it will be
sufficient to notice the general principle upon which the Supreme Court professes to apply the full faith and credit
2
United States Constitution, Art. 4, § I: "Full Faith and Credit shall be
given in each State to the public Acts, Records, and judicial Proceedings of
every other State. And the Congress may by general Laws prescribe the Manner
in which such Acts, Records and Proceedings shall be proved, and the Effect
thereof."
Art. I4, § I: "· . . No State shall make or enforce any law which shall
abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall
any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process
of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of
the laws."
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clause. In Alaska Packers Association v. Industrial Commission of California3 the Court said:
"In the case of statutes, the extra-state effect of which Congress has not prescribed, where the policy of one state statute
comes into conflict with that of another, the necessity of some
accommodation of the conflicting interests of the two states is
still more apparent. A rigid and literal enforcement of the
full faith and credit clause, without regard to the statute of
the forum, would lead to the absurd result that wherever
the conflict arises, the statute of each state must be enforced
in the courts of the other, but cannot be in its own. Unless
by force of that clause a greater effect is thus to be given to
a state statute abroad than the clause permits it to have at
home, it is unavoidable that this Court determine for itself
the extent to which the statute of one state may qualify or
deny rights asserted under the statute of another.
"Prima facie every state is entitled to enforce in its own
courts its own statutes, lawfully enacted. One who challenges
that right, because of the force given to a conflicting statute
of another state by the full faith and credit clause, assumes the
burden of showing, upon some rational basis, that of the conflicting interests involved those of the foreign state are superior to those of the forum. It follows that not every statute
of another state will override a conflicting statute of the forum
by virtue of the full faith and credit clause; that the statute
of a state may sometimes override the conflicting statute of
another, both at home and abroad; and again, that the two
conflicting statutes may each prevail over the other at home,
although given no extraterritorial effect in the state of the
other."
In a subsequent section of this book it is argued that a departure from choice-of-law principles is likely to press harder
upon a defendant than upon a plaintiff. 4 A plaintiff, whose
claim based upon the law of the place of wrong has been refused recognition at the forum, can generally sue elsewhere.
8

Alaska Packers Ass'n v. Industrial Accident Commission of California,

(1935) 294 U.S. 532, 547, 55 Sup. Ct. 518.

• Section

II,

below.
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A defendant whose foreign defence has been denied must
pay the judgment and forever hold his peace. It might be
thought that the Supreme Court would be more ready to use
the full faith and credit clause as a shield for a defendant than
as a means to compel the enforcement of a plaintiff's rights.
And this idea is supported by a passage from the opinion in
Bradford Electric Light Co., Inc. v. Clapper. 5 But a somewhat different view is expressed in Ala.s·ka Packers Association v. Industrial Commission of California:
"The necessity is not any the less whether the statute and
policy of the forum is set up as a defence to a suit brought
under the foreign statute or the foreign statute is set up as
a defence to a suit or proceeding under the local statute. In
either case, the conflict is the same. In each, rights claimed
under one statute prevail only by denying effect to the other.
In both the conflict is to be resolved, not by giving automatic
effect to the full faith and credit clause, compelling the courts
of each state to subordinate its own statutes to those of the
other, but by appraising the governmental interests of each
jurisdiction, and turning the scale of decision according to
their weight."
The bearing of the due process clause upon the solution of
choice-of-law problems is not quite so obvious as that of the
full faith and credit clause. It may be illustrated by a simple
case drawn from the field of contracts. In Home Insurance
Co. v. Dick 6 a fire insurance contract was made in Mexico.
It provided that all legal proceedings to enforce the policy
should be taken within a year from the date of loss. This
clause was valid under Mexican law. The policy covered only
losses in Mexican waters and was payable in Mexico. A loss
having occurred, a suit to enforce the policy was brought in
Texas, after the time limit of one year had elapsed. Certain
• See Bradford Electric Light Co. v. Clapper, (1932) 286 U. S. 145, 16o,

sz Sup. Ct. 571.

• Home Insurance Co. v. Dick, (1930) 281 U.S. 397, 407,

so Sup. Ct.

338.
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companies who had reinsured part of the risk were brought
into the action by garnishment proceedings. These garnishees
pleaded that, by the very terms of the contract, the action was
brought too late. But the Texas court followed a Texas statute
which purported to avoid such contractual limitations when
they required a shorter period than two years. Judgment was
given in favour of Dick, the insured. On appeal, the Supreme
Court of the United States reversed this judgment:
"The Texas statute as here construed and applied deprives
the garnishees of property without due process of law. A
state may, of course, prohibit and declare invalid the making
of certain contracts within its borders. Ordinarily, it may prohibit performance within its borders, even of contracts validly
made elsewhere, if they are required to be performed within
the state and their performance would violate its laws. But, in
the case at bar, nothing in any way relating to the policy sued
on, or to the contracts of re-insurance, was ever done or required to be done in Texas. All acts relating to the making
of the policy were done in Mexico. All in relation to the
making of the contract of reinsurance were done there or in
New York. And likewise, all things in regard to performance
were to be done outside of Texas. Neither the Texas laws
nor the Texas courts were involved for any purpose, except
by Dick in the bringing of this suit. The fact that Dick's permanent residence was in Texas is without significance. At all
times here material, he was physically present and acting in
Mexico. Texas was, therefore, without power to affect the
terms of contracts so made. Its attempt to impose a greater
obligation than that agreed upon and to seize property in
payment of the imposed obligation violates the guaranty
against deprivation of property without due process of law."
The due process clause was implemented in this case to
protect a defendant from an improper resort to the law of
the forum. It seems unlikely that it would ever be invoked
to assist a plaintiff whose foreign cause of action had been
denied recognition. The court would have to go the length
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of holding that the court of the forum, in refusing to enforce
a foreign cause of action, had deprived the plaintiff of property without due process of law. In this respect, the scope of
the due process clause is more limited than that of the full
faith and credit clause.
But the full faith and credit clause has, as we have seen,
certain limitations which are not found in the due process
clause. If, in a given case, a state court's refusal to apply the
proper law of the case is a denial of due process, it is immaterial whether the appropriate rule of the proper law which
has been rejected is a rule of common law or a statute. It
may be doubted, however, whether a state court's refusal to
apply the common law of a sister state (as distinct from its
statute law) could ever amount to a denial of full faith and
credit. Again, the full faith and credit clause only compels
American courts to recognize the laws of other American
states. But the application, by a state court, of its own local
law to a set of facts arising in a foreign country might constitute a denial of due process. This is what happened in the
Home Insurance Company case.
Attempts have been made to invoke the due process clause
in some of the more complex tort cases. They can be more
conveniently considered at a later point.
In subsequent sections of this book it is proposed to discuss
various principles which operate as exceptions to the general
choice-of-law principle. The effect of these exceptional principles in practice is to exclude the application of the law of
the place of wrong. When a court follows one of these principles it disregards the law of the place of wrong and either
applies its own law instead or else washes its hands of the
case. The law of the place of wrong may be excluded on the
ground that it concerns procedure, that it is contrary to public
policy, that it is penal in character, etc. In discussing the operation of these exceptional principles, the reader should bear in
mind the fact that each one of them is overshadowed by the
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possibility of a constitutional limitation. In the Home Insurance Company case the Texas court, in trying to deprive the
insurers of the benefit of a term in their contract, valid under
the proper law, said that it was applying Texas law to a
matter of procedure. It said the proper law of the contract
was contrary to Texas public policy. But the Supreme Court
said the Constitution prohibited this particular application
of established conflict of laws theories. No one can tell how
far the Supreme Court may go in using the full faith and
credit clause or the due process clause to check state courts
which refuse to follow choice-of-law principles directing them
to respect and apply the laws of other states.
SECTION IO
THE FEDERAL COURTS OF THE UNITED STATES AND THE
CONFLICT OF LAWS

The relation between the federal courts and state law is a
large and difficult question which goes far beyond the scope
of this study. We shall not attempt to discuss it exhaustively
but a few comments upon its conflict of laws aspects may not
be out of place. Since these courts exercise a large and important jurisdiction, notably in cases where the parties are
citizens of different states, it is important to know where they
stand in relation to the conflict of laws.
Judicial administration by federal courts in the United
States is governed by section 34 of the Judiciary Ace (1789)
which provides:
"The laws of the several States, except where the Constitution, treaties or statutes of the United States shall otherwise require or provide, shall be regarded as rules of decision
in trials at common law in the courts of the United States in
cases where they apply."
1

1 Stat. L. 73, 92, (1789), 28 U.S. C. (1934) § 725.
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Without considering the precise meaning of this section
we pass on to another federal statute controlling the administration of the courts which provides:
"The Supreme Court of the United States shall have the
power to prescribe, by general rules, for the district courts
of the United States and for the court of the District of Columbia, the forms of process, writs, pleadings, and motions, and the
practice and procedure in civil actions at law. Said rules shall
neither abridge, enlarge, or modify the substantive right of
any litigant. They shall take effect six months after their
promulgation, and thereafter all laws in conflict therewith
shall be of no further force or effect." 2
Pursuant to this statute the Supreme Court drafted and
promulgated a code of rules which took effect in 1938. This
code governs the procedure in all the lower federal courts
throughout the United States. It establishes a uniform procedure in these courts which is independent of the rules followed in the courts of the various states. 3 But by the very
terms of their constituent statute, these rules may not "abridge,
enlarge or modify the substantive right of any litigant."
Where a matter of "substantive right" is involved, the federal courts must observe the mandate of the Judiciary Act
(section 34).
If we examine section 34 of the Judiciary Act from a conflict of laws point of view we discern an ambiguity. The section says that "the laws of the several States
shall
be regarded as rules of decision
in cases where
they apply." This section might be interpreted in at least
2

48 Stat. L. 1064, § 1 (1934), 28 U.S. C. (1934) § 723 b.
Before the introduction of these rules the lower federal courts followed
the procedure of the state courts for the state in which they were located, as
directed by the Conformity Act, 17 Stat. L. 197, § 5 (1872), 28 U. S. C.
3

(1934) § 724.

The formulation and application of the uniform federal code will doubtless
raise many border-line issues as to whether particular rules or problems are
matters of "procedure," i.e., whether they ought to be governed by uniform
federal rules. See Note, (1938) 38 CoL. L. REV. 1472.
Such an issue has been raised regarding the burden of proof in relation to
contributory negligence. See section 36, below.
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two different ways. The direction to the federal courts to
apply the laws of the several states might be interpreted as a
direction to apply those laws in conformity with established
choice-of-law principles. Since the direction to apply state
law proceeds from the federal Judiciary Act4 and the choiceof-law principles to be followed are implicit in the direction
itself, the scope and application of these principles would
naturally be determined by the federal courts themselves
with the final word lying in the mouth of the Supreme Court.
A second interpretation might be placed upon the section:
that a federal court shall apply to each case coming before it
the laws of the state in which the federal court is located,
including the conflict of laws rules normally applied by the
courts of that state. If we adopt the second interpretation, it
follows that a federal court ought, in conflicts cases, to follow
automatically the conflict of laws rules of the state in which it
sits, as expounded by the courts of that state.
Before we turn to the judicial treatment of this problem
let us pause to consider it from the standpoint of a student of
the conflict of laws. There are, in the United States, a number
of different jurisdictions with different internal laws. Within
the limits set by the Constitution, each state is free to develop
its own body of legal rules, different from those of the other
states. Yet it is frequently possible for one of two parties engaged in a legal controversy to choose any one of several
• The Supreme Court's opinion in Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, (1938) 304
U. S. 64, 58 Sup. Ct. 817, contains statements which appear to indicate that
the relation between the federal courts and state laws is determined by the
Constitution and that Congress is without power to alter that relation.
But, carefully considered, the majority opinion does not seem to go beyond
a statement that, in the absence of Congressional direction, the federal courts'
assumption of power to disregard state decisions was unconstitutional. The
opinion does not say explicitly that Congress could not prescribe special rules
of decision to be followed by the federal courts in all cases coming before them.
See Note, (1939) 52 HARV. L. REv. 1002.
For general discussion of the relation between the federal judiciary and state
law under the Constitution, see McCormick and Hewins, "The Collapse of
'General Law' in the Federal Courts," (1938) 33 ILL. L. REv. 126; Note,
(1938) 36 MICH. L~ REV. 1312.
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states as the forum in which to litigate the controversy. If
the court of each of these states were to apply its own internal
law in settling the controversy the fortunes of the parties to it
would depend entirely upon their choice of a forum. Such a
situation would produce grave injustice, not to mention the
possibility of unseemly bickering between the courts of different states. The solution to this difficult problem has been
found in the application of choice-of-law principles. In dealing with a controversy which has arisen in another state, a
state court will normally decline to apply its own local law
and will try, so far as possible, to apply the law of the state
in which the controversy arose. For the sake of uniformity and
other choice-of-law policies 5 which we shall discuss later, the
state courts of the United States are all engaged in a cooperative enterprise to solve the problem of the conflict of laws.
Viewed in this light, the conflict of laws appears to be a ·
problem of national consequence. Although one of its prime
objectives is justice for the individual, this objective cannot
be secured without the cooperation of all the states and state
courts. Moreover, the application of choice-of-law principles
in certain types of cases involves a certain weighing and adjustment of the interests of different states which is, in some
sense, an interstate problem. The Supreme Court has already
recognized this national aspect of the conflict of laws. It has
intervened on constitutional grounds to check the activity of
state courts which were extending the application of their
local laws in utter disregard of choice-of-law principles. 6 In
this way the Court limits and supervises, in the interests of
the nation, the administration of the conflict of laws by state
tribunals.
But the Supreme Court, although it has set limits to the
powers of state tribunals, has left them considerable freedom
6

12,
6

For a more detailed discussion of choice-of-law policies, see sections
38.

See generally section 9·

1

x,
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to follow or to abandon choice-of-law principles as they please.
And it must be admitted that the state courts do not always
give the fullest possible measure of cooperation to the work
of solving the conflict of laws problem. Although paying lipservice to choice-of-law principles, they sometimes refuse to
enforce particular rules of the law of a sister-state on the
ground that these rules run counter to their own "public
policy" or "procedure." Occasionally there is good reason
for such a refusal but often there is none. In some cases it is
difficult to avoid the conclusion that a state court's failure to
co-operate in the application of choice-of-law principles has
resulted from a narrow, provincial point of view or a failure
to completely understand the conflict of laws problem and its
solution. But although we may deplore such decisions, the
Supreme Court, on its present view of the matter, is powerless
to prevent them.
Let us now consider the role of the federal courts with the
aid of a specific example. A injures Bin state X. The law of
state X does not allow any interest on damages for an injury
of this character. If B brings suit in state X the court there
will very properly apply its own law to the case and B will
recover no interest. Now let us suppose that B brings suit, not
in state X, but in state Y. Under the local law of state Y
interest would be recoverable upon damages for an injury
of the character sustained by B. But A should not have to pay
greater damages because he happens to be subject to the
jurisdiction of state Y. For the sake of uniformity and other
choice-of-law ideals the court in state Y ought to adopt a cooperative attitude. It should disregard its local rule regarding interest in this case and adopt the rule of state X, the state
of wrong. 7 We shall suppose, however, that the court of state
Y refuses to follow the law of state X and applies its own rule
instead. This decision is unfair to Band evinces an unwilling7
For a more detailed discussion of rules relating to damages, see section 26,
especially note 2.
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ness to co-operate with other state courts in solving the conflict of laws problem.
Now we reach the final stage of our analysis. Suppose B
brings suit in a federal court sitting in state Y. If we adopt
the second of the two interpretations of the Judiciary Act
which we have outlined above, the federal court will have
to give the same undesirable decision which the state court of
state Y would give. If the federal court were disposed to accord more complete support to the choice-of-law principle
by allowing the law of state X to govern the measure of damages it would not be permitted to do so. Surely this is a most
unfortunate result. A federal court, representing the judicial
power of the United States, ought not to be forced to take
an unjust and uncooperative attitude toward a problem of
national significance. The federal courts should, it is suggested, be left free to decide conflicts cases according to their
own best judgment subject, of course, to the guidance of the
Supreme Court.
It is quite true that this suggested view of the federal
courts' powers would permit such a court to render decisions
which would not conform to the rulings given in similar cases
by the local state court. Thus, in our example above, we have
suggested that the federal court in state Y should decide the
A-B controversy in a manner inconsistent with the views of the
state Y state court. This lack of uniformity is no doubt regrettable. But if the federal court in state Y was bound to do as
the local state court would do, its decision would not conform
to that which would be given by the court of state X, or by the
court of any other state which adhered thoroughly to the
choice-of-law principle. Hence there is bound to be some lack
of uniformity in any event.
Perhaps the strongest argument which can be advanced
against the view here suggested is that it would permit a
federal court to disregard the policy of its home state as
enunciated by the state courts. No doubt the policy of its home
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state is a matter to which a federal court should always give
serious consideration. But in a conflict of laws case the policies
of other states besides the forum may also be involved. 8 And,
more important still, the national policy of uniformity in the
solution of conflicts cases will always be affected in some degree. In view of these facts it is difficult to understand why the
federal court should be expected to give an automatic preeminence to the policy of the state in which it sits and to
slavishly follow the decisions of that state's courts.
There is a further point to be made in favour of federal
independence in the conflicts field. The primary objective of
choice-of-law principles is to secure uniformity in the treatment of conflicts cases consistent with a fair adjustment of the
interests of the states involved. To attain this objective the
various state courts must act in concert. Such concerted action
in the treatment of conflicts problems would be greatly facilitated if some single pre-eminent tribunal could take the lead
in laying down a pattern of sound decisions to which the
various state courts might conform. This function might very
well be performed by the Supreme Court of the United States.
If the Supreme Court were free to follow its own bent in conflicts cases coming up from the federal courts, it would be
able to offer persuasive guidance, not only to the lower federal
courts, but to the state tribunals as well. If, on the other hand,
the federal courts were in all cases bound to follow their local
state decisions, the Supreme Court would have much less occasion to pronounce upon conflicts problems. It could only do
so when some state or federal court had exceeded the limits
set by the Constitution.
This suggestion that the Supreme Court should sound the
key-note of conflicts doctrine for the state tribunals is by no
means a theoretical novelty. In the past the Court has (as we
shall see) made a practice of writing independent opinions
upon important conflicts problems for the special guidance of
8

See section

12.
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federal courts. Some of these opinions had a widespread influence not only upon federal but also upon state tribunals
and made important contributions to the erection of a uniform American conflict of laws jurisprudence. Without going
outside the field of torts we can name such great cases as Dennick v. Railroad Co} Huntington v. Attrill, 10 Slater v. Mexican National R. Co. 11
Having speculatively considered our problem let us turn
to its history in the courts. As we have said, the Judiciary Act
is patient of two constructions. One construction would permit the federal courts to apply state laws according to established choice-of-law principles as understood by them, the
other construction would bind the federal courts to apply
state laws upon the automatic principle of locality. This
doubt was not resolved by the Supreme Court until the
decision of Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Electric Mfg. Co. 12 ( 1941 ).
The seeming tardiness of this clarification was due to the fact
that until the epochal decision of Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkini3 (I 93 8) the problem was almost totally obscured by the
doctrine of a general federal common law. For many years, the
Supreme Court and other federal courts assumed that they
were entitled, notwithstanding section 34 of the Judiciary
Act, to disregard the decisions of the state courts when dealing
with matters of "general law." In certain fields of law, never
clearly defined, they administered a general federal common
law which governed the decision of all cases coming before
federal courts. They did not, of course, disregard state statutes
which the states had constitutional power to enact. But if a
case in a federal court involved a point of common law within
• Dennick v. Central Railroad Co., (188o) 103 U.S. I I .
Huntington v. Attrill, (1 892) 146 U.S. 657, r 3 Sup. Ct. 224.
11
Slater v. Mexican Nat. R. Co., (1904) 194 U.S. 120, 24 Sup. Ct. 58r.
,. Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Electric Mfg. Co., (1941) 6r Sup. Ct. 1020.
"'Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, (1938) 304 U.S. 64, 58 Sup. Ct. 817.
10
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the general law field, the federal court made no attempt to
follow state law. The case was simply decided according to
the rules of the federal common law, a jurisprudence built up
by the accretion of federal decisions. The final authority upon
matters of general law was, of course, the Supreme Court.
The classic justification for this practice was Mr. Justice
Story's opinion in Swift v. Tyson 14 (I 842) in which he said:
"
the true interpretation of the thirty-fourth section limited its application to state laws, strictly local, that is
to say, to the positive statutes of the state, and the construction
thereof adopted by the local tribunals, and to rights and titles
to things having a permanent locality, such as the rights and
titles to real estate, and other matters immovable and intraterritorial in their nature and character. It never has been supposed by us that the section did apply, or was designed to apply, to questions of a more general nature, not at all dependent
upon local statutes or local usages of a fixed and permanent
operation, as, for example, to the construction of ordinary
contracts or other written instruments, and especially to
questions of general commercial law, where the state tribunals are called upon to perform the like functions as ourselves, that is, to ascertain upon general reasoning and legal
analogies, what is the true exposition of the contract or instrument, or what is the just rule furnished by the principles
of commercial law to govern the case."
In Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins the Supreme Court acknowledged that all this was error. The doctrine of Swift v.
Tyson was described as "an unconstitutional assumption of
powers by courts of the United States which no lapse of time
or respectable array of opinion should make us hesitate to
correct." The court declared that "in applying this doctrine
this Court and the lower federal courts have invaded rights
which in our opinion are reserved by the Constitution to the
several States." For the future, federal courts were directed to
14

Swiftv.Tyson, (1842) 16Pet. (41 U.S.) r, 18.
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apply and enforce the non-statutory as well as the statutory
law of the states.
During the heyday of the Swift v. Tyson doctrine the problem of choosing between the two interpretations of the Judiciary Act outlined above did not arise because at that time
the Supreme Court regarded the application of choice-of-law
principles as a branch of law which came within the scope of
that doctrine. Conflict of laws was a part of the general federal common law. Lower federal courts took their conflict of
laws doctrine from the Supreme Court. In various cases coming up from the lower federal courts the Supreme Court announced its own independent solutions of conflict of laws
problems without any particular regard for the views entertained by the courts of the states in which these cases were
tried.
After Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins the propriety of
this practice was at least questionable. The general law theory
upon which it was based had been destroyed, root and branch.
The power of the federal courts to work out their own conflict
of laws principles could not be supported any longer upon the
general law theory. It might still have been justified, however, as a necessary implication of the relation between the
federal courts and the laws of the several states, as that relation was determined by the Judiciary Act of 1789. 15
But in Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Electric Mfg. Co. 16 (1941)
the Supreme Court appears to have definitely decided that the
federal courts must adhere implicitly to the conflict of laws
decisions of their local state courts. The action was brought in
a Delaware federal court for breach of a contract made in New
15
See Cheatham, "Sources of Rules for Conflict of Laws," (r 9.}i )89u. PA. L.
REV. 430, 437; Note (1939) 52 HARV. L. REv. rooz, 1007.
16
Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Electric Mfg. Co., (1941) 61 Sup. Ct. xozo.
Lower federal courts held themselves bound to follow the conflicts rules of
the state forum in Sampson v. Channell, (C. C. A. rst, 1940) I ro F. (zd) 754;
Wagganam v. General Finance Co., (C. C. A. 3d, 1940) II6 F. (zd) 254.
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York. Having won a judgment, the plaintiff claimed that,
under New York law, he was entitled to interest from the
date of suit to that of the judgment. The defendant opposed
the application of New York law. The Circuit Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit ruled that the rights of the parties
ought to be governed by New York law and that the plaintiff
was entitled to the interest claimed. The Circuit Court of
Appeals apparently reached this conclusion independently
without consulting the Delaware cases or statutes. The Supreme Court remanded the case to the Circuit Court of Appeals for decision in conformity with the law of Delaware.
Speaking for the Court, in a rather short opinion, Mr. Justice Reed said:
"We are of opinion that the prohibition declared in Erie
Railroad Co. v. Tompkins against such independent determinations by the federal courts extends to the field of conflict of laws. The conflict of laws rules to be applied by the
federal court in Delaware must conform to those prevailing
in Delaware's state courts. Otherwise the accident of diversity
of citizenship would constantly disturb equal administration
of justice in co-ordinate state and federal courts sitting side by
side. . . . Any other ruling would do violence to the principle of uniformity within a state upon which the Tompkins
decision is based. Whatever lack of uniformity this may produce between federal courts in different states is attributable
to our federal system, which leaves to a state, within the limits
permitted by the Constitution, the right to pursue local policies
diverging from those of its neighbours. It is not for the federal courts to thwart such local policies by enforcing an independent 'general law' of conflict of laws. Subject only to
review by this Court on any federal question that may arise,
Delaware is free to determine whether a given matter is to be
governed by the law of the forum or some other law."
In view of our extended speculative discussion above, any
comment upon this decision would be tautologous.

CHAPTER

III

Choice-of-law Policy
SECTION II
UNIFORMITY AS A CHOICE-OF-LAW POLICY

T IS frequently said that choice-of-law principles are
designed to secure uniformity. Perhaps the precise significance of this objective and its relation to choice-oflaw principles can best be visualized in the light of a specific
problem. A takes his friend B for an automobile ride. Due to
A's careless driving the car runs into a ditch and B is injured.
Having decided to bring an action against A, B will proceed to
choose a suitable forum. He must be sure that the forum
selected will undertake to exercise jurisdiction over A. And
he will probably want to bring his action in a place where A
has sufficient assets to satisfy a judgment. Let us suppose that
he elects to sue in state X. It would be easy for the court
there to decide the case according to the rules of its own internal law without considering how the courts of any other
state might have decided it. But if every court took this attitude, B's power to recover damages would depend entirely
upon his choice of a forum. A might be a man of means with
property in a number of states. B could then select the state
whose law was most favorable to him. Such a possibility would
strike many persons as unfair. "Fairness to the parties," says
Goodrich, "requires that the obligations created between them
remain unchanged by fortuitous changes in the geographical
locations of either until such obligations are settled or otherwise discharged." 1 It seems desirable, therefore, that the court

I

1
Goodrich, "Public Policy in the Law of Conflicts," (1930) 36 WEST VA.
L. Q. 156, 164. See also Beach, "Uniform Interstate Enforcement of Vested
Rights," (1918) 27 YALE L. J. 656; CONFLICT OF LAWS RESTATEMENT (1934)
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of state X should attempt to cooperate with those of other
states in arriving at a uniform solution of the A-B controversy.
The court can do this by invoking some choice-of-law principle indicating a single legal system to whose rules all courts
might resort in dealing with that controversy. The principle
that tort claims are regulated by the law of the place of wrong
would obviously be appropriate. Following out this principle,
the court ought not to decide the case according to its own
internal law unless the accident occurred within the bounds of
state X. If it occurred in any other state, the law in force there
should govern the decision.
Let us assume, however, that the accident occurred outside state X. Yet the court disregards the established choiceof-law principle, settles the case according to the law of the
forum, and so reaches a result different to that which a reference to the law of the place of wrong would have prompted.
If we accept the premise that justice requires uniformity,
that result will be, to some extent, unfair to either the plaintiff or the defendant. It should be observed that the possibility
of hardship to the defendant is greater than that of hardship
to the plaintiff. A judicial decision in favour of a defendant
which contravenes an established choice-of-law principle
works a certain hardship upon the plaintiff. But a judicial
decision in favour of a plaintiff which contravenes an established choice-of-law principle works a much greater hardship
upon the defendant. This proposition, although perhaps not
readily apparent, is one of fundamental importance in the
conflict of laws. It deserves further elucidation.
We have supposed that the accident occurred outside state
X but that the court of state X, disregarding the choice-oflaw rule, has applied the law of the forum. Let us suppose
further that whilst the law of the place of wrong would have
permitted the plaintiff to recover, the law of the forum directs
a contrary result. Thus the plaintiff is deprived of the opportunity to litigate his claim in this particular jurisdiction. But
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he may have other strings to his bow. Perhaps he can bring a
successful suit in some other jurisdiction, e.g., the place of
wrong. His power to bring a second suit in some other jurisdiction would, of course, depend upon the attitude of the
court there. The court of the jurisdiction in which the second
suit was brought might take the view that the adverse judgment given in the first suit by the court of state X had settled
the merits of the A-B controversy once for all. It might say
that that judgment was res judicata against the plaintiff. But
the court of state X can render this result a highly unlikely
one. It can, if it wishes, make it perfectly clear that its judgment is based solely upon the rules of the internal law of state
X. The court of state X has decided that, under the internal
law of state X, the plaintiff has no cause of action. Nothing is
said regarding his rights under the laws of other states. If
he can convince some other court that his claim should be
governed by the laws of state Y, the judgment rendered by
the court of state X ought not to impede him. That judgment
does not purport to determine in any way what the plaintiff's
rights under the law of state Y may be. Thus the court of
state X can refuse to enforce the plaintiff's claim accor~ing
to the law of the place of wrong and, by making explicit the
theory of their decision, leave him free to pursue his remedy
in other jurisdictions.2
Suppose now, on the other hand, that the court of state X,
in disregard of the choice-of-law rule, gives judgment against
the defendant. He will be forced to pay plaintiff according
to the terms of the judgment and he has no further means of
redress. His liability is irrevocably fixed. Hence it would
2

This attitude was taken by the Supreme Court of the United States in
Slater v. Mexican Nat. R. Co., (1904) 194 U.S. rzo, 24 Sup. Ct. 581.
In the United States the effect of a judgment as a conclusive determination
of facts and legal rights between the parties is usually referred to the law of
the state where the judgment was rendered. See FREEMAN, JUDGMENTS (1925)
vol. 3> §§ 1394-1397; CONFLICT OF LAWS RESTATEMENT (1934) 533·
For further discussion of this problem, see section r6, below.
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seem to be particularly important that a court should not set
aside a choice-of-law principle, the proper application of
which would have the effect of protecting a defendant. 3
This distinction between a foreign law which favours the
plaintiff and one which favours the defendant is believed to
have considerable significance in the conflict of laws although
it has been frequently over looked. We shall recur to it at
various points in the subsequent pages of this treatise. At this
point a few illustrations may not be inappropriate. Let us turn
first to our historical review. We saw that in England, as early
as the seventeenth century, the courts adopted the justification
theory, which protects the defendant. In an English court
the defendant may with certain exceptions employ any defence available under the law of the place of wrong. A plaintiff, on the other hand, can apparently get no advantage at all
from the application of foreign law. 4 He must in all cases
show that "the wrong was of such a character that it would
have been actionable if committed in England." In brief, although English courts have long seen the importance of allowing a defendant to rely upon defences not recognized by
English internal law, they have been notoriously slow to let
a plaintiff collect a claim in England which English internal
law would not give him. Does not this history suggest that
the recognition of foreign defences is more pressing and important than the recognition of foreign claims?
When we considered the history of extraterritorial
torts in America we found evidence of a development analo8
In Bradford Electric Light Co., Inc. v. Clapper, (1932) 286 U. S. 145,
16o, 52 Sup. Ct. 571, Mr. Justice Brandeis said:
"A State may, on occasion, decline to enforce a foreign cause of action. In
so doing, it merely denies a remedy, leaving unimpaired the plaintiff's substantive right, so that he is free to enforce it elsewhere. But to refuse to give effect
to a substantive defence under the applicable law of another State, as under
the circumstances here presented, subjects the defendant to irremediable liability.
This may not be done."
• See above, section 3.
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gous to that in England. Almost all the earlier cases involved
the problem of a defendant who seeks to justify himself
according to the law of the place of wrong. Dozens of decisions upon the death statutes established the proposition
that the death statute of the forum imposed no liability upon
a defendant who had caused the decedent's death in an outside
jurisdiction. Yet when suits were brought to enforce foreign
death statutes, to establish claims by foreign law, they met
numerous objections. For many years a plaintiff claiming
under a foreign death statute had to surmount that judicial
hurdle of uncertain dimensions, the similarity doctrine. 5 And
although that obstacle has vanished in most jurisdictions, its
function is filled by an even more nebulous theory-"public
policy." The decisions which have clustered about this concept lend further support to our suggested distinction. "Public policy" often frustrates a plaintiff but it rarely hurts a defendant. There are many cases in which an action based upon
foreign law has been dismissed on the ground that it is contrary to the public policy of the forum. But instances in which
a court has struck down a defence based on foreign law for
this reason are extremely rare. 6
A similar pattern is found in the cases on damages. 7 Not
infrequently a plaintiff's compensation, estimated according
to the law of the place of wrong, has been cut down to the
amount which he would have recovered if his claim had been
governed by the internal law of the forum. But the cases
are few in which a defendant has been forced to pay damages
greater than those which the law of the place of wrong would
have authorized. In Slater v. Mexican National R. Co. 8 it
• See above, section 6.
• See below, section 18.
7
See below, section z6.
8
Slater v. Mexican Nat. R. Co., (1904) 194 U. S. uo, 2.4 Sup. Ct. 581.
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appeared that the limitations of common-law procedure made
it impossible for an American court to award the same damages
to the plaintiffs which they could have recovered in the courts
of Mexico, the place of wrong. In a Mexican court they
would have received a long series of periodical payments. A
Mexican court would have had power to stop these payments
in the event of certain specified contingencies. The Supreme
Court decided that it would be preferable to dismiss the
plaintiff's action rather than to give him some substitute
award which might be more burdensome to the defendant than
the Mexican procedure.
To sum up the argument: ordinary notions of justice and
equity suggest the desirability of uniformity in the settlement of legal controversies, wherever they may be litigated.
Since each jurisdiction has different laws, courts have devised
a number of choice-of-law rules which attempt to allocate the
decision of each individual case to a particular legal system.
One of these rules is that matters of tort liability ought to be
referred to the law of the state where the alleged tort occurred.
For the sake of uniformity this rule ought to be followed. If
a court, in a given case, refuses to follow it and applies the
internal law of the forum, the resulting decision will be inconsistent with the general choice-of-law practice and therefore, unfair to the party who would have succeeded had the
choice-of-law rule been adopted. 9 If that party is the plaintiff
he may still be able to succeed elsewhere. If he is the defendant, however, he will be forced to pay damages according to
the unjust judgment and will be unable to do anything more
about it. Hence a court should be especially careful not to
give an affirmative judgment awarding damages in violation
9
When a decision is given which is inconsistent with choice-of-law principles
the responsibility usually lies with the court of the forum. It may, however, lie
with the legislature of the forum.
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of a general choice-of-law principle. That English and American courts have generally been careful to avoid such a result is shown by our historical survey of the subject and by
various groups of cases.
Even in cases with an obviously foreign setting, courts
often follow the law of the forum unless one of the parties
requests a reference to some foreign law. 10 This practice would
seem to indicate that such references are primarily made in
the interest of the parties to the suit. Adherence to a choice-oflaw theory may also be said to benefit the court slightly in
the following way. If a court always applied its local rule in
a particular class of cases and that rule favoured the plaintiff,
the world would make a beaten path to its door. 11 It might
be embarrassed by the great volume of business thus thrust
upon it.
Two observations may be made regarding uniformity as
an objective in the conflict of laws. In the first place, it will
not guide us to a complete solution of the choice-of-law problem because it does not indicate any particular legal system.
Where a well established practice of selection exists we may,
presumably, approach uniformity by following it. But where
the question presented is without precedent, we must go
further afield for an answer. Secondly, the ideal of consistency in the treatment of conflicts cases is very incompletely
realized. Sometimes different states apply different choiceof-law principles to the same fact problem. And even the
most complete unanimity in choice-of-law theory is apt to be
frustrated by a divergence in rules of procedure affecting
the ultimate result. It would seem, therefore, that the obstacles
to securing the identical decision of conflicts cases in all jurisdictions are formidable enough to warrant a willingness to
10

See BEALE, CoNFLICT OF LAWS (1935) vol. 3, p. 1679.
See Shaw v. Postal Telegraph & Cable Co., (1901) 79 Miss. 67o, 684,
3 I So. zzz.
11
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sacrifice it in some instances for other and less difficult objectives. 12
SECTION !2
THE INTEREST OF THE STATE WHERE THE WRONG OCCURRED;
THE NEED FOR A SIGNIFICANT CONNECTION WITH THE
CONDUCT OF THE PARTIES

With particular reference to the field of torts, the theory
has been advanced that a controlling rule should be imported
from the place of wrong because that jurisdiction appears to
have the greatest social interest in securing conformity to it. 1
To a great extent tort liability, like criminalliabilty, is imposed by a state to secure compliance with prescribed rules
and standards of conduct on the part of those who enter its
borders. Whether or not those rules are there obeyed is a
matter of greater importance to it than to any other state.
Hence its laws ought to determine the legality of conduct
within its boundaries wherever that issue may be raised. Of
course, a state's interest in regulating behaviour there will
not always find expression in the imposition of duties and
liabilities. The community there may also deem it expedient
to create privileges in favour of certain types of conduct, as
where police officers are authorized to use force in preventing an escape, or injury necessary to save human life is
permitted. In either event, other states, recognizing the paramount concern of that community in penalizing or exonerating a defendant, should attempt as far as possible to give
effect to its policies.
This theory is reminiscent of the old doctrine that states
12

See Yntema, "The Hornbook Method and the Conflict of Laws," (192.8)
3 7 YALE L. J. 4-68; Cavers, "A Critique of the Choice-of-law Problem," ( 193 3)
4-7 HARV. L. REV. 173> 197·
1
See STUMBERG, CONFLICT OF LAWS (1937) 182.; Note, (1935) 4-4 YALE
L. J. 12.33; CHEATHAM, DoWLING and GooDRICH, CASES oN THE CoNFLICT
OF LAWS (1936) 4-11,
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referred to one another's laws for the sake of international
courtesy or comity. But the modern theory is more specific.
The law of the place of wrong is not merely rehearsed by the
court in a spirit of friendly deference. It is actually enforced
by the court because the matter in hand is felt to be of more
acute concern to the foreign community than to the community of the forum.
The reasonable expectations of the parties are not the least
of the various factors to be considered in choosing a proper
law. It would be inequitable to determine their rights and
duties upon a principle whose application to their affairs they
had no reason to anticipate. From this point of view the law
of the place of wrong would seem to be a satisfactory choice.
Most persons realize when they enter a jurisdiction that
they are bound to comply with the laws in force there. A man
who failed in this duty might well expect to be mulcted in
damages. On the other hand, a man who succeeded in it
might justly complain if he were compelled to answer for
his conduct in a jurisdiction where different laws prevailed.

CHAPTER

IV

Exclusion of Foreign Procedural Rules
SECTION

I3

REASONS FOR EXCLUSION OF FOREIGN PROCEDURAL RULES

T IS axiomatic in the conflict of laws that courts only
apply foreign substantive law, eschewing that which is
procedural or remedial/ that the law of the forum must
govern all matters of procedure or remedy. The application
of foreign law in compliance with choice-of-law principles is
always limited by this general theory. In effect, it directs the
courts to disregard certain classes of foreign rules, and to
adhere instead to the ordinary principles and practices of their
own internal law. An actual issue upon the point will, of
course, only arise when, at some stage in a lawsuit, one party
attempts to rely upon a rule of foreign law which conflicts
with a rule of the local law. The question may then be raised
whether or not the foreign rule ought to be excluded from
the court's deliberations. This question might be phrased in
any one of three ways, viz., is the local rule procedural? is the
foreign rule procedural? does the subject matter of these rules
relate to the remedy? But the practical issue is always the
same; the court must decide whether the local or the foreign
rule shall prevail.
What are the reasons for this exclusionary principle? Most
authorities are agreed that it would be practicably impossible
for the court of the forum to duplicate in every detail the performance which would be given by a foreign tribunal with
the same suit before it. Until the court has decided that some

I

1

For conflict of laws purposes the words "procedure" and "remedy" are
usually assumed to have the same significance. In this study they are used interchangeably.
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reference to foreign law should be permitted it has, of course,
no rules for guidance save those of its own internal law and
must conduct its adjudication accordingly. But even after the
proper external law has been selected, there may be certain
rules of that system which the court of the forum and its officers could not obey without expending a great deal of time
and effort. Thus it might be very difficult for the judges and
officials to adhere strictly to the rules of a foreign jurisdiction
in executing and enforcing judgments. If the court did not
confine its reference to foreign rules to those which it could
conveniently and expeditiously apply, the administration of
justice at the forum might be seriously hampered.
During the first three quarters of the nineteenth century
common-law courts were inclined to look askance at laws of
other jurisdictions which differed from their own. It seems
very probable that such laws were sometimes labelled "procedure" and excluded merely because they did not conform to
the law of the forum which from habit and experience the
court had come to regard as ideal. 2 Foreign doctrines are not
likely to be viewed with such naive hostility at the present
day. But when foreign doctrines are believed to be very harsh
or unjust, there is no need to reject them in a back door fashion
by calling them rules of procedure. They can be rejected upon
the more appropriate ground that they are contrary to the
public policy of the forum. Calling them rules of procedure
obscures the real reason for the decision to disregard them,
their repugnance to local ideals of justice.
However necessary this substitution of local principles for
foreign ones may be, it constitutes a serious impediment to
the attainment of certain objectives which choice-of-law rules
are supposed to seek. It plainly jeopardizes the ideal of
uniformity. The very fact that one of the parties to a suit has
2
See STUMBERG, CONFLICT OF LAWS (1937) 147; Lorenzen, "The Statute
of Frauds and the Conflict of Laws," (1923) 32 YALE L. J. 311, 327·
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sought to introduce a particular rule of the law of the place
of wrong may be taken to show that he expects to derive some
advantage from its application. The importance of this advantage will depend upon the nature of the rule and the facts
of the particular case. Had the suit been brought at the place
of wrong, he would have obtained the advantage. The exclusion of a particular rule of the law of the place of wrong in
this way may confer an abnormal benefit upon either the
plaintiff or the defendant.
Sometimes a particular rule of the law of the place of wrong
has been laid down by the courts or legislature of that state
in order to protect an important social interest. The forum's
choice-of-law principle aims, in a measure, to recognize such
interests. If a rule of this kind is excluded as procedural, the
recognition of these interests will be prevented.
For these reasons certain writers have urged that the courts
should try, so far as convenience in the dispatch of judicial
business will permit, to apply as few local, as many foreign,
rules as possible. 3 Moreover, as we have observed, a number
of recent decisions indicate that American courts are moving
in this direction. 4
SECTION

14

THE PROBLEM OF CLASSIFICATION

The substance-procedure problem arises because the law
of the forum differs from the law of the place of wrong. The
problem becomes crucial with regard to particular conflicting
rules of these two systems. Whenever the problem comes before a court, there is a foreign rule and a local rule which contradict one another. A lawyer, stating the question in formal
language, might put it in any one of three ways, viz., Is the
8
See STUMBERG, CoNFLICT OF LAWS (I 93 7) 148; Cook, "'Substance' and
'Procedure' in the Conflict of Laws," (1933) 42 YALE L. J. 333, 343·
'Above, section 7·
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foreign rule one of procedure or substance? Is the local rule
one of procedure or substance? Is the subject matter of these
rules one of procedure or substance? For instance, an action
is brought upon a foreign tort. The local period of limitation
for such a suit would be three years, the period laid down by
the law of the place of wrong is five years. The defendant
relies upon the local statute. It, in effect, conflicts with the
affirmative rule of the foreign law that such a suit may be
brought at any time within five years after the cause of action
arose. The defendant might be said to have raised the question: is the local limitation of three years a rule of substance
or procedure? Or, in a different form: Is the foreign rule allowing suit in five years a rule of substance or procedure? Or,
in a third form: Does the subject matter of these rules (which
we find to be in conflict), namely, limitation of actions, fall
within the category of substance or the category of procedure?
All these forms of statement are used by the courts.
Put in any of these three ways, the problem becomes what
certain writers call a problem of classification (qualification,
characterization). The court's task is to classify the local rule,
or the foreign rule, or the subject matter as belonging to the
class "substance" or the class "procedure." There may appear
to be a certain discrepancy between the statements of the
problem offered by various writers because they appear to be
classifying different things. 1 But no matter which formula we
employ, the underlying problem is always the same. The
court must decide whether the rule of the forum or the rule
of the place of wrong shall prevail, and, as a consequence,
whether one party or the other shall obtain the advantage.
It should be observed that all three of these formulae,
although frequently used by courts and writers, are to a cerSee, e.g., Beckett, "The Question of Classification ('Qualificati~n') in Private
International Law," ( 1934) 15 BRITISH YEAR BooK INT. LAW 46. At p. 64
he speaks of "classification of the internal law of the forum"; at p. 72, of
"classification of rules of foreign law."
1
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tain extent incomplete and misleading. They are incomplete
because they fail to make explicit the important social factors
which must be considered in the solution of a substanceprocedure problem. These factors we have already considered. 2 A rule of the forum and a rule of the place of wrong
conflict. To give effect to the rule of the forum will serve the
court's administrative convenience. But choice-of-law policies
demand the application of the place-of-wrong rule. None of
these factors finds its way into any of the three classification
formulae. These formulae suggest that the problem is merely
one of logic. A rule or its subject matter is either substance
or procedure. We must ascertain its true nature and classify
it accordingly. To talk of the "problem of classification" is to
accentuate this unfortunate notion that the problem is simply
an exercise in deduction. An analysis of the problem which
adopts this terminology is apt to focus the judge's attention
upon the mental process of assigning legal rules to abstract
categories. He may forget all about the social factors involved;
in any event, the tendency of this terminology is to minimize
their importance.
This is merely another particular instance of that recurrent
phenomenon of legal thought which has been called "mechanical jurisprudence," "the tyranny of labels," 3 "the
squirrel cage of conceptualism." In discussing, in thinking
about legal problems of all kinds, we are liable to become too
much engrossed with the meaning of verbal symbols or formulae and the process of deducing logical consequences therefrom. Our concern with such matters may lead us to forget the
social interests which are involved in our problems. The suggestion is ventured that, in conflict of laws, the dangers of me2

In section I 3, above.
See Pound, "Mechanical Jurisprudence," (1908) 8 ·CoL. L. REv. 6os; Mr.
Justice Cardozo's opinion in Snyder v. Massachusetts, (1934) 291 U.S. 97, II4,
54 Sup. Ct. 330; Yntema, "The Hornbook Method and the Conflict of Laws,"
(1928) 37 YALE L. J. 468, 481.
3
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chanicallogical thinking are greater than in other fields. The
basic social functions of that collection of legal theories which
we call the conflict of laws do not seem to be very generally
understood by the legal profession. One does not expect a
judge to give all the reasons for his decision in his opinion.
But it is not an infrequent experience to feel, after reading an
opinion in a conflicts case, that the judge who wrote it did not
have a very clear conception of the policies and purposes which
choice-of-law principles have been created to achieve. Perhaps
the social interests underlying the conflict of laws are unusually obscure or subtle. However this may be, a court which
does not fully appreciate the social implications of the case
before it is very likely to fall into the rut of automatic deduction. It is accordingly submitted that if we must, in conformity to established usage, speak of the classification of legal
rules or their subject matter, we should, at the same time, keep
clearly in view the various conflicting aims and policies which
ought to govern that classification.
The dangers inherent in the established terminology and
the type of thinking which it engenders have been fully demonstrated by Cook. 4 As he points out, the words "substance"
and "procedure" are used by lawyers in a number of different
connections. For example, we may say a certain rule is a rule
of procedure because it is usually taught in a law-school course
on procedure. Or we may say that a constitutional prohibition
of retrospective laws does not apply to statutes which merely
affect matters of procedure. But we must not assume that the
word procedure, when used in connection with these internal
law problems, has the same meaning as it has when used in the
conflict of laws. The symbol is the same, but the problems are
different. For example, statutes shifting the burden of proving
contributory negligence have generally been classified as pro• Cook," 'Substance' and 'Procedure' in the Conflict of Laws," (1933) 42
L. J. 333· See also Cheatham, "Internal Law Distinctions in the Conflict
of Laws," (1936) 21 CoRN. L. Q. 570.
YALE
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cedural in the sense that suGh statutes may be given a retrospective effect without infringing a constitutional prohibition
of retrospective laws. But it does not follow that a statute of
the forum disposing of the burden of proof ought to be classified as procedural in the conflict of laws. The problem which
occasions the classification is different. If the law of the place
of wrong has a rule governing the burden of proof different
from that of the forum, choice-of-law policies, especially the
ideal of uniformity, require the application of the rule of the
place of wrong in preference to that of the forum. The court
of the forum should do this, if it can. Thus the statute of the
forum ought to be classified as "substantive" for conflict of
laws purposes.
"In view of the fact that today it is generally no more difficult to know the foreign rule as to burden of proof than it is
to know the foreign (substantive law', much can be said for
holding the question, at least in the negligence cases, to be
(substantive' in the conflict of laws cases, for often the location of the burden in these cases is really decisive as to which
side will emerge victorious." 5
Let us take another example. Common-law courts have
held for over two centuries that a contract debt, barred by a
statute of limitations, revives if the debtor promises to pay
it. In rationalizing this result, they often say that the statute
abolishes the remedy but does not affect the right. 6 If we
assume that the word "remedy" has at all times and in all
places the same significance, we might argue that such a
statute ought to be classified as a rule "pertaining to the
remedy" in conflict of laws. But is this not the sheerest casuistry? A rule does not become a remedial rule for conflict of
laws purposes simply because someone has applied the word
"remedy" to it in a totally different context. The considera" Cook, "'Substance' and 'Procedure' in the Conflict of Laws," (1933) 42
L. J. 333, 346.
"See, e.g., Quantock v. England, (rno) 5 Burr. z6z8, 98 Eng. Rep. 382.
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tions of expediency which lead the courts to permit the revival
of statute-barred debts are totally different from those bearing upon the question whether or not a given rule of foreign
law should be adopted. The word remedy should not be
juggled about in such a way as to make the judicial solution
of the first problem affect that of the second. Yet this dismally
mechanical type of reasoning appears to have influenced an
English court in one of the early cases 7 and has probably affected the decisions of other courts too.
The suggestion is therefore offered that a court, in resolving
a substance-procedure problem, ought not to be influenced
by the fact that the word "procedure" or "remedy" has been
applied to a particular rule of law in the process of determining some question which is purely a question of internal law.
In other words, classification ought not to be governed by the
internal law of the forum nor by the internal law of the place
of wrong. It ought to be governed by conflict of laws policies.
SECTION

I5

POSSIBLE BASES OF CLASSIFICATION CONSIDERED

In dealing with the so-called problem of classification, certain writers discuss extensively the question whether the classification ought to be determined by the internal law of the
forum or by the proper law of the case, i.e., for the purposes of
this treatise, the law of the place of wrong. As we have seen,
there are three alternative modes of stating the classification
problem. The elements of the problem are a rule of the
forum's internal law and a rule of the internal law of the
state of wrong which conflict with one another. We may purport to classify the local rule, the foreign rule, or the subject
matter of these rules. Our problem is to make a classification
in order properly to apply the forum's choice-of-law principle.
7

Williams v. Jones, (18II) 13 East 439, 104 Eng. Rep. 441.
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We must assign the conflicting rules or their subject-matter
to the category of substance or the category of procedure, for
the purposes of the forum's conflict of laws rules. If we view
this classification as a purely logical operation, there are three
ways in which it might be carried out.
( r) We might adopt as the basis of our classification some
classification of the local rule which has been made for some
internal law purpose at the forum.
( 2) We might adopt some classification of the foreign rule
which has been made for some internal law purpose in the
law of the place of wrong.
(3) We might adopt the classification of the foreign rule
(if any) which the court of the state of wrong has made in
dealing with a conflict of laws problem analogous to that
which is now before the court of the forum.
In reading the works of writers on this subject it is not
always easy to be sure which of these last two alternatives they
have in mind when they speak of classification by the proper
law. Let us consider, in order, each of the three methods
which have been suggested.
The first method is classification according to the internal
law of the forum. 1 It is not very favourably regarded by most
writers but Cheshire suggests that it must be adopted under
some circumstances:
"It is clear that with one important exception secondary
classification must be effected according to the lex causae. The
exception is this, that if the result of classifying some English
or foreign rule in the manner adopted by the foreign lex
causae is to infringe a rule of English internal law which is
1
In speaking of classification according to the internal law of the forum we
do not mean to imply that the rule of the law whose classification is in question
will have been classified as substance or procedure for all internal law purposes.
Within the internal law of the forum a particular rule may be regarded as
"procedure" for some purposes and "substance" for others.
The same is true of the conflicting rule of the law of the place of wrong so
far as its classification in the internal law of the place of wrong is concerned.
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regarded in this country as a rule of procedure, then the English classification must be followed.
"That this exception is justifiable cannot be doubted. It is
inevitable that in the sphere of substance and procedure an
English Court which encounters an English rule of procedure
should adhere rigidly to its own principles of classification. No
Court can be expected to disregard one of its well-established
procedural rules merely because the particular action happens
to contain a foreign element. . . .
"· .. Normally the lex causae should be omnipotent,
but this cannot be so if the result is to contravene an English
rule of procedure. A Court which has consistently acted on the
assumption that one of its own rules is procedural in nature
can scarcely allow its view to be disturbed in a limited class of
cases merely because a foreign court would have acted on a
different assumption." 2
No doubt Dr. Cheshire's statement gives us a fairly accurate description of the usual practice of English courts. It is
impossible to agree with him that this practice is justifiable or
necessary. In the light of Professor Cook's arguments it appears to be not only unnecessary, but undesirable because (as
Dr. Cheshire admits) it often frustrates choice-of-law policies.
What is necessary is that English courts (and perhaps Dr.
Cheshire himself) should recognize the fact that "procedure"
may have one meaning in English internal law and another in
English conflict of laws. It is not, of course, suggested that the
court of the forum should not take into account the policy and
the practical effect of a rule of its own internal law. If, for example, a tort action were brought which would be barred by
the forum's statute of limitations (though not barred by the
law of the place of wrong) the court might feel that the policy
of the forum forbade the trial of such a stale claim. But the
court should not rigidly adhere to its own statute of limitations merely because the statute had been said to "pertain to
the remedy."

° CHESHIRE, PRIVATE

INTERNATIONAL LAW,

Ed.

2 (1938) 38.
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The second method which has been proposed is classification
according to the internal law of the place of wrong. 3 This
method is also within the gravamen of Professor Cook's argument. Suppose the court of the state of wrong has, in the course
of solving some problem of internal law, called its statute of
limitations a rule of "procedure." Why should that fact
determine the classification of the rule for conflict of laws purposes? The court of the forum is not concerned with the nature
of the rule in the abstract. Its problem is to decide whether or
not the rule can conveniently be applied so as to further choiceof-law policies. Choice-of-law policies require the maximum
possible application of the law of the place of wrong. The court
of the forum could easily follow the foreign statute of limitations. Why should it decline to do so because, under very
different circumstances, the foreign statute has been called
a rule of "procedure?"
In addition to the criticisms which Professor Cook has
levelled at all schemes for classification which are based upon
internal law, this method is open to a further objection. It does
not take any account of a very important practical matter, the
administrative convenience of the forum. Suppose a particular
rule of the law of the place of wrong has been classified, for
some internal law purpose, as "substantive." Notwithstanding
such classification, the court of the forum would have to reject the rule if its enforcement by the courts and officials there
could not practicably be carried out.
An individual and special method of classification according
3

When a writer speaks of classification by the foreign law or by the proper law
of the transaction it is not always clear whether he means classification by the
internal proper law or classification according to the conflict of laws principles
of the proper law. For a suggestion of classification according to the proper
law, see McClintock, "Distinguishing Substance and Procedure in the Conflict
of Laws," (1930) 78 UNrv. OF PA. L. REV. 933; HARPER and TAINTOR, CASES
ON CONFLICT OF LAWS (1937) 655; ROBERTSON, CHARACTERIZATION IN THE
CoNFLICT OF LAWS (1940) 246. This method of classification appears also
to be advocated by Cheshire with certain limitations. See CHESHIRE, PRIVATE
INTERNATIONAL LAW, Ed. 2 (1938) 38.
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to the law of the place of wrong has been suggested by Harper.
He appears to argue that the court of the forum ought to
classify a particular rule of the law of the state of wrong as
"substance" and so adopt it, if it embodies an important social
policy of that jurisdiction. He puts the matter thus:

"If the policy of a state in regulating social intercourse
within its borders and affording legal protection to certain interests of persons within the state represents such deep-seated
convictions of fairness and justice as to require the same legal
consequences by way of judicial action wherever recovery is
sought, whether in the local courts or those of other states, this
policy is expressed by characterizing a particular rule of law
as a rule of 'substance' rather than 'procedure'. In such a case,
the state having legislative jurisdiction over the acts or events
and the parties involved, attempts to extend the application
of the rules of its law to actions brought in the courts of other
states.
"Accordingly, it would seem that the law of each state
should determine what part of its own law is procedure and
what part is substance. The policy of each state is expressed in
its laws. Therefore, whether the policy of the state is of such a
character that any given rule of its law should be regarded as
substance or procedure is properly determined by the law of
that state. Whether a particular rule of any state is by it characterized as substance or procedure very often presents an extremely difficult question. Several factors may indicate the
policy which a state expresses in its legal rules." 4
It is impossible to quarrel with Harper's premise that the
purpose and ideals underlying a particular rule of the state of
wrong should serve as an inducement to the court of the forum
to assist in its enforcement. But the substance-procedure problem cannot be solved upon this basis alone. There are other
and more important factors to be considered also. In the first
place, we must always take into account the administrative
convenience of the court of the forum. No matter how preg• HARPER

and TAINTOR, CASES ON CoNFLICT OF LAWS (1937) 655.
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nant with social policy a rule of foreign law may be, it must
be classified as "procedure" and rejected if the technique of
its application is beyond the competence of the forum's officials. In the second place, the important choice-of-law policy,
uniformity, has its bearing upon the problem also. Suppose a
certain rule of the state of wrong is brought forward by one of
the parties. Nothing in the law or policy of the state of wrong
indicates that this rule is there regarded as representing "deepseated convictions of fairness and justice." If the sole purpose
of the forum's resort to the law of the state of wrong was to
respect and enforce the basic policies of that law, the court
might safely classify this rule as "procedure" and ignore it.
But there is still the ideal of uniformity to be considered.
Neither party should be permitted to gain any advantage
which the law of the state of wrong does not confer upon him.
Hence the rule in question, notwithstanding its insignificance
in relation to the policy of its home state, ought to be classified
as "substance" and adopted at the forum.
Let us now consider the third possible method of classification: classification according to the conflict of laws principles of the law of the place of wrong. This would mean that
any given rule of a state's internal law would always be placed,
for conflict of laws purposes, in the same category. At first
sight it might be thought that this method of classification
would produce a desirable uniformity in the conflict of laws.
Uniformity in the definition and application of choice-of-law
principles is a very important conflict of laws ideal. But the
rule that the law of the forum governs procedure is not a
choice-of-law principle, it is the negation of choice-of-law
principles. What is wanted is not its uniform application
everywhere but its contraction to the minimum practicable
limits. Classification by the conflict of laws principles of
the state of wrong is just as objectionable as classification
by the internal law of the place of wrong. Let us assume
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that the court of the state of wrong treats its statute of
limitations as a rule of procedure in conflicts cases.
This means that the court will dismiss all suits barred by
the statute regardless of their place of origin. If the court of
the forum adopts this classification, it will disregard the state
of wrong's statute of limitations in cases arising there. Such
a course of action would directly contravene all choice-of-law
policies. It would deprive the defendant of a clear ground of
defence which would have been available to him if the case
had been litigated in the courts of the place of wrong. Classification by the conflict of laws rules of the law of the place of
wrong is also subject to the criticism that it is unworkable
where the foreign rule is unsuitable for expeditious application at the forum. Under such circumstances the foreign rule
would have to be rejected no matter how it had been classified
in conflicts cases at home.
In the light of what has been said, we venture to conclude
that a court, confronted by a substance-procedure problem,
need not concern itself with any of these three proposed
schemes for classification, nor with the question which one
should be adopted. All of these schemes are deficient and unsatisfactory because they fail to take account of the social
purposes of choice-of-law principles and the practical purpose
of the doctrine that foreign rules of procedure cannot be
adopted. They are also undesirable because they tend to obscure these important purposes and to draw the court's attention·away from them. We venture to agree with Cook and
Stumberg that the answer to the so-called problem of classification is, in reality, a very simple one. The court of the forum
ought to restrict the category of procedure as much as possible
and to give the law of the place of wrong the maximum possible application consistent with the due and effective administration of justice. American courts seem to be working slowly
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toward this result. It is to be hoped that they continue to do
so, and do not allow themselves to be led astray by any of the
three theories whose defects we have attempted to demonstrate.
Another criterion, suggested by certain writers, for determining whether a foreign or local rule of law ought to be
placed in the category of procedure should be noted. 5 These
writers divide the work of courts of law into two parts: (a)
the process of ascertaining physical facts; (b) the ascription
of legal meanings to those facts, the predication of legal relations. Only those rules and practices which relate to the factfinding process ought to be regarded as procedural. U nquestionably this definition places emphasis upon a very striking
distinction which it is possible to make between the various
legal precepts coming into play in the course of litigation. In
everyday argument and exposition lawyers almost invariably
state their problems in terms of facts which are supposed to
exist in the physical world. It can, therefore, be plausibly
urged that the application of foreign law might most conveniently begin at the point where the court has before it a
clear picture of acts and events. Before this point could be
reached, however, the court might have to investigate a mass
of evidence and decide disputed issues of fact. If this part of
the proceedings were governed exclusively by the rules of
the forum, and not by those of the proper law, one of the
parties might gain a very decided advantage thereby, or some
important rule of the proper law, pregnant with social policy,
might be disregarded. In view of these undesirable possibilities, some courts have taken the trouble to follow certain
rules of foreign law although they appeared to regulate the
process of proving facts. 6
5
See STUMBERG, CONFLICT OF LAWS (I 9 3 7) I 2 8; Lorenzen, "The Statute
of Frauds and the Conflict of Laws," (I 923) 32 YALE L. J. 3 I r, 325.
6
See sections 33, 35, below.
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SECTION

16

EFFECT OF EXCLUSION OF FOREIGN LAW: BURDEN ON
PLAINTIFF

If we adopt complete uniformity as our theoretical norm
we may say that whenever a rule of the law of the place of
wrong is excluded as procedure an abnormal burden is placed
upon either the plaintiff or the defendant. When the burden
is placed upon the plaintiff, one of two things may happen.
Notwithstanding his loss of whatever advantage the application of the foreign rule might have brought him, the plaintiff
may succeed and recover a judgment. With this situation we
are not presently concerned. The other possibility is that the
plaintiff may lose his case. For example, the court may decline to follow the law of the place of wrong relating to
limitation of actions and dismiss the plaintiff's suit because it
is proscribed by the forum's statute of limitations.
Under these circumstances the plaintiff may desire to institute a second suit in some more favourable jurisdiction.
It will then become necessary for the court there to decide
whether the adverse judgment given in the former proceedings should be regarded as having settled the merits of the controversy. In order to ascertain exactly what matters were decided in the first suit the court will probably turn to the
formal judgment and to the law of the first forum. In the
example we have taken, the first judgment really decides
very little except that the plaintiff cannot bring an action in
that particular forum. It is important that the second court
should know this. The suggestion is therefore offered that a
court which, in dismissing an action, follows some local rule
of procedure ought to make the basis of its decision perfectly
clear. In this way it will facilitate the work of other tribunals
which are called upon to determine the effect of its judgment.
This does not mean, of course, that in cases of this type the
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court before whom the second action is brought will always
allow it to proceed. Other factors would have to be taken
into consideration besides the conclusiveness of the first judgment. In the statute-of-limitations illustration which we have
used most lawyers would probably agree that the plaintiff
ought to be given a second try. 1 But there are good arguments to the contrary. He chose the forum for the first suit;
ought he not to be content with the "procedure" there? Protracted litigation is undesirable for both parties. The plaintiff should not be allowed to whip the defendant from state
to state, looking for a favourable forum. A court's view regarding the propriety of a second suit would probably also
be influenced, to some extent, by the nature of the procedural
rule involved in the first one. Suppose the first court substituted its own rule relating to the burden of proving some
particular issue for that of the state of wrong. It is most unlikely that another court would, under these circumstances,
allow the plaintiff to retry the entire case. Such problems,
although interesting, have been little explored as yet by
courts or writers. We take note of them because they relate,
indirectly, to the problems of this treatise.
SECTION

17

EFFECT OF EXCLUSION OF FOREIGN LAW: BURDEN ON
DEFENDANT

The operation of the doctrine that foreign rules of procedure must be excluded will in some instances subject the defendant to an abnormal burden. The plaintiff, in such cases,
is permitted to profit by his selection of a particular forum
whose procedural rules help him to a recovery. Since the defendant will have no redress against an adverse judgment,
1

For discussion of this problem and citation of authorities, see FREEMAN,
JUDGMENTS (1925) vol. 31 § 1397; PIGOTT, FOREIGN JUDGMENTS AND JURISDICTION (1908) part 11 p. 78.
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this result is highly undesirable. Nevertheless, it has occurred
in a good many cases. Perhaps the most notorious are those
in which courts have disregarded the state of wrong's statute
of limitations and allowed actions which would there be
barred to proceed to judgment at the forum. 1
On the other hand, there is authority of a very high order
for the view that when the operation of local procedure would
press too hard upon a defendant, the attempt to enforce principles of the law of the place of wrong through the medium
of that procedure should be completely abandoned. Without
giving any final pronouncement upon the rights of the parties,
the court ought to dismiss the action. It is not very easy
to say just when this alternative course should be pursued because there are so few cases on the subject. 2
The authority referred to is Slater v. Mexican National
Railroad Co. 3 Suit was brought in a Texas federal court to
recover damages for a death occurring in Mexico. It appeared
that in a Mexican court, the deceased's dependent relatives
would have been awarded a series of periodical payments
during the probable period of his life, terminable upon any
one of several contingencies such as the marriage, majority, or
attainment of economic independence of the beneficiaries. In
the Supreme Court of the United States Mr. Justice Holmes
wrote for the majority:
"The present action is a suit at common law and the court
has no power to make a decree of this kind contemplated by
the Mexican statutes. What the Circuit Court did was to disregard the principles of the Mexican statute altogether and to
follow the Texas statute. This clearly was wrong and was ex1

See below, section 30.
For further discussion of the problem of this chapter, see Consolidated
Coppermines Corp. v. Nevada Consolidated Copper Co., (1926) 127 Misc. 71,
215 N.Y. Supp. 265.
See also the workmen's compensation cases discussed below, section 46.
3
Slater v. Mexican National Railroad Co., (1904) 194 U. S. uo, 24 Sup.
Ct. 581.
2
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cepted to specifically. But we are of opinion further that
justice to the defendant would not permit the substitution of
a lump sum, however estimated, for the periodical payments
which the Mexican statutes required. The marriage of beneficiaries, the cessation of the absolute necessity for the payments, the arising of other circumstances in which, according
to law, the deceased would not have been required to continue the support, all are contingencies the chance of which
cannot be estimated by any table of probabilities. It would
be going far to give a lump sum in place of an annuity for
life, the probable value of which could be fixed by averages
based on statistics. But to reduce a liability conditioned as
this was to a lump sum would be to leave the whole matter to a
mere guess. We may add that by article 225 concerning alimony, the right cannot be renounced, nor can it be subject to
compromise between the parties. There seems to be no possibility in Mexico of capitalizing the liability."
Three members of the bench dissented. They inclined
toward the view that the Mexican law of damages should be
characterized as procedural and disregarded. "The extent of
damages," they argued, "does not enter into any definition
of the right enforced or the cause of action sought to be prosecuted." Mr. Justice Holmes rejected this fissiparous notion:
"The theory of the foreign suit," he wrote, "is that although the act complained of was subject to no law having
force in the forum, it gave rise to an obligation, an obligatio,
which like other obligations, follows the person and may be
enforced wherever the person may be found. But as the only
source of this obligation is the law of the place of the act, it
follows that that law determines not merely the existence of
the obligation but equally determines its extent. It seems to us
unjust to allow a plaintiff to come here absolutely depending
on the foreign law for the foundation of his case, and yet to
deny the defendant the benefit of whatever limitations on his
liability that law would impose.
Therefore we may
lay on one side as quite inadmissible the notion that the law
of the place of the act may be resorted to so far as to show
that the act. was a tort, and then may be abandoned, leaving
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the consequences to be determined according to the accident
of the place where the defendant may happen to be caught."
The plaintiff's action was accordingly dismissed.
This decision promulgates an important principle of conflict of laws and raises several interesting questions. Why did
the court not carry on the adjudication in the customary fashion, substituting, where necessary, the rules of the forum for
those of the place of wrong? Mr. Justice Holmes makes the
answer quite plain; such a course would be unfair to the defendant. He would, in all probability, have been forced to
pay higher damages than a Mexican court would have exacted.
The case rests upon the basic ideal that the defendant's fate
should not be determined according to the accident of the place
where he "may happen to be caught." This reasoning suggests a further query. If the defendant can have the plaintiff's
suit dismissed because the use of the forum's procedure might
increase the bill of damages, may there not be other situations
in which the defendant could claim to be protected against a
very unfavourable procedural rule of the forum? Whenever
the substitution of a local for a foreign doctrine deprives him
of an unanswerable defence or renders his position especially
precarious, the theory of the Slater case would appear to at
least provide a basis for arguing that the court should decline
jurisdiction.
Following the same theory in the opposite direction, we
may be permitted to conclude that, if the element of hardship
to the defendant had been removed from the constituent
circumstances of the Slater case, the final result would have
been different. Had the court been of the opinion that a
common-law recovery could not possibly place a greater burden upon the defendant than would a Mexican decree, they
would very likely have allowed the action to proceed. Such
a result would be fair enough to both parties. 4
• See

CoNFLICT oF LAWS RESTATEMENT (1934)

§ 609.
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Although the Slater case upholds one major conflict of laws
policy, it does so at the expense of another. The defendant is
secured against a liability more onerous than that imposed by
the law of the place of wrong. But the plaintiff has been denied
a remedy in at least one forum. The Supreme Court laid some
stress upon the accessibility of the Mexican courts as a convenient place for him to wage his claim. Suppose he had shown
that the Mexican courts would not exercise jurisdiction over
the defendant or that the latter had no property there to
satisfy their decree. Perhaps, under those circumstances, the
court would have been willing to weigh the injustice to the
plaintiff of leaving him without any effective remedy against
the injustice to the defendant of subjecting him to a possibly
heavier penalty. On such a basis a different decision might
have been pronounced.
In Mexican National R. Co. v. Jackson 5 the plaintiff suffered personal injuries in Mexico for which he sought to fix
liability upon the plaintiff in a Texas court. The case differed
from Slater v. Mexican National R. Co. in that the injuries
to the plaintiff did not result in death. The Supreme Court
of Texas dismissed his suit upon grounds similar to those
adopted in the Slater case. The court also decided that the
enforcement of the Mexican law would be contrary to Texas
public policy. These two theories seem to have become merged
in subsequent Texas decisions.
5
Mexican National R. Co. v. Jackson, (I896) 89 Tex. 107, 33 S. W. 857.
The Jackson case was followed in Jones v. Mexican Central R. Co., (I902 Tex.)
68 S. W. 186; El Paso & Juarez Traction Co. v. Carruth, (I923 Tex.) 255

s. w.

I59·

The Jackson case was distinguished and criticized in Mexican Central R. Co.
v.Mitten, (I896) 13 Tex.Civ.App. 653,36 S. W. 282; SouthernPaci:ficR. Co.
v. Dusablon, (I 907) 48 Tex. Civ. App. 203, I o6 S. W. 766.
Federal courts in Texas refused to follow the Jackson case in Evey v. Mexican Cent. R. Co., (I897), 26 C. C. A. (sth) 407, 8I Fed. 294; Mexican Cent.
R. Co. v. Marshall, (I899), 34 C. C. A. (sth) I33, 9I Fed. 933; Mexican Cent.
R. Co. v. Jones, (I9oi) 48 C. C. A. (sth) 227, I07 Fed. 64.

CHAPTER

v

Additional Limitations on the Application
of the Law of Place of Wrong
SECTION

!8

PUBLIC POLICY OF THE FORUM

N SECTIONS r r and 12 we have tried to set out some
of the objectives which courts seek to attain by applying
the law of the place of wrong in tort litigation. Natwithstanding the compelling significance of these objectives,
few courts would care to undertake the blindfold adoption of
every foreign rule which this choice-of-law principle might
lay upon their doorstep. Suppose the law of the place of
wrong appeared to be extremely harsh or unfair. The court of
the forum would naturally be loath to lend the force of its
authority to a decision which was entirely contrary to local
ideals of justice. To meet such situations, the vague but generally accepted theory of "public policy" has been developed. 1
Foreign laws which conflict with the public policy of the forum
will not be accepted. This doctrine obviously leaves a good
deal of discretion to reject foreign law in the hands of the
judges. It is difficult to see how it could be more explicitly
framed unless all foreign rules differing from those of the
forum were excluded. This would completely wipe out choiceof-law principles.
In practice the public policy theory may have one of two
effects, depending upon the tenour of the foreign law which
the court refuses to follow. Let us consider first the situation

I

1

See Lorenzen, "Territoriality, Public Policy and the Conflict of Laws,"

(1924) 33 YALE L. J. 736, 748. See Loucks v. Standard Oil Co., (1918) 224
N.Y. 99, 120 N. E. 198; Herrick v. Minneapolis, etc., R. Co., (r883) 31 Minn.
II,

r6 N. W. 413·
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where the foreign law favours the plaintiff. The court, believing that law to be unjust, dismisses the plaintiff's suit.2
Such a decision is opposed to the purposes of choice-of-law
principles. But the plaintiff, although deprived of one forum,
may be able to enforce his claim elsewhere. The court merely
washes its hands of the case and leaves the parties as they
were.
In section 6 we endeavoured to trace historically the
progress of American legal opinion regarding this problem.
It apparently passed through three cycles. The problem became acute in the I 86o's with the advent of death statutes,
which varied a good deal from state to state. At first the courts
and text writers harboured grave doubts as to whether foreign
death statutes ought to be enforced at all. Then the courts
began to enforce them in some cases, with the cautious qualification that the foreign death act must be "similar" to that
of the forum. Finally they dropped the similarity requirement
but continued to insist, as they do today, that a cause of action
created by the law of another state must not conflict with the
"public policy" of the forum. Today the verbal formula is the
same for death cases, for other tort cases, for all departments
of conflict of laws. In both judicial opinions and extra-judicial
writings the view has been often and emphatically expressed
that as between sister states, only the strongest grounds should
induce one state to refuse its aid in enforcing the civil laws
of another. 3
• This is the most common result. By disregarding a single rule of the foreign
law for reasons of policy a court might also (a) make it more difficult for the
plaintiff to succeed or (b) reduce the amount of his recovery.
• See Beach, "Uniform Interstate Enforcement of Vested Rights," (1918) 27
YALE L. J. 656, 663; Goodrich, "Public Policy in the Law of Conflicts,"
(I930) 36 w. VA. L. Q. I 56, I7o; BEALE, CoNFLICT OF LAWS (I935) vol. 3,
p. I 6 5 I ; Nutting, "Suggested Limitations of the Public Policy Doctrine,"
(I935) 19 MINN. L. REV. 196; CONFLICT OF LAWS RESTATEMENT (193 4 )

§ 612.

See Eskovitz v. Berger, (1936) 276 Mich. 536, 268 N. W. 883; Loucks v.
Standard Oil Co., (1918) 224 N.Y. 99, 120 N. E. 198.
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Let us turn now to a discussion of the second effect which
the public policy theory may produce. Here the foreign law
favours the defendant. The court feels that it cannot reconcile that law with its own ideas of justice. So it gives an affirmative judgment for the plaintiff. This application of the
public policy theory is much more drastic than the first one
which we have considered. The defendant is forced to pay
damages in a situation where the proper law would not have
exacted them, merely because he is vulnerable at a particular
forum. Such a result is especially undesirable in the conflict
of laws. It is quite unusual for a court to deny a defendant the
protection of the proper law upon the express ground that
that law runs counter to the public policy of the forum. But in
a few instances this has been done. 4
SECTION

I9

THE FIRST RULE IN PHILLIPS V. EYRE AND THE CONCEPT
OF PUBLIC POLICY

In section 3 above we discussed the peculiar doctrine, laid
down by the Privy Council in The Halley 1 and epitomized
by Willes J., as the first rule in Phillips v. Eyre/ which prevents English courts from allowing a recovery under foreign
law unless "the wrong is of such a character that it would have
been actionable if committed in England." While the meaning of this sentence is not transparently clear, it seems to
require every plaintiff in an English court to show that the
• Johnson v. Carolina, etc., R. Co., (1926) 191 N.C. 75, 131 S. E. 390;
Galef v. United States, (D. C. S.C. 1928) 25 F. (zd) 134; Fox v. PostalTelegraph Cable Co., (1909) 138 Wis. 648, 120 N. W. 399·
See also the cases discussed at p. zoo, below.
'The Halley, (1868) L. R. 2 P. C. 193.
"Phillips v. Eyre, (r87o) L. R. 6 Q. B. r, 28. On the subject of this section,
see Hancock, "Torts in the Conflict of Laws: The First Rule in Phillips v.
Eyre," (1940) 3 UNIV. OF ToRONTO L. J. 400; Lorenzen, "Tort Liability and
the Conflict of Laws," (1931) 47 L. Q. REv. 483, 497; F<lkonbridge, Comment, (1940) 18 CAN. BAR REV. 308.
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acts of which he complains, though committed abroad, would
give rise to a liability under English internal law.
If we consider this rule historically, in relation to the time
and place of its enunciation, it does not appear so very absurd.
In the r 86o's, the idea of enforcing foreign law was still a
novelty. Many judges, both in England and in America, seem
to have thought that to give a judgment awarding damages,
which was not based upon statutes or decisions of the jurisdiction in which they sat, would be a daring innovation. Text
writers such as Wharton and Rorer had the same idea. 8 Some
judges like Sir Robert Phillimore and Mr. Justice Miller did
not share this attitude. 4 But they seem to have been exceptional. When the first rule in Phillips v. Eyre was enunciated,
American courts were toying with similar theories which they
did not entirely abandon for another forty years.
But in the cooperative atmosphere of modern conflict of
laws, the first rule in Phillips v. Eyre is like a breath from a
bygone age. As a restriction upon the normal application of
choice-of-law principles and the realization of choice-of-law
policies it is objectionable in its generality. Conceivably there
might be cases in which an English court would not want to
enforce a liability in tort created by some foreign state because
that liability was utterly repugnant to English ideas of justice.
But it could scarcely be contended that every tort liability unknown to English law is, from the standpoint of English law,
something so immoral that it ought not to be recognized. The
first rule in Phillips v. Eyre compels the court of the forum to
disregard foreign laws and fundamental choice-of-law policies
whether there is any special reason for doing so or not.
Cheshire, who emphatically deplores the English Court of
Appeal decision in Machado v. Fontes 5 and seeks to prove
8

See above, p. 26.
'For Sir Robert Phillimore's views see The Halley, (I867) 2 Adm. & Ecc. 3·
For Mr. Justice Miller's views, see Dennick v. Cent. R. R. Co., (I88o) I03
U, S. II,
"Machado v. Fontes, [I897] 2 Q. B. 23I.
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that it has been overruled, accepts the first rule in Phillips v.
Eyre with something approaching equanimity. 6 He argues
that the rule, though severe in its generality, has the merit of
simplicity. It can easily be applied and it enables the parties
to know where they stand so far as English courts are concerned. Now there are undoubtedly some legal problems ior
which a simple, workable criterion is very desirable. In a situation where two social interests, each deserving serious consideration, conflict with one another in almost every case
which comes before the courts, we may save time and trouble
in the long run by adopting a rigid formula and sticking to
it, instead of deciding each case upon its own merits by a nice
balancing of the conflicting interests. But the instant problem
is surely not one of this category. Here is no frequent conflict
of delicately balanced interests. In every case where an English court is asked to enforce the law of the place of wrong,
choice-of-law policies require that it should do so. On the
other hand, the cases in which the foreign law is so unfair or
oppressive that choice-of-law policies are opposed to English
ideas of justice will probably be very few and far between.
And when a case of this type does occur, the courts could
easily deal with it under their general discretionary power to
reject any foreign law which clashes with the "public policy"
of the forum.
The first rule in Phillips v. Eyre was formulated at a time
when the need for a rational system of conflict of laws was
very dimly perceived in common-law jurisdictions and when
many judges felt that there was something rather strange and
perhaps a little dangerous about enforcing the law of another
jurisdiction. Today that notion is obsolete. Every jurisdiction
has different laws and these laws are continually changing.
6

CHESHIRE, PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW,

Ed.

Z (1938) 302,
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What difference if a court in one jurisdiction enforces the laws
of another? "We are not so provincial," said Judge Cardozo,
"as to say that every solution of a problem is wrong because
we deal with it otherwise at home." 7 It is rather amusing to
note that the liability of a shipowner for the negligence of a
compulsory pilot which Lord Justice Selwyn refused to enforce in The Halley 8 and upon which he expended so many
high-sounding phrases, was later introduced by an act of
Parliament into English internallaw. 9
In keeping with the centripetal tendency of AngloDominion jurisprudence, the first rule in Phillips v. Eyre has
been transplanted to some of the federal Dominions where
it is indeed an exotic plant. Between the territorial units of a
federal state there should be friendship and cooperation. It
seems incredible that because in I 868 the Privy Council refused to enforce a particular rule of Belgian law, the courts
of Canadian provinces should refuse to enforce any law of a
sister province which happens to differ slightly from their
own. Yet this appears to be the prevailing doctrine in Canada
today. 10 One would look far to find a more striking example
of "mechanical jurisprudence," blind adherence to a verbal
formula without any regard for policies or consequences.
Notwithstanding Cheshire's suggestion, the application of
the first rule of Phillips v. Eyre in practice has raised some
difficult questions. In Potter v. Broken Hill Proprietary
7

In Loucks v. Standard Oil Co., (I9I8) 224 N.Y. 99, III, 120 N. E. I98.
The Halley, (I868) L. R. 2 P. C. I93·
"By the Pilotage Act, I9I3 (2 & 3 Geo. s, c. 3I).
10
Simonson v. Canada Northern R. Co., (I9I4) 24 Man. 267, 28 West.
L. R. 3Io.
For dicta, see O'Connor v. Wray, [I93o] Can. L. R. 23I, 2 Dom. L. R.
899; Canadian Nat. Steamships Co. v. Watson, [I939] Can. L. R. I, I Dom.
L. R. 273; Story v. Stratford Mill Building Co., (I9I3) 30 Ont. L. R. 27I.
Canadian courts applied the first rule in Phillips v. Eyre to exclude claims
based on the law of states of the United States in Papageorgiouv v. Turner,
(I 906) 3 7 New Bruns. 449; Gillis Supply Co. Ltd. v. Chicago, etc., R. Co.,
(I9II) I6 Brit. Col. 254·
8
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Co., Ltd. 11 the action was brought in Victoria by the owner
of a New South Wales patent for the unlawful use of his
invention in New South Wales. The invention was not patented in Victoria. How should the first rule in Phillips v.
Eyre be applied in a case like this? The defendant argued
that if he had used the invention in Victoria where it was not
patented he would have incurred no liability. Therefore "the
wrong" was not actionable in Victoria so the plaintiff could not
succeed. To this the plaintiff retorted that if the defendant
had used an invention in Victoria which was patented in Victoria he would have been liable. This, he claimed, showed that
Victoria law recognized "the wrong" of patent infringement
and so "the wrong" was actionable in Victoria. "What," asked
Mr. Justice A'Beckett, "are we to take to be the meaning of
the words-<the wrong must be of such a character'? Do they
mean that we are to regard merely the act of the defendant
and consider whether, if that act were done in the state of the
forum, it would give any right of action to the plaintiff or are
we to import into the state of the forum the circumstances
which surrounded the act in the foreign state, including the
existence of a privilege conferred under the statute law of
that state?" Taking the latter, more liberal view of the matter,
his lordship concluded: "In the case before us the defendant
was bound to observe the obligation imposed by the New
South Wales patent in New South Wales. It was under no
similar obligation in Victoria, but that would not prevent the
Victorian court from affording redress for the wrong committed in New South Wales if our court would afford, as it
undoubtedly would, redress for a wrong of the same character committed in Victoria." But the Supreme Court of Victoria was divided in opinion and the case went off upon
another point.
nPotter v. Broken Hill Proprietory Co., Ltd., [1905] Viet. L. R. 6u.
A somewhat similar problem was presented by Papageorgiouv v. Turner,
(1906) 37 New Bruns. 449·
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If the first rule in Phillips v. Eyre is applied in a purely
mechanical fashion, without regard to its underlying purpose, a little scholastic puzzle may be produced. Suppose B
injures A in state X whose law gives A a cause of action. A
brings suit in state Y, which subscribes to the first rule in
Phillips v. Eyre. A must show that "the wrong was of such a
character that it would have been actionable if committed in
state Y." Assuming the injury to have occurred in state X,
we find that the common law of state Y would have given A no
right of action. But a statute has been enacted in state Y (prior
to A's injury) which would permit him to recover. A argues
that this statute enables him to comply with the first rule in
Phillips v. Eyre. But B argues that since the statute was not
meant to have extraterritorial effect, A's rights cannot be any
greater than they were before it was passed. The simple answer
to B's argument would seem to be that there is no question of
giving the statute extraterritorial operation. The statute is
referred to only for the purpose of determining whether or not
a recovery by A would be contrary to the policy of state X.
But Canadian courts have reached divergent results. 12
By its own terms the first rule in Phillips v. Eyre only affects foreign "wrongs," foreign causes of action which belong
to the category of "torts." Other departments of the conflict
of laws are exempt from its severity. An action for breach of
a contractual obligation imposed by foreign law may be
brought in an English court even though English internal
law would not impose liability in the same circumstances. 13
Borderline questions may thus arise as to whether a particular
obligation created by foreign law falls within the tort category.
If it does, it must be strained through the more finely meshed
12

Compare Simonson v. Canada Northern R. Co., (1914) 24 Man. 267, 28
West. L. R. 310, with Story v. Stratford Mill Building Co., (1913) 30 Ont.

L. R. 271.
For an ingeniously mechanical explanation of the first rule in Phillips v.
Eyre, see Note, (1937) 6 FoRTNIGHTLY L. J. 297.
10
In Re Bonacina, [1912] 2 Ch. D. 394·
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sieve appropriate to such obligations, instead of the general
sieve of "public policy." This state of affairs produces a problem of classification. The foreign law must be classified as tort
or non-tort for the purpose of this rule of English conflict
of laws.
Batthyany v. W alford 14 presented one of these borderline
problems. The plaintiff was the tenant in possession of certain large estates in Austria under a fidei commiss. He brought
action in England against the personal representative of a
previous tenant claiming that the personal representative was
liable, under Austrian law, for the deterioration and dilapidation of the Austrian estates during the lifetime of the previous
tenant. The defendant argued that this claim based upon
Austrian law was a claim sounding in tort; that therefore it
must be tested by the first rule in Phillips v. Eyre; that upon
that test it must be rejected since, under English internal law,
a tenant's liability for waste could not be enforced against
his estate after death. The court experienced difficulty, as one
might expect, in classifying the Austrian fidei commiss as tort
or non-tort, even for conflict of laws purposes. At one point an
Austrian lawyer was asked point-blank whether the action by
the possessor against the heirs of the preceding possessor was
an action founded on contract or tort. He replied: "It is not an
action founded upon contract. There is no contract existing
upon which it could be founded. It is an action founded upon
tort, if you understand by tort what the Romans understood by
the word delictum." But after an intensive study of the Austrian law the court decided that the liability thereby established was not a liability in tort and so it need not be tested
by the first rule in Phillips v. Eyre. "As I understand the
evidence," said Lord Justice Cotton, "the claim according to
the law of Austria is not in the nature of damages for default,
14

Batthyany v. Walford, (r887) 36 Ch. D. 269.
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but a claim under an obligation to keep the property in as good
condition as the late possessor found it, with liberty to excuse
himself from making good the deficiency if he can shew that
it was not caused by any default of his own. That, in my opinion, is not a claim simply depending on tort and does not come
within the rule of actio pm·sonalis moritur cum persona."
The opinion in this case does not contain any suggestion of
a functional basis for the classification ultimately adopted.
This is not surprising in view of the difficulty which we have
experienced in finding a functional basis for the first rule in
Phillips v. Eyre itself.
SECTION 20
PENAL LAWS

In most states the courts and officials do not attempt to
punish anyone for crimes committed against the laws of other
states. A number of cases have raised the question whether
or not the courts should also refuse to entertain civil actions
based upon foreign laws which appear to have a punitive purpose. As examples of such foreign laws, we might cite statutes
authorizing the recovery of exemplary damages or double
damages.
It is difficult to see why a general rule excluding civil suits
of a punitive character should be either necessary or desirable.
A foreign law of this type which was regarded as harsh or unfair at the forum could always be excluded on grounds of public policy. A general rule excluding all such laws might deprive a deserving injured person of any remedy at the forum
although there was no reason for doing so. The sweeping rule
which forbids criminal prosecution under foreign laws is wellestablished in practice. But the reasons for it are mainly historical. The failure of the courts to make some desirable ex-
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ceptions to it has not gone scathless. 1 Its extension to include
civil suits would be unfortunate. 2
In Huntington v. Attrill both the Supreme Court of the
United States 3 and the English Privy Council 4 took the
view that a civil action, brought by an injured party to enforce
a foreign law, should not be dismissed on the ground that it
was penal in its nature. Both courts were called upon to decide
whether a certain New York judgment ought to be enforced
in outside jurisdictions. This judgment made an officer of a
corporation liable to pay certain of its debts because he had
signed a false certificate regarding its affairs. It was argued
that the judgment ought not to be enforced outside New York
because it imposed a penalty. Both courts held that the judgment was not a penal judgment. In the Supreme Court, the
majority discussed the meaning of the words "penal" and
"penalty" as follows:
"Strictly and primarily they denote punishment, whether
corporal or pecuniary, imposed and enforced by the State, for
a crime or offence against its laws. But they are also commonly
used as including any extraordinary liability to which the law
subjects a wrongdoer in favour of the person wronged, not
limited to the damages suffered. . . . Penal laws, strictly
and properly, are those imposing punishment for an offence
committed against the State and which, by the English and
American constitutions, the executive of the State has the
power to pardon. Statutes giving a private action against the
wrongdoer are sometimes spoken of as penal in their nature,
but in such cases it has been pointed out that neither the liability imposed nor the remedy given is strictly penal."
Both courts admitted that a qui tam action by a common
informer would fall within the penal category, but this was
1

See STIMSON, CONFLICT OF CRIMINAL LAWS (1936) 25.

• See Lefl.ar, "Extrastate Enforcement of Penal and Governmental Claims,"
(1933) 46 HARV. L. REV. 193.
8
Huntington v. Attrill, (1892) 146 U.S. 657, 13 Sup. Ct. 224.
• Huntington v. Attrill, [1 893] A. C. I so.
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explained by the Privy Council to be unexceptional since such
actions are brought on behalf of the community. So far as
suits by private individuals are concerned, the punitive purpose of the recovery would seem to be immaterial. They are
not penal actions in the conflict of laws. As between actions
brought by a state, the distinction apparently turns upon the
nature and purpose of the recovery sought. A claim for money
exacted because of an offence against the laws of the plaintiff
state would no doubt be rejected as quintessentially penaP
But there is nothing in the reasoning of either court to preclude one state from collecting compensation for an injury
or breach of contract in the courts of another.
Although the decisions in Huntington 'V. Attrill were based
upon a factual situation involving a foreign cause of action
already crystallized in a judgment, their rationale plainly
extends, and was meant to extend to the treatment of foreign
legal doctrines in original actions. 6 The Supreme Court's definition of an action penal for conflict of laws purposes has been
adopted in a number of cases where foreign doctrines, not
judgments, were involved. In other cases courts have unfortunately taken a broader view of the penal concept. These
cases are discussed in section 26, below. 7

SECTION 21
INJURIES TO FOREIGN LAND

In many common-law jurisdictions the courts will not
entertain an action to recover damages for an injury to land
5
See Wisconsin v. Pelican Insurance Co., (1888) 127 U.S. 265, 8 Sup. Ct.
1370.
6
See Huntington v. Attrill, (1892) 146 U.S. 657, 671, 683, 13 Sup. Ct. 224.
7
See generally, Lefiar, "Extrastate Enforcement of Penal and Governmental
Claims," (1933) 46 HARV. L. REV. 193; STIMSON, CONFLICT OF CRIMINAL
LAWS (1936) 33; Note, (1929) 38 YALE L. J. 387.
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situated in another jurisdiction. 1 These courts say that such a
suit is beyond their competence. Without even considering the
terms of the foreign law they turn the plaintiff away. Every
court which takes this view deprives the plaintiff of an available forum. The enquiring student of the law will naturally
ask what is the reason for this restrictive doctrine.
It is submitted that there is no adequate reason. The point is
sometimes taken in support of the doctrine that it may be
necessary for the court of the forum to decide a question of
title to the foreign land. That is true. But is such a question
any more difficult for the court of the forum than any other
question of foreign law? The application of any choice-of-law
principle may require the court of the forum to investigate
questions of foreign law. Why cavil at a question of title
to land? There are other species of actions, regularly entertained by the courts, which sometimes involve the determination of title to land outside the jurisdiction. An action for
breach of contract relating to foreign land may raise such a
question. An action for conversion of timber or minerals on
foreign land may turn upon the issue of ownership of the
land itself. On the other hand, the question of title may never
be raised. In an action brought in state X for damage to land
in state Y the defendant may not dispute the plaintiff's title
to the land at all. But, by virtue of the doctrine under discussion, such a suit cannot proceed.
A second point sometimes made in favour of this doctrine
is based upon the court's lack of control over the subject mat1
British South Africa Co. v. Companhia de Moc;ambique, [1893] A. C. 6oz;
Ellenwood v. Marietta Chair Co., (1895) 158 U.S. ro5, 15 Sup. Ct. 771;
Dodge v. Colby, (r888) ro8 N.Y. 445, 15 N. E. 703; Brereton v. Canadian
Pacific R. Co., (rS98) 29 Ont. 57·
The rule forbidding suits for trespass to foreign land does not seem to be
part of the law of Louisiana or Quebec.
See Holmes v. Barclay, ( 1 849) 4 La. Ann. 6 3; Glasgow, etc., Ins. Co. v.
Canadian Pacific R. Co., (r888) 34 Lower Canada Jurist r.
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ter. It is, of course, generally recognized that, while a court
might decide that one person had a valid title, a legal right
to the enjoyment of a piece of foreign land, it could not
effectively put that person in possession of such land or protect his possession. If A dispossesses B of his land in state X,
the court of state Y cannot send its officers into state X to put
B back into possession. The government of state X would not
tolerate such action. Suppose, however, the court of state X
were to award damages to B equal to the value of the land.
It is argued that this would be a mere substitution of remedies
and most unfair to A, because B might then return to state X,
recover possession of the land, and keep both the land and the
damages. 2 Given its fullest possible significance, this argument
merely proves that the court in state X ought not to award
damages equal to the value of the land but should only attempt to compensate B for the actual injury to the land resulting from A's acts. B could then recover his land without
injustice to A. However, even if the court in state Y did award
full damages, the court in state X could easily avoid any in'"'
justice by requiring B to repay part of these damages to A
before allowing him to resume possession.
The doctrine that no action will lie for an injury to foreign
land is a very old one. In Skinner v. East India C o.3 (I 66 5)
it was laid down by all the judges, reporting to the House of
Lords. It is a lingering vestige of the ancient rule that the
venue of every fact must be truly stated in the plaintiff's
pleading so that a jury can be summoned from that place.
In the sixteenth century the courts relaxed this rule so far as
to allow a plaintiff whose cause of action arose outside England to say in some cases, that it arose in Cheapside. But this in• See British South Africa Co. v. Companhia de Mo~ambique, [r 893] A. C.
6o2, per Lord Herschell at p. 625.
• Skinner v. East India Co., (r66s) 6 How. St. Tr. 710.
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dulgence was never extended to plaintiffs seeking recovery
upon a local cause of action. And the category of local causes
of action included suits for the recovery of land or damages for
trespass to land. 4
Lord Mansfield allowed several suits based upon injuries
to land outside England to be tried before him, but after his
death the old rule was re-established. 5 In Livingston v.
Jefferson 6 the problem arose before a United States Circuit
Court composed of Chief Justice Marshall and District Judge
Tucker. Chief Justice Marshall said he could see no good
reason for the rule but he adopted it for the sake of consistency
and continuity. His half-hearted decision to uphold the doctrine became a leading case which has been followed by many
American courts.
In Little v. Chicago, etc., R. Co. 7 the Supreme Court of
Minnesota refused to follow Livingston v. Jefferson. The
plaintiff alleged that one of the defendant railway company's
engines had started a fire which injured his land in Wisconsin.
The court allowed the suit to proceed, saying:
"We recognize the respect due to judicial precedents and
the authority of the doctrine of stare decisis; but, inasmuch as
this rule is in no sense a rule of property, and as it is purely
technical, wrong in principle, and in practice often results
in a total denial of justice, and has been so generally criticized
by eminent jurists, we do not feel bound to adhere to it notwithstanding the great array of judicial decisions in its favour.
If the courts of England, generations ago, were at liberty to
invent a fiction in order to change the ancient rule that all actions were local and then fix their own limitations to the application of the fiction, we cannot see why the courts of the
present day should deem themselves slavishly bound by those
limitations."
• See p. 21 above.
British South Africa Co. v. Companhia de Mot,;ambique, [I893] A. C. 602.
"In Doulson v. Matthews, (I792) 4 Term. Rep. 503, IOO Eng. Rep. II4J.
6
Livingston v. Jefferson, (C. C. 4th, I 81 I) I Brock 203, 4 Hughes 6o6, 15
Fed. Cas. 66o.
• Little v. Chicago, etc., R. Co., (1896) 65 Minn. 48, 67 N. W. 846.
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In Brithh South Africa Co. v. Companhia de Mofambique 8
the House of Lords gave exhaustive consideration to the problem of suits for trespass to foreign lands and decided that they
should not be entertained in England. Unlike American
courts, their lordships did not disparage the doctrine but appear to have approved it. Lord Chancellor Herschell, who
delivered the lengthiest opinion (there were no dissents), put
forward in support of the doctrine the various arguments
which we have considered. He also took the position that the
doctrine depended, in some measure, upon general principles
of international law. This argument appears to have been
based solely upon a quotation from Story. His lordship concluded that the grounds for the doctrine were "substantial and
not technical."
The refusal of the courts to try actions for trespass to foreign land has naturally raised a number of border-line issues
regarding objects which are sometimes treated as part of the
land, such as fences, timber, growing crops, minerals, etc. The
general trend of decision here appears to limit the scope of the
term "land" as much as possible. Considering the unsatisfactory nature of the general rule, this is only to be expected.
In Brown v. Hedges (qo8),9 the court of King's Bench upheld the transitory character of a suit in trover for cutting
timber in Ireland. No significance was attached to the objection that it might be necessary to pass upon the plaintiff's title
to the land. Subsequent decisions fully support this view.10
Suits to recover the value of minerals taken from land outside
the jurisdiction have also been assigned to the category of
transitory actions. 11
"British South Africa Co. v. Companhia de Mo~ambique, [I893] A. C. 6o2.
• Brown v. Hedges, (I7o8) I Salk. 290, 9I Eng. Rep. 257 •
10
•
McLaren v. Ryan (1875) 36 Up. Can. Q. B. 307; Stone v. United States,
(I 897) I 67 U.S. I 78, I 7 Sup. Ct. 778; Hodges v. Hunter Co., (I9I I) 6I Fla.
28o, 54 So. 81 I; Brady v. Brady, (I9IJ) I6I N.C. 324, 77 S. E. 235.
Contra, Long v. Long, (I9I7) 44 New Bruns. 599, 36 Dom. L. R. 722.
n McGonigle v. Atchison, (r885) 33 Kan. 726, 7 Pac. sso; Stuart v. Baldwin, (I877) 41 Up. Can. Q. B. 446.
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In Boslund v. Abbottsford Lumber Co. 12 a fire spread from
the defendant's land and burned over the plaintiff's land in
the state of Washington. The action was brought in British
Columbia. The court refused to allow compensation for injuries to the soil, fences or barns but awarded damages for the
burning of timber, growing crops, and grass in the pastures.
Another problem which we must consider is that of applying the doctrine of this section to multiple contact cases. Suppose A, in state X, does some act which causes injury to B's
land situated in state Y. It does not seem to have been doubted
that B can bring suit in state Y where the damage was suffered.13 A number of courts have also taken the view that the
court of state X has jurisdiction because the allegedly wrongful act of the defendant was done there. 14 But there are some
decisions to the contrary, holding that the action may only
be brought in the state where the injury occurred. 15
SECTION 22
LIMITATIONS CREATED BY THE LAW OF THE
PLACE OF WRONG

In some states statutes have been enacted which establish a
tort cause of action with the proviso that suits to enforce this
cause of action must be brought in the courts of that state and
not elsewhere. A person who has been injured in a state where
"'Boslund v. Abbotsford Lumber Co., (I925) 34 Brit. Col. 485.
See also Ducktown Sulphur, etc., Co. v. Barnes, (I9oo Tenn.) 6o S. W.
·593 (claim for injuries to grass, crops, trees by noxious vapours held to be
transitory.)
13
See St. Louis, etc., R. Co. v. Craigo, ( 189 5) I o Tex. Civ. App. 2 3 8, 3 I
S. W. 207; Thayer v. Brooks, (1849) I7 Ohio 489.
14
Rundle v. Delaware & Raritan Canal, (C. C. N.J., I 849) I Wall. Jr. 27 5,
aff'd I4 How. (55 U.S.) 8o; Foot v. Edwards, (C. C. 2d I855) 3 Blatchf.
3Io; Smith v. Southern R. Co., (I9o9) 136 Ky. I62, 123 S.W. 678; Armendiaz
v. Stillman, (I88I) 54 Tex. 623.
15
Howard v. Ingersoll, (I 850) I 7 Ala. 7 8o; Eachus v. Trustees of Illinois
& Michigan Canal, (I856) I7 Ill. 534; Boslund v. Abbotsford Lumber, etc.,
Co., (I925) 34 Brit. Col. 485 (semble).
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such a statute has been passed may attempt to bring an action
upon it in another jurisdiction. Should the court of the forum
accept the restriction in the law of the place of wrong and
dismiss the suit or should it attempt to give a transitory
remedy in defiance of this particular rule of the law of the
place of wrong?
A rigid compliance with the obligation and vested rights
theories would seem to require that the action at the forum
be dismissed. The law which created the right or obligation
has limited it so that it can only be enforced in one court. But
there is still a way out; we can distinguish between the right or
obligation and the mode of its enforcement. The law of the
place of wrong creates the obligation, the law of the forum
determines the mode of its enforcement. Thus we might allow
a recovery at the forum and still profess our adherence to the
obligation theory. This solution apparently did not satisfy
Mr. Justice Holmes. 1
Let us consider the actual social interests at stake. To prevent the parties from litigating their controversy outside the
state of wrong may put them to some inconvenience. It may
deprive the plaintiff of all recourse against the defendant if
the latter keeps himself and his assets out of the state of wrong.
On the other hand, by refusing to let the plaintiff collect his
claim at the forum we show proper respect, "comity," for
the government of the state of wrong. Actual decisions upon
the point are in conflict. Some courts have refused to recognize
jurisdictional restrictions in the law of the place of wrong 2 but
others have shown a disposition to give effect to them!1
1
See his dissenting judgments in Atchison, etc., R. Co. v. Sowers, ( r 909)
213 U.S. 55, z9 Sup. Ct. 397; Tennessee Coal, Iron & Railroad Co. v. George,
(1914) 233 U.S. 354, 34 Sup. Ct. 587.
=Atchison, etc., R. Co. v. Sowers, (1907 Tex.) 99 S. W. 190; Atchison, etc.,
R. Co. v. Mills, (1909) 53 Tex. Civ. App. 359, II6 S. W. 8sz.
8
Southern Pacific R. Co. v. Dusablon, (1907) 48 Tex. Civ. App. zo3, 106
S. W. 766 (plaintiff also a citizen of state of injury); Coyne v. Southern
Pacific R. Co., (C. C. A. 8th, 1907) 155 Fed. 683; Martin v. Kennecott
Copper Corp., (D. C. Wash. 1918) zsz Fed. zo7.
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In Tennessee Coal, Iron & Railroad Co. v. George 4 an
attempt was made to use the full faith and credit clause to prevent an outside court from disregarding a restriction contained in the law of the place of wrong. A workman who had
been injured in Alabama brought an action against his employer in Georgia. Alabama law purported to give the courts
of that state exclusive jurisdiction over such claims. The
Georgia court refused to follow this rule of Alabama law, and
allowed the action to proceed to judgment. The Supreme
Court of the United States held that the full faith and credit
clause did not oblige the Georgia court to comply with the
Alabama rule.
So far in the discussion we have assumed that the cause of
action created by the law of the place of wrong is one which
could be justly administered by the court of the forum. The
cause of action in question might, of course, be of a peculiar
character so that it could not be administered by the court of
the forum without subjecting the defendant to the risk of
a recovery more onerous than that which the law of the place
of wrong would allow. For instance, the law of the place of
wrong might, as in Slater v. Mexican National R. Co} contemplate a judgment for a long series of contingent payments,
which the court of the forum could not conveniently enforce.
In such a situation there is authority for the view that the court
of the forum should take no action at all but should dismiss
the plaintiff's claim without prejudice to his existing rights. 6
But the reasons for adopting this course are quite independent
of any express provision in the law of the state of wrong.
There is another situation which must be distinguished
from the problem which forms the theme of this section.
4

Tennessee Coal, Iron & Railroad Company v. George, (1914) 233 U.S.
354, 34 Sup. Ct. 587. See also Atchison, etc., R. Co. v. Sowers, (1909) 213
U. S. 55, 29 Sup. Ct. 397·
5
Slater v. Mexican National R. Co., (1904) 194 U.S. 120, 24 Sup. Ct. 581.
6

See section

I

7, above.
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Sometimes a state creates a cause of action and then purports
to prevent other states, not only from enforcing this cause of
action, but from allowing persons entitled to it any recovery
whatsoever with respect to facts which might form the basis
for the cause of action in question. W ork:men's compensation
laws often purport to have this effect. The question may then
arise whether or not an outside court ought to abstain from
applying its own local law in such a case. The further question
may also be raised: does the full faith and credit clause compel
it to do so? This problem is discussed in detail in section 4 7.

CHAPTER

VI

Some Specific Problems
SECTION

23

DETERMINATION OF THE NATURE OF DEFENDANT'S CONDUCT

NE of the prime factors which the courts take into
consideration in imposing tort liability is the character of the defendant's conduct which has caused
harm to the plaintiff. For analytical purposes it is customary
to distinguish three broad categories of conduct causing harm.
A defendant may be held liable for harm which he has caused
intentionally. Or he may be held liable for harm which,
although unintended, was causedby reason of his negligence.
Or he may be held liable for the harm which he has caused,
irrespective of his intention or the care which he has exercised.
Sometimes, for certain purposes, additional special categories
are used; under certain circumstances a defendant's liability
may be made to depend upon whether or not he has been
guilty of "gross negligence" in causing harm.
In various instances the rules of the state of wrong have
been allowed to determine the species of conduct of which
the defendant must be proven guilty in order to make him
liable for harm which he has caused. A recent, and very clear
example may be found in the "guest cases." In some states the
driver of an automobile is liable to a guest passenger for any
injury suffered by the guest passenger which is due to the
driver's failure to use ordinary care and skill in handling the
automobile. In other states the host driver's liability has been
diminished, sometimes by statute, sometimes by a process of
judicial interpretation. To succeed in an action against the host
driver the injured guest must show, not merely the lack of

O
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ordinary care but something further; "gross negligence,"
"wanton recklessness," "culpable negligence." A number of
cases have been decided in which the rule of the forum and
the rule of the place of wrong were different. It has generally
been held that the law of the place of wrong ought to determine the type of conduct on the part of the host driver which
would give rise to liability.
When the rule of the place of wrong required only ordinary negligence and the rule of the forum required some further element, the rule of the place of wrong was applied. 1
Some cases explicitly decide that the rule of the forum minimizing defendants' liability is not a rule of public policy in
the conflict of laws sense. 2 An Iowa court has held that it is
not a rule of procedure. 3 Conversely, when the law of the
place of wrong required something more than ordinary negligence, the court of the forum upheld that requirement. 4
In Boneau v. Swift 5 an action was brought in Missouri to
recover damages for a tort committed in Illinois. The plaintiff
had been injured by a swinging iron door while walking across
the defendants' premises. He was accustomed to walk there
without any objection from the defendants but they did not invite him to do so, nor could it be said that he was there in the
defendants' interest. According to the law of the place of
wrong (Illinois) the plaintiff's status was that of a licensee
and the defendants owed him no duty except "to refrain from
1

Eskovitz v. Berger, (1936) 276 Mich. 536, 268 N. W. 883; Freas v.
Sullivan, (1936) 130 Ohio St. 486, 200 N. E. 639; Loranger v. Nadeau, (1932)
215 Cal. 362, 10 Pac. (2d) 63; Redfern v. Redfern, (1931) 212. Iowa 454, 236
N. W. 399; Baise v. Warren, (1932) 158 Va. 505, 164 S. E. 655.
"Loranger v. Nadeau, (1932) 215 Cal. 362, 10 Pac. (2d) 63; Eskovitz v.
Berger, (1936) 276 Mich. 536, 268 N. W. 883.
3
Redfern v. Redfern, (1931) 212. Iowa 454, 236 N. W. 399·
• De Shetler v. Kordt, (1931) 43 Ohio App. 236 1 183 N. E. 85; Metcalf v.
Reynolds, (1935) 267 N.Y. 52, 195 N. E. 681; Wright v. Pettus, (1936) 209
N.C. 732, 184 S. E. 494·
See Howard, Comment, (1937) 36 MICH. L. REV. 268.
6
Boneau v .. Swift, (1934 Mo.) 66 S. W. (2d) xp..
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injuring him wilfully or wantonly, or by such gross negligence
as is the equivalent of wilfulness or wantonness." The court
of the forum (Missouri) applied this general rule to decide
whether the defendants' conduct was of a liability-creating
character.
In Dallas v. Whitney 6 blasting operations carried on in
West Virginia seriously damaged the plaintiff's property in
Ohio. The action was brought in West Virginia. The court
there decided that Ohio should be regarded as the state of
wrong so that its law would control the decision. Under the
law of Ohio a defendant who caused damage in this way was
liable for it, whether he had been guilty of ordinary negligence or not. This rule of Ohio law, determining the effect
of the defendant's conduct upon his liability, was applied by
the West Virginia court.
As we have indicated, the internal law of the place of wrong
may describe the conduct necessary to make the defendant
liable in very general terms such as "lack of ordinary care,"
"wanton disregard of the interests of others," etc. Under
these circumstances the court of the forum will decide for
itself in each particular case whether or not the facts, as
proved, fall within the general category of liability-creating
conduct established by the law of the place of wrong. Sometimes, however, the law of the place of wrong is more specific.
It may say that under certain circumstances a defendant must
do certain things. If he fails to do them, he is guilty of negligence. The general definition of negligence is supplemented
by a specific rule for a particular situation. For example, the
law of state X may say that a motorist who exceeds a certain
speed limit is guilty of negligence and so liable for any injury
caused by his excessive speed.
6

Dallasv. Whitney, (1936) u8 W.Va. ro6, r88 S. E. 766.
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Specific rules of this character may be imposed either by
legislative enactment or by a series of judicial decisions dealing with a specific problem.
What is the status of rules of this character in the conflict
of laws? The reports are full of instances in which such rules
forming part of the law of the place of wrong have been applied, usually without question, by outside courts. On the
positive side, this treatment has been accorded to rules which
made the following omissions, taken with their attendant
circumstances, negligence per se: failure of a locomotive
driver to signal at a railway crossing/ failure of railway employees to operate gates at a crossing, 8 failure of a locomotive
driver to look out for pedestrians on the line,9 failure of an
automobile driver to observe a speed limit/0 failure of employer to guard dangerous machinery. 11
Specific rules defining the duty of the defendant in particular circumstances may be negative as well as positive in
character. A court may say that a defendant who, under certain
circumstances fails to do certain things shall not, for that reason only, be deemed guilty of negligence. For example, some
state courts have said that a locomotive driver is not guilty
of negligence merely because he fails to keep a lookout for
trespassers walking on the railway track. Such negative rules
have often been imported from the law of the place of wrong.
Following a rule of the law of the place of wrong it has been
held that the following omissions, taken with their attendant
circumstances, did not in themselves constitute negligence:
7
Norfolk, etc., R. Co. v. Norton Iron Works, (C. C. A. 6th, 1922) 279
Fed. 32; Hiatt v. St. Louis, etc., R. Co., (1925) 308 Mo. 77, 271 S. W. 8o6;
Gardner v. New York, etc., R. Co., (r892) 17 R.I. 790, 24 Atl. 831.
8

Cox v. Terminal R. Ass'n., (193 r Mo.) 43 S. W. (2d) 57 I.

"Wheeler v. Southern R. Co., (I9I6) III Miss.
1

°Kemp

11

sz8,

7I So. 8I2.

v. Stephenson, (I93I) I39 Misc. 38, 247 N. Y. Supp. 650.

Security Cement & Lime Co. v. Bowers, (I 9 J 4) r Z4 Md.

II,

9 I Atl. 8 34·
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failure of a locomotive driver to look out for trespassers on
the track, 12 failure of a locomotive driver to slow down at a
crossing, 13 failure of a locomotive driver to signal at a private
crossing, 14 failure of a railroad company to block switches. 15

SECTION

24

CAUSATION

Section 3 83 of the "Conflict of Laws Restatement" tells us
that "whether an act is the legal cause of another's injury
is determined by the law of the place of wrong." 1 There is
no reason to doubt the substantial accuracy of this general
principle but explicit judicial authority for it is not easily
found.
Connole v. East St. Louis R. Co. 2 deals with the question
of legal cause in express language. The action was brought in
Missouri to recover damages for the death of a truck driver
who collided with one of the defendant's trains at a crossing
in Illinois. An Illinois statute obliged the truck driver to
come to a stop before crossing the railroad track, and, according to the Illinois decisions, a failure to comply with the statute would be negligence per se. However, the Illinois decisions also supported the rule that a failure to stop would
not bar the plaintiff's recovery if that failure was not the
proximate cause of the accident. If compliance with the statute would not have obviated the accident (because, had he
12
Teitsort v. Illinois Central R. Co., (1929) 322 Mo. 64o, 15 S. W. (2d)
779; Harrison v. Atlantic, etc., R. Co., (19I5) I68 N.C. 382, 84 S. E. 5I9·
18
Gannett v. Boston, etc., R. Co., (I92I) 238 Mass. 125, I30 N. E. 183.
"Thacker v. Norfolk, etc., R. Co., (19I5) I62 Ky. 337, I72 S. W. 658.
16
Newlin v. St. Louis, etc., R. Co., (I9o9) 222 Mo. 375, I2I S. W. 125.
1
CONFLJCT OF LAWS RESTATEMENT (I934).
"Connole v. East St. Louis, etc., R. Co., (I937) 340 Mo. 69o, Io2 S. W.
(2d) 581.
See also Louisville, etc., R. Co. v. Keiffer, (I 908) I 32 Ky. 4I9, I I3 S. W. 433·
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stopped, the driver could not have seen or heard the train approaching) then the failure to stop would not be the proximate cause of the accident. The Missouri court carefully
considered and applied these rules of Illinois law.
In Mosby v. Manhattan Oil Co. 3 an action was brought in
Missouri to recover damages for pollution of a stream in
Kansas. Several defendants, acting separately, had dumped
salt water and crude oil into the stream from which the plaintiff, a rancher, obtained his supply of water. Under Kansas law
each defendant was, in these circumstances, legally responsible
for the entire damage caused by the acts of all of them. Apparently Kansas law treated each defendant's acts as the legal
cause of the total damage. The Missouri court followed the
Kansas doctrine, although, under Missouri law, the result
would have been different.
The problem which forms the theme of the present section must be distinguished from another problem also involving the use of the conception of causation. This second
problem arises when a court is called upon to determine
whether the facts of a particular case are so connected with a
particular state that it would be fair to apply the law of that
state in determining the rights of the parties. In some cases
it is possible to argue that the defendant is not responsible for
the occurrence of events in a particular state, that there is
not a sufficient causal connection between the act of the defendant and the fact that certain events have occurred in a
particular state. If this is so, the argument proceeds, it would
be unjust to make the defendant's liability depend upon the
law of the state in question. This problem and the relation of
its solution to the causation conception are discussed in section
39, below.
8

Mosby v. Manhattan Oil Co., (C. C. A. 8th, 1931) 52 F. (zd) 364.
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SECTION

25

CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE

In deciding whether or not to impose tort liability, courts
frequently give some consideration to the character of the
plaintiff's conduct and its relation to the harm for which he
seeks to make the defendant liable. In some jurisdictions the
courts follow the general principle that a plaintiff whose failure to use proper care for his own safety has been a contributory cause of his injury cannot recover any damages; what is
known tersely as the doctrine of "contributory negligence."
Certain well-known exceptions to this general principle are
recognized in many states; notably, the doctrine of "discovered peril" or "last clear chance" and the doctrine of the
"inattentive plaintiff" sometimes called "the humanitarian
rule." 1 If the facts of a case bring it within the ambit of one
of these exceptional doctrines, the plaintiff will recover full
damages, notwithstanding his contributory fault. In some jurisdictions, however, a plaintiff's contributory negligence does
not completely bar him from recovery in any case but merely
reduces the amount of his damages. The court or jury merely
deducts an amount proportionate to the degree of the plaintiff's negligence so far as that is capable of measurement. This
principle is often referred to as that of comparative negligence.
In the conflict of laws the law of the place of wrong is
usually permitted to determine whether or not the plaintiff
has been guilty of contributory negligence. The law of the
place of wrong may describe in general terms what conduct
on the part of a plaintiff shall be regarded as contributory
negligence. The court of the forum will determine in each
case whether the plaintiff's conduct should be so classified.
Sometimes the law of the place of wrong describes, in specific
terms and with reference to a special fact situation, the conduct
1

For general definitions of these exceptional doctrines, see ToRTS RESTATE-

MENT (1934) vol. z, §§ 479> 480.
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on the part of a plaintiff which will constitute contributory
negligence. For example, in many jurisdictions the rule has
been laid down that a motorist approaching a railway crossing
must "stop, look, and listen." If he fails to do so and an accident ensues, his failure will be held to constitute contributory
negligence per se or contributory negligence as a matter of
law. If this "stop, look, and listen" rule is found in the law of
the place of wrong, the court of the forum will give effect to
it. 2 Similar treatment has been accorded to other rules which
make the following acts, taken with their attendant circumstances, contributory negligence per se: driving an automobile
in the dark too fast to stop within the range of the headlights,3
use by an employee of a patently dangerous machine/ parking an unlighted vehicle on the highway at night. 5
In jurisdictions where the plaintiff's contributory negligence prevents him from recovering anything, an exceptional
principle is usually recognized, the doctrine of "discovered
peril" or "last clear chance." A number of conflicts cases have
come before the courts in which this doctrine formed a part of
the law of the place of wrong. The courts have usually endeavoured to apply the doctrine in the sense in which it would
have been applied by the courts of the state of wrong. 6
Missouri Pac. R. Co. v. Coca-Cola Co. 7 is a good illustrative
decision. A truck belonging to the plaintiff was demolished by
"Pittsburgh, etc., R. Co. v. Austin's Adm'r, (1911) 141 Ky. 722, 133 S. W.
78o; Woodard v. Bush, (1920) 282 Mo. 163,220 S. W. 839; Louisiana Western
R. Co. v. Jones, (1921 Tex.) 233 S. W. 363; Connole v. East St. Louis, etc.,
R. Co., (1937) 340 Mo. 69o, 102 S. W. (2d) 581; Curtiss v. New York Cent.
R. Co., (C. C. A. 2nd, 1935) 79 F. (2d) 91.
a Inter State Motor Freight Co. v. Johnson, (1929) 32 Ohio App. 363, 168
N. E. 143.
4
St. Louis, etc., R. Co. v. Rogers, (1927) 172 Ark. 5o8, 290 S. W. 74·
• Singer v. Messina, (1933) 312 Pa. 129, 167 Atl. 583.
6
Morris v. Chicago, etc., R. Co., (1923 Mo.) 251 S. W. 763; Sing v. St.
Louis, etc., R. Co., (1930 Mo.) 30 S. W. (2d) 37; Johnson v. Atchison, etc.,
R. Co., (1927 Mo.) 290 S. W. 462; Cox v. Terminal R. Ass'n, (1931 Mo.) 43
S. W. (2d) 571.
7
Missouri Pac. R. Co. v. Coca-Cola Co., (1922) 154 Ark. 413, 242 S. W.
813,
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one of the defendant railway company's trains at a crossing
in Oklahoma. The defendant contended that the driver of the
truck was guilty of contributory negligence in failing to perceive the approach of the train. The plaintiff contended that it
was entitled to recover, notwithstanding the contributory negligence of its driver, basing its contention upon the doctrine
of discovered peril. Upon this point the law of the forum
(Arkansas) and the law of the place of wrong (Oklahoma)
differed. According to Arkansas law, if the persons running
the train could, by keeping a proper lookout, have discovered
the perilous situation of the truck in time to avoid the collision, the plaintiff was entitled to recover in spite of his own
contributory fault. The Oklahoma law was not so favourable
to the plaintiff. Under Oklahoma law the plaintiff, having
been guilty of contributory fault, could not succeed unless
he proved that the persons in charge of the train did discover
his helpless peril in time to avoid the collision but failed to do
so. The Arkansas court applied the Oklahoma law.
As we have indicated, the law of contributory negligence
has been amended in many jurisdictions so tha.t a plaintiff
whose negligence has been a contributory cause of his injury
is not completely barred from any recovery. His contributory
negligence merely has the effect of diminishing his recovery,
the damages being proportioned according to the degrees of
fault of the parties. When the law of the forum and the law
of the place of wrong are different, the law of the place of
wrong determines the legal effect of the plaintiff's contributory negligence. The cases may be grouped according to the
permutations of local and foreign law. First, the law of the
forum allows the plaintiff a partial recovery on a comparative
negligence basis but the law of the place of wrong gives him
nothing. There is authority for the view that in this situation
the law of the place of wrong controls and the plaintiff's action
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must fail. 8 The converse of this situation is that in which the
law of the forum makes contributory negligence an absolute
defence but the law of the place of wrong is more lenient with
the plaintiff and allows him to recover part of the damages
which he has suffered. Here, too, the law of the place of wrong
is usually applied; the court of the forum awards partial damages upon a comparative negligence basis. 9

SECTION

26

MEASURE OF DAMAGES: AMERICAN JURISPRUDENCE

In this section we are concerned with rules of various types
determining the amount of the monetary award which the
plaintiff may obtain in an action. A rule of this character may
generally be regarded as expressing a policy of the state creating it. If, for example, it permits a person to recover damages
for mental anguish it indicates a desire of the government to
give protection against this type of injury. Obviously, the
aims of choice-of-law principles can best be served by giving
the plaintiff exactly what the law of the place of wrong
allows him,-no more and no less. But when the law of the
place of wrong and the local law are different, various obstacles to the enforcement of the law of the place of wrong
may be raised.
The law of the place of wrong and the law of the forum
may differ in two ways. First, the law of the place of wrong
may allow the plaintiff less damages than he would recover,
in a similar case, at the forum. Second, the law of the place of
8
East Tennessee, etc., R. Co. v. Lewis, (r89o) 89 Tenn. 235, 14 S. W. 603.
• Fitzpatrick v. International R. Co., (1929) 252 N.Y. 127, 169 N. E. 112;
Jarrett v. Wabash R. Co., (C. C. A. znd, 1932) 57 F. (2d) 669; Caine v.
St. Louis, etc., R. Co., (1923) 209 Ala. 181, 95 So. 876; Louisville, etc., R.
Co. v. Whitlow's Adm'r, (1897) 105 Ky. 1, 43 S. W. 711; Keane Wonder
Mining Co. v. Cunningham, (C. C. A. gth, 1915) 22.2 Fed. 821.
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wrong may allow the plaintiff more damages, a more ample
recovery than he would get in a similar case at the forum.
Let us consider these problems separately. When the law of
the place of wrong allows a less ample recovery, the situation
is not unlike that in which the law of the place of wrong
allows no recovery at all. If we give the plaintiff damages on
the liberal scale of the forum and abandon the meagre measure
of the law of the place of wrong, the plaintiff gets a very
obvious advantage from the fact that he has been able to bring
suit at this particular forum. Such a result is most unfair to the
defendant. It would seem therefore that a court should "on
principle" refuse to grant the plaintiff an award bigger than
that which the law of the place of wrong allows him ..
Slater v. Mexican National R. Co. 1 presented this problem
in a most striking fashion to the Supreme Court of the United
States. The action was for damages for death. The law of the
place of wrong (Mexico) required them to be paid out over
a long period of time. The courts there were empowered to
relieve the defendant from making further payments upon the
happening of various contingencies. The Texas .federal court
in which the action was brought had no power to make and
superintend an elaborate decree of this nature. The plaintiff
suggested that the court should follow the ordinary rule of
the forum and order the defendant to pay a lump sum. But
because of the possibility that the defendant might thereby be
forced to pay more than the law of the place of wrong would
have required, the Supreme Court refused to make such an
order. "To reduce liability conditioned as this was to a lump
sum would be to leave the whole matter to a mere guess,"
said Mr. Justice Holmes. The plaintiff's suit was dismissed.
The Slater case, therefore, stands unequivocally for the
proposition that a court should not make an award of damages
which exceeds, or which might exceed, that permitted by the
1

Slater v. Mexican National R. Co., (1904) 194 U.S. xzo, 24 Sup. Ct. 581.
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law of the place of wrong. To do so would be contrary to one
of the basic policies of the conflict of laws. Following this principle, courts have frequently refused to permit the recovery of
damages upon a theory of measurement not sanctioned by the
law of the place of wrong. Damages for physical pain and suffering, consolation money for mental anguish, interest upon
damages have all been refused because they were not authorized by the law of the forum. 2
Calef v. United States 3 appears to be in conflict with the
doctrines of the Slater case. The libelant, an American citizen,
claimed damages for the loss of a cargo on board a German
lighter which had been struck by a United States Shipping
Board vessel in German waters. For the United States government it was argued that, under German law, they were
only liable for part of the damages in proportion to the degree
of their fault. The court, following the American principle,
allowed the cargo owner full damages upon three grounds.
(a) The German rule was contrary to public policy. (b) The
German rule dealt with the remedy only. (c) The German
law should not be applied to a vessel owned by the United
States. Foreign laws allowing cargo owners part damages only
have been applied by American admiralty courts in other
2
Damages for mental pain allowed by law of forum but refused because
not allowed by place of wrong. Western Union Tel. Co. v. Brown, (1914) 234
U.S. 542, 34 Sup. Ct. 955; Thomas v. Western Union Tel. Co., (1901) 25
Tex. Civ. App. 398, 61 S. W. 501; Western Union Tel. Co. v. Jennings, (1916)
110 Miss. 673, 70 So. 830; Christensen v. Floriston Pulp & Paper Co., (1907)
29 Nev. 552, 92 Pac. 210; Jackson v. Anthony, (1933) 282 Mass. 540, 185
N. E. 389.
Damages for pain and suffering allowed by law of the forum but refused
because not allowed by law of the place of wrong. Louisville, etc., R. Co. v.
Graham's Adm'r, (1896) 98 Ky. 688, 34 S. W. 229.
Interest allowed by law of forum but refused because not allowed by place
of wrong. Kiefer v. Grand Trunk R. Co., (1896) 12 App. Div. 28, 42 N.Y.
Supp. 171; Frounfelker v. Delaware, etc., R. Co., (1902) 73 App. Div. 350,
76 N.Y. Supp. 745·
Damages limited to maximum sum allowed by law of place of wrong. Keep
v. National Tube Co., (C. C. N.J., 1907) 154 Fed. 121.

8

Galef v. United States, (D. C. S. C., 1928) 25 F. (2d) 134.
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cases. 4 Unless something is made of the fact that the wrongdoing vessel was owned by the American government, the decision must be regarded as a very anomalous one.
Royal Mail Steam Packet Co. v. Campanhia de Navegacao
Lloyd Brasileiro 5 also sounds a discordant note. It arose out
of a collision in Belgian waters. Both Belgian and American
law would have permitted the respondent to limit his liability.
But under Belgian law he would have been liable for a smaller
sum than that fixed by American law. The court refused to
allow him the benefit of the Belgian limitation. Thus the
plaintiff received a large sum of money merely because he
brought suit in the United States. It is well-established that
even in cases governed by foreign law, an injured party cannot
recover any greater amount than that permitted by the American limited liability laws. 6 It does not necessarily follow,
however, that a foreign law of similar character should be disregarded. The court overlooked the important distinction between declining to enforce a foreign liability and declining to
recognize a foreign defence.
Let us consider now our second problem: the law of the
place of wrong gives the plaintiff a more liberal allowance
of damages than the law of the forum would give him. Under
these circumstances, choice-of-law policies would favour the
idea that the plaintiff should recover the full amount authorized by the law of the place of wrong. To limit his recovery to
the amount authorized by the law of the forum may in some
cases be almost as hard upon him as to refuse recovery alto• The Eagle Point, ( 1906) 73 C. C. A. (3rd) 569, 142 Fed. 453; Royal
Mail Steam Packet Co. v. Companhia de Navegacao Lloyd Brasileiro, (D. C.
N.Y., 1928) 31 F. (2d) 757; The Mandu, (D. C. N.Y., 1936) 15 F. Supp.
627·
• Royal Mail Steam Packet Co. v. Companhia de Navegacao Lloyd Brasileiro,
(D. C. N. Y., 1928) 27 F. (2d) 1002. A Scottish court rendered a similar
decision in Owners of S. S. Reresby v. Owners of S. S. Cobetas, (1923) Scottish
L. T. 719.
6
See below at p. II9.
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gether. On the other hand, the law of the place of wrong may
sometimes conflict with the public policy of the forum. When
this occurs the court will tell the plaintiff that he must take
what the law of the forum gives him or else go empty handed.
Such a decision does not, of course, violate the doctrine of
the Slater case because it is the plaintiff, not the defendant,
who suffers by the court's failure to apply completely the law
of the place of wrong.
There are a few cases in which courts refused to enforce
a foreign law governing the measure of damages on the broad
ground that the measure of damages "relates to the remedy." 7
But the facts of these cases show clearly that there was no
practical obstacle of convenience to impede the application
of the foreign law. The courts appear to have reached their
results by a purely mechanical deduction from an oversimplified and erroneous general theory. Perhaps they really felt
that the enforcement of the foreign law was inconsistent with
the forum's public policy.
Claims for damages based upon foreign law have also been
rejected or cut down on the ground that they were penal laws.
We have already discussed this peculiar notion in section 20,
above.
Sometimes the law of the place of wrong not only attempts
to compensate the plaintiff for his injuries but authorizes the
court to award him an additional sum as exemplary or punitive
damages. A judicial power of this kind indicates that the
foreign community is anxious to prevent the conduct penalized. At the same time the court of the forum might feel that
such conduct ought not to be penalized. It is not surprising
to find that exemplary damages, allowed by a foreign law,
1

98
N.
N.
8r

Dorr Cattle Co. v. Des Moines National Bank, (1904) 127 Iowa 153,
N. W. 918; Wooden v. Western, etc., R. Co., (1891) 126 N.Y. 10, 26
E. 1050; Armbruster v. Chicago, etc., R. Co., (1914) 166 Iowa 155, 147
W. 337; Evey v. Mexican· Cent. R. Co., (r897) 26 C. C. A. (5th) 407,
Fed. 294.
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have been refused for reasons of policy. 8 And some courts
have taken the view, advocated by Minor, that such damages
are penalties. 9 But since they are not recovered by the state
or its representative, they are not penalties as defined in
Huntington v. Attrill, and the Supreme Court has so held. 10
In a good many cases foreign rules conferring a right to a
punitive award have been enforced without objection. 11
Analogous to exemplary damages are double or treble damages and fixed monetary penalties. Some death statutes set a
definite sum to be paid by the tortfeasor in all cases. Granting that each of these remedies inflicts liability upon the defendant over and above reparation of the plaintiff's injuries,
they all appear, like exemplary damages, to fall outside the
Supreme Court's definition of a penalty. But they have all
been classified as penal laws by various state tribunals. 12 In
"Rochester v. Wells Fargo & Co. Express, (1912) 87 Kan. 164, 123 Pac.
729 (obiter).
"See Armbruster v. Chicago etc. R. Co., (r9r4) r66 Iowa 155, 147 N. W.
337; Grinestaff v. N.Y. Central R. Co., (1929) 253 Ill. App. 589; McLay v.
Slade, (r927) 48 R.I. 357, 138 Atl. 212.
10
In James-Dickinson Farm Mortgage Co. v. Harry, (1927) 273 U.S. 119,
47 Sup. Ct. 3o8.
11
Loucks v. Standard Oil Co., (1918) 224 N.Y. 99, 120 N. E. 198; Daury
v. Ferraro, (1928) 108 Conn. 386, 143 Atl. 630; Wellman v. Mead, (1919)
93 Vt. 322, 107 Atl. 396; Boston, etc., R. Co. v. Hurd, (r9or) 47 C. C. A.
(rst) 6I5, ro8 Fed. II6; Malloy v. American Hide & Leather Co., (C. C. Mass.,
19o6) 148 Fed. 482; Rodwell v. Camel City Coach Co., (1933) 205 N.C. 292,
171 S. E. roo; Louisville, etc., R. Co. v. Lynch, (1910) 137 Ky. 696, 126
S. W. 362; Lauria v. E. I. DuPont, etc., Co., (D. C. N. Y., 1917) 241 Fed.
687; Louisville, etc., R. Co. v. McCaskell, (1910) 98 Miss. 20, 53 So. 348.
12
Double or treble damages held to be penal. Langdon v. New York, etc.,
R. Co., (I89o) 58 Hun I22, II N.Y. Supp. 5I4, 33 N.Y. St. Rep. 907;
Mohr v. Sands, (I9I3) 44 Okla. 330, I33 Pac. 238; Bettys v. Milwaukee,
etc., R. Co., (I 8 75) 3 7 Wis. 32 3; Consolidated Coppermines Corp. v. Nevada
Consolidated Copper Co., (I926) I27 Misc. 71, 2I5 N.Y. Supp. 265.
Contra: Boyce v. Wabash R. Co., (I884) 63 Iowa 70, 18 N. W. 673.
Additional money penalty held to be penal. Taylor v. Western Union Tel.
Co., (1895) 95 Iowa 740, 64 N. W. 66o.
Contra: Coryell v. Atchison, etc., R. Co., (I918) 273 Mo. 361,201 S. W. 77·
Death statute fixing compensation for all cases held to be penal. Matheson
v. Kansas City, etc., R. Co., (I9oo) 6I Kan. 667, 6o Pac. 747; Raisor v.
Chicago, etc., R. Co., (I905) 2I5 Ill. 47, 74 N. E. 69; El Paso & S. W. Co. v.
La Lande, (I9I6) 108 Texas 67, I84 S. W. 498.
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Atchison, etc., R. Co. v. Nichols 13 the Supreme Court approved the extraterritorial enforcement of a death statute fixing the amount of damages for all cases. The court did not
even admit a punitive purpose behind the statute but pointed
out that, since a precise assessment of the loss caused by death
would be impossible, the fixed sum represented the legislature's approximate estimate of reasonable compensation for
all cases.
Rules of the forum limiting liability in particular cases
may also restrict the application of foreign law. A local statute
provides that the damages awarded in certain classes of cases
shall not exceed a fixed sum. Should the court obey this rule
even in cases governed by foreign laws? The answer to this
question would seem to depend upon the court's opinion regarding the policy of the local limitation. Some courts have
disregarded such limitations to permit the plaintiff a full recovery according to the foreign laws. 14 The restriction imposed
by the law of the forum might, however, be deemed to embody some very important policy of that law which the court
could not properly ignore. This appears to be the view of
American courts regarding limitations upon the liability of
shipowners. In The Titanic/ 5 a number of actions for death
and personal injuries were brought against the owners of a
18

Atchison, etc., R. Co. v. Nichols, (1924) 264 U.S. 348, 44 Sup. Ct. 353·
Northern Pac. R. Co. v. Babcock, (r894) 154 U. S. 190, 14 Sup. Ct.
978; Powell v. Great Northern R. Co., (r9o7) 102 Minn. 448, 113 N. W.
1017; Hanna v. Grand Trunk R. Co., (r89r) 41 Ill. App. II6; Hasbrouck v.
New York Cent. & H. R. Co., (r9u) 202 N.Y. 363, 95 N. E. 8oS.
15
TheTitanic, (1914) 233 U.S. 718, 34Sup. Ct. 754·
Section 4 of the Federal Death Act of 1920 (41 Stat. 537,46 U.S. C. [1934]
§ 7 64) abolishes the shipowner's right to limit liability in respect of death on the
high seas in cases governed by foreign laws. See The Vestris, (D. C. N.Y., 1931)
53 F. (2d) 847.
The American limited liability laws have also been applied to collisions in
foreign territorial waters. See The State of Virginia, (D. C. N. Y., r 894) 6o
Fed. 1018,
An English court would probably apply the local limitation of shipowners'
liability even in a case controlled by foreign law. See The Amalia, ( r 86 3) 1
Moo. N. s. 471, T 5 Eng. Rep. ns.
14
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British ship which had gone down on the high seas after
colliding with an iceberg. The Supreme Court held that although these actions were governed by British law, the owners
of the ship were entitled to the benefit of an American statute
fixing the maximum amount recoverable:
"It is true," said Mr. Justice Holmes, "that the foundation
for a recovery upon a British tort is an obligation created by
British law. But it is also true that the laws of the forum may
decline altogether to enforce that obligation on the ground
that it is contrary to the domestic policy, or may decline to
enforce it except within such limits as it may impose."
Despite the possible obstacles of public policy and the now
almost obsolete theories of "procedure" and "penalties," foreign rules for measuring damages are regularly applied in
tort cases. Damages for mental anguish, damages for physical
pain have been awarded because authorized by the law of the
place of wrong. 16 Many jurisdictions have adopted the rule
that when the plaintiff and defendant have both contributed to
the plaintiff's injury, the loss should be borne by both in proportion to their respective degrees of fault. When this rule
forms part of the law of the place of wrong it is usually enforced in other states.17
16
Damages for mental anguish. Texas, etc. R. Co. v. Gross, (I9IO) 6o Tex.
Civ. App. 6zi, 128 S. W. II73; Davis v. Gant, (I922 Tex. Civ. App.) 247
s. w. 576.
Death action; damages for pain and suffering of deceased. Boyle v. Southern
R. Co., (I9oi) 36 Misc. 289, 73 N.Y. Supp. 465.
Stream polluted by several joint tortfeasors; each one held responsible for
full amount of damage. Mosby v. Manhattan Oil Co., (C. C. A. 8th, 19 3 I)
52 F. (zd) 364.
17
Plaintiff partly responsible for damages; damages borne by plaintiff and
defendant according to respective degrees of fault. Fitzpatrick v. International
R. Co., (I929) 252 N.Y. I27, I69 N. E. II2; Jarrett v. Wabash R. Co., (C.
C. A. 2nd, I932) 57 F. (2d) 669; Caine v. St. Louis, etc., R. Co., (I923)
209 Ala. I8I, 95 So. 876; Louisville, etc., R. Co. v. Whitlow'sAdm'rs, (I897)
I05 Ky. I, 43 S. W. 7I 1; Keane Wonder Mining Co. v. Cunningham, (C. C.
A. 9th, I915) zz2 Fed. 821.
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MEASURE OF DAMAGES: ANGLO-DOMINION
JURISPRUDENCE

There is no case in the Anglo-Dominion jurisprudence
squarely deciding that the damages allowed for a foreign
tort should not exceed the amount authorized by the law of
the place of wrong. The situation is complicated by the bifurcate nature of English choice-of-law theory examined in section 2. The justification doctrine which originated in a group
of early English cases can hardly be regarded as throwing any
light on the matter at all. Focusing attention upon the juristic character of the defendant's conduct, it is silent regarding
the measurement of his penalty. On the other hand, the obligation doctrine, announced by Mr. Justice Willes in Phillips
v. Eyre 1 would seem to require that the law of the place of
wrong should determine the extent of the plaintiff's recovery.
The situation is further complicated by the case of Machado
v. Fontes. 2 There an action was brought in England for a libel
published in Brazil. The English court assumed that Brazilian law made this act punishable as a crime but would not
have compelled the defendant to pay damages. They indicated that under these circumstances they would not permit
the defendant to go scot free but would give the plaintiff
damages measured by the rules of English internal law. This
was avery exceptional case.3 Having decided to give the plaintiff relief, the court had no alternative but to follow the law of
the forum in computing damages, since the law of the place of
wrong gave no civil remedy at all. It does not follow that
this course of action ought to be taken in all cases. Such a
proposition would go directly against basic choice-of-law
policies.
1

Phillips v. Eyre, (r87o) L. R. 6 Q. B. r.
• Machado v. Fontes, [1897] 2. Q. B. 2.31.
8
See the discussion of Machado v. Fontes at p. r6.
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In Story v. Stratford Mill Building Co. 4 a workman sued
his employer in Ontario for injuries sustained in Quebec.
There was no question of criminal liability and the workman
had a clear cause of action under the law of Quebec. It was
suggested that the amount awarded by the jury should be reduced to the maximum permitted by Quebec law. The court
admitted that "were the matter res integra, it might not unreasonably be held that the plaintiff, by suing in another
jurisdiction, cannot put himself in a better position than if he
had sued in the country delicti commissi." But they felt constrained by the decision in Machado v. Fontes to allow the
plaintiff the larger sum permitted by Ontario law. This inference seems far-fetched and unfortunate.
An ingenious counsel in an Anglo-Dominion courtroom
dealing with the problem of damages for a foreign tort would
probably be able to make some use of the first of the two
rules in Phillips v. Eyre. 5 "The wrong must be of such a
character that it would have been actionable if committed in
England." It might be argued that the strict application of
this principle requires that English courts should never award
greater damages for a foreign wrong than those ·which English
internal law would authorize in the same circumstances. We
have already observed the unfortunate effects of the first rule
in Phillips v. Eyre itself. Its sweeping and automatic exclusion
of foreign law often needlessly frustrates choice-of-law
policies. A derivative doctrine regarding damages would be
equally objectionable.
There are a few other decisions and dicta which an AngloAmerican court might wish to take into consideration in dealing with a conflict between foreign and local rules governing
damages.
4
Story v. Stratford Mill Building Co., (I9I3) 30 Ont. L. R. 27I.
• Phillips v. Eyre, (I 8 70) L. R. 6 Q. B. I.
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In Cope v. Doherty 6 an American shipowner took proceedings in Chancery to have his liability limited in accordance
with the British Merchant Shipping Act of r854. 7 His ship,
the Tuscaroca, had become involved in a collision on the
high seas. The long point of the case was whether or not that
statute protected alien owners; the court decided that it did
not. It was sought in argument to obtain a decision in favour
of the petitioner upon the short ground that the statutory
limitations upon damages affected only the remedy and must,
therefore, be applied as part of the law of the forum in every
controversy before a British court. Refusing to accede to this
contention, both Vice-Chancellor Wood and Lord Justice
Turner affirmed in the clearest terms that a limitation on
damages affected the substance of the plaintiff's rights. In
this case there was really no question of applying foreign law.
The court purported to make its selection between the internal
law of the forum and the so-called "general maritime law"
governing collisions on the high seas.
In Lives ley v. H orst 8 the Supreme Court of Canada decided, in an action upon a foreign contract, that the proper law
of that contract should determine the extent of the damages to
be recovered. Speaking for the court, Mr. Justice Duff referred to Cope v. Doherty as "authority, both unmistakable
in effect and of a high order, for the proposition that the
measure of damages in an action for reparation in respect of a
tort in a foreign country, is not matter of procedure but matter
of the substance of liability."
Ekins v. East India Co. 9 was an action brought in England for conversion of a ship in the East Indies. Lord Chancel"Cope v. Doherty, (r8s8) 2 De G. & J. 6I4, 44 Eng. Rep. II27.
7
British Merchant Shipping Act, (I854) I7 & r8 Viet. c. Io4. The law is
different today; any owner, British or foreign, may limit his liability in an
English court. See The Amalia, (I863) I Moo. N. S. 471.
"Livesleyv. Horst, [I924] Can. L. R. 6os, [I925] I Dorn. L. R. I59·
9
Ekins v. East India Co., (I7I7) I P. Wrns. 395, 24 Eng. Rep. 441.
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lor Cowper allowed the plaintiff to recover interest from the
date of the conversion at the high rate then obtainable in the
East Indies. Nothing was said, however, regarding East
Indian law.
SECTION

28

PROPER PLAINTIFFS TO THE ACTION

The law of the place of wrong may be said to decide who is
the proper plaintiff to an action in the sense that it determines
whether the plaintiff bringing the suit has any claim at all
against the defendant. Thus, in Ross v. Sinhjee, 1 an action
brought in Scotland alleging the seduction of the plaintiff by
the defendant in London was dismissed on the ground that
English common law gave the right of action in such circumstances, not to the seduced woman, but to her parents. It was
argued that this rule was remedial only but without success.
Assuming, however, that the law of the place of wrong does
give the plaintiff some claim against the defendant, it may be
necessary to decide whether other formal parties should be
added to the record, such as next friends, guardians, assignors,
husbands, etc. There is authority for the view that, in general,
the law of the forum should answer this question. 2
Problems of both types are raised by suits based on death
statutes, which often provide that a representative action shall
be brought by the deceased's personal representative on behalf
of a group of designated beneficiaries. Since the latter are the
real parties in interest it has been uniformly held that the
1

Ross v. Sinhjee, (1891) 29 Scottish L. R. 63. See also Buckles v. Ellers,
220, 37 Am. Rep. 156.

(188o) 72 Ind.

"CoNFLICT OF LAWS RESTATEMENT (1934) §588; BEALE, CONFLICT OF
LAWS (1935) vol. 3, p. 1603.

See contra: Lucas v. Coupal, (r93o) 66 Ont. L. R. 141.
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statute of the state of wrong shall determine their identity and
the shares which they are to receive.3
Sometimes the statute ordains that the damages shall be
distributed in the same proportions as personal property of
a deceased intestate. A question of construction is then raised;
does the statute refer to the distribution statute of the state
of wrong or to that of the deceased man's domicile? Both
views have been taken in the decisions. 4 A similar question is
raised by the use of the words "heirs," or "next-of-kin," in
the death statute of the state of wrong. Several courts appear
to have assumed, rather than consciously determined, that the
denotation of these terms should be ascertained by considering
the inheritance laws of the state of wrong. 5
The cases dealing with these problems all accept the principle that the law of the place of wrong should be allowed to
say who shall divide the damages. But some courts, having res An anomalous case is Re Hertell's Estate, (I929) I35 Misc. 36, 237 N.Y.
Supp. 655, where a New York surrogate divided the damages according to the
law of the forum.
• Applying the scheme of distribution of the state where tort committed:
Bolinger v. Beacham, (I 9 I o) 8 I Kan. 746, I o6 Pac. I 094; Re Coe's Estate,
(I9o6) qo Iowa 307, Io6 N. W. 743; Mcdonald v. McDonald's Adm'r,
(I 894) 96 Ky. 209, 28 S. W. 482; Stoeckman v. Terre Haute, etc., R. Co.,
(I884) IS Mo. App. 503; Hartman v. Duke, (I929) I6o Tenn. I34, 22 S.
W. (2d) 221.
Applying the scheme of distribution in force where decedent died domiciled:
Pennsylvania R. Co. v. Levine, (C. C. A. 2nd, I92o) 263 Fed. 557·
See Note, (I92o) 29 YALE L. J. 798.
Sometimes the death statute of the place of wrong expressly stipulates what
law shall determine the distribution of damages. See Dronenburg v. Harris,
(I9o8) Io8 Md. 597, 7I Atl. 8I; Hartness v. Pharr, (I9o3) 133 N.C. 566,
45 S. E. 90I; Re Hertell's Estate, (I929) I35 Misc. 36, 237 N.Y. Supp. 655.
5
Charlton v. St. Louis, etc., R. Co., (I9o6) 200 Mo. 4I3, 98 S. W. 529;
Wheeler v. Southern R. Co., (I 9 I 6) I I I Miss. 52 8, 7 I So. 8 I 2; Stangeland
v. Minneapolis, etc., R. Co., (I9o8) Ios Minn. 224, II7 N. W. 386; Stipetich
v. Security Stove & Manufacturing Co., (I92o Mo.) 2I8 S. W. 964.
The Supreme Court has held that the membership in the class of "next-of-kin,"
as that term is used in the Federal Employers' Liability Act, should be determined according to the inheritance laws of the state where the cause of action
arose. Seaboard Air Line Ry. v. Kenney, (19I6) 240 U. S. 489, 36 Sup. Ct.
458; see also Meisenhelder v. Chicago, etc., R. Co., (I927) I70 Minn. 3I7,
2I3 N. W. 32.

126

TORTS IN THE CONFLICT OF LAWS

ferred to that law, find themselves carried by a species of
renvoi to a third system of law, the law of the deceased person's domicile.
In Re Degaramo's Estate 6 the wrongful death occurred in
Ohio. A New York court had to decide whether a certain
claimant was the husband of the deceased within the terms of
the Ohio death act. This issue turned upon the effect of a divorce obtained in Michigan. The court did not refer the validity of the divorce to Ohio law. They referred it to the law
of the forum (New York) and decided that the judgment
ought not to be recognized.
In several cases the court found that the law of the place of
wrong authorized the trial judge to apportion the damages
among the beneficiaries. This procedure was followed at the
forum. 7
What law should indicate the proper formal plaintiff to
represent the beneficiaries in an action for wrongful death?
Conceivably the view might have been taken that this was a
matter of procedure to be determined by the law of the forum.
But at one time many jurisdictions had no death statute and
consequently no procedural rule to apply in this connection.
Hence there has grown up a general practice of insisting that
the formal plaintiff in a death action should be the person
prescribed by the statute of the state of wrong. There are a
few decisions to the contrary. 8
• Re Degaramo's Estate, (I895) 86 Hun 390, 33 N.Y. Supp. 502, 67 N.Y.
St. Rep. 2I5.
7
Powell v. Great Northern R. Co. (I907) I02 Minn. 448, II3 N. W.
IOI7i Hanna v. Grand Trunk R. Co. (I89I) 4I Ill. App. II6; Lauria v. E.
I. DuPont etc. (D. C. N.Y., I9I7) 241 Fed. 687.
8
In Stewart v. Baltimore etc. R. Co. (I 897) I 68 u. s. 445, I 8 Sup. Ct. I05,
the Supreme Court held that an action might be brought in the District of
Columbia by an administrator appointed there although the statute of the place
of wrong, Maryland, prescribed suit in the name of that state. This was followed in Hollenbach v. Elmore & H. Contracting Co. (C. C. N.Y., 1909) 174
Fed. 845. A contrary ruling had been given in Stone v. Groton Bridge & Mfg.
Co. (I894) 84 N.Y. S. Ct. (77 Hun) 99, 28 N.Y. Supp. 446.
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If the statute of the state of wrong decrees that suit shall
be brought by a relative-beneficiary, he or she and not the
personal representative is the proper plaintiff.9 If the statute
provides for a representative action by the personal representative, the beneficiaries may not sue for themselves. 10
When the statute of the state of wrong provides for a representative action a further question may arise: By what state
must the proper administrator to maintain the suit be appointed? It seems to have always been taken for granted that
an administrator appointed in the state of wrong would come
within the terms of the statute in force there. But in a number
of early cases an administrator appointed in a state other than
the state of wrong was refused permission to sue on the ground
that the statute of the state of wrong authorized a suit by one
administrator only: the administrator appointed in the state
of wrong. 11 This attitude, which greatly hindered the transitory enforcement of death statutes, was emphatically rejected
in I 8 8o by both the Supreme Court of the United States and
The question of the proper formal plaintiff was held to be a matter of procedure, governed by the law of the forum, in Teti v. Consolidated Coal Co.
(D. C. N.Y., I9I4) 2I7 Fed. 443; Bussey v. Charleston, etc., R. Co., (I9o6) 73
s. c. 2I5, 53 s. E. I65.
"McCarthy v. Chicago, etc., R. Co., (I877) 18 Kan. 46; Brown v.
Sunday Creek Co., (C. C. Ohio, I 908) I 6 5 Fed. 504; Vicksburg, etc., R. Co. v.
Williams, (I9I2) I02 Miss. 735, 59 So. 883; Lower v. Segal, (1896) 59
N. J. L. 66, 34 Atl. 945; s. c., (I 897) 6o N. J. L. 99, 36 Atl. 777; Rankin v.
Central R. Co., (I 9o8) 77 N.J. L. I 7 5, 7I Atl. 55; Johnson v. Phoenix Bridge
Co., (I9Io) I97 N.Y. JI6, 90 N. E. 953; Limekiller v. Hannibal, etc., R.
Co., (I885) 33 Kan. 83, 5 Pac. 40I.
10
Usher v. West Jersey R. Co., (I889) 126 Pa. 206, I7 Atl. 597; Vaughn v.
Bunker Hill, etc., Co., (C. C. Ore., I903) 126 Fed. 895; Lovell v. De Bardelaben
Coal & Iron Co., (I89o) 90 Ala. 13, 7 So. 756; Selma, etc. R. Co. v. Lacey,
(I873) 49 Ga. Io6; Oates v. Union Pac. Ry. Co., (r89r) I04 Mo. 5I4, 16 S.
W. 487; La Bar v. New York, etc., R. Co., (I907) 2I8 Pa. 261, 67 Atl. 413;
Thorpe v. Union Pac. Coal Co., (1902) 24 Utah 475, 68 Pac. 145; Casey v.
Hoover, (I9o6) I97 Mo. 62, 94 S. W. 982; Western, etc., Ry. v. Strong, (I 874)
52 Ga. 46I; Patton v. Pittsburgh, etc., Ry. Co., (r88o) 96 Pa. 169; Schueren
v. St. Louis, etc., R. Co., (I9I7 Mo.) 192 S. W. 965.
11
Richardson v. New York Cent. R. Co., (I867) 98 Mass. 85; Mackay v.
Central R. Co., (C. C. N.Y., 1876) I4 Blatchf. 65; Taylor's Adm'r v. Pennsylvania Co., (r88o) 78 Ky. 348.
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the New York Court of Appeals/2 after which it rapidly went
out of fashion. These courts took the position that where the
death act of the state of wrong provides, without special qualification, that the action shall be brought by the deceased's
personal representative, it may be brought by a duly qualified
administrator appointed in any state.
So far as the terms of the death statute are concerned, then,
the defendant may be attacked in any convenient forum. But
there are two rules of local policy with which the plaintiff may
have to contend in certain jurisdictions. In many states the
general rule that a foreign administrator cannot sue is applied in actions for wrongful death. 13 The chief purpose of
this rule is supposed to be the conservation of assets for local
creditors of the deceased. Normally they have no interest
whatever in the proceeds of actions for wrongful death, since
such proceeds form no part of the estate and are distributed
directly to the beneficiaries. 14 Accordingly some courts have
held that the general rule has no relation to actions of this
kind and have allowed a foreign representative to proceed
12

By the Supreme Court in Dennick v. Central R. Co., (1·88o) 103 U. S.
and by the New York Court of Appeals in Leonard v. Columbia Steam
Navigation Co., (1881) 84 N.Y. 48.
But the rejected construction was adopted at a much later date in Manitoba.
See Couture v. Dominion Fish Co., ( 1909) 19 Man. L. R. 6 5; Johnson v.
Canadian Northern Ry., (1909) I9 Man. L. R. I79·
II,

12
South-Western R. Co. v. Paulk, (I858) 24 Ga. 356; Central R. Co. v.
Swint, (I884) 73 Ga. 65I; Cornell Co. v. Ward, (I909) 93 C. C. A. 473,
168 Fed. 51; Louisville, etc., R. Co. v. Brantley's Adm'r, (1894) 96 Ky. 297,
28 S. W. 477; The Princess Sophia, (D. C. Wash., I929) 35 F. (2d) 736;
Dodge v. North Hudson (C. C. N.Y., 1910) 177 Fed. 986; Brooks v. Southern
Pac. Co., (C. C. Ky., I9o6) I48 Fed. 986.
In many states the rule that a foreign administrator cannot sue has been
abolished in whole or in part by statute.

"See Rose, "Foreign Enforcement of Actions for Wrongful Death," (I935)
33 MICH. L. REv. 545, 570, 592. Where creditors in the forum have an interest
in the fund recovered there may be some justification for refusing to let a
foreign representative carry it away. See Maysville, etc., Co. v. Wilson's Adm'r,
(I893) I6 U.S. App. 236, 59 Fed. 9I; Sanbo v. Union Pac. Coal Co., (C. C.
Colo., I 904) I 30 Fed. 52.
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with his action. 15 Where this privilege is denied, however, the
only alternative is to secure ancillary letters of administration at the forum. Here a second obstacle may be encountered.
If the deceased did not reside within the jurisdiction and left
no assets there, the court may possibly refuse to appoint a
local administrator for the sole purpose of litigating a claim
for damages for death. 16
The existence of several administrators for one deceased,
each empowered to bring an action, may raise a problem regarding the effect of a prior judgment. Suppose a death action
is brought by one administrator. The defendant sets up as a
defense a prior judgment given in an earlier action brought
by another administrator. This prior judgment might be
pleaded either ( I ) as a merger of the cause of action or ( 2) as
having conclusively determined some issue of law or fact
in the defendant's favour. Would this previous judgment be a
good defence to the present action by a different adminisll> Wilson v. Tootle, (C. C. Mo., I 893) 55 Fed. 2II; McCarty v. New York,
etc., R. Co., (C. C. N.Y., I894) 62 Fed. 437; Pearson v. Norfolk, etc., R. Co.,
(D. C. Va., I923) 286 Fed. 429; Knight v. Moline, etc., R. Co., (I9I3) I6o
Iowa I6o, I40 N. W. 839; Boulden v. Pennsylvania R. Co., (I903) 205 Pa.
264, 54 Atl. 906; Robertson v. Chicago, etc., R. Co., (I904) I22 Wis. 66, 99
N. W. 433; Kerr v. Basham, (I934) 62 S.D. 30I, 252 N. W. 853; Connor v.
New York, etc., R. Co., (I9o8) 28 R.I. s6o, 68 Atl. 48I; Ghilain v. Couture,
(I929) 84 N. H. 48, I46 Atl. 395; Byrn v. Paterson Steamship Ltd. (I936)
Ont. 3II 1 3 Dom. L. R. III.
In Kansas a foreign administrator may sue for wrongful death, Kansas Pac.
R. Co. v. Cutter, (I876) I6 Kan. 568, provided that he could have maintained
the same type of suit in the state of his appointment, Limekiller v. Hannibal, etc.,
R. Co., (I88s) 33 Kan. 83,5 Pac. 40t; Chicago, etc., R. Co. v. Mills, (I897)
57 Kan. 687, 47 Pac. 834; Hulburt v. Topeka, (C. C. Kan., I888) 34 Fed.

5IO.

See also Metrakos v. Kansas City, etc., R. Co., (I9I4) 9I Kan. 342, I37
Pac. 953·
16
Re Yarbrough's Estate, (I923) 126 Wash. 85, 2I6 Pac. 889; Louisville,
etc., R. Co. v. Herb, (I9II) 125 Tenn. 408, I43 S. W. II38; Perry v. St.
Joseph, etc., R. Co., (I883) 29 Kan. 420; Hall's Adm'r v. Louisville, etc., R.
Co., (I897) Ioz Ky. 48o, 43 S. W. 698; Jeffersonville R. Co. v. Swayne's
Adm'r, (I866) 26 Ind. 477·
See also Schueren v. St. Louis, etc., R. Co. (I9I7 Mo.) I92 S. W. 965;
Connor v. New York, etc., R. Co. (I9o8) 28 R.I. 56o, 68 Atl. 48I.
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trator? Hesitation and doubt upon the point are expressed in
a few early opinions. 17 But there is substantial modern authority for the view that if the first court had proper jurisdiction over the parties, its judgment would be recognized in the
second suit though the formal plaintiffs be different. 18
In Spokane, etc., R. Co. v. W hitley/ 9 a death action, controlled by the law of Idaho, was brought in that state by one
of the beneficiaries. A satisfied judgment for $9,500 obtained
in a Washington court by the deceased's administratrix was
set up as a defence. The plaintiff beneficiary replied that since
she had never given her consent or been made a party to the
Washington suit she was not bound by the judgment terminating it. The Idaho court allowed the plaintiff to recover and
the Supreme Court affirmed its decision. Since the beneficiary
was not a party to the Washington suit, the Washington court
did not acquire judicial jurisdiction over her cause of action,
and the Washington judgment was not entitled to full faith
and credit in Idaho. The Supreme Court indicated that the
beneficiary might have been bound by any judgment obtained
by a duly appointed administrator, even without the beneficiary's concurrence in the action, if the statute of the state of
wrong (Idaho) had so provided. But the Idaho statute, as
construed by the Idaho courts, made no such provision. The
law of the state of wrong (Idaho) gave the administratrix no
17

Woodard v. Michigan, etc., R. Co., (1859) 10 Ohio St. 121; Taylor's
Adm'r v. Pennsylvania Co., (188o) 78 Ky. 348; Usher v. West Jersey R. Co.,
(1889) 126 Pa. St. 2061 17 Atl. 597·
18
See Chicago, etc., R. Co. v. Schendel, (1926) 270 U.S. 611 1 46 Sup. Ct.
420; Louisville, etc., R. Co. v. Jones' Adin'r, (1926) 215 Ky. 774, 286 S. W.
1071; Alabama, etc., R. Co. v. Hill, (1912) 139 Ga. 224 1 76 S. E. 1001;
Schendel v. Chicago, etc., R. Co., (1926) 168 Minn. 152 1 210 N. W. 70; see
generally FREEMAN, JUDGMENTS (1925) vol, 31 §§ 1392 1 1393·
For dicta on the point, see Ghilain v. Couture, (1929) 84 N.H. 48 1 146 Atl.
395; Morris v. Chicago, etc., R. Co., (1885) 65 Iowa 727, 23 N. W. 143;
Nelson's Adm'r v. Chesapeake & 0. R. Co., (1892) 88 Va. 971 1 14 S. E. 838;
Anderson v. Louisville, etc., R. Co., (1914) 127 C. C. A. (6th) 277 1 210 Fed.
689; Forrester v. Southern Pac. Co. (1913) 36 Nev. 247, 134 Pac. 753·
19
Spokane, etc,, R. Co. v. Whitley, (r913) 23 Idaho 642 1 132 Pac. 121 1
aff'd (1914) 237 U. S. 487, 35 Sup. Ct. 655.
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power to bind the beneficiaries without their sanction. Hence
the Washington judgment, obtained by the administratrix
without the consent of the beneficiary did not effect a merger
of the beneficiary's cause of action:
"The question," said the Supreme Court, "is one of jurisdiction, that is, whether the mother-Mary Elizabeth Whitley-was represented by the administratrix in the Washington suit. The mother was not a party to that suit, and if she
was not represented by the administratrix, the Washington
court was without jurisdiction as to her, and the Idaho court
was not bound to treat the judgment as a bar to her recovery
in the present suit. [Citations.] The matter is not one of
mere form or procedure, and it is manifest that the authority
of the administratrix to represent the mother without her consent, if that authority existed, could be derived only from the
Idaho statute. . . . The Supreme Court of Idaho having
authority to construe the Idaho statute, has held that the administratrix did not represent the mother, and, consequently
that the mother's right was not barred."

SECTION

29

PROPER DEFENDANTS TO THE ACTION

The law of the place of wrong indicates the proper defendant as it does the proper plaintiff in the sense that it shows
whether a particular defendant has incurred any liability
whatsoever. Where that law imposes liability for an injury
upon several persons, a question may arise as to whether they
may or must be joined as defendants in a single action. Is the
answer to be given by the law of the forum or the law of the
place of wrong?
This very problem was dealt with at an early date in the
English case, General Steam Navigation Co. v. Guillou. 1 The
'General Steam Navigation Co. v. Guillou, (I843) II Mees. &W.
Eng. Rep. I06I,

sn, 1$2
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action was brought against an alleged owner of a French ship
which collided with plaintiff's ship upon the high seas. The
defendant set up a plea which the judges considered to be
patient of two different meanings. Some of them interpreted it
as averring that the defendant, being a member of an association which owned the erring ship, could only be sued in France
in a joint action prosecuted against all members of the associa~
tion simultaneously. Others thought it meant that under
French law the association bore the responsibility alone, like
an English limited company. Assuming on demurrer that
French law was the proper law of the case, the court expressed the unanimous opinion that, taking the second view of
the plea, it expressed a good defence to the action but that,
on the first interpretation, the plea was bad. "It is well
established," said Parke, B., "that the forms of remedies and
modes of proceeding are regulated solely by the law of the
place where the action is instituted-the lex fori; and it is
no objection to a suit in proper form here, that it would have
been instituted in a different form in the Court of the country
where the cause of action arose or to which the defendant
belongs."
The theory of this case would seem to be that once it is
admitted that the proper law creates some obligation to pay
damages, the local law will decide whether or not co-obligees
must be joined in an action to enforce it. Although other authorities support the doctrine, 2 it seems at least questionable
whether the forum's administrative convenience really requires it.
It was rejected in Mosby v. Manhattan Oil Co.3 While
carrying on drilling operations, a number of oil companies
polluted a stream in Kansas by dumping crude oil into it~
• See BEALE, CoNFLICT OF LAWS ( 193 5) vol. 3, p. 16o3; Fryklund v. Great
Northern R. Co., (1907) 101 Minn. 37, I I I N. W. 727.
• Mosby v. Manhattan Oil Co., (C. C. A. 8th, 1931) 52 F. (2d) 364.
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This practice injured cattle belonging to the plaintiff, a riparian rancher. Under Kansas law the companies were each liable
to the plaintiff to the full extent of the damage. This liability
could be enforced by joint action against all the companies.
Under the law of the forum (Missouri) each company was
responsible only to the extent of the damage caused by its
activities and a separate suit would have to be brought against
each company.
Conceivably the court might have split the issues, and,
while holding that each defendant was liable for the whole
damage according to the law of the place of wrong (Kansas),
have referred the propriety of a joint action to the law of the
forum (Missouri). It appears, however, to have followed the
law of the place of wrong on both points and to have decided
that the companies were properly made co-defendants to a
single action, as they would have been in Kansas.
SECTION

JO

LIMITATIONS UPON THE TIME FOR BRINGING AN ACTION

A rule of the forum limiting the period of time within which
an action must be brought may conflict with a rule of the state
of wrong in either one of two ways. The rule of the forum
may prescribe a shorter period of time than that permitted
by the rule of the state of wrong. Or the rule of the state of
wrong may prescribe a shorter period than the rule of the
forum allows.
Let us consider the first of these problems. An action is
brought at a time when it would be barred by the law of
the forum but not by that of the place of wrong, which allows
a longer period. If the court follows the local law, the plaintiff will be deprived of a remedy at the forum although he
might have succeeded at the place of wrong or some other
jurisdiction. Such a result is prima facie undesirable. Is there
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any reason why the court should not depart from its usual rule
and follow that of the foreign law? A foreign rule of this
character should not be particularly difficult to apply. But it
has been argued that the law of the forum ought to govern
for another reason. Statutes of limitation are intended to protect the courts from stale claims. The investigation of facts
which are supposed to have occurred long ago necessarily involves the sifting of meagre and unsatisfactory evidence.
Justice, long delayed, sometimes has the appearance of injustice. The policy of the forum requires that its courts should
not be burdened with this kind of litigation. This interest must
be weighed against that of making all courts available to the
plaintiff upon the same conditions. 1
This problem was first presented in connection with actions
for breach of contract during the first half of the nineteenth
century. Both in England and America the doctrine became
established that such actions must be brought within the period
prescribed by the statute of the forum. The same doctrine has
been applied in the field of tort. 2
In a number of cases an important exception to this general
principle has been developed. 3 In each instance the legislature
at the forum had created a new form of statutory liability. The
constituent statute specified that actions to enforce it should be
brought within a certain period of time. The courts held that
the legislature did not intend the limitation to control actions
1

See Lorenzen, Comment, (1919) 28 YALE L. J. 492, 497·
• Mufios v. Southern Pac. Co., (r892) 2 U.S. App. 222, 51 Fed. r88; Larue
v. Kershaw Contracting Co., (1912) 177 Ala. 441, 59 So. 155; Haefer v.
Herndon, (D. C. Ill., 1938) 22 F. Supp. 523; Horan v. New Home, etc., Co.,
( r 93 7) 289 Ill. App. 340, 7 N. E. (2d) 401; McConnell v. Caribbean Petroleum Co., (r938) 278 N.Y. 189, 15 N. E. (2d) 573; Miles v. McGrath, (D. C.
Md., 1933) 4 F. Supp. 6o3; McCluny v. Silliman, (r83o) 28 U.S. (3 Pet.)
270,
See also Annotation, (1930) 68 A. L. R. 217.
3
Negaubauer v. Great Northern R. Co., (1904) 92 Minn. 184, 99 N. W. 62o;
Keep v. National Tube Co., (C. C. N.J., 1907) 154 F. 121; Theroux's Adm'r
v. Northern Pac. R. Co., (r894) 27 U.S. App. so8, 64 Fed. 84; Coffman v.
Wood, (D. C. Ill. 1934) 5 F. Supp. 906,
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brought to enforce a similar statute of another jurisdiction.
They distinguished the special statutory provision from the
general statutes of limitations which were involved in the
older cases. There does not seem to be any functional basis for
this distinction. Presumably the special limitation, like all
limitations, was established to protect the courts from stale
claims. When this protection is afforded by a general statute
of limitations it is deemed to be more important than choiceof-law policies. Why should it be neglected when it is provided in a particular statute governing a single type of liability? Some courts have adopted this argument and refused
to recognize the distinction. 4 But these courts assume that the
general principle produces satisfactory results. The distinction, though groundless, is probably symptomatic of dissatisfaction with the general principle and of a desire to limit its
sphere of operation.
Let us now consider the second problem. The law of the
place of wrong prescribes a shorter limitation than that allowed by the law of the forum. The plaintiff brings suit within
the intermediate period. Such a suit, if brought at the place
of wrong, would not have succeeded. If the court does not
adopt the rule prevailing there and dismiss the instant suit,
the defendant may be subjected to a liability which the law of
the place of wrong does not sanction. His misfortune will be
due to the fact that he is amenable to suit at the forum. To
avoid this result, the court ought to adopt the foreign rule.
This could be done without difficulty. No important policy of
the forum would be affected.
This problem was first raised in actions for breach of a contract governed by foreign law. Common-law courts both in
England and America took the view that the limitation of the
foreign law should be disregarded. One cannot read the early
'Tieffenbrun v. Flannery, (1930) 198 N.C. 397,
v. Heller, (1931) 3oz Pa. z79, 153 Atl. 346.

rsr

S. E. 857; Rosenzweig
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cases without receiving the impression that the judges failed
to distinguish the instant problem from the situation where
the forum demands that suit be brought in a shorter time than
the foreign law allows. 5 There, as we have seen, the policy of
the forum may require the observance of its rule. Even if the
court observes the local rule and dismisses the action, the
plaintiff may still be able to succeed in another forum. In the
instant situation, however, the application of the local rule
imposes an obligation upon the defendant against which he has
no redress. The solution adopted in the early cases neglects
this important consideration.
To the general doctrine excluding foreign statutes of limitations there is one recognized exception. It is said that a
statute which not only bars the plaintiff's remedy but extinguishes his "right" should be enforced in other jurisdictions. But when does such a statute "extinguish the right"? It
is well established in common-law jurisdictions that a contract debt barred by a statute of limitations may be revived by
a subsequent promise to pay it. There is some authority for the
theory that such statutes do not "extinguish the right" because they leave open this possibility of revival. 6 On this
theory it would seem that, so far as tort claims are concerned,
the ordinary statute of limitations of a common-law jurisdiction does "extinguish the right" because, after the statutory
period has elapsed, such claims cannot be revived. 7 They continue to exist in the juristic imagination as metaphysical essences, devoid of practical consequence. But this reasoning does
not seem to have been adopted in any of the decided cases. In
a number of these a tort action has been allowed to continue
"See LeRoy v. Crowninshield, (r82o) 2 Mason 151, 15 Fed. Cas. 362;
Huber v. Steiner, (1835) 2 Bing., (N.C.) 202, 132 Eng. Rep. So.
"See Williams v. Jones, (1811) 13 East 439, 104 Eng. Rep. 441; Wood &
Selick v. Compagnie Generale Transatlantique, (C. C. A. 2nd, 1930) 43 F.
(2d) 941.
7

See WooD, LIMITATIONS, Ed. 4 (1916) vol. 1, § 66.
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although, according to the law of the place of wrong, it was
begun too late. 8 A good many states have passed legislation to
prohibit their courts from entertaining suits which have been
barred by the appropriate foreign law. 9
In one particular situation a limitation provision is usually
regarded as "extinguishing the right" for conflict of laws purposes. If the legislature of an outside jurisdiction creates a new
form of liability and directs that actions to establish it shall be
brought within a specified period, that direction will be enforced at the forum. 10 A foreign limitation of this kind is commonly said to be a "condition of the right of action" conferred
by the legislature. It is not essential that it should be contained in the same statute with the constituent clauses creating
the right. 11
There is also some authority for the view that a foreign
statute ought to be regarded as ''extinguishing the right" if,
by its express wording, it purports to do so. 12
Story maintained that a statute which extinguished the right
8

Eggen v. Canadian Northern R. Co., (I9I 8) I67 C. C. A. (8th) 229, 255 Fed.
937i Morgan v. Camden, etc., R. Co., (I88s) 2 Pa. Co. Ct. Rep. 97; Tarbell
v. Grand Trunk R. Co., (I922) 96 Vt. I7o, I I8 Atl. 484; Nonce v. Richmond
& D. R. Co., (C. C. N. C., I 8 8 7) 3 3 Fed. 429; O'Shields v. Georgia Pac. R. Co.,
(I889) 83 Ga. 62I, ro S. E. 268; Louisville, etc., R. Co. v. Burkhart, (I9I3)
I 54 Ky. 92, I57 S. W. I8.
9
See Annotation, (I9JI) 75 A. L. R. '203.
10
Boyd v. Clark, (C. C. Mich., I88I) 8 Fed. 848; Selma, etc., R. Co. v.
Lacey, (I873) 49 Ga. Io6; Pittsburgh, etc., R. Co. v. Hine, (I874) 25 Ohio
St. 629; The Harrisburg, (I886) II9 U.S. I99, 7 Sup. Ct. I4o; Cavanagh v.
Ocean Steam Nav. Co., (Sup. Ct., Ist dept., I89o) IJ N.Y. Supp. 540, I9 Civ.
Proc. R. 39I; The Vestris, (D. C. N.Y., I9JI) 53 F. (2d) 847; Louisville,
etc., R. Co. v. Dixon, ( I933) I68 Miss. I4, I 50 So. 8 I I; Ford, Bacon & Davis
v. Volentine, (C. C. A. sth, I933) 64 F. (2d) 8oo; Byron v. Great American
Indemnity Co., (I934) 54 R.I. 405, I73 Atl. 546; Connecticut Valley Lumber
Co. v. Maine Cent. R. Co., (I9I8) 78 N.H. 553, Io3 Atl. 263.
To the same effect, see Johnson v. Canadian Northern R. Co., (I909) I9
Man. L. R. I79i Goodman v. London, etc., R. Co., (I877) I4 Scottish L. R.
449·
11
Davis v. Mills, (I904) I94 U.S. 45I, 24 Sup. Ct. 692.
:tJl Osborne v. Grand Trunk R. Co., (I 913)
8 7 Vt. I 04, 8 8 Atl. 5 I 2
(semble) ; Finnell v. Southern Kan. R. Co., (C. C. Mo., I 8 8 8) 3 3 Fed. 42 7;
Smith v. Webb, (I9I6 Tex. Civ. App.) I8I S. W. 8I4.
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should not be enforced unless it were shown that both the
parties concerned had resided in the state where the statute
was in force for the full period of time prescribed by the
statute. 13 To illustrate: A injures B in state X. More than a
year later B brings action in state Y. A pleads a rule of the
law of state X which is regarded by the court in state Y as
extinguishing B's right to compensation at the end of one
year. To get the benefit of this rule A must also show that
both A and B resided for one year in state X. 14 One can well
understand this requirement being insisted upon at the forum
if it were part of the law of state X. Otherwise, as Goodrich
points out, it seems to be a needless refinement. 15 Why should
the defendant have to surmount another hurdle in order to
secure the benefit of a rule of the place of wrong? If the residence requirement fulfilled any useful function we would
expect to find it employed in cases of the type discussed above,
where the courts adopt the time limit attached to a newlycreated foreign cause of action. Yet in many of these cases it is
never mentioned.
The application of rules restricting the time. for suit may
give rise to incidental problems. In Murray v. New York,
etc., R. Co./ 6 an action to recover damages for a wrongful
death occurring in Pennsylvania was brought in New York
by the father of the deceased. The Pennsylvania death statute
13

STORY, CoNFLICT OF LAWS, Ed. 8 (1883) § 582B.
This view is adopted in the following cases: Canadian Pac. R. Co. v.
Johnston, (1894) 26 U.S. App. 85,61 Fed. 738; Moores v. Winter, (1899) 67
Ark. 189, 53 S. W. 1057; Kansas City, etc., R. Co. v. Maynor, (1913) 126
C. C. A. (sth) 433, 209 Fed. 61o; Finnell v. Southern Kan. R. Co., (C. C. Mo.,
1888) 33 Fed. 427; Williams v. St. Louis, etc., R. Co., (1894) 123 Mo. 573,
27 S. W. 387; Smith v. Webb, (1916 Tex. Civ. App.) 181 S. W. 814.
Some doubt is expressed regarding the theory of these decisions in Wood &
Selick v. Compagnie Generale Transatlantique, (C. C. A. 2nd, 1930) 43 F.
(2d) 941.
15
GooDRICH, CoNFLICT OF LAws, Ed. 2 (I938) 202.
16
Murray v. New York, etc., R. Co., (I934) 242 App. Div. 374, 275 N.Y.
Supp. I o. To same effect, Chapman v. Terminal R. Ass'n, (Mo. I 940) 13 7
S. W. (2d) 612.
14
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provided that such actions should be brought in the name of
both parents and within a specified period of time. After this
time had elapsed it was sought to join the deceased's mother
as a party plaintiff. The court decided that the time limitation
was a "condition of the right" which ought to be enforced.
They were then faced with a second problem: could an additional and necessary plaintiff be joined after the time for
bringing suit had passed? General choice-of-law policy
would seem to require that this question be determined, if possible, by the law of Pennsylvania. This course was adopted by
the court. Following the Pennsylvania cases, they ruled that
a new party to the action might be added although the statutory period had run out.
The same question arose in Knight v. Moline, etc., R. Co. 17
where the plaintiff sought to amend his pleadings at a time
when a new action would have been extinguished (not merely
barred) by the statute of the place of wrong. It was not shown
that the courts there would have refused such an amendment
but the court of the forum simply decided the question according to their own rules, saying that it was one of procedure.
The amendment was allowed.
A very interesting variation of this problem is found in
Louisville, etc., R. Co. v. Dixon. 18 The action was brought
in Mississippi by a workman to recover compensation under
the Louisiana compensation act for an injury received there.
A Mississippi court dismissed the action on the ground that
the judicial machinery of the forum was not adequate for the
proper administration of the Louisiana statute. Subsequent decisions of the higher Mississippi courts departed from this
theory and held that the Louisiana statute in question could
17
Knight v. Moline, etc., R. Co., (I9I3) I6o Iowa I6o, I40 N. W. 839.
See also Lassiter v. Norfolk, etc., R. Co., (I904) 136 N.C. 89, 48 S. E. 642.
18
Louisville, etc., R. Co. v. Dixon, (I933) I68 Miss. I4, I5o So. 8II. See
also Cavanagh v. Ocean Steam Nav. Co. (Sup. Ct., ISt Dept., I 890) I 3 N. Y.
Supp. 540, I9 Civ. Proc. R. 391.
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be enforced in Mississippi. The plaintiff then brought a second
action in Mississippi. By this time the period for bringing suit
laid down by the Louisiana statute had run out. The court decided this time limit was "a condition of the cause of action."
The plaintiff attempted to rely upon a curative principle of
Mississippi law which would have permitted the second action
to be maintained because the dismissal of the first did not
settle the merits of the controversy. The court held that this
rule could not affect the operation of the Louisiana statute and
dismissed the second suit also.
This result seems unsatisfactory. One cannot quarrel with
the court for its reluctance to resort to the law of the forum.
That shows a due and proper regard for choice-of-law policies.
But this case was an exceptional one and required special treatment. Let us examine it more closely. The problem presented
in the second suit was based upon two facts. First, a previous
suit at the forum had been dismissed because it was brought
to enforce a foreign created right and the court thought that
the administrative machinery of the forum was inadequate.
Second, the time for bringing the action allowed by the law of
the place of wrong had run out. What should be done in a
case like this? Choice-of-law policies suggest that we turn to
the law of the place of wrong for an answer. But we turn to
the law of Louisiana in vain, because this problem could not
have arisen in Louisiana. Had the first suit been brought in
Louisiana it would not have been dismissed; no question
would have been made of the competence of Louisiana courts
to enforce their own statutes. Since Louisiana law offered no
solution of the problem and the solution provided by the
law of the forum was a fair and reasonable one, it is submitted that the court would have been justified in adopting
the curative principle of the law of the forum. 19
19
On the problems discussed in this section, see generally: Ailes, "Limitation
of Actions and the Conflict of Laws," (1933) 31 MICH. L. REV. 474; Note,
(1931) 79 UNiv. OF PA. L. REv. rr12; Lorenzen, Comment, (r9r9) 28 YALE
L. J. 492, 497·
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3I

NOTICE BEFORE ACTION

Several conflict of laws cases have involved the consideration of statutes which had the effect of compelling an injured
person to serve notice of his claim upon the tortfeasor within
a limited time period on pain of losing his right of action if
he failed to do so. In their practical operation such statutes
are not unlike statutes of limitation. A statute requiring a notice
of action may form a part of either the law of the forum or the
law of the place of wrong. Let us consider the latter situation
first.
The law of the place of wrong forbids the bringing of an
action unless the defendant has been notified of the plaintiff's
claim within a stated time. The law of the forum makes no
such restriction. The plaintiff fails to comply with the law of
the place of wrong. If the court of the forum allows the action
to proceed, the plaintiff will gain an improper advantage by
his selection of a forum. Choice-of-law policies will obviously
be best maintained by dismissing the plaintiff's suit. In dealing with the analogous problem of a foreign statute of limitations which bars the plaintiff's suit, the courts refused to
enforce the foreign statute, saying it was merely a rule of procedure.1 We suggested that this was an unfortunate result. Decisions upon the instant problem have not been affected by
statute-of-limitations cases. There is authority for the view
that if the notice required by the law of the place of wrong
has not been given, the plaintiff cannot bring an action anywhere.2
Suppose the law of the forum requires notice of the plaintiff's claim and the law of the place of wrong does not. The
plaintiff fails to give the notice. Under these circumstances
1

See above, section 30.
• Husted v. Missouri Pac. R. Co., (r9ro) 143 Mo. App. 623, 128 S. W. 282;
Sawyer v. El Paso, etc., R. Co., ( r 9o8) 49 Tex. Civ. App. ro6, ro8 S. W. 718.
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the court can best assist in the realization of choice-of-law
policies by enforcing the plaintiff's cause of action as it would
be enforced in the state of wrong. But the court may feel that
the policy underlying the local rule requiring a notice is so
important that it should be applied even in cases which have
a foreign proper law. The court will then have to weigh the
local policy against the choice-of-law policies. 3

SECTION

32

THE MARITIME LIEN

Under both English and American law, many mantlme
torts give rise to a maritime lien upon the ship concerned in
favour of the person wronged. The lien attaches to the ship
at the time of the injury. As a rule, it cannot be displaced by a
sale of the ship to a bona fide purchaser for value. An admiralty court will enforce the lien by seizing the ship and, if
necessary, selling it to pay off the lienholder. 1
The position of these maritime liens in the conflict of laws
is extremely doubtful. At the threshold of our· discussion,
it may be well to distinguish a lien upon a vessel from the
power to arrest the vessel at the commencement of a suit in
admiralty. The latter is obviously a matter which could only
be governed by the local law. At the commencement of the
suit the court's officers would not know all the facts of the
case. They could not tell what foreign law or laws to apply.
They could not apply a foreign law because they would not
know its provisions. Hence, in deciding whether or not a ship
may be seized, an admiralty court can only be governed by its
own local rules. After the case has been tried, the facts proved,
8
The rule of the forum requiring notice was applied to a foreign cause of
action in Arp v. Allis Chalmers Co., (1907) 130 Wis. 454, I xo N. W. 386.
1
Under the Constitution of the United States a state court cannot enforce a
maritime lien by proceedings in rem. See RoBINSoN, ADMIRALTY (1939) 359·
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and the relevant foreign laws established, the situation is different. The court has before it all the materials necessary to
decide what law should determine the rights of the person
wronged and whether that law gives him a lien upon the vessel in question which may be enforced by selling the vessel.
In considering the conflicts aspect of the maritime lien we
have, as usual, two problems. ( r) Will the admiralty court
of the forum enforce a lien in a case where the law of the forum
would create a lien but the law of the place of wrong would
not? ( 2) Will the admiralty court of the forum enforce a lien
in a case where the law of the forum would not create a lien
but the law of the place of wrong would? Attacking the first
problem from a conflict of laws point of view we must conclude
that the forum ought not to enforce a lien which the law of
the place of wrong does not authorize. To do so is to put an
extra burden upon the defendant (the claimant, in admiralty
terms) or perhaps upon some innocent bona fide purchaser of
the ship, which burden is solely due to the fact that his ship
has entered the waters of the forum. So far as the court's
administrative convenience is concerned, a mere refusal to enforce the plaintiff's (in admiralty, the libellant's) claim should
not involve any difficulty upon that score.
But in dealing with the conflicts aspect of the maritime
lien we must reckon with that ancient and formidable tradition of admiralty courts, the conception of a universal maritime law. The conflicts argument which we have outlined
clashes with this conception. We are apt to be told that when
an admiralty court of the forum enforces a maritime lien for
tort, it is not enforcing the internal law of the forum, it is
enforcing the law of the sea which is common to all civilized
sea-going nations. Admiralty courts do not seek the ideal of
uniformity through choice-of-law principles; they have their
own uniform system. The notion that admiralty law is the
same in all countries appears today to be merely a pleasant
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fiction. 2 But it has had considerable influence upon the treatment of the instant problem by admiralty courts.
The classic American decision is The Eagle 3 (Supreme
Court, I 86 8) which arose out of a collision in Canadian waters.
For the claimant it was argued that Canadian law gave the
libellant no lien. Dealing briefly with the point, the Supreme
Court indicated that the question was to be decided by "the
practice and principles of the courts of admiralty in this country, wholly irrespective of any local law."
The same problem came before Judge Emmons in The
A von 4 (I 873) and was discussed by him at considerable
length. His opinion shows plainly the reluctance of admiralty
judges at that time to follow choice-of-law principles where
maritime liens were concerned. After wavering between the
choice-of-law principle and the so-called universal maritime
law as conceived by American courts he chose the latter.
The Eagle and The A von do not seem to proceed upon the
ground that the maritime lien is a part of American admiralty
procedure which must be followed in all cases for the convenience of the court. Such a view is expressly rejected in The
A von. The basis of decision is that the lien is part of the general maritime law which American courts administer in all
cases, whether they have a foreign setting or not.
There is a group of tort cases in which American courts have
refused to enforce a maritime lien on the ground that to do
so would be inconsistent with the foreign law by which the
case ought to be governed. Most of these cases involved personal injury or death aboard single ships, in foreign waters or
2

See below, section 55·

3

The Eagle, (r868) 8 Wall. (75 U.S.) 15. Robinson explains this decision
as proceeding upon the ground that the vessels were merely passing through
Canadian waters but were not entering or leaving a Canadian port. See ROBINsoN, ADMIRALTY (1939) 825.
'The Avon, (1873) 1 Brown's Adm. 170, 2 Fed. Cas. 255.
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on the high seas. 5 The courts which decided them do not make
it clear whether or not the injured person or the deceased person's dependents would have had a lien on the ship under
the general maritime law as applied by American courts.
Probably, in most of these cases, he would not. They are not,
therefore, in irreconcilable conflict with The Eagle and The
A von. The most that can be said of them, in relation to the
general maritime law theory, is that they damn it with faint
prarse.
Outside the field of tort liability there are several American
decisions dealing with the effect of foreign contractual transactions to raise a lien upon a vessel. These decisions emphatically announce that no lien will be enforced which is not sanctioned by the proper law of the transaction in question. 6 In
The Kaiser Wilhelm 7 the libellant sought a lien for repairs
and supplies furnished to a German ship in England. The
court said:
"The laws of Great Britain and of Germany have both been
pleaded, and, if no lien or right to proceed against the vessel
is given under either of them, it is immaterial whether or not
the libellant is entitled to proceed in rem, under the general
maritime law as recognized in this country."
It would appear, therefore, that the general tendency of
American courts is to deny a lien in cases governed by foreign
law unless the proper law creates one. But there are older au• The Egyptian Monarch, (D. C. N.J., 1 888) 36 Fed. 773; The Lamington,
(D. C. N.Y., 1898) 87 Fed. 752; The Cuzco, (D. C. Wash., 1915) 225 Fed.
169; The Hanna Nielsen, (C. C. A. 2nd, 1921) 273 Fed. 171; The Baymead,
(C. C. A. 9th, 1937) Am. Mar. Cas. 207.
See also Robinson v. Detroit & C. Steam Nav. Co., (r896) 43 U.S. App. 190,
20 C. C. A. (6th) 86, 73 Fed. 883 (collision in foreign territorial waters; action
for wrongful death against ship not carrying deceased).
"The Kaiser Wilhelm II, (D. C. N.J., 1916) 230 Fed. 717; The Woudrichem, (D. C. N.Y. 1921) 278 Fed. 568; The City of Atlanta, (D. C. Ga.,
1924) Am. Mar. Cas. 1305; The Constantinople, (D. C. N, Y., 1926) 15 F.
(2d) 97·
7
The Kaiser Wilhelm II, (D. C. N.J., 1916) 230 Fed, 717.
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thorities which favour the view that American courts may disregard the proper law and enforce a lien by virtue of the
general maritime law.
English courts incline to the simple view that "lien or no
lien" is a question of procedure. In The Mil ford 8 (I 858) the
master of an American ship, hired in the United States, claimed
a lien for his wages. American law gave no such lien. A British
statute provided, in very general terms, that "every master of
a ship" should have such a lien. Dr. Lushington applied the
British statute, saying:
"It was very ingeniously contended that the law of the
United States formed part of the contract; but I cannot think
so; the proceedings originated in this country; it is a question
of remedy, not of contract at all. Now the law as to contract
and remedy was settled by Donn v. Lippmann to the effect
that the remedy must be according to the law of the forum in
which it is sought. . . . Now in this case the legality of the
arrest of the freight is the whole matter in dispute."
. These remarks evince a confusion of two things; the lien
and the arrest. As we have indicated, the seizure of the res
by the court would have to proceed according to the law of the
forum; no other course would be practicable. 9 But the right
of the master ultimately to enforce a lien on it might well
have been referred to the proper law of the case. The Milford
is an old decision, as conflicts decisions go; the opinion displays
the diffidence and distaste for foreign law which is characteristic of the period. It was criticized by Sir Robert Phillimore,
who did not share the hostility of other English judges toward
foreign laws. 10 But it has been followed 11 and approved 12
in subsequent cases.
"The Milford, (x8s8) Swab. 362, 166 Eng. Rep. u67. Followed in The
Jonathan Goodhue, (1859) Swab. 524, x66 Eng. Rep. 1246.
9
Above, p. 142.
.
10
In The Halley, (I 867) L. R. 2 Adm. & Ecc. 3, I 2.
11
In The Tagus, [1903] P. 44, 72 L. J.P. 4·
lll In The Colorado, [1923] P. 102, 92 L. J.P. 100.
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Let us consider now the second problem of maritime liens:
will the admiralty court of the forum enforce a lien in a case
where the law of the forum would not create a lien but the law
of the place of wrong would? From the conflict of laws point
of view, an affirmative answer is desirable. If no obstacle of
policy or inconvenience intervenes, the court should allow the
libellant the same remedy which he would have under the law
of place of wrong.
There is very little direct authority in the United States.
As we have seen, American courts favour the application of
foreign law, as a general doctrine. But only one case has been
found in which a foreign lien was enforced under circumstances in which the local law would not create a lien. In The
Maud Carter 13 the libellant claimed liens upon a ship for insurance premiums and materials used in her construction. The
lien transactions occurred while the vessel was in a British
port. Neither transaction would have given rise to a lien under
the general ~aritime law of the United States. The British
law gave liens in both cases. The court held that they should
be enforced.
Turning to the British Empire we find a diversity of opinion. In Clark v. Bowring and Co. 14 certain persons claimed a
lien in a Scottish court for moneys expended upon a ship while
it was in the port of New York. They based their claim upon
American law. The court refused to consider the American
law, holding that the matter must be determined by the law
of the forum which gave no lien.
In The Strandhill 15 the same problem came before the
Supreme Court of Canada. Goods were furnished to the ship
"'The Maud Carter, (D. C. Mass., 1886) 29 Fed. 156.
American admiralty courts will enforce a lien for wrongful death created by
the laws of an American state in cases occurring within the territory of the
state in question. See Lewis v. Jones, (1928) 27 F. (2d) 72. But no lien is
enforced unless the state death act so provides.
"Clark v. Bowring and Co., (19o8) Scottish Sess. Cas. n68.
15
The Strandhill, (1926) Can. L. R. 68o, 687.
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in the port of Boston. American law gave a lien; Canadian law
gave none. After considering the matter at some length, the
court enforced the American law, saying:
"Indeed it is difficult to perceive any reason why an American citizen, the owner of a ship which is by American law
subject to a maritime lien for the price of necessaries purchased
by him in an American port, could avoid the enforcement of
the lien by sending his ship to Canada, if there be a Canadian
tribunal having jurisdiction to enforce it."
The court distinguished the decision in Clark v. Bowring
on the ground that it involved a question of priorities among
competing claims against the ship. This is perfectly true but
the Scottish court's decision proceeded upon the very broad
ground that the court would not recognize any liens which
were not created by the law of the forum.
SECTION

33

DETERMINATION OF FACTS BY COURT OR JURY

In common-law courts an issue of fact is commonly disposed
of in one of three ways. It may be entrusted exclusively to the
court, whose decision is final unless reversed by a higher
court. It may be entrusted exclusively to the jury, whose decision cannot be changed or questioned by the court. Generally,
however, an issue of fact is passed upon by both the court
and the jury in the following manner. The judge first considers all the evidence relating to the fact in question. If he
thinks the evidence overwhelmingly favours one conclusion
so that no reasonable jury could make a different finding, he
will assume that conclusion to be correct and proceed to decree legal consequences accordingly. But if he thinks that the
evidence is so conflicting that a reasonable jury might come to
either one of two conclusions, he will then permit the jury to
give the final decision. 1
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Rules defining the respective functions of court and jury
are in a sense ancillary to other legal principles. The problem
of determining which of these bodies should pass upon a particular question of fact arises because the court has resolved
to enforce some principle of law which declares that certain
defined operative facts shall have certain legal consequences.
In order to apply such a principle it is necessary to decide
whether or not those operative facts are present. For example:
a court desires in a particular case to apply the general principle that a defendant shall only be held liable for injuries
caused by his negligence. Two issues of fact must therefore
be decided: (a) was the defendant's conduct negligent?
(b) did it cause the injury complained of? The question arises:
are these issues to be decided by the court, by the jury, or by
both acting in concert? To answer this question we must resort
to some ancillary rule.
In a conflict of laws case, the primary principles requiring
the investigation and proof of facts may be derived from either
the law of the forum or the law of the place of wrong. In applying a principle of this kind taken from the law of the
forum, a court would very probably decide the factual issues
involved or submit them to the jury according to its usual practice in non-conflicts cases. But who is to decide the questions of
fact which are raised by primary principles of the law of the
place of wrong? A solution for this problem might be sought
in the rules of either the law of the place of wrong or the law of
the forum. If the law of the place of wrong emanated from a
jurisdiction where trial by jury was part of the judicial machinery, it would no doubt be possible to derive a controlling
rule from that legal system.
But the court might also resort to the law of the forum
for guidance. Often the primary principle of the law of the
place of wrong with which the court is dealing can be
matched with an apparently similar rule of the local law. As
between two common-law jurisdictions, the law of the forum
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and the law of the place of wrong frequently concur in making
liability depend upon the defendant's "negligence," the plaintiff's "contributory negligence," "assumption of risk," etc. In
such a situation the court of the forum might feel inclined to
follow its own secondary rule governing the assignment of the
issue to court or jury.
For example: the primary principle that a plaintiff who
has by his own negligence contributed to his own injury cannot recover damages is law in both state X and state Y. In
state X the jury decides whether or not the plaintiff has been
guilty of such negligence, subject to the usual supervision
by the court. In state Y the question of contributory negligence is determined by the jury alone. An action is brought
in the courts of state Y arising out of a highway accident in
state X. Following the primary principle of the law of state
X, the court of the forum resolves to investigate the question
of the plaintiff's contributory negligence. But who is to decide that question, the court or the jury? As we have suggested, the court might turn to the law of the place of wrong
for an answer and follow the procedure laid down by the
law of state X. But since the jurisprudence of the forum
contains a similar principle, raising the same general issue
of fact (was the plaintiff guilty of contributory negligence?)
the court might adopt the secondary rule of the forum making
the question exclusively one for the jury.
It is quite possible that a court might be called upon to
enforce some primary principle of the law of the place of
wrong which had no counterpart in the law of the forum. The
opportunity to employ a secondary rule derived from the law
of the forum would not be so clearly available in such a case.
But the court could still obtain assistance from the law of
the forum. It might treat the factual issue defined by the
law of the place of wrong in the same manner that it would
treat analogous or similar questions of fact arising in the course
of ordinary non-conflicts litigation at the forum. This par-
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ticular variety of the general problem does not seem to have
been canvassed in the decided cases.
In discussing other types of legal rules and their relation
to the substance-procedure problem, we have usually drawn
a distinction between the situation where the application of
the rule of the place of wrong would help the defendant and
that in which it would help the plaintiff. In the present context it may not always be possible to say whether the trial of
an issue by the tribunal and in the manner prescribed by the
law of the place of wrong would assist the plaintiff or the
defendant. But one thing is clear. To dispose of the question
in the manner prescribed by the law of the place of wrong
will at least bring the court as near as possible to the hypothetical result which the foreign court would have reached
had the case been tried before it. Choice-of-law policies direct us to go as far as we can in this direction. On the other
hand, it must be admitted that the delimitation of the functions of judge and jury is a matter of intimate concern to the
court of the forum. One can well understand its reluctance
to adopt the rule of another jurisdiction upon the matter.
Some states have enacted statutes providing that the question of contributory negligence should be entrusted exclusively to the jury. These statutes usually operate to diminish
the defendant's chances of success because they deprive him
of the opportunity of getting a directed verdict upon this issue. Even if the court believes that no reasonable jury could
exonerate the plaintiff from contributory fault, the question
must go before the jury. In Atchison, etc., R. Co. v. Spencer 2
a federal court refused to apply a local statute of this type because the case had a foreign setting.
"It cuts deep," said the court, "into the right observed at
common law by which a defendant can obtain a decision by the
court upon a proven state of facts. What is, at common law,
within the power of the judge to decide, is in all cases left
2

Atchison, etc., R. Co. v. Spencer; (C. C. A. 9th, 1927) 20 F. (zd) 714.
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to the jury and their finding is conclusive on the court. Thus,
although by the law of the place where an injury has been
inflicted the power and duty of the judge are to pass upon a
clearly established state of facts, a litigant may avoid the consequence of the exercise of those functions by going into a
jurisdiction where the fundamental local law strips the court
of that power by making the jury the sole arbiter of the question with conclusive force upon the court."
The court refused to countenance that state of affairs. They
therefore asserted the power, which a court sitting at the place
of wrong would have possessed, to pass upon the evidence
and decide whether or not it showed the plaintiff to be guilty
of contributory negligence beyond all reasonable doubt. They
decided that it did show such guilt and directed a verdict for
the defendant.
The converse situation where the statute forbidding the
court to control the jury is in force at the place of wrong has
arisen in several cases. Here the law of the place of wrong
ostensibly favours the plaintiff. It enables him to escape the
risk of a directed verdict which would be possible under the
law of the forum. Under these conditions some courts have
applied the statute of the place of wrong. 3 But others have refused to do so on the ground that the foreign statute dealt
with a matter of procedure. 4
"Missouri Pac. R. Co. v. Miller, (I93I) I84 Ark. 6I, 4I S. W. (2d) 97I;
Jackson v. St. Louis-San Francisco R. Co., (I93o) 224 Mo. App. 6oi, 31
S. W. (2d) 25o; Caine v. St. Louis, etc., R. Co., (I923) 209 Ala. r8I, 95 So.
876.
'Colucci v. Lehigh Valley R. Co., (I923) I2I Misc. 758, 202 N.Y. Supp.
71 n Singer v. Messina, (I933) 3 I 2 Pa. 129, 167 Atl. 583.
See also Massachusetts Benefit Life Ass'n v. Robinson, (I 89 8) I 04 Ga. 2 56,
30 S. E. 918 (the court refused to follow the rule of the law of the place of
contracting that in actions upon insurance policies the materiality of a misrepresentation should be decided by the court) ; Higgins v. Central, etc., R. Co.,
(1892) 155 Mass. I76, 29 N. E. 534 (here the court assumes rather than decides that it would not follow the practice of the law of the place of wrong
permitting the jury to assess damages when a different practice prevailed at
the forum).
For dicta, see Jones v. Louisiana, etc. R. Co., (1922 Tex. Com. App.) 243
S. W. 976; Chicago, etc., R. Co. v. Tuite, (I892) 44 Ill. App. 535; Don v.
Lippmann, (1837) 5 Cl. & Fin. 1, 7 Eng. Rep. 303.
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In common-law jurisdictions most issues of fact are settled by the jury working under the judge's supervision. This
means that the power of the jury to decide the issue depends
upon the judge's opinion of the evidence. If he considers that
it leaves no room for difference of opinion regarding the
facts, he will not ask the jury for their conclusion. The control exercised by the judge may also be governed by a class
of rules, commonly known as presumptions. These rules direct
the judge to presume the probable truth of one fact from the
existence of another. If sufficient evidence is put in to justify
the jury finding the basic fact, they should also be allowed
to pass upon the presumed fact. This is not, however, the only
consequence produced by presumptions. Their status in the
conflict of laws is discussed in other sections.
SECTION

34

NATURE AND FUNCTION OF RULES RELATIVE TO BURDEN OF
PROOF

The term "burden of proof" has, as every lawyer knows,
two meanings. 1 It may refer to the duty resting upon the
proponent of some factual allegation, to convince the jury,
as triers of the facts, that the allegation is true-what
Wigmore has called the risk of non-persuasion. It may also
be used simply to denote the duty of adducing enough evidence in support of some factual allegation that the court will
permit the jury to decide whether or not that allegation is
true. At the beginning of a trial, the burden of proof in the
first sense will be placed, with respect to each of the· spe1 The discussion of the burden of proof and presumptions which follows is
based upon the following works: THAYER, PRELIMINARY TREATISE ON EVI·
DENCE (I898) 313-390; WIGMORE, EVIDENCE, Ed. 3, (I940) Vol. 9> pp. z6629 I; Morgan, "Some Observations Concerning Presumptions," (I 9 31) 44
HARV. L. REV. 906; Morgan, "Instructing the Jury Upon Presumptions and
Burden of Proof," (1933) 47 HARV. L. REv. 59; Maguire and Morgan, "Looking Backward and Forward at Evidence," (1937) so HARV. L. REv. 910-9I3;
Bohlen, "The Effect of Rebuttable Presumptions of Law Upon the Burden of
Proof," (1920) 68 U. PA. L. REV. 307.
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cific allegations raised and disputed in the course of pleading,
upon either the plaintiff or the defendant. The burden of
proof in the second sense, that of adducing sufficient evidence
to get to the jury, is almost invariably assigned, with respect
to each issue, to the party bearing the risk of non-persuasion.
This allocation of the burdens of proof at the outset of the
trial is governed by various rules of law which, according to
writers on the law of evidence, are based upon considerations
of convenience, fairness, and social policy. 2
There is a second species of rules affecting the incidence
of the burden of proof, known as presumptions. A presumption, as generally understood, is a direction to the trier of
the facts that, whenever a certain basic fact or group of facts
has been proved, the truth of another specified fact must be
assumed. According to Wigmore and Thayer, the normal
operation of a presumption should be to shift the burden of
adducing evidence from one party to the other. When once
the required minimum of evidence upon which the jury might
find the basic facts has been introduced, the party who was
originally obliged to bring in enough evidence of the presumed fact to get before the jury ought to be relieved of that
obligation. And at the same time his opponent ought to be
required to adduce sufficient evidence to justify a finding
against the presumption. If such evidence is not forthcoming,
the jury should be told that in the event they find the basic
facts they must find the presumed fact.
No doubt every presumption has the effect of shifting the
duty of producing evidence in this manner. But Morgan and
Bohlen have pointed out that, in the decided cases, a number
of further consequences have sometimes been attributed to
them. These consequences are often much more onerous for
the party against whom the presumption works than those
suggested by Thayer and Wigmore. Some presumptions have
2

References by Wigmore and Morgan cited in· footnote

I

above.
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been held to shift the risk of non-persuasion. Moreover, it is
not always easy to say whether a given rule ought to be classified as a presumption, or as a rule fixing the risk of nonpersuasion at the outset of the trial. Where the circumstances
which bring the rule into operation are of a somewhat general
character, it may be regarded as belonging to either category. 3
Morgan and Bohlen have also examined the functions
which presumptions are designed to fulfil and found them
to be quite as diverse as their immediate effects. Some presumptions are created to serve the convenience of the court
and the parties by expediting the trial. If experience shows
that fact A usually supplies a safe basis of inference for fact
B, time, money, and effort will be saved by acting upon this
inference, in the absence of countervailing proof. Again, conclusive evidence upon certain types of factual issues is very
difficult to obtain. Here the courts might find themselves
utterly unable to reach a definite conclusion if they did not
make use of a presumption in one direction or the other.
But a presumption is often something more than a device
to secure procedural convenience. It may represent a judicial
conception of fairness in deciding which party should assume
the task of accumulating sufficient relevant evidential data.
Where one party has the better opportunity to obtain such
data he ought to be forced to produce it. An unfavourable presumption will work this result. A presumption may also be
used to enforce a general social policy. A statute which forces
railroad companies to disprove their own negligence in actions brought by their employees obviously has the effect of
imposing a stricter standard of care upon such companies.
Statutes which make the doing of certain acts prima facie evidence of negligence would seem to be intended to dissuade
people in general from doing those acts.
8

For examples of such dubious rules, see Helton v. Alabama, etc., R. Co.,

(1893) 97 Ala. 275, 12 So. 276; Southern R. Co. v. Robertson, (1909) 7 Ga.
App. I54, 66 s. E. 535·
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Rules regulating the burden of proof are, like rules defining the functions of court and jury, ancillary to other legal
principles. A court decides to give effect to some primary principle of law which declares that certain defined operative
facts shall have certain legal consequences. It then becomes
necessary to allocate the burden of proving or disproving
those facts. For instance, it is a general rule of law that a
plaintiff who has by his own negligence contributed to his
own injury cannot recover damages. The application of this
primary principle requires a secondary rule which will tell
us whether the plaintiff must show that he was not guilty of
such contributory fault, or the defendant must adduce proof
that he was.
The position of such rules in the conflict of laws is somewhat analogous to that of rules assigning issues to court and
jury. Primary principles requiring the proof of certain facts
may emanate from either the law of the place of wrong or
the law of the forum. Where the primary principle in question has its source in the law of the forum, most courts and
lawyers would probably take it for granted that the secondary
rules of the forum ought to decide who should prove the facts
necessary to bring the primary principle into play. Where the
principle in question has its source in the law of the place of
wrong, the incidental burden of proof problem might be
solved by a reference to either the law of the place of wrong
or the law of the forum.
Reference to the secondary rules of the law of the place
of wrong requires no explanation. The possibility of a reference
to the secondary rules of the forum is presented when the
primary principles of the two systems appear to be similar.
Often the law of the forum and the law of the place of
wrong agree in laying down some general principle, such
as that the defendant shall be liable for harm caused by his
negligence, the defendant shall not be liable for harm caused
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by the plaintiff's negligence, etc. Here the court of the forum
is very likely to say: "We shall recognize and give effect to
the principle of the foreign law prescribing the investitive
facts which must be found in order to impose liability. But
the burden of proving those facts we shall dispose of according to our own rules."
For example: an action is brought in the courts of state
Y against a railroad company for injuries received in a collision with one of the company's trains at a level crossing
in state X. The primary principle that a railroad company is
only responsible, under such circumstances, for damage caused
by the negligence of its servants is law in both state X and
state Y. State X has an ancillary burden-of-proof rule that
the plaintiff must prove the defendant's negligence, while in
state Y the defendant company is expected to prove its freedom from fault in such a case. Following the primary principle of the law of X, the court of the forum resolves to investigate the question of the railroad company's negligence.
But to whom should the court assign the burden of proof
upon this issue, the plaintiff or the defendant company? As
we have suggested, the court might refer the problem to the
law of the place of wrong, and assign the burden of proof
to the plaintiff. But since the law of the forum contains a
similar primary principle, raising the same issue of fact (was
the defendant company guilty of negligence?), the court
might decide to follow its own secondary rule requiring the
company to show affirmatively that it was not guilty of negligence.
A slightly different situation would be presented if the
court of the forum were called upon to enforce a primary
principle of the law of the place of wrong which could not
be matched by any. duplicate doctrine of the local law. Here
the possibility of using a secondary burden-of-proof rule
derived from the local law would not be so apparent. Perhaps
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the facts put in issue by the primary principle of the law of
the place of wrong could be dealt with in the same fashion
as some analogous factual issue defined by a primary principle
of the law of the forum. But in the cases where this problem
has come before the courts, they have taken the alternative
course of adopting the appropriate secondary rule provided
by the law of the place of wrong.
Lemieux v. Boston, etc., R. Co. 4 illustrates this situation.
A workman, injured in Vermont, sued his employer in Massachusetts. By the law of Vermont there could be no recovery
in such a case if the harm was due to some danger of which
the plaintiff had knowledge. Upon him rested the burden of
showing that he did not know of the danger. By the law of
Massachusetts there could be no recovery if the plaintiff
voluntarily assumed the risk which produced his injury, a
fact which the defendant was required to prove. It will be
seen that the Massachusetts burden-of-proof rule concerned
an issue of fact which was quite different from that raised
by the law of Vermont. The law of Massachusetts really did
not provide any rule for deciding which party should carry
the burden of proof upon the single issue of plaintiff's knowledge. The court applied the Vermont rule. The plaintiff
was required to prove that he did not know of the danger
which caused his injury.
A somewhat subtler problem of the same kind was presented in Fitzpatrick v. International R. Co. 5 In New York
where the case was tried, contributory negligence is a complete
bar to recovery. The onus rests with the plaintiff to prove
that he was not guilty of such negligence. In Ontario, the
place of wrong, contributory negligence is not an absolute
defence; even though it be proved, the plaintiff is entitled
•Lemieux v. Boston, etc., R. Co., (1914) 219 Mass. 399, 106 N. E. 992.
"Fitzpatrick v. International R. Co., (1929) 252 N.Y. 127, 169 N. E. 112.
A New York federal court followed this decision in Jarrett v. Wabash R. Co.,
(C. C. A. 2nd, 1932) 57 F. (zd) 669.
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to have a share of his damages paid by the defendant upon a
comparative negligence basis. And the defendant is expected
to establish the plaintiff's culpability. Here again it seems clear
that the rules of law in the two states, defining the crucial
issues of fact to be determined between the parties, were substantially different although they both contained the same
symbol "contributory negligence." The New York rule
requiring the plaintiff to show his own freedom from fault
was never intended to be applied in conjunction with a rule
of comparative negligence such as that prevailing in Ontario.
Had the Ontario law coincided with the New York law in
making the existence of contributory fault a complete bar to
the plaintiff's recovery, the New York court would probably
have substituted its ancillary doctrine for that of the Ontario
courts and demanded that the plaintiff satisfy the court of
his innocence. 6 But in view of the outstanding difference between the primary principles of law involved, the New York
court held that the trial judge had properly charged the
jury upon the burden of proof question in strict accord with
the Ontario law.

SECTION

35

ARGUMENT FOR THE APPLICATION OF THE LAW OF PLACE OF
WRONG RESPECTING BURDEN OF PROOF

In the previous section we observed the fact that it is very
often possible to apply a rule of the forum in dealing with
the burden of proving some fact put in issue by the law of
the place of wrong. 1 The law of the forum and the law of
"See Wright v. Palmison, (1932) 237 App. Div. 22, 260 N.Y. Supp. 812;
Geoghegan v. Atlas S. S. Co., (1893) 3 Misc. 224, 22 N.Y. Supp. 749; Clark
v. Harnischfeger Sales Corp., (1933) 238 App. Div. 493, 264 N.Y. Supp. 873.
1
Above at p. 156.
On the subject of this section, see generally Hamshaw, "Conflict of Laws as
to Presumptions and Burden of Proof," (1939) 4 Mo. L. REV. 299·
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the place of wrong may concur in making ultimate liability
depend upon some question of fact, such as: Was the defendant guilty of negligence? Was the plaintiff guilty of contributory negligence? Did the plaintiff assume the risk?
If the forum and the state of wrong have different rules for
dealing with the burden of proof upon the issue in question,
the court of the forum may feel inclined to follow its own
rule. Admitting that the law of the place of wrong should
be allowed to prescribe that liability depends upon a certain
issue of fact, the court of the forum may allow its own domestic rule to say who should prove or disprove that fact.
But although it may often be possible to apply a burdenof-proof rule of the forum in foreign litigation, there are a
number of reasons for arguing that the foreign burden-ofproof rules should prevail. Such rules undoubtedly affect,
in some degree, the strategic balance of power between the
parties. In collision cases, where conflicting testimony is common, the burden of proof may become crucial. A rule of the
law of the place of wrong affixing the burden of proof may,
on occasion, reflect an important social policy which the forum
should be concerned to recognize. And the fact that certain
courts have adopted such principles from another jurisdiction
suggests that it can easily be done. 2
Against such a course of action an argument of policy may
be raised in one instance. Where the court of the forum habitually employs a presumption of the type intended to obviate
delay and uncertainty in settling the facts, it may be reluctant
to abandon this expedient in the face of a contrary doctrine
of the law of the place of wrong. Suppose A brings suit in
state Y for injuries suffered in state X while riding on the B
railroad. By the law of state X the plaintiff in such a suit must
allege and prove the railroad company's negligence. But the
courts of state Yin such cases always assume that the company
was negligent until the company proves that it exercised due
• See cases cited below.
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care. The courts of state Y do this because their experience
has lead them to believe that personal injuries to passengers
or employees caused by the operation of railroads are generally the result of negligence on the part of the company
or its servants. Hence this inference is made to save the
time and trouble which the accumulation of full proof would
entail. But if the courts of state Y apply the rule of state X
requiring the plaintiff to prove the defendant's negligence,
they will have to abandon their helpful inference and undertake an investigation of the B company's conduct. This they
may well be unwilling to do. 3 When the tort has been committed in Y, however, there is no reason why the courts of
outside states should not act upon the state Y presumption
in the interests of uniformity.
Some little show of authority might be mustered to support the thesis that rules determining the incidence of the
burden of persuasion are entitled to recognition by an outside forum 4 whilst less effective rules are not. Rules assigning
the burden of persuasion are, no doubt, more likely to affect
the final result of a contest than those of less importance. But
even the humblest presumption may carry the day for one
of the parties on a proper state of the evidence. It may be
doubted whether the slight advantage which might be gained
by discarding the less significant foreign presumptions would
be commensurate with the effort expended in applying the
suggested distinction.
In considering the various interests involved in a conflict
• See Southern R. Co. v. Robertson, (1909) 7 Ga. App. 154, 66 S. E. 535,
where a local presumption of this kind was applied. The point is also discussed
in Precourt v. Driscoll, (1931) 85 N.H. 28o, 157 Atl. 525.
4
In some cases where a foreign rule was applied the courts have stressed the
fact that it fixed the risk of non-persuasion. See Hiatt v. St. Louis, etc., R. Co.,
(1925) 308 Mo. n, 27! s. W. 8o6; Olson v. Omaha, etc., R. Co., (1936) I3I
Neb. 94, 267 N. W. 246.
In a number of cases where the foreign rule was disregarded the courts stressed
the fact that the local rule did not go so far as to alter the risk of non-persuasion.
Levy v. Steiger, (1919) 233 Mass. 6oo, 124 N. E. 477; Gould v. Boston & M.
R. Co., (1931) 276 Mass. 114, 176 N. E. 8o7.
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of rules governing the burden of proof we shall have to make
our customary distinction. The substitution of the forum's
rule for that of the state of wrong may assist either (a) the
plaintiff or (b) the defendant. Let us consider the first situation. The application of the forum's rule assists the plaintiff.
The very statement of the problem suggests the unfairness
of allowing the plaintiff to increase his chances of recovery
by "catching" the defendant in such a forum. Choice-of-law
policies emphatically require that the rule of the place of
wrong and not that of the forum be applied. Opposed to
choice-of-law policies may be the court's conviction that it
cannot abandon its own rule without undue procedural inconvemence.
It has been suggested that a way out of this dilemma might
be found by resorting to the expedient of the Slater case. 5 If
the court of the forum cannot see its way clear to follow the
foreign rule, and the application of the local rule would seriously prejudice the defendant, the court might simply dismiss the action without determining its merits. Such a result
seems preferable to forcing upon the defendant a burden of
proof which the proper law would not have put upon him.
But the suggested solution does not seem to have been adopted
in any reported case.
Let us consider some species of local burden-of-proof
rules, which may jeopardize a defendant's position. At the
present day it is not uncommon to find statutes, forming
part of the forum's internal law, which provide that, under
certain circumstances, a defendant shall be presumed guilty of
negligence unless he makes the contrary appear. A passenger
is injured in a railway train. The railway company is presumed to have been guilty of negligence. An employee is injured by defective machinery. His employer is presumed to
0

See CONFLICT OF LAWS RESTATEMENT (1934) § 595, comment a; Precourt
v. Driscoll, (1931) 85 N.H. 28o, 157 Atl. 525.
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have been negligent. Such rules raise a presumption which
the defendant must rebut. They must be carefully distinguished from rules which say that certain acts constitute negligence per se. The defendant cannot overcome the effect of
a rule of the latter type by adducing evidence to show that he
was not negligent. A rule of this type is not a burden-of-proof
rule; it is what we have called a primary rule of law. It directs
that certain facts, if proved, shall have certain legal consequences. 6 Such rules are sometimes said to raise a conclusive
or irrebuttable presumption of negligence. This description
is accurate enough, but by introducing the idea of a presumption it may lead to confusion.
Our concern here is with the type of rule which raises a
rebuttable presumption of negligence upon certain basic facts.
We assume such a rule to be in force at the forum. The law
of the place of wrong makes the defendant's liability turn
upon the issue of negligence. If the court of the forum brings
its domestic presumption into play, it will give the plaintiff
a special advantage which be ought not to obtain. Nevertheless, this has been done in several cases. 7 The courts which
followed their local presumption gave no explanation for
doing so beyond the statement that the presumption "relates to the remedy."
One of the most important species of burden-of-proof
rules consists of rules concerning the issue of contributory negligence. It often happens that both the forum and the state
of wrong concur in making the plaintiff's contributory negligence an absolute bar to his recovery. Yet the law of the
state of wrong assigns to the plaintiff the duty of clearing
himself, whilst the law of the forum requires the defendant
to prove the plaintiff's culpability. Which doctrine should the
6

See above, sections 2 3, 2 5.
Pennsylvania Co. v. McCann, (1896) 54 Ohio St. to, 42 N. E. 768; Rastede
v. Chicago, etc., R. Co. (1927) 203 Iowa 430, 212 N. W. 751; Richmond, etc.,
R. Co. v. Mitchell, (r893) 92 Ga. 77> r8 S. E. 290.
7
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court adopt? It could scarcely be urged, as a reason for adopting the doctrine of the forum, that it was a trusted inference
employed by the courts to eliminate the task of adducing
more complete proof. Judicial experience never compelled a
court to conclude either that plaintiffs are usually guilty of
contributory negligence, or that they are usually innocent.
Neither rule can be regarded as a rational inference crystallized for convenience into a rule of law. 8
To apply the rule of the forum and so require the defendant to bear a burden which the law of the place of wrong
would not have put upon him would seem to be unfair to the
defendant. Nevertheless, this has been done in a good many
cases. 9 The great weight of authority supports the view that
the ordinary rule of the forum should allocate the burden
of proof upon the issue of contributory fault.
In Precourt v. Driscoll 10 the Supreme Court of New
Hampshire took the contrary view which, if we may say so
with respect, appears to be the more reasonable one. Vermont
was the state of wrong. Under the New Hampshire practice,
the defendant was required to prove the plaintiff's contributory negligence. In Vermont the plaintiff would have been
expected to prove himself free from fault. The New Hamp8
The same point is made in a different way by Allen J., in Precourt v.
Driscoll, (1931) 85 N.H. 28o, 157 Atl. 525.
'
"Sapone v. New York, etc., R. Co., (I927) I30 Misc. 755, 225 N.Y. Supp.
2 II (see semble, where the rule affected risk of non-persuasion, Schrader v.
New York, etc., R. Co., (1930) 254 N.Y. I48, I72 N. E. 272); Levy v.
Steiger, (I9I9) 233 Mass. 6oo, I24 N, E. 477; Gould v. Boston & M. R. Co.,
(193I) 276 Mass. I14, I76 N. E. 807; Menard v. Goltra, (I93I) 328 Mo.
368, 40 S. W. (2d) I053; Holland v. Boston & M. R. Co., (1932) 279 Mass.
342, I81 N. E. 217; Chicago Terminal Transfer R. Co. v. Vandenberg,
(1905) I64 Ind. 470, 73 N. E. 990; Midland Trail Bus Lines v. Martin,
(I935) Ioo Ind. App. 206, I94 N. E. 862; Jenkins v. Minneapolis, etc., R. Co.,
(I9I4) I24 Minn. 368, I45 N. W. 40; Jones v. Louisiana, etc., R. Co., (I922
Tex. Com. App.) 243 S. W. 976; Smith v. Wabash R. Co., (I895) I4I Ind. 92•
40 N. E. 270 (semble, a special rule for railway crossing accidents).
10
Precourt v. Driscoll, (193I) 85 N.H. 28o, I57 Atl. 525. See also Olson v.
Omaha, etc., R. Co., (I936) I3I Neb. 94, 267 N. W. 246.
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shire court adopted the Vermont rule saying (in the course
of a lengthy opinion):
"It appears that the procedural rule in Vermont as to
the burden of proof of contributory negligence is indispensable to the enforcement of the substantive rule, and is established in conformity with it. The procedural rule is incidental to it, effectuates it, and in a real sense is part and
parcel of it. The substantive rule in an exceptional way embraces the procedural rule as an inseparable corollary of it.
"The usual distinctions are so merged that, if they were
made, the substantive rule would become invalid in the alteration of its character which the observance of the distinctions would impose. An element of the cause of action would
be destroyed, and the allowance of the non-existence of the
element as a defence would not restore it. Whatever technical
comparisons may be made, the practical result of the enforcement of the local burden of proof rule would be to substitute
a domestic cause of action for that sought to be enforced."
In this passage the court is obviously pouring new wine
into old bottles. In the face of earlier authority, the court
hesitates to say that the Vermont rule is not procedural. Yet
it is strongly convinced that the Vermont rule ought to be
enforced at the forum if the plaintiff's cause of action is to
be defined in any real, practical sense by the law of Vermont.
Let us turn now to our second problem situation: the
substitution of the forum's burden-of-proof rule for that of
the state of wrong assists the defendant. Here there is not,
perhaps, such a strong element of unfairness in applying the
rule of the forum. If the plaintiff's chances of success are diminished, he has only himself to blame for choosing this
forum. However, it is still desirable, from the point of view of
choice-of-law policies, that the rule of the place of wrong
should prevail.
We have already considered rules which create a presumption of negligence upon certain basic facts. A rule of
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this kind forming part of the law of the place of wrong gives
the plaintiff a certain advantage. It is desirable that he should
retain that advantage in other jurisdictions. Some courts
have reached this result by giving rules of this type the same
treatment which they would receive in their home state. 11
Other courts have excluded such rules from consideration. 12
The law of the place of wrong may allocate the burden
of proving contributory negligence in such a way as to favour
the plaintiff. But if the forum's rule requires that the plaintiff
should affirmatively show his freedom from fault, the defendant will try to have the local rule applied. There does
not appear to be any good reason for excluding the rule of the
state of wrong upon this point. But in a number of cases this
has been done. 13 There is also authority for the position that
if the law of the place of wrong would make the defendant
prove contributory fault, the court of the forum should do
likewise. 14
n Rule of the law of the place of wrong applied:
Negligence of defendant railroad company presumed from fact of injury to
the plaintiff. Hiatt v. St. Louis, etc., R. Co., (1925) 308 Mo. 77, 271 S. W.
8o6; Ramey v. Missouri Pac. R. Co. (1929) 323 Mo. 662, 21 S. W. (2d) 873.
Negligence of defendant railway company presumed from failure to give required signals. Baltimore, etc., R. Co. v. Ryan, (1903) 31 Ind. App. 597,
68 N. E. 923.
Burden of proving absence of negligence placed upon employer in action
brought by employee. Lykes Bros. S. S. Co. v. Esteves, (C. C. A. 5th, 19 3 7)
89 F. (2d) 528.
12
Rule of the law of the place of wrong excluded:
Negligence of defendant railroad company presumed from fact of injury to
plaintiff. Helton v. Alabama, etc., R. Co., (1893) 97 Ala. 275, 12 So. 276.
Defendant's negligence presumed from rate of speed at which he was travelling. Johnson v. Chicago, etc., R. Co., (1894) 91 Iowa 248, 59 N. W. 66;
Smith v. Wabash R. Co., (1895) 141 Ind. 92, 40 N. E. 270; Davis Cabs v.
Evans, (1932) 42 Ohio App. 493, 182 N. E. 327; Kingery v. Donnell, (1936)
222 Iowa 241, 268 N. W. 617; Collins v. McClure, (1939) 63 Ohio App.
312, 26 N. E. (2d) 780.
Defendant's negligence presumed from defective machinery. Jones v. Chicago, etc., R. Co., (19oo) 8o Minn. 488, 83 N. W. 446.
13
Kingery v. Donnell, (1936) 222 Iowa 241, 268 N. W. 617; Wright v.
Palmison, (1932) 237 App. Div. 22, 260 N. Y. Supp. 812; Geoghegan v.
Atlas S. S. Co., (1893) 3 Misc. 224,22 N.Y. Supp. 749; Clark v. Harnischfeger Sales Corp., (1933) 238 App. Div. 493, 264 N.Y. Supp. 873. ·
"Reilly v. Pepe, (1928) 108 Conn. 436, 143 Atl. 568; Southern R. Co. v.
Robertson, (1909) 7 Ga. App. 154, 66 S. E. 535·
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Something should be said at this point regarding a species
of rules which, although not classically included in the
category of presumptions, possess one of the most important
attributes of presumptions in that they enable one of the
parties to avoid a directed verdict. In common-law jurisdictions it is customary for trial and appellate courts to reverse any finding of fact, made by a jury, which they do not
believe to be supported by a reasonable quantum of evidence.
In the process of supervising and testing the work of juries,
a court will sometimes build up, by the accumulation of decisions, a general theory that fact B is sufficient evidence
from which a jury might properly infer fact A. Thus, if a
proponent charged with the burden of adducing enough
evidence of fact A to get before the jury, succeeds in producing the necessary minimum of evidence to prove fact B, he
will be held to have fulfilled his original duty relative to fact
A. Unlike a presumption, however, such a theory merely
enables the proponent to obtain the jury's opinion upon the
existence of fact A; it casts no obligation upon the opponent
to adduce some quantity of evidence in rebuttal.
What should be the status of such rules in conflict of laws
litigation? No doubt they may materially assist the proponent of an issue upon which the evidence is scanty and
ought, when they form part of the law of the place of wrong,
to be taken into consideration. There is some authority for
this view. 15 By the same token, an habitual inference derived
from the decisions of the forum ought to be ignored. It may
be difficult, however, for a court to put out of mind a rational
conclusion which it has already drawn from similar data in
its previous opinions. 16
15
Rapers v. Holmes, (1937) 292 Ill. App. II6, 10 N. E. (2d) 707; Jarrett
v. Wabash R. Co., (C. C. A. 2nd, 1932) 57 F. (2d) 669 (semble).
Contra: Clodfelter v. Wells, (1938) 212 N.C. 823, 195 S. E. 11.

"'Usual inference of local law applied: Harrison v. Atlantic Coast Line R.
Co., (1915) 168 N.C. 382, 84 S. E. 519. See also Kingery v. Donnell, (1936)
222 Iowa 241, 268 N. W. 617 (dictum?).
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THE BURDEN OF PROOF UPON THE ISSUE OF CONTRIBUTORY
NEGLIGENCE IN THE FEDERAL COURTS OF THE UNITED
STATES

The attitude of the federal courts to the burden of proof
on the contributory negligence issue requires separate consideration. Let us approach the question historically. When
the doctrine of Swift v. Tyson 1 was in flower there was no
difficulty. The burden of proof upon an issue of contributory
negligence was classified as part of the "general federal common law." The divergent opinions of state courts were ignored. All federal courts followed the uniform federal rule
laid down by the Supreme court. 2 And this rule assigned
the burden of proving contributory negligence to the defendant. But since Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins 3 (I938) the federal
courts no longer administer a general common law. They
must, in compliance with the Judiciary Act of 1789 (section 34), follow the common law as well as the statute law
of "the several States." Hence the federal courts are no
longer free to adopt a uniform federal rule governing the
burden of proving contributory negligence on the ground
that it is part of the federal common law.
The federal courts have, however, a uniform code of rules
of procedure, authorized by an act of Congress and promulgated in 1938.4 The act which authorized the Supreme Court
to prescribe these rules stipulates that they "shall neither
1

Swift v. Tyson, (1842) 16 Pet. (41 U.S.) r.

2

Hough v. Railway Co., (1879) roo U.S. 213, 2.2.5; Central Vermont R. Co.
v. White, (1914) 238 U.S. so7, 35 Sup. Ct. 865.
3

Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, (1938) 304 U. S. 64, 58 Sup. Ct. 81 7·

• The rules are printed as a supplement to U. S. C. A. following title 2. 8,
section 723b.
The constituent statute is 48 Stat. (1934) 1064, 28 U. S.C. (1934) § 72.3b.
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abridge, enlarge, nor modify the substantive rights of any
litigant." Rule 8 (c) of the code might be thought to provide
that the defendant to a suit in a federal court must assume
the duty of pleading and proving the plaintiff's contributory
negligence. But in several cases where the applicable state
law required the plaintiff to prove his freedom from contributory fault, lower federal courts have refused to accept
the view that rule 8 (c) affects the burden of proof, on the
ground that the rule would then affect the substantive rights
of the parties which must be determined by the state law. 5
These federal courts take the view that a state rule which
makes it necessary for the plaintiff to show his freedom from
fault transcends the procedural category and affects substantive rights. Such a state rule therefore comes within the
scope and policy of section 34 of the Judiciary Act and is
obligatory upon federal courts.
If we adopt the position that the federal rules of court do
not touch the burden of proof in relation to contributory
negligence and that the federal courts must be guided by state
laws, a further problem arises. To illustrate, suppose A is
injured by Bin state X. He brings suit against Bin a federal
court in state Y. Should the federal court, in dealing with
the burden of proof on a contributory negligence issue, adopt
the rule of state Y which is the forum, or the rule of state X
where the injury was received? From the standpoint of
choice-of-law policies it is desirable that the law of state X
(the state of wrong) should prevaiJ.6 But since the Supreme
Court's decision in Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Electric Mfg. Co. 7
"Schopp v. Muller Dairies, (D. C. N.Y., I938) 25 F. Supp. so; Francis v.
Humphrey, (D. C. Ill., I938) 25 F. Supp. I; Sampson v. Channell, (C. C. A.
Ist, I94o) IIO F. (2d) 754·
See Note, (1939) 37 MICH. L. REV. 1249; Note, (1938) 38 CoL. L. REv.
1472·
• See section 35·
7
Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Electric Mfg. Co., (1941) 61 Sup. Ct. 1020.
See section I o, above.
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the federal court's choice-of-law would appear to be a choice
in name only. This decision requires federal courts to adhere
strictly to the conflict of laws rulings of their home states.
Hence the treatment of the burden of proof by the federal
court sitting in state Y will depend upon the views entertained
by the state Y state courts. 8 If the state courts would, in the
instant case, apply their local burden-of-proof rule, the federal court will do likewise. If the state courts would, in the
instant case, apply state X's burden-of-proof rule, the federal
court will do likewise.
8

See Sampson v. Channell, (C. C. A. 1st, 1940) 110 F. (zd) 754·

CHAPTER

VII

Multiple Contact Cases: Introductory
Discussion
SECTION

37

APPLICATION OF ONE OR OF SEVERAL CHOICE-OF-LAW
PRINCIPLES

H

ITHERTO in our discussion we have only dealt
with cases in which the operative facts occurred
within the bounds of a single jurisdiction, the state
of wrong. The problems with which we were concerned all
arose from the circumstance that the litigation to determine
the legal consequences of those facts had been instituted in
another jurisdiction, the forum. However, conflict of laws
cas~s are not all as simple as this. Courts are often confronted
by cases in which the very operative facts themselves are
spread over two or even more jurisdictions whose internal laws
are different. For example, A, blasting rock in state X, causes
a piece of rock to fly over into state Y and injure B who is
standing there. A has not been guilty of any negligence. U nder the internal law of state X, A is liable to B whether he
has been negligent or not. Under the internallaw of state Y,
B cannot recover without proving negligence. Can B recover
damages? Another example, A injures Bin state X. B signs
a contract in state Y releasing A from all liability. Such contracts are void under the internal law of state Y, valid under
the internal law of state X. Can B recover damages from A?
For the sake of convenience we venture to call cases of this
kind "multiple contact cases" because the facts make significant contacts with a number of jurisdictions. But there is another important element in these cases besides their multiplicity of contacts which makes them difficult to decide; the
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internal laws of various jurisdictions concerned are different. If, in either of these examples, the laws of state X and
state Y were identical, there would be no problem. We could
determine the legal effect of the operative facts according
to the law of either state and the results would be the same.
But when the two relevant laws are different, we are forced to
resolve the "conflict of laws." In other words, there are two
essential elements in a multiple contact problem: (I) multiple
contacts and ( 2) different laws.
In solving multiple contact cases the courts appear to
have used two formal techniques. One of these techniques
involves the application of a single choice-of-law principle
in such a manner as to select the law of one of the various
jurisdictions and exclude the laws of the others. This technique would very likely be used in the "rock blasting" example above. An American court would probably decide the
case according to the law of state Y where the injury occurred
and ignore the law of state X where the defendant acted. The
single choice-of-law principle applied would be that the law
of the place of wrong determines liability in tort. This principle does not, as stated, carry us very far because "place of
wrong" means "place where the acts and events of which the
plaintiff complains occurred." 1 That description would include either state X or state Y. But, for reasons which we
shall discuss later, the case would probably be handled as
if both the blasting and the injury had happened in state Y.
The law of state X would not have any effect upon the :final
decision. 2
The second formal technique which the courts adopt in
1

See above, p. xvii.
• For discussion, with special reference to torts, of the solution of multiple
contact cases in terms of a single choice-of-law principle, see: Lorenzen, "Tort
Liability and the Conflict of Laws," (1931) 47 LAW QuARTERLY REV. 483,
491; Cook, "Tort Liability and the Conflict of Laws," (1935) 35 CoL. L. REV.
202; Magruder and Grout, "Wrongful Death Within the Admiralty Jurisdiction," (192.6) 35 YALE L. ]. 395; STUMBERG, CONFLICT OF LAWS (1937) 165,
182.
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multiple contact cases involves the use of two or even more
choice-of-law principles. Through the operation of these
choice-of-law principles, each of the relevant laws is permitted to govern a particular aspect of the case in hand. We
should probably find this technique employed in the "injury
and release" example above. The injury having been inflicted
in state X, the law of that state would be allowed to determine
the nature and extent of A's liability in tort. But since the
contract of release was signed in state Y, its law would be
allowed to determine the validity and effect of the release.
This would be the court's general theoretical approach to the
problem. Probably the contract of release, being void under
the internal law of the place where it was made, would be
treated as having no legal effect in any forum. The theory
of this second technique, employing two or more choice-oflaw principles, is that no one body of law should regulate the
entire series of transactions. Questions of tort liability are
referred to the law of the place of wrong; questions relating
to the effect of the contractual transaction are referred to the
law of the place of contracting.3
The operation of this second technique, involving more
than one choice-of-law principle, may be illustrated by another example. A buys a railway ticket in state X. During the
journey he is injured in state Y. He brings suit against the
railroad company. Upon the facts of the case, A has a good
cause of action against the railroad company under the internal law of state X; he has no cause of action under the
internal law of state Y. By what law should the case be governed? In favour of the law of state Y it may be urged that
the law of the place of wrong usually defines the defendant's liability in tort. But since the contract of carriage was
8
For a general discussion of the solution of multiple contact cases in terms
of several choice-of-law principles, see: STUMBERG, CoNFLICT OF LAWS ( 193 7)
182; Note, (1935) 44 YALE L. J. 1233; Rheinstein, "Comparative Law and
Conflict of Laws in Germany," (1935) 2 UNIV. OF CHI. L. REV. 232, 265.
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made in state X, its law might be permitted to determine
how the contract should be performed. Some courts have
held that in such cases they will apply both choice-of-law
principles. 4 The law of state Y will determine whether the
plaintiff has any claim in tort; the law of state X will determine whether he has any claim for breach of contract.
The case of Burkett v. Globe Indemn#y Co. 5 exemplifies
a problem to which either of the two formal techniques which
we have discussed might have been applied with the same
result. A, an automobile repairman, was commissioned by B
to repair B's automobile in Louisiana. A left the car in such
a dangerous condition that while B was driving it in Alabama,
it ran off the road and injured C. C brought an action against
A for damages. The court referred the question of A's liability to C to the law of Louisiana and awarded damages to C.
Now we could explain this decision as an illustration of the
first technique by saying that that court regarded Louisiana,
where the car was negligently repaired, as the place of wrong.
It therefore chose Louisiana law, as the proper law to determine A's liability to C in tort.
However, there is a good deal of authority for the view
that when a negligent act, done in one state, causes injury
in another, the law of the state of injury should be applied
exclusively, i.e., that state is the place of wrong. On this view,
the law of Louisiana ought not to be chosen, since the injury
occurred in Alabama. If pressed with this argument, we could
explain the result reached in Burkett v. Globe Indemnity Co.
as an application of the second technique. This involves the
use of two choice-of-law principles. One choice-of-law principle directs that the law of the place of wrong governs all
questions of tort liability. The weight of authority supports
the view that "place of wrong" means "place of injury."
• See below, p. I 92.
• Burkett v. Globe Indemnity Co.,

( I 93 8) I

82 Miss. 423,

I

8 I So. 3 I 6.
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Hence the law of Alabama will decide whether C has any
cause of action against A for the wrong or tort. But we may
invoke another choice-of-law theory; the effect of a contract
is to be determined by the law of the place of contracting. A's
failure to repair B's car properly was a breach of the contract
for the repairs, made between A and B in Louisiana. This contract was also breached by A in Louisiana. That breach caused
injury to C. May not the law of Louisiana be permitted to
impose a liability upon A in favour of C, arising out of this
breach of contract? Thus we have two arguable theories, each
based upon a different choice-of-law principle, to explain the
court's reference to Louisiana law.
SECTION

38

CHOICE-OF-LAW POLICIES IN MULTIPLE CONTACT CASES

In the subsequent sections of this work we shall examine
in detail a number of different types of multiple contact cases.
Before doing so, however, it may be useful to discuss in a
somewhat general fashion the various social interests which
are likely to come into play in such cases. Such a discussion will
facilitate the more detailed treatment of particular problems
later on.
As a preliminary point it should be noted that, in a multiple contact case, the forum may be one of the states with
which the operative facts are connected. This circumstance
does not in itself alter the character of the choice-of-law
problem. But in practice it will be found that the court of
the forum is likely to give more careful and favourable consideration to the policies of its own local law. For example,
the legislature of state X exacts a workmen's compensation law
making employers responsible for the costs of industrial accidents. An employee who does most of his work in state Y is
injured in state X while performing some temporary service
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there. He applies for compensation in state X. In dealing
with this type of multiple contact case, the court will doubtless take into account the general choice-of-law principles
governing wrongs and breaches of contractual relations. But
the most important factor in determining the issue will probably be the court's opinion regarding the policies and purposes
of the local compensation law.
In section I I, above, we discussed at some length the significance of "uniformity" as a juristic ideal in the conflict of
laws. It is most desirable that when certain transactions give
rise to a controversy between two parties, one of those parties
should not be able to gain an advantage by commencing litigation in one jurisdiction rather than another. All courts
should cooperate, as far as possible, in the application of
choice-of-law principles, so that wherever the dispute may
be litigated the result will be approximately the same. This
ideal is not completely realized in present-day practice, but
American courts have achieved a considerable degree of success in minimizing the improper advantages to be gained
by suing in particular jurisdictions.
These considerations apply to multiple contact cases quite
as much as to others. Hence a court, confronted by a multiple
contact problem, ought to give most careful consideration
to the decisions which have been handed down by the courts
of other jurisdictions in dealing with identical or closely
analogous problems. This practice is regularly followed by
courts in the United States with regard to decisions given
by the courts of other American states. It has enabled them
to build up a fairly uniform conflict of laws jurisprudence.
It may be conceded, however, that at least some species
of multiple contact cases are rather rare. When a case of
this kind occurs there may be no existing precedent which can
be said to have established a uniform standard of decision.
The court will then be free to give full play to other social
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interests besides that of uniformity. It is impossible to pursue
uniformity until some pattern has been set up to which we
may conform. But even if such a pattern has been set up by
prior decisions it will be no great matter if, in a rare type of
case, a particular court refuses to follow it. Because where the
problem presented is an uncommon one, a lack of consistency
in its solution from state to state will affect only a small class
of persons. For example, a statute is passed in state X imposing
very strict liability upon all persons who set out fires. A sets
out a fire in state X which spreads into state Y and causes considerable damage to B's property in state Y. B sues A in state
X. Now the prevailing doctrine in such cases is that the law
of the state where the damage occurred should govern the
defendant's liability. But if the court of state X decides to
disregard the prevailing doctrine and apply its own law, the
law of the place where the defendant acted, no great harm
will be done. Such a ruling, even if followed in other cases
will only affect the comparatively small group of persons
who set out fires in one state and so cause injury in another.
And even they are not likely to be affected if they can keep
themselves and their property out of state X. If, on the other
hand, the court of state X had undertaken to apply its local
statute to all cases of damage by fire wherever they occurred,
such a decision would be highly objectionable from the conflict of laws point of view.
In other words, although uniformity is always a matter
for consideration in multiple contact cases, its significance is
liable to be diminished by the fact that the solution of unusual
cases of this type will affect only a small class of persons.
Uniformity and predictability are not the sole objectives in
the conflict of laws. Cases may arise in which a court will
deem it desirable to depart from the established pattern of
decision in order to protect some other social interest. If,
however, no other important social interest appears to be at
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stake, uniformity will remain, as always, our principal objective in the conflict of laws.
In the ordinary case where all the operative facts are
located in a single state, we refer the question of defendant's
liability in tort to the law of that state because it appears to
have the greatest social interest in the matter. 1 In a multiple
contact case, where the operative facts are spread over several states, one or more of these states may be said to have
an interest in the outcome of the controversy. 2 And in some
cases these interests may conflict with one another. Thus,
in our "fire spreading" example, it is clear that the government of state Y, where the damage occurred, has an interest
in the protection of persons or property within its borders.
At the same time state X, where the acts causing the damage
occurred, has also an interest in determining the legal consequences of the entire series of acts and events. The government of state X may desire to regulate the conduct of persons
who set out fires there. It may desire to impose a liability upon
such persons if they carry on their operations in such a manner
as to produce serious injury to others, even though the injury
occurs in some other state.
In this case it would probably be an exaggeration to say
that the policies of state X and state Y regarding the setting
out of fires conflict with one another. The law of state X imposes a somewhat stricter liability than the law of state Y but
there is no need to assume that this strict liability is contrary
to the policy of state Y. However, in some multiple contact
cases it may be a matter of importance to one state that a lia1

See above, p. 6 r.
•on this point see STUMBERG, CoNFLICT OF LAWS (1937) 182; Lorenzen,
"Tort Liability and the Conflict of Laws," (1931) 47 LAW QuARTERLY REV,
483, 493; Note, (1935) 44 YALE L. J. 1233.
A similar problem arises in the field of criminal law. Almost any of the states
connected with an interstate crime are likely to mete out justice to the wrongdoer according to their own laws. See STIMSON, CONFLICT OF CRIMINAL LAWS
(1936) 46; BEALE, CoNFLICT OF LAWS (1935) vol. r, p. 315.
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bility should not be imposed. For example, the law of state
X creates a privilege in favour of certain acts such as shooting
criminals to prevent their escape or inflicting injury to save
a human life. The law of state Y does not recognize these defences. If a person, doing one of these acts in state X, produces
injurious consequences in state Y, the policies of the two
states will, in a measure, come into conflict with one another.
The court of the forum will have to choose between them. 3
Let us consider another example. A injures B in state X.
B signs a contract in state Y which releases A from all liability
for the injuries. This contract is quite valid under the law of
state Y but a statute of state X purports to make such releases
absolutely void. Now state Y has an interest in prescribing
the validity and effect of contracts made there. But state X
has also some interest in extending contract-proof protection
to persons who have been injured within its borders. Hence
the policies of the two states are, to some extent, opposed to
one another.
It is not suggested, of course, that in all multiple contact
cases each of the states involved has of necessity a vital interest in the outcome of the litigation. All we desire to indicate
is that in such cases the interests of the states involved may
have to be taken into consideration.
Where the forum is one of the states connected with a case,
its claim to impose or eliminate liability is likely to receive
very careful consideration. The same sympathetic treatment
ought also to be given to the claims of other states. But there
is no need for the court of the forum to give the laws of
other states any more ample recognition than that which they
would receive at home. To illustrate, A, who is shooting in
state X, accidentally injures Bin state Y. There is no negligence or want of care upon A's part. Under the internal law
of state X, B can recover; under that of state Y, he cannot. B
3

See the

CONFLICT OF LAWS RESTATEMENT (1934)

§ 382.

18o

TORTS IN THE CONFLICT OF LAWS

brings suit against A in state Y. Since A was physically present
in state X at the time of the shooting, state X has some claim
to determine the legal effect of A's conduct. The court of state
Y might feel inclined, in the absence of some clear domestic
policy to the contrary, to give effect to the law of state X by
imposing liability upon A. Suppose, however, it was shown
that, in a case identical with this one, the court of state X would
not apply its own internal law but would apply that of state Y.
If the court of state X would not apply its own law to such a
case, there is no reason why the court of state Y should do so.
The court of state X is the best judge of that state's interests
and policies. 4
In such a case as this, the fact that the court of state X
would apply the law of state Y is probably a good reason
for the court of state Y to do the same thing. By following the
precedent set by the court of state X, the court of state Y is
helping to achieve the choice-of-law ideal of uniformity in all
jurisdictions. The parties receive the same treatment in the
court of state Y as they would have received in the court of
state X.
This solution of the problem should not be regarded as a
general approval of the renvoi doctrine. Under the circumstances of the problem supposed, a reference to the total law
of state X and a renvoi to the internal law of state Y would
doubtless reach the same result. But the solution which we
have suggested is not derived from any general theory of "do
renvoi" or "don't renvoi." It is based upon the idea that if
a certain state refuses to apply its own internal law to a particular type of multiple contact cases, it cannot be said that
other states ought to make such an application out of respect
for the interest of the state in question. They may safely as• See The Vestris, (D. C. N. Y., 193 I) 53 F. (2d) 847 (vessel of British
registry sinking on the high seas; American court held, following British decisions, that British loading regulations did not govern such cases).
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sume that the state in question has no real interest in the
solution of such cases, and proceed to adopt what appears to be
the uniform practice.
SECTION

39

THE THEORY OF CAUSATION APPLIED IN MULTIPLE CONTACT
CASES

A theory which is somewhat analogous to that of proximate cause in internal tort law has been invoked in certain
multiple contact cases to exclude the application of the law
of a particular state. Perhaps the best-known example is found
in the "automobile owner's liability" cases. A, an automobile
owner, lends his car toBin state X. B drives the car into state
Y and while operating the car there, injures C. C brings an
action against A. Under the internal law of state Y, A is
vicariously liable to C for injuries inflicted by the operation
of his car; under the internal law of state X, A is not liable
to C. In favour of the application of the law of state Y, it
may be said that state Y has an interest in prescribing the conditions respecting civil liability which will govern the use
of automobiles on its highways. But in favour of A it may be
argued that his liability ought not to depend upon the law
of state Y because he did not cause the car to be taken there.
The only reason for making A liable under the law of state
Y is that his car was involved in an injury there. The causal
connection between A's act of lending the car to B and the car
being in state Y is so remote that it seems unfair to make A
liable under the law of state Y.
To put the argument in another form; if B while driving
the car in state X had injured C there, most persons would
think it rather harsh to subject A to liability for a violation
of the laws of state Y. From A's point of view, the case is not
different when C is hurt in state Y because A had nothing
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to do with the car being in state Y. It was B, not A, who took
the car into state Y. This argument has made so much impression on the courts which have dealt with the problem that
they have adopted a via media. Although applying the law
of state Y, they indicate (some more explicitly than others)
that the automobile owner (A) must be shown to have given
an express or implied consent to the use of his car in state Y. 1
It should be observed that the idea of causation as it affects
this conflict of laws problem is different from the idea of
causation in ordinary internal tort law. In the latter context
we are called upon to decide whether a person should be liable
for certain harmful events. It is customary to require some
causal connection between that person's act and the harmful
events in question. In the conflict of laws situation we are
called upon to decide whether a person should be subjected
to liability under the law of a particular state. If the person
has not entered the state in question, it is suggested that
we should require some degree of causal connection between
his act and the fact that certain events have occurred in that
state. In brief, we are concerned for conflicts purposes, not
with the relation of an act to events, but with the relation of
an act to the location of events.
' To make this distinction clearer and further illuminate
the significance of the causation conception in conflict of laws
let us consider another example. Suppose A injures B in state
X. B is removed into state Y and dies there. The question is
raised whether A's liability to B or to B's dependents should
be determined by the law of state Y. Now the causal connection between A's act and B's death may be perfectly clear
and satisfactory. But the connection between A's act and the
fact that B died in state Y seems very vague and remote. A
might be in no way responsible for the location of the death
which might be due to the act of B himself or of some third
1

See below, p. 237.
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party. There would be an element of unfairness to A in making his liability depend upon these circumstances which have
so little relation to his original act. Hence the courts which
have been confronted by this problem have unanimously declined to make any reference to the law of the place of death. 2

SECTION

40

THE PROBLEM OF CLASSIFICATION IN MULTIPLE CONTACT
CASES

In introducing the topic of multiple contact cases we suggested that these cases, like all other cases which come before the courts, involve a pattern of operative facts. But these
cases are peculiar in that the pattern of facts is spread over
a number ofjurisdictions whose laws are different, a state of
affairs which raises the question, "which law or laws is to be
applied?"
In dealing with these cases the courts sometimes adopt the
law of one state to determine the legal effect of the entire
series of transactions. The other laws are excluded from
consideration. A second technique, not infrequently employed, is to make a selection of legal rules from each of the
relevant laws, by using several choice-of-law principles. No
one body of law is allowed to determine all the legal consequences of the fact situation.
When there appears to be a possibility of applying two
or more choice-of-law principles to a set of operative facts,
the problem may be stated as a problem of classification (characterization, qualification). To illustrate this point we may
use an example which we considered in section 3 8. Suppose A
2

See below, p. 25 5·
For a discussion of the theory of causation in relation to the selection of a
proper law for torts cases, see BEALE, CoNFLICT OF LAWS (1935) vol. z,
p. 1296; Cheatham, "Internal Law Distinctions in the Conflict of Laws,"
(1936) 21 CoRN. L. Q. 570,580.
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injures Bin state X. B signs a contract in state Y which releases A from all liability for the injuries. According to
choice-of-law principles the internal law of state X governs
matters of tort liability, the internal law of state Y determines
the legal effect of the contract. We find that the contract of
release is valid under the internal law of state Y (where it
was signed) but void under the internal law of state X (where
the injury occurred). Thus we have a rule of the internal law
of state X which is contrary to a corresponding rule of the internal law of state Y. Which rule ought to prevail? The
formal problem of classification might be stated in any one of
three ways: does state X's rule avoiding the contract belong to
the category of tort or to the category of contract? does state
Y's rule upholding the contract belong to the category of tort
or to the category of contract? does the subject-matter of these
rules (contracts releasing tort claims) belong to the category
of tort or to the category of contract? But the actual problem
is always the same irrespective of the form in which it is
stated; the court must decide which of the two conflicting
rules shall govern the decision. This accounts for the fact that
writers who employ this terminology sometimes appear to be
classifying different things. 1
These three formulae which state the problem in terms
of a classification do not provide us with a very complete
picture of the real issues which are at stake. In a sense, they
oversimplify the problem. They omit all the important social
factors to which we referred in section 38. In multiple contact cases of this kind, the conflicting rules of the various states
involved may embody important social policies which the
court of the forum will want to take into consideration. In
the example which we have used, state X's rule avoiding
1

Another explanation for this apparent disparity in the objects of classification is found in the treatment of certain writers who divide the classification
process into two stages. At the first stage they classify the facts, at the second, the
rules of the appropriate internal law. See below, section 41,
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releases is probably a rule of this kind. Another matter which
ought to be taken into account in all conflicts cases is the ideal
of uniformity. If possible, it is desirable that the court trying
this case should decide it as other courts have decided similar
cases, or would be likely to decide this one.
The classification analysis does not seem to find any place
for these matters. It suggests that the problem is one of pure
logic. A legal rule or a legal rule's subject-matter necessarily
belongs to some category. The court's only task is to discover
the correct pigeon-hole. The writers who employ this analysis
usually try to find some general theory which the courts ought
to follow in making their classification. They debate whether
the classification ought to be governed by the internal law of
the forum or by one of the relevant proper laws. They seem
to lay very slight emphasis upon the relation of the classification to conflict of laws policies.
In favour of this approach to the problem it may be urged
that many multiple contact cases do not involve any important policies of the states with which the case is connected.
In many cases it is a matter of indifference to these states
whether the case be decided one way or the other. Uniformity is the sole objective. What is wanted, therefore, is a simple
general principle of classification to which the courts of every
state may resort and which will enable them to deduce a
solution for every case. It may be conceded that in many
multiple contact cases uniformity is the most important objective. But this is not true of all such cases. Under these circumstances it would be most dangerous to adopt some formula
which, by producing satisfactory results in some cases, would
lull us into a state of complacent indifference to social factors
which might, in other cases, assume a position of crucial importance.
This criticism or warning regarding the use of the term
"classification" is not by any means a purely theoretical ob-
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jection. Courts and writers are very prone, in dealing with
conflicts problems, to be too much influenced by some sweeping general principle or some over-simplified mechanical
analysis and to ignore the social factors involved in these
problems. Whatever may be the reasons for this tendency,
it is so real that certain American writers have been constrained to protest against it quite vigorously. 2 If we are to
employ the term "classification" to describe the application
of choice-of-law principles, we must use it with caution and
reservation. We should remember that it does not refer to
a process of automatic deduction but to a technique for deciding actual controversies and laying down the rules by which
men live. In making a classification, a court ought to be guided
by a consideration of the various social factors which are important in the conflict of laws: the ideal of uniformity, the
recognition of the interests of different states, etc.
The term "classification" has also been applied to the
problem of deciding whether a particular rule of foreign law
should be regarded as a rule of procedure which the court
of the forum could not conveniently enforce. 3 Although certain formal analogies can be drawn, this problem is really
quite different from that involved in a multiple contact case.
In dealing with the substance-procedure problem the court
makes a selection of legal rules from the law of the forum and
from the law of some foreign state or states. The prime objective is to apply as much of the foreign law as possible. No such
general policy can be laid down for the multiple contact cases.
In those cases the arguments of policy in favour of the various
2
See Yntema, "The Hornbook Method and the Conflict of Laws," (1928)
37 YALE L. J. 468; Cavers, "A Critique of the Choice-of-law Problem," (1933)
47 HARV. L. REv. 173; Heilman, "Judicial Method and Economic Objectives
in Conflict of Laws," (1934) 43 YALE L. J. 1082; Cook, "Logical and
Legal Bases of the Conflict of Laws," (1924) 33 YALE L. J. 457; Lorenzen,
"Territoriality, Public Policy and the Conflict of Laws," (1924) 33 YALE
L.J. 736.
I
See also our discussion of the classification analysis as applied to the substanceprocedure problem in section 14, above.

8

See above, sections 14 and 15.
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laws involved will depend upon the tenour of their specific
provisions and the nature of the contacts. The use of the same
term "classification" in connection with both problems is
rather unfortunate and may lead to confusion.
We are indebted to some of the writers who have discussed the classification problem for a clarification of certain
matters incidental to the application of choice-of-law principles. One of these matters is the relation between the terms
of choice-of-law principles and the internal law of the forum.
Choice-of-law principles normally contain verbal symbols
which are used in the internal law of the forum, such as contracts, torts, intestate succession, etc. But when these terms
are used in the conflict of laws they have a significance different
from that attached to them in internal law contexts. Their
conflict of laws connotation is broader and more inclusive
than their internal law connotation. 4 They may include rules
and obligations of foreign law which are not part of the
forum's internal law. For example, an English court will
enforce a foreign contractual obligation created under circumstances in which English internal contract law would not
create any obligation, as where the parties have made an
agreement without consideration. 5 The term "contract" as
used in English conflict of laws is broad enough to include
such obligations. Similarly the term "quasi-contract" as used
in English conflict of laws, includes foreign obligations unknown to English internallaw. 6 The term "tort" as used in
the conflict of laws by the courts of an American state normally
includes tort obligations which would not be imposed by the
• This point is particularly emphasized by Cheatham, "Internal Law Distinctions in the Conflict of Laws," (1936) 21 CoRN. L. Q. 570.
See also Beckett, "The Question of Classification ('Qualification') in Private
International Law," (1934) 15 BRITISH YEAR BooK INT. LAw 46, 58; Unger,
"The Place of Classification in Private International Law," (1937) 19 BELL
YARD 3; RoBERTSON, CHARACTERIZATION IN THE CONFLICT OF LAWS (I 940) 8 I.
"Re Bonacina, [r9~2] 2 Ch. 394·
"Batthyany v. Walford, (r887) 36 Ch. D. 269.
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internal law of that particular state. Whether we can say the
same thing for the term "tort" as a term of English conflict
of laws is very doubtful. English courts have laid down the
rule in conflict of laws that "the [foreign] wrong must be
of such a character that it would have been actionable if committed in England." 7
When the forum is one of the jurisdictions with which a
multiple contact case is connected, its internal law will presumably be well known to the court. The same cannot be said
of the laws of other jurisdictions. This is especially true in
European countries where the laws of nearby states are often
written in different languages and very different in their contents. The importance of a careful and sympathetic examination of the provisions of a foreign legal system which is involved in a conflicts case has been emphasized by Falconbridge. 8 Rules of a foreign legal system ought not to be torn
from their native jurisprudence and casually classified as
tort or contract according to their most obvious characteristics.
They should be considered in their proper context, which is
the legal system from which they are derived. Most important
of all, a serious attempt should be made to understand their
purpose, to discover what social interests they have been designed to uphold. 9
1

See above, sections 3 and r 9.
Falconbridge, "Characterization in the Conflict of Laws," (1937) 53 LAw
QuARTERLY REV. 235, 254· See also Unger, "The Place of Classification in
Private International Law," (1937) 19 BELL YARD 3, rs.
9
For discussion of the classification analysis, see, in addition to the works already cited: Falconbridge, "Conflict of Laws; Examples of Characterization,"
(1937) 15 CAN. BAR REV. 215; Lorenzen, "Theory of Qualifications and the
Conflict of Laws," (1920) 20 CoL. L. REv. 247; Rheinstein, "Comparative
Law and Conflict of Laws in Germany," (1935) 2 UNiv. OF CHI. L. REV.
232, 261; Robertson, "A Survey of the Characterization Problem in the Conflict
of Laws," (1939) 5Z HARV. L. REV. 747; CHESHIRE, PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL
LAW, Ed. 2 (1938) 24. The problem of classification in all its aspects is very
thoroughly examined and the views of other writers are discussed in the monograph by ROBERTSON, CHARACTERIZATION IN THE CONFLICT OF LAWS (I 940).
8

MULTIPLE CONTACT CASES
SECTION

4I

THE THESIS OF A PRIMARY CLASSIFICATION

In our discussion of multiple contact cases we have assumed that a multiple contact case would normally present
itself to a court for decision as a pattern of operative facts
spread over a number of states whose internal laws were
different. We have also assumed that the court would know
the relevant provisions of the internal laws of these states
and would take them into account in working out its solution
for the case. It may be inferred from the works of certain
writers that they would object to this point of departure.
These writers divide the classification problem into two
stages which they call primary and secondary classification.
They argue that in the first stage, i.e., that of primary classification, it is illogical to give any consideration whatsoever
to foreign law. "We cannot consider foreign law," they argue,
"before we have decided which foreign law is to govern the
case." In their view, the court starts with a pattern of operative
facts spread over several states. It knows no law save that of
the forum, i.e., the forum's internal law and also its choiceof-law principles. With these legal elements in mind the court
must first classify the legal issue or question presented by the
facts. It must determine what legal problem or problems are
raised by the facts. Contemplation of a set of facts will not in
itself suggest any legal problems; hence the court must
consider the facts in the light of the forum's internal law and
its choice-of-law principles. Having classified the problem,
e. g., as one of tort liability, or as one of contractual liability,
the court then applies one or more of its choice-of-law principles and for the first time is brought to consider the content of
the foreign law in detail. A second stage is thus reached at
which further issues may arise with regard to the classification
of particular rules of the foreign law. This stage is called
by these writers "secondary classification" or "delimitation
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of the foreign law." At this stage the court may, according
to these writers, take into consideration rules of the foreign
law and their classification within the foreign legal system. 1
Even as a purely theoretical introduction to the classification problem, this primary classification without reference
to foreign law is an entirely artificial and unnecessary invention. Courts and counsel need not, in practice, attack a conflictof-laws problem like a game of blind man's buff, shutting
their eyes to all legal rules save those of the forum until
they have reached a particular stage. 2 In a conflict of laws case
counsel for both sides will very probably scrutinize the provisions of all the relevant legal systems to see whether their
side can gain any advantage thereby. If they think there is a
possibility of this they will plead and, if necessary, prove the
foreign law or laws in question. The court may have a detailed
knowledge of all the relevant foreign laws at the time when
it decides whether to adopt them or ignore them. When an
appellate court decides to apply a foreign law it is almost
certain that it will have the rules of that law before it. In
actual practice, the point of departure is not a pattern of facts
plus a knowledge of the law of the forum but a pattern of
facts plus a knowledge of the internal law of every state with
which they make a connection of any possible significance.
The idea of a primary classification without reference to
foreign law is also theoretically unsound because, if rigidly
followed, it would exclude from the court's consideration any
distinct legal conception of foreign law which had no counterpart in the law of the forum. Suppose an English court starts
with the fact that two people have been married in France.
1
This theory of a primary classification is put forward by Unger, "The Place
of Classification in Private International Law," (1937) 19 BELL YARD 3;
CHESHIRE, PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW, Ed. 2. (1938) 30; ROBERTSON,
CHARACTERIZATION IN THE CONFLICT OF LAWS (1940) zo, 59·
2
This point is made by Cavers, "A Critique of the Choice-of-law Problem,"
(1933) 47 HARV. L. REV. 173. Falconbridge, who has written extensively on
the classification problem, apparently does not accept the idea of dividing the
classification process into two different stages. See his "Renvoi, Characterization
and Acquired Rights," (1939) 17 CAN. BAR REV. 369, 373·
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How can this fact, in the light of English law, suggest to the
court that a question of an implied marriage contract for
community of goods 3 might be raised?
"The solution," says Unger, "depends on the recognition
that at this stage the lex fori is not applied to decide the issue
but merely to give a legal characterization of the circumstances. It follows that only the analytical framework of that
legal system without its body of detailed provisions need be
considered." 4 This is all very well for such cases as Unger
cites: a foreign contract without consideration, a foreign marriage without English formalities. But if the foreign legal
conception was absolutely unlike anything known at the
forum, it would never occur to a court which closed its eyes
to everything except the "analytical framework" of the
forum's internal law.
Robertson contends even more pointedly than Unger that
in its initial attack upon a conflicts case the court must classify
the bare facts as they have been proved. He further insists
that at this stage of the game the court cannot logically take
into consideration the provisions of foreign law. But he does
not explain how the court can effectively classify a set of facts
which would have no legal consequences whatever under the
internal law of the forum without some knowledge of the
foreign law which would endow these facts with legal significance. He admits, however, that the "analytical framework" of the forum's internal law will not meet the exigencies
of the problem suggested. 5 As described by these writers the
task of making a primary classification in the proper manner
becomes very difficult indeed. It goes beyond mere blind
man's buff and involves pulling oneself up by the bootstraps.
3

As in De Nicols v. Curlier, [1900] A. C. 21.
'Unger, "The Place of Classification in Private International Law," (1937)

19 BELL YARD 3·
5

See

RoBERTSON, CHARACTERIZATION IN THE CONFLICT OF LAWS

59-63, 68, 83.

(1940)
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Specific Problems in Multiple Contact Cases
SECTION

42

LIABILITIES OF CARRIERS AND TELEGRAPH COMPANIES:
LIMITATION OF LIABILITY

1\.

THE present day the liabilities of interstate carriers
and telegraph companies in the United States are
regulated to a great extent by federal legislation.
But before the federal government entered the field, actions
against these bodies were decided by the application of state
laws selected according to ordinary conflict of laws principles.
Many interesting problems in the applications of these principles were raised and decided. Most of these are now of
diminished practical significance. But they illustrate admirably the technique of handling choice-of-law principles and
may still provide suggestive analogies for the solution of
more modern problems.
A buys a ticket in state X for a railway journey into state Y.
He receives some injury while the train is in state Y. It
seems to have been well settled that he could recover compensation from the railway company in an action of tort governed by the law of state Y. 1 Could he, by framing his action as one for breach of contract, obtain the benefit of a
reference to the law of state X? In Pittsburgh etc., R. Co. v.
Gram 2 a Kentucky court ruled that the carrier's liability to
passengers could not be classified as contractual so as to permit
1
Pittsburgh, etc., R. Co. v. Grom, (1911) 142 Ky. 51, 133 S. W. 977;
Hines v. Rice, (1920) 142 Ark. 159, 218 S. W. 851; Lake Shore, etc., R. Co.
v. Teeters, (19o6) 166 Ind. 335, 77 N. E. 599; Indiana, etc., R. Co. v. Masterson, (1896) 16 Ind. App. 323, 44 N. E. 1004; Smith v. Atchison, etc., R. Co.,
(1912) 114 C. C. A. (8th) 157, 194 Fed. 79·
2
Pittsburgh, etc., R. Co. v. Grom, (1911) 142 Ky. 51,133 S. W. 977·
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such a reference. But this theory is opposed to the decision of
the New York Court of Appeals in Dyke v. Erie Railroad Co. 3
The plaintiff, who had obtained a verdict for thirty-five
thousand dollars, had been injured in Pennsylvania after buying his ticket in New York. Since the damages recoverable in
such cases were limited to three thousand dollars by Pennsylvania law, the defendants sought to make the plaintiff's
claim depend upon Pennsylvania law alone. But the court
decided that he might maintain a suit in contract which would
be governed by the laws of New York. In Sawyer v. El Paso,
etc., R. Co. 4 the plaintiff, an injured railway passenger, was
met with the defence that notice of her claim had not been
delivered to the defendants as required by a statute of New
Mexico, the place of wrong. The court held that this was a
good defence to a count in tort. But since the plaintiff had
bought her ticket in Pennsylvania she was allowed to recover
under a second count for breach of contract governed by the
laws of that state and unaffected by the New Mexico statute.
Suits against railroad companies for personal injuries sometimes produced another interesting multiple contact problem.
Suppose that one of the railroad company's employees is
charged with the task of inspecting trains and their equipment in state X. Due to his failure to perform this duty properly a train becomes involved in an accident in state Y, and
A who is riding on the train is injured. Should the question
of the company's liability be referred to the law of state X
or to the law of state Y? A considerable body of case-law
supports the view that under such circumstances state Y,
where the injury occurred, should be regarded as the place
8

Dyke v. Erie R. Co., (I87I) 45 N.Y. II3.
• Sawyer v. El Paso, etc., R. Co., (I9o8) 49 Tex. Civ. App. Io6, Io8 S. W.
7I8. See also New Orleans, etc., R. Co. v. Wallace, (I874) so Miss. 244;
Pittsburgh, etc., R. Co. v. Bishop, (I896) 13 Ohio C. C. 38o; Fryklund v.
Great Northern R. Co., (I907) IOI Minn. 37, III N. W. 727; Forrester v.
Southern Pac. Co., (I9I3) 36 Nev. 247, I34 Pac. 753; The Constantinople,
(D. C. N.Y., I926) IS F. (2d) 97·
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of wrong and the case should be decided according to its rules
of law. 5
The failure of a telegraph company to deliver a message
promptly and accurately entailed consequences which varied
considerably in different states. 6 In some, the telegraph company was forced to pay a fixed penalty for errors or might
find itself at the mercy of a jury empowered to award damages for mental anguish. The possibility of numerous multiple
contact cases in this field is obvious. Very frequently a contract
for the carriage of a message was made in one state, the message to be delivered in another. If the message was delayed
or altered in the transmission and an action brought against
the telegraph company it would become necessary to decide
which law ought to control.
Before we come to grips with this problem it should be
noticed that there are two parties who might bring action
against the telegraph company, the sender and the addressee.
Let us consider the rights of the sender first. The sender of
the message could always frame his claim as one for breach
of contract. As such, it was held in some courts to be governed
by the law of the place of contracting/ in others by the law
5
El Paso, etc., R. Co. v. McComas, (r903 Tex. Civ. App.) 72 S. W. 629;
Cincinnati, etc., R. Co. v. McMullen, (r889) 117 Ind. 439, 20 N. E. 287;
Kansas City, etc., R. Co. v. Becker, (r899) 67 Ark. r, 53 S. W. 406; Chicago,
etc., R. Co. v. Doyle, (r883) 6o Miss. 977; Alabama, etc., R. Co. v. Carroll,
(I892) 97 Ala. I26, II So. 8o3; Nashville, etc., R. Co. v. Foster, (I88z) 78
Tenn. 351.
See also Hoodmacher v. Lehigh Valley R. Co., (I9o7) 218 Pa. zi, 66 Atl.
97 5 (law of state where negligence and death, but not actual injury, occurred
applied).
6
The application of state statutes to impose liability upon telegraph companies in respect of interstate transactions was held, under certain circumstances,
to be an unconstitutional interference with interstate commerce. See Western
Union Tel. Co. v. Pendleton, (I887) I22 U.S. 347, 7 Sup. Ct. IIz6; Western
Union Tel. Co. v. James, (I896) 162 U.S. 6so, 16 Sup. Ct. 934; Western Union
Tel. Co. v. Brown, (I9I4) 234 U. S. 542, 34 Sup. Ct. 955·

'Western Union Tel. Co. v. Pratt, (I907) 18 Okla. 274, 89 Pac. 237; Hall
v. Western Union Tel. Co., (1905) I39 N.C. 369, 52 S. E. so; Western Union
Tel. Co. v. Smith, (19I6 Tex. Civ. App.) I88 S. W. 702.
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of the place where the message ought to have been delivered. 8
In Gray v. Telegraph Co./ a Tennessee court allowed the
sender to claim the advantages of the law of the place of delivery on the theory that it gave him a right of action in
tort, alternative to any claim arising out of the contract.
Let us now consider the case of the addressee. Most of
the suits against telegraph companies seem to have been
brought by the addressees of delayed or garbled messages.
Although the addressee was rarely a party to the contract for
delivery of the message, he was treated in some jurisdictions
as a third party beneficiary with an enforceable interest in
its performance. 10 By many courts, however, his right to recover was held to sound in tort for a breach of a duty imposed upon the company in the interest of the general public.
Both these ideas influenced the courts when they came to decide what law sh~uld govern the addressee's claim in a multiple contact case. In some cases he was permitted to rely
upon the provisions of the law of the place of contracting. 11 In
others he was allowed the benefit of the law in force where the
message ought to have been delivered on the theory that the
contract was to have been performed there. 12
Some of those courts which had invoked the law of the
place of contracting to permit a recovery by the addressee
went further and declined to classify his claim as other than
"Western Union Tel. Co. v. Fuel, (r9ro) 165 Ala. 391, 51 So. 571.
9
Gray v. Telegraph Co., (r9or) ro8 Tenn. 39, 64 S. W. 1063.
10
See WILLISTON, CoNTRACTS, Rev. Ed. ( 1936) vol. 2, 1095; }OYCE, ELECTRIC LAWS, Ed. 2 (1907) vol. 2, 1499; }ONES, TELEGRAPH AND TELEPHONE
CoMPANIES, Ed. 2 (r9r6) 6o2.
uWestern Union Tel. Co. v. Cooper, (r9o2) 29 Tex. Civ. App. 591, 69
S. W. 427; Western Union Tel. Co. v. Waller, (r9o3) 96 Tex. 589, 74 S. W.
751; Reed v. Western Union Tel. Co., (r896) 135 Mo. 66r, 37 S. W. 904;
Markley v. Western Union Tel. Co., (r9rr) 151 Iowa 612, 132 N. W. 37;
Walker v. Western Union Tel. Co., (r9o6) 75 S.C. 512, 56 S. E. 38; Fail v.
Western Union Tel. Co., (r9o8) 8oS. C. 207, 6oS. E. 697, 6r S. E. 258;
Brown v. Western Union Tel. Co., (r9ro) 85 S.C. 495, 67 S. E. 146.
12
Western Union Tel. Co. v. Lacer, (r9o6) 122 Ky. 839, 93 S. W. 34; Bailey
v. Western Union Tel. Co., (1916) 97 Kan. 6r9, 156 Pac. 716.
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contractual. He must succeed under the law of the place of
contracting or fail entirely. 1s In other states, however, the
tortious nature of his suit was recognized to the extent that
he was permitted an alternative reference to the law of the
place of wrong. 14 In Schmitt v. Postal Telegraph Cable Co. 15
the court said:
"Counsel for appellant argue that inasmuch as the telegram
was delivered for transmission in Illinois, the measure of recovery would be governed by the laws of that state, and, as
thereunder damages are not allowed for mental anguish disconnected from physical injury, the verdict should have been
for defendant. Were this an action ex contractu, little difficulty would be experienced in determining the point, but, as
the action is one sounding in tort, it would seem that the law
where the breach of duty occurred would determine the
measure of damages; though authorities are not wanting
which hold that, as the wrong grew out of and is based on a
breach of contract, the lex loci contractus should prevail. This,
however, is too narrow a view for it overlooks the fact that
the breach is of a public duty owing by the telegraph company
as a common carrier of intelligence. . . . This court is committed to the doctrine that either an action ex delictu or ex
contractu may be maintained for a breach of the company's
duty to transmit promptly."
Among those courts which adopted this tort doctrine there
arose a difference of opinion as to whether the place where the
"'Johnson v. Western Union Tel. Co., (r9o7) 144 N.C. 410, 57 S. E. 122;
Western Union Tel. Co. v. Buchanan, (r9o4) 35 Tex. Civ. App. 437, 8o
s. w. 561.
14
Western Union Tel. Co. v. Favish, (r9r6) 196 Ark. 4, 71 So. r83;
Western Union Tel. Co. v. Ford, (I 906) 77 Ark. 53 r, 92 s. w. 528; Western
Union Tel. Co. v. Armstrong, (r9r8 Tex. Civ. App.) 207 S. W. 592; Schmitt
v. Postal Telegraph Cable Co., (r9r4) I64 Iowa 654, I46 N. W. 467;
Balderston v. Western Union Tel. Co., (I 908) 79 S. C. I 6o, 6o S. E. 43 5;
Western Union Tel. Co. v. Burris, (r9ro) I02 C. C. A. (8th) 386, I79 Fed. 92;
Hornthal v. Western Union Tel. Co., (1914) 166 N.C. 6o2, 82 S. E. 851. See
CONFLICT OF LAWS RESTATEMENT (1934) § 414; Note, (1912) 6r UNIV. OF
PA. L. REV. 42.
15
Schmitt v. Postal Telegraph Cable Co., (r9r4) 164 Iowa 654, 656, 146
N. W. 467.
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blunder in transmission occurred or the place where the message ought to have been delivered should be considered the
locus of the tort. Suppose A makes a contract with a telegraph
company in state X for the delivery of a message to B in state
Z. The message is to be sent from point to point, starting in
state X, passing through state Y, and reaching B in state Z.
At some point in state Y a mistake is made by the telegraph
company's employees; the message is lost, delayed or altered. B, the addressee, sues the telegraph company. If we
assume that he can frame a claim in tort, based upon the law
of the place of wrong, which state should we regard as the
"place of wrong?" We might choose state Y, where the negligent acts of the telegraph company's servants were done, or
state Z, where the ultimate failure of delivery occurred.
In Balderston v. Western Union Tel. Co. 16 the Supreme
Court of South Carolina was confronted by a problem of
this type. The court adopted the law of the state where the
message ought to have been delivered promptly and correctly
(state Z in our illustration), saying:
"The plaintiff cannot be expected to determine the point on
defendant's line where the failure of duty occurred, nor do
we think it consonant with public policy to permit the defendant to show that the message was delayed or failed at
some specific point on its line and thus make plaintiff's right
to recovery to depend upon the laws of that place. Such a
holding would, in nearly every case, lead to much uncertainty,
to say nothing of the broad field that would thus be opened to
fraud."

If we may say so with respect, these remarks suggest a sound
and practical basis of decision.
Other courts appear, however, to have proceeded upon the
16

Balderston v. Western Union Tel. Co. (1908) 79 S.C. 16o, 163, 6oS. E.
435· In other cases it seems to have been assumed rather than decided that the
place where the failure of delivery occurred should be regarded as the place of
wrong. See Western Union Tel. Co. v. Favish, (1916) 196 Ala. 4, 71 So. 183;
Gray v. Telegraph Co., (1901) 108 Tenn. 39, 64 S. W. 1063.
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theory that the place where the negligent acts were done
should be regarded as the "place of wrong." 17 An Arkansas
statute which imposed liability upon telegraph companies
for "mental anguish caused by negligence in receiving, transmitting, or delivering messages" was applied by the Arkansas
courts to all cases in which the actual negligent acts occurred
there, irrespective of the place of delivery. 18 If, on the other
hand, the message should have been delivered in Arkansas
but no negligence in that state was proved, the plaintiff did
not get the benefit of the statute. 19
In the Texas case, Thomas v. Western Union Tel. Co./ 0
an ingenious attempt was made to capitalize on one contact
of the fact pattern. A telegram was sent from one point to
another, both of them within the state of Arkansas. Because
of delay in delivering it, the addressee was unable to see his
daughter before she died or to attend her funeral. His counsel
argued that because he suffered much mental anguish on this
account while physically present in Texas, the liberal rule of
that state should be applied in estimating damages. They also
pointed out that he was a citizen of Texas. But the court did
not consider these connections sufficiently significant and applied Arkansas law. The decision seems very sound. It is quite
true that the plaintiff suffered the injury of mental pain in
Texas. And that mental pain was doubtless a direct consequence of the telegraph company's neglect of duty. But there
17
Hornthal v. Western Union Tel. Co., (r9r4) r66 N.C. 6o2, 82 S. E. 85r.
The court relied upon this theory as an alternative ground of decision in Fail v.
Western Union Tel. Co., (r9o8) 8oS. C. 207, 6oS. E. 697, 6r S. E. 258;
Brown v. Western Union Tel. Co., (r9ro) 85 S.C. 495, 67 S. E. 146.
"'Western Union Tel. Co. v. Ford, (r9o6) 77 Ark. 531, 92 S. W. 528;
Arkansas, etc., R. Co. v. Lee, (r9o6) 79 Ark. 448, 96 S. W. 148; Western
Union Tel. Co. v. Chilton, (r9rr) roo Ark. 296, 140 S. W. 26.
lJ) Western Union Tel. Co. v. Crenshaw, (r9ro) 93 Ark. 4I5, 125 s. w. 420j
Western Union Tel. Co. v. See, (r9ro) 94 Ark. 86, 126 S. W. 78; Western
Union Tel. Co. v. Burris, (r9ro) ro2 C. C. A. (8th) 386, 179 Fed. 92 .
.. Thomas v. Western Union Tel. Co., (r9or) 25 Tex. Civ. App. 398, 6r
S. W. 5or.
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is very little causal connection between the negligent acts of
the telegraph company's operators and the fact that the plaintiff suffered his mental pain in the state of Texas. There would
be an element of unfairness in making the telegraph company's liability depend upon the plaintiff's presence in Texas
when the company was not responsible in any way for his
presence there. The telegraph company's liability ought not
to be increased because the plaintiff carried his grief into a
particular state.
Can we draw any general conclusions from this maze of
cases and theories dealing with the choice-of-law problem
in suits against telegraph companies? It is, of course, impossible to reconcile all the decisions. We can say that, in one
case or another, almost every state with which it is possible
for a telegram case to make a significant contact has been
permitted to create a cause of action against a telegraph company or to increase the amount of damages. In producing this
result the courts have applied several choice-of-law principles:
choose the law of the place of contracting, choose the law of
the place of performance of the contract, choose the law of
the place of wrong, etc. In applying the principle, "choose the
law of the place of wrong," they have selected different states
as the place of wrong, i.e., sometimes they have selected the
state of injury, sometimes they have selected the state where
the telegraph company's negligent acts were done. On the
other hand, we find numerous cases in which a court has refused to allow the law of a particular state, which was connected with the pattern of facts, to impose liability. Perhaps
we may venture the conclusion that, taken as a whole, the
cases evince a general tendency of the courts (often checked
and qualified in particular instances) to recognize the fact that
every state with which a telegraph case makes a significant
connection has an interest in the imposition of a liability upon
the telegraph company.

200

TORTS IN THE CONFLICT OF LAWS

Contracts for the carriage of goods or passengers often contain a stipulation limiting the carrier's liability for injuries
to the goods or passengers during transit. In the conflict of
laws, such stipulations have received a variety of treatments.
Their validity has been referred to the law of the place where
the contract of carriage was made, to the law of the place where
some actual injury was received, and to the law of the
destination. 21
Even when they were admittedly valid under the law
which the court considered to be the proper law of the contract, contracts limiting a carrier's liability have been refused
recognition on the ground that they were contrary to the public policy of the forum. In these cases the doctrine of public
policy was applied affirmatively to strike down a defence and
to give the plaintiff a cause of action which, apart from this
special rule of the forum, he would not have had. But these
decisions are not quite as unjust or as contrary to basic choiceof-law principles as they might at first sight appear to be.
On closer examination it will be found that, in almost all of
them, the contract of carriage had been made at the forum or
else some part of it was to be performed there. Quite apart
from the fact that the action was brought in the forum, the
forum had a certain interest in the transaction. 22
An exceptional case is Fox v. Postal Telegraph Cable Co. 23
decided by the Supreme Court of Wisconsin. The plaintiff
claimed damages for the late delivery of a telegram which
was to have been sent from New York to Chicago. The de21
See BEALE, CoNFLICT OF LAWS (I 93 5) vol. z, p. r I 8 7; Annotation, (I 9 3 I)
72 A. L. R. 250.
For the application of these theories to telegram cases see }oNES, TELEGRAPH
AND TELEPHONE COMPANIES, Ed. 2 (I9I6) 501.
00
See Annotations, (I928) 57 A. L. R. I75; (I9JI) 72 A. L. R. 250 for an
exhaustive analysis and classification of cases applying these theories to contracts
limiting carrier's liability. See also ROBINSON, ADMIRALTY (I939) 545, 558.
The problem goes beyond the scope of the present work.
28
Fox v. Postal Telegraph Cable Co., (I9o9) I38 Wis. 648, I2o N. W. 399·
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fendant company set up as a defence a stipulation printed upon
the back of the telegram blank relieving it from all liability.
According to the law of Illinois and the law of New York
this stipulation would have been a valid defence. But in Wisconsin such stipulations were not recognized in the courts on
the ground that they were contrary to public policy. Although
the facts of the instant case had no apparent connection with
Wisconsin, the court refused to recognize the contractual defence and gave judgment for the plaintiff. This decision might
be attacked on constitutional grounds. Although Wisconsin
had no apparent interest in the decision of the case, the court
applied Wisconsin law to strike down a contractual defence,
valid under the laws of the states with which the case was connected. There is authority for the view that such a course of
procedure constitutes a denial of due process. 24
Suppose a contract of carriage containing a limitation provision is made in state X. Damage to the goods or passenger
occurs in state Y. By the law of state X the limitation provision would be valid. The law of state Y expressly forbids
such contracts. This clash of legal policies might be resolved
by regarding state Y, where the injury occurred, as the place
of performance whose law was therefore entitled to govern
the contract. On this view, the limitation provision would not
be recognized. Apart from this theory, however, there is some
authority for the view that a limitation of liability which is
repugnant to the law of the place of wrong, should not be
available as a defence. 25
In Canadian Pacific R. Co. v. Parent 26 a carrier's contract
excluding liability produced a nice problem of concurrent
24

See above, section 9·
See Lake Shore, etc., R. Co. v. Teeters, ( 1906) r 66 Ind. 335, 77 N. E. 599;
Smith v. Atchison, etc., R. Co., (1912) 114 C. C. A. (8th) 157, 194 Fed. 79;
Weir v. Rountree, (1909) 97 C. C. A. (8th) soo, 173 Fed, 776; Kansas City,
etc., R. Co. v. Becker, (r 899) 67 Ark. r, 53 S. W. 406; Clark v. Southern R. Co.,
(r9r8) 69 Ind. App. 697 (very vague).
26
Canadian Pacific R. Co. v. Parent, (r9r4) 24 Qw~b. K. B. 193; (r915
Sup. Ct.) 51 Can. L. R. 234, [1917] A. C. 195.
25

\
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reference through two choice-of-law principles. The railway
company agreed to carry Joseph Chalifour, a stockman in
charge of cattle, from Winnipeg to Montreal at a reduced
fare. At the beginning of the journey Chalifour signed a contract absolving the company for any "damage, injury or loss
to himself." Owing to the negligence of the company's employees, Chalifour was killed at Chapleau, Ontario. An action
was begun in Quebec on behalf of his dependents under the
Ontario death statute which permits recovery only where
the deceased himself, had he survived, could have maintained
suit. Counsel for the railroad contended that such a suit by
Chalifour would have failed because he had renounced his
rights. Hence, according to the law of the place of wrong, the
present plaintiffs ought not to succeed. The court arrived at a
contrary result. They held that the effect of the contract should
be determined by the law of Manitoba, where it was signed.
Since that law had not been proved, they presumed it to be
the same as the law of Quebec. It was well established in Quebec law that a deceased person's contract could not affect the
right of his dependents to recover damages for his death.
Hence the present contract, governed by Quebec law, could
not possibly prevent the plaintiffs from recovering damages.
This reasoning was not impugned in any way by the Supreme
Court of Canada or the Privy Council. But since these bodies
take judicial notice of the laws of every Canadian province, the
presumption which had enabled the Quebec courts to apply
their own peculiar rules to the contract ceased to operate.
The contract, governed by either Ontario or Manitoba law,
was quite effective to bar the deceased's and hence the plaintiffs' recovery.
SECTION

43

ASSIGNMENT OR RELEASE OF A TORT CAUSE OF ACTION

A injures Bin state X. The law of state X gives B a cause
of action in tort. B assigns this cause of action to C in state Y.
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To what extent should the validity and effect of this transaction depend upon the laws of state X and state Y respectively? Authority upon this point is scanty. The Conflict of
Laws Restatement, which devotes an entire "topic" to the
theme "transfer of contractual rights," has nothing to say
about the transfer of tort claims. Let us suppose that in the
problem stated the assignment is void by the law of state X
and valid by that of state Y. Generally speaking, an assignable obligation to pay damages is more onerous than one
which cannot be transferred. To uphold the assignment would
be to impose a greater burden upon B than that sanctioned
by the law of the place of wrong. The only justification for
this course is the fact that the assignment was made in state
Y. But B is not responsible for that event nor for its occurrence
there. He has done nothing to subject himself to the law of
state Y. His position ought not to be altered by the fact that
A and C have gone into state Y and carried out some transaction there. It is submitted therefore that an assignment of a
tort cause of action which is invalid by the law of the place
of wrong ought not to be recognized.
The conven~e situation arose in Vimont v. Chicago, etc.,
R. Co. 1 A claim for injuries suffered in Iowa was transferred
in Illinois under whose law it would not be assignable. An
Iowa court allowed the assignees to maintain an action upon it
because Iowa law upheld the validity of the transfer.
"It seems to us," said the court, "that the mere carrying of
this claim into another state could not have the effect to change
its character or take from it any of its qualities, but that it
would retain its properties notwithstanding the removal of the
person in whose favour it arose to another state or country;
and that, as it had properties which rendered it assignable
imparted to it by the laws under which it arose, it would retain those properties when taken beyond the jurisdiction of
those laws, and would be assignable anywhere."
1

Vimont v. Chicago, etc., R. Co., (1886) 69 Iowa 296, 299, zz N. W. 906,
z8 N. W. 6IZ; see also Sanders' Adm'x v. Louisville, etc., R. Co., (1901) 49
A. (6th) s6 s, I I I Fed. 708.

c. c.
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However mechanical this reasoning may sound, the result
seems just and reasonable. Although the contract was made in
Illinois, that state had a very slight interest in the transaction.
And there is a good deal to be said for the view that, when two
people make a bargain, it should be enforced if one of the
relevant legal systems upholds its validity. 2
A release of a claim sounding in tort stands upon a different
footing from an assignment. Suppose B, having been injured
by A in state X, signs an agreement in state Y absolving B
from liability. The contract is void by the law of state X but
valid by that of state Y. B cannot argue that he was not responsible for the case's connection with state Y. State X has,
however, an obvious interest in extending contract-proof protection to persons injured there. Leach v. Mason Valley
Mines 3 raised this problem. Emphasizing the fact that the
plaintiff resided in the state of contracting, the court sustained the contract as a defence.
In Snashell v. Metropolitan, etc., R. Co. 4 an action was
brought in the District of Columbia by a husband and wife
to recover for injuries received there by the wife. The defendants pleaded a sealed discharge of all claims executed by the
wife alone. They urged that effect ought to be given to this
instrument, because under the law of the plaintiffs' matrimonial domicile the wife was entitled to contract away her
claim like a feme sole. But the court took the view that the
law of the place of wrong having conferred a cause of action
• See Lorenzen, "Validity and Effect of Contracts in the Conflict of Laws,"
(1921) 30 YALE L. J. s6s, (1921) 31 YALE L. J. 53; Heilman, "Judicial
Method and Economic .Objectives in Conflict of Laws," (1934) 43 YALE L. J.
1082; CHESHIRE, PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW, Ed. 2 (1938) 244·
3
Leach v. Mason Valley Mines, (1916) 40 Nev. 143, 161 Pac. 513· As
emphasizing the place of contracting, see also Page v. United Fruit Co., (C. C. A.
1st, 1925) 3 F. (2d) 747 where, however, both tort and contract had the same
locus.
4
Snashall v. Metropolitan, etc., R. Co., (189o) 8 Mackey (19 D. C.) 399·
See also Cowen v. Ray, (1901) 47 C. C. A. 352, 108 Fed. po where it was
held that the law of the place of wrong should determine whether a release by
the plaintiff could bar her from maintaining suit in a purely representative
capacity.
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upon the husband and wife jointly, no other law could authorize one of them to dispose of it alone.
Many death acts provide for the compensation of all the
beneficiaries in a single suit to be instituted by the decedent's
personal representative. This has usually been interpreted as
referring to a duly accredited administrator appointed in any
state. W auld a release of all claims given by one administrator
be a good defence to an action by another? Several cases have
held that it would. 5 Such a release might, however, be given
without the consent of the beneficiaries, the real parties in interest. It has been held that the effect of this circumstance
upon the legal validity of the release ought to be decided by
the law of the place of wrong. 6

SECTION

.44

EMPLOYERS' COMMON-LAW LIABILITY FOR INJURIES
TO EMPLOYEES

In this section we are concerned with the conflict of laws
aspects of employers' liability for injuries to their employees,
prior to the enactment of modern workmen's compensation
legislation. At this time it was well established that an injured
employee might bring an action in tort against his employer
which would be governed by the law of the place of
wrong. Between master and servant there usually exists a
contract of employment. Considerable authority could be
mustered to support the view that an injured employee should
be permitted an alternative reference to the law of the place
5
Compton's Adm'rs v. Borderland Coal Co., (I9I8) I79 Ky. 695, 2oi S. W.
20; McCarron v. New York Cent. R. Co., (I92I) 239 Mass. 64, I3I N. E. 478.
6
Pisano v. B. M. & J. F. Shanley Co., (I9oi) 66 N.J. L. r, 48 Atl. 6I8. See
also McCarron v. New York Cent. R. Co., (I92r) 239 Mass. 64, I3I N. E. 478.
In Baltimore, etc., R. Co. v. Evans, (I 91 I) I IO C. C. A. (3d) I5 8, I 88 Fed. 6, 8,
it was held that only the domiciliary administrator had power to compromise the
beneficiaries' claim.
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where the employment contract had been made. 1 If that law
were different from the law of the place of wrong, the employee could take his choice. The law of the place of wrong
might give him a right of action in tort; the law of the place
of contracting might give him one for breach of contract. But
if the employee was killed in the course of his work, his dependents could not make out a cause of action under the death
statute of the state in which he was hired. The coverage of
such statutes was limited to cases where the fatal injury was
received within the bounds of the enacting state. 2 In other
words, the state in which the employment contract was made
was not regarded as having a sufficient interest in the transaction to confer a cause of action upon the deceased employee's
dependents if he was killed in another state. But in a few cases
the state of hiring was allowed to confer a cause of action upon
the employee himself if he were injured in another state.
Some "nice points" were taken in connection with the notorious fellow-servant doctrine, which flourished in some
states but had been cut down or abolished in others. Suppose
a workman had been hired in a state where the doctrine prevailed and injured in a state where it had been abolished.
The doctrine was often explained in domestic law by saying
that every contract of employment contained an implied term
by which the servant accepted the risk of injury by his fellowservants. In several cases of the type suggested the employerdefendant argued that the fellow-servant rule prevailing at
the place of contracting was incorporated into the workman's
1
See Williams v. Southern R. Co., (r9or) 128 N.C. 286, 38 S. E. 893; The
Lamington, (D. C. N. Y., r 89 8) · 87 Fed. 7 52; Marra v. HamburgAmerikanische, etc., (1917) r8o App. Div. 75, r67 N.Y. Supp. 74; Grand
Trunk R. Co. v. Wright, (C. C. A. 6th, 1927) zr F. (zd) 814.
For dicta, see Logan v. Missouri Valley, etc., Co., (r923) 157 Ark. 528, 249
S. W. zr; Schweitzer v. Hamburg-Amerikanische, etc., (r9r2) 78 Misc. 448,
138 N.Y. Supp. 944; Alexander v. Pennsylvania Co., (r89r) 48 Ohio St. 623,
30 N. E. 69.
• Crowley v. Panama R. Co., (1859) 30 Barb. (N. Y.) 99; Ott v. Lake
Shore, etc., R. Co., (1899) 18 Ohio C. C. 395·
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contract. Like a limitation of liability, it should prevent him
from recovering for an injury by a fellow-servant wherever
that injury had been received. This plausible argument was
not received with favour by the courts. They held that a
fellow-servant rule prevailing in a particular state could not
affect the position of workmen who were hired in that state
but injured or killed in other states. 3 Whatever formal analogies may be drawn from the domestic law explanations of
the fellow-servant doctrine, the law of the state of injury has
a paramount interest in extending what protection it pleases to
persons injured within its boundaries. This interest the courts
recognized.
The converse situation arose in Dupont v. Quebec Steamship Co./ where an employee of the defendant company,
hired in Quebec, was killed by a falling derrick on board a
British ship. The court treated the ship as the place of wrong.
The relatives of the deceased brought an action based upon the
British death statute which provided that any defence which
would have prevented a recovery by the deceased (had he
lived) should bar a recovery by his beneficiaries. The defendant argued that the present action must fail because the death
was due to the negligence of deceased's fellow-employees.
The Quebec court, trained in civil law doctrines, pointed out
that this bete nair of English common law, the fellow-servant
rule, was based, according to leading English texts and decisions, upon an implied undertaking of the deceased to accept the risks of his employment; they therefore classified
it as a contractual rule and irrelevant to the tort aspect of the
"See Dormidy v. Sharon Boiler Works, (C. C. Pa., I904) I27 Fed. 485;
Smith v. Southern R. Co., (I9Io) 87 S.C. 136, 69 S. E. I8 [But see contra the
former decision of the same court in Caldwell v. Seaboard, etc., R., (1906) 73
S.C. 443,53 S. E. 746]; Kansas City, etc., R. Co. v. Becker, (1899) 67 Ark. I,
53 S. W. 406 (here the court relied upon a statute of the state of injury avoiding
all contracts limiting employers' liability) ; Boston, etc., R. Co. v. McDuffey,
(1897) 25 C. C. A. (2d) 247, 79 Fed. 934·
• Dupont v. Quebec Steamship Co., (I 896) I I Queb. S. C. I 88. See also Logan
v. Lee, (I9o6) 3I Queb. S.C. 469, (I907) 39 Sup. Ct. Rep. 3II.
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case. The deceased having been hired in Quebec, his contract
of employment was governed by Quebec law which imposed
no such unfavourable restrictions. In other words, the Quebec
court's reference to English law, as the law of the place of
wrong, completely excluded the fellow-servant rule on the
ground that it concerned, not tort liability, but the effect of
contracts. By this ingenious chain of reasoning the court was
able to avoid the application of the fellow-servant rule, which,
as civil lawyers, they probably considered unduly harsh. The
chain of reasoning adopted by the Quebec court does not seem
to have been suggested in common-law jurisdictions.

SECTION

45

WORKMEN's COMPENSATION ACTS: COVERAGE OF THE
STATUTE OF THE FORUM

Workmen's compensation acts, like the death and survival
statutes of an earlier generation, have raised many interesting
conflict of laws questions. 1 Although the number of variations
from state to state makes generalization difficult, the common
denominator of all these laws seems to be a new and special
remedy for injured industrial employees or their dependents,
in case of death. The monetary award, usually adjusted by a
quasi-judicial administrative board, may be paid by the employer concerned or his insurer or by a special fund to which
all employers contribute. Acceptance of the provisions of the
act may or may not be optional with the parties.
Courts have frequently been called upon to decide whether
or not their own local statute should be construed as extending the new remedy to an employee in some fact situation
1
See generally, Angell, "Recovery Under Workmen's Compensation Acts
for Injury Abroad," (1918) 31 HARV. L. REv. 619; Dunlap, "The Conflict
of Laws and Workmen's Compensation," (1935) 23 CAL. L. REV. 38I; Dwan,
"Workmen's Compensation and the Conflict of Laws," (1927) II MINN. L.
REV. 329, (1935) 20 MINN. L. REv. I9; Annotation, (1934) 90 A. L. R. 119.
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where an important incident, such as the formation of the contract of employment or the injury to the employee, occurred
in the forum. Primarily this question is one of statutory construction and interpretation depending upon the wording of
the statute, the general implications of its terms, and the
purposes which it was meant to fulfil. Decisions of the courts
defining the coverage of their local compensation statutes,
which are very numerous, depend so intimately upon the
form of the particular statute in question that no attempt is
made in this study to analyze and classify all of them. But the
process of construction and interpretation has been influenced
to a considerable extent by pre-existing rules and analogies of
the conflict of laws. In many cases the courts have attempted
to reconcile their decision to apply or not to apply the forum's
statute with established choice-of-law principles. It may be
of interest to observe briefly the applications of these principles
to the coverage problem.
Let us consider first the possibility of applying the law of
the state where tlie employee is injured. That state has an
obvious interest in the protection of persons injured there
and there is an established choice-of-law theory referring
questions of tort liability to the law of the place of wrong.
Under these circumstances, it is not surprising to find that
many states apply their local acts to cases in which an employee has been injured at the forum although he was hired in
some other state. 2 Sometimes a contract theory is introduced
in these cases. The employee has been hired in an outside state
and injured at the forum. The court of the forum justifies
the application of the statute of the forum on the ground that
the forum is the place of performance of the employment
contract. Hence its law ought to determine the legal rights of
2

Ocean, etc., Corp. v. Industrial Commission of Arizona, ( 1 9 2 7) 32 Ariz.

275, 257 Pac. 644; Smith v. Heine Safety Boiler Co., (1921) 119 Me. 552,
II2 Atl. 5I6; Farr v. Babcock Lumber & Land Co., (1921) 182 N.c. 725,
109 S. E. 833.
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the employee arising out of the injury in the course of performance.3
However, the fact of injury at the forum has not always
been deemed a sufficiently significant contact with that state
to justify the application of its compensation laws. The course
of an employee's employment at the forum might be of a
very transitory character, such as soliciting orders, or merely
travelling through on his employer's business. A few courts
have held that an employee, injured at the forum under some
such circumstances, should not be granted an award under the
forum's compensation law. 4
In discussing the common-law rules of master and servant,
we considered the possibility of referring the master's liability
for the servant's injuries to the law of the place where the
employment contract was made. There was some authority
for the view that that law might impose a contractual liability
upon the master for injuries to the servant in the course of his
work. 5 This theory has had great influence in the workmen's
compensation field. Many American courts have interpreted
their local compensation statutes as applicable to all contracts
of employment made at the forum. The practical result is
that the employee gets compensation under the statute of the
state in which he was hired for injuries received in another
state. This interpretation of the compensation statutes in their
conflict of laws aspect has often been explained or justified on
the theory that the liability to pay compensation is contractual
or quasi-contractual in its nature. The statutory provisions
8
Johns-Manville v. Thrane, (1923) So Ind. App. 432, 141 N. E. 229;
American Mut. Liability Ins. Co. v. McCaffrey, (C. C. A. sth, 1930) 37 F. (2d)
87o; Smith v. Heine Safety Boiler Co., (1921) 119 Me. 552, 112 Atl. sx6;
Bannister v. Shepherd, (1939) 191 S. C. 165, 4 S. E. (2d) 7·
• Norman v. Hartman Furniture, etc., Co., ( 1926) 84 Ind. App. 173, 1 so
N. E. 416; Hall v. Industrial Commission, (1925) 77 Colo. 338, 235 Pac.
1073; Hopkins v. Matchless Metal Polish Co., (1923) 99 Conn. 457, 121
Atl. 828.
• See above, section 44·
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are said to be directed to the regulation of employment contracts made within the governed area and the determination
of their legal consequences. 6 The use of the somewhat ambiguous term "quasi-contractual," even in connection with the
so-called elective acts, has been sharply criticized. 7 As Judge
Cardozo has pointed out, it really means nothing more than
that "the contract creates the relationship to which the law
attaches the duty and the same law which imposes the duty defines its orbit and its measure." 8
The law of the place of contracting has not been invariably
applied in workmen's compensation cases. The decisions rejecting its application are of two classes. The first class consists of decisions which were handed down at an early period
while the courts were strongly influenced by the analogy between compensation claims and a common-law recovery for
tort. These decisions proceed upon the theory that a claim for
compensation is merely a novel form of tort liability. Hence
the compensation statute of the state of hiring could have no
application to injuries received in another state. 9 This limitation upon the scope of the compensation statutes was found
unsatisfactory. Courts and legislatures of states which had
adopted compensation laws wanted to extend their protection
to employees, who, though regularly employed in such a
state, suffered an injury while performing some incidental
work in another state. This aspiration brought into play the
"state of hiring" theory. The second class of decisions reject• Cases adopting this theory are legion. See, e.g., Matter of Post v. Burger,
(I9I6) 2I6 N. Y. 544, III N. E. 35I·
For a long list of citations, see Annotation, (I929) 59 A. L. R. 735; BEALE,
CoNFLICT OF LAWS (I 9 3 5) vol. 2, p. I 3 I 8.
1
See Dwan, "Workmen's Compensation and the Conflict of Laws," (I927)
II MINN. L. REv. 329, 34I; GooDRICH, CoNFLICT OF LAws, Ed. 2, (I938)
240.
8
Smith v. Heine Safety Boiler Co., (I9I 8) 224 N.Y. 9, 12, I I9 N. E. 878.
"Gould's Case, (I9I3) 2I5 Mass. 48o, I02 N. E. 693; Union Bridge, etc.,
Co. v. Industrial Commission, (I919) 287 Ill. 396, I22 N. E. 6o9; North
Alaska Salmon Co. v. Pillsbury, (1916) 174 Cal. 1, I62 Pac. 93·
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ing the state of hiring theory proceed upon a less sweeping
principle. They are simply cases in which the fact of hiring
provided the sole significant contact with the state in question.
The employment contract was made there but the actual work
was performed elsewhere and the injury occurred elsewhere.
Under these conditions some courts have refused to apply
their local compensation acts. 10
So far we have merely discussed various solutions of the
coverage problem in terms of long-established choice-of-law
theories. The coverage problem has, however, evoked a new
choice-of-law theory based upon the idea of the "place of
employment." In various states the courts have held that the
scope of their local statute extends to all employment within
the state. 11 The employee must, in the course of his employment, perform some service there. If he does so, the place
of hiring and place of injury are not important. The position
is thus explained by the Supreme Court of Wisconsin:
"Under the express provisions of the act, an employee is
one who renders services for another in the state of Wisconsin
under a contract of hire, express or implied, oral or written.
Where the employer under the act engages a person to perform services in this state under a contract of hire, express or
implied, no matter where or when such contract may have been
engendered, such employee is under our act and is entitled to
its benefits, and this is so even though he is injured while outside of this state, rendering services incidental to his employment within this state. The place where the contract is made is
not controlling. Whether the employee be a resident of this
10

Durrett v. Eicher-Woodland Lumber Co., (1932) 19 La. App. 494, 136 So.
II2, 140 So. 867; Platt v. Reynolds, (1929) 86 Colo. 397, 282 Pac. 264;
Salkind v. Pennsylvania, etc., Ins. Co., (1939) 335 Pa. 326, 6 Atl. (2d) 301;
Texas Employers' Ins. Ass'n v. James, (1938) 131 Tex. 6os, II8 S. W. (2d)
293; Wandersee v. Moskewitz, (1929) 198 Wis. 345, 223 N. W. 837.
11
See State ex rel. Chambers v. District Court, (1918) 139 Minn. 205, 166
N. W. 185; Penwell v. Anderson, (1933) 125 Neb. 449, 250 N. W. 665;
Bagdalik v. Flexlume Corp., (1939) 257 App. Div. 583, 14 N.Y. Supp. (2d)
35; Traders etc. Ins. Co. v. Stakes, (1939 Tex. Civ. App.) 131 S. W. (2d)
270; Baldwin v. Byrne, (1939) 53 Wyo. 519,86 P. (2d) 1095.
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state is not material. The controlling and decisive factor is
whether he had a status as an employee within this state." 12
Surveying the coverage problem in retrospect we may say
that the courts, in determining the ambit of their local compensation statutes, have employed several different theories.
As a result, a good deal of overlapping is possible. In certain
situations an injured workman may find that the statutes of
two or even more states each offer him a right to compensation.
He may be able to get relief in the state where he was injured. He may be able to get relief in the state where he was
hired. He may be able to get relief in any state where he actually worked for his employer.
SECTION

46

WORKMEN's COMPENSATION ACTS: A CLAIM AUTHORIZED BY
THE LAW OF ONE STATE CAN RARELY BE ENFORCED
IN THE COURTS OF ANOTHER STATE

An employee whose injuries are compensable under the
statute of a certain state may desire to collect his claim by
proceedings in the ordinary courts of another state. Usually
he cannot do so. In many cases the special remedies conferred
by compensation laws have been held to be unsuitable for
extraterritorial enforcement through the common-law process.
Their administration in the state of origin is generally confided to a special tribunal invested with unusual powers,
great latitude of discretion, and a system of procedure quite
different to that employed by courts of law. Awards often
take the form of periodical payments to the injured party.
Litigation of the rights conferred by those statutes through an
ordinary civil action would really defeat their principle purpose, a cheap and speedy settlement of industrial accident
12
McKesson-Fuller-Morrison Co. v. Industrial Commission, ( 1933)
Wis. 507, 512, 250 N. W. 396.
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cases. In declining to implement the acts of other states, the
courts have not placed any noticeable emphasis upon the
danger of oppressing the defendant, although this factor
would probably have to be reckoned with. They have taken
the broad ground that the effect of such laws in practice depends too intimately upon the powers and personnel of the
executing authority. An outside court, lacking such powers
and following its own traditional technique, could not hope
to produce even a colourable imitation of that authority's
normal administration.
Mosley v. Empire Gas and Fuel Co. 1 is the most articulate
decision. An action was brought in the Supreme Court of Missouri for damages to be recovered under the Kansas W arkmen's Compensation Law. The Missouri court carefully
reviewed its many detailed provisions and the somewhat extraordinary powers conferred upon the local boards and courts
authorized to enforce it. In particular, they noted that the
Kansas court might, in its own discretion, decree the payment
of either a lump sum or a series of sums subject to modification
by the court on the application of either party.
"Courts in Missouri," said the Supreme Court of that
state, "can render only such judgments or so modify them
after they are rendered as they might be authorized to do by
the laws of Missouri. The jurisdiction of the court is determined by the law of its creation. A statute of Kansas cannot
confer upon a Missouri court in a suit for money, a jurisdiction
and a power wholly unknown to the Missouri code of procedure. . . . By that statute the right and remedy are so
united, and the provision for liability is so coupled with a
provision for a special remedy to be administered by a designated tribunal with certain specific powers given, that the
remedy must be sought in the designated tribunal."
Other state courts have replied in a similar vein to suggestions that they should set in motion the rights conferred by
1

Mosley v. Empire Gas and Fuel Co., (1926) 313 Mo. 225 1 245 1 281 S. W.

762.
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foreign compensation statutes. 2 But more often they simply
assume that such a course is out of the question or justify that
assumption with the laconic remark that the sister state "furnishes an exclusive remedy." 3 Federal courts, too, have declined to take jurisdiction in such cases when the parties have
become subject to a state compensation law. 4
In some of the states the compensation statutes are administered, not by any specially organized commission but by
the ordinary state courts. Such acts have received exceptional
treatment in a few cases. One of the earliest is Texas Pipe Line
Co. v. W are 5 in which the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals
considered the various sections of Louisiana's act in some detail and decided that effect could, with propriety, be given to
it through the medium of federal procedure. "There may be,"
the court admitted, "some few provisions of the act which perhaps could be more easily carried out in the courts of Louisiana.
Such provisions can properly be held to apply where a suit
is brought in the state court. We see no insuperable difficulties,
however, to the federal courts enforcing the provisions of this
Compensation Law." Earlier in the opinion it was remarked
that the district court appeared to have encountered no serious
clashes between the statute in question and the ordinary trial
procedure. Statutes operated by administrative tribunals were
emphatically distinguished. "The remedy provided to enforce
the provisions of the act is a proceeding in a court of justice,
viz., a suit." Other federal and state courts have also under"Logan v. Missouri Valley, etc., Co., (I923) I57 Ark. 528, 249 s. W. 2I;
Douthwright v. Champlin, (I9I7) 9I Conn. 524, Ioo Atl. 97·
In Harbis v. Cudahy Packing Co., (I 92 I) 2 I I Mo. App. I 8 8, 24I S. W.
96o, the court declined to enforce another state's statute because its express
terms prohibited such a course of action. See also Alaska Packers Ass'n v. Industrial Accident Commission, (I934) I Cal. (2d) 250, 34 P. (2d) 7I6.
8
See, e.g., Resigno v. Jarka Co., (1927) 22I App. Div. 2I4, 223 N.Y. Supp.
5; Delaware, etc., R. Co. v. Peck, (I9I8) I66 c. c. A. 43I, 255 Fed. 261.
•Delaware, etc., R. Co. v.Peck, (r9r8) r66 C. C. A. (2d) 431,255 Fed. 261;
Elsas v. Montgomery Elevator Co. (D. C. Mo., 1930) 38 F. (2d) 303.
"Texas Pipe Line Co. v. Ware, (C. C. A. 8th, 1926) 15 F. (2d) 171.
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taken the administration of Louisiana's Workmen's Compensation Law. 6 In Johnson v. Employers Liability Corporation 7 a Texas court declared itself incapable of properly
administering that act "with full justice to the parties." This
decision also rested upon the ground that the statute's dissimilarity to corresponding Texas law rendered its enforcement incompatible with Texas public policy. These views do
not seem to be shared by the federal courts in Texas. 8
In Walpole v. Canadian Northern R. Co. 9 and McMillan
v. Canadian Northern R. Co. 10 the Privy Council was called
upon to determine what effect should be attributed in one
Canadian province to the compensation statutes of another.
In the final result, their lordships reached the same result as
the majority of American courts by giving an additional twist
to the meaning of that pliable symbol "justifiable." 11 The
Anglo-Dominion choice-of-law theory is that an action cannot
be brought upon a foreign tort if the acts complained of are
"justifiable" under the law of the place of wrong. The Privy
Council decided that the compensation act of one province
could not be enforced in the ordinary courts of another prov"United Dredging Co. v. Lindberg, (C. C. A. 5th, 1927) 18 F. (2d) 453,
aff'g Lindberg v. Southern Casualty Co., (D. C. Texas, 1926) 15 F. (2d)
54; Blount v. Kansas City Southern R. Co., (D. C. La., 1925) 5 F. (2d) 967;
Ford, Bacon & Davis v. Volentine, (C. C. A. 5th, 1933) 64 F. (2d) 8oo; Floyd
v. Vicksburg Cooperage Co., (1930) 156 Miss. 567, 126 So. 395; Louisville,
etc., R. Co. v. Dixon, (1933) 168 Miss. 14, 150 So. 8II; Dunn Const. Co. v.
Bourne, (1935) 172 Miss. 62o, 159 So. 841; Orleans Dredging Co. v. Frazie,
(1935) 173 Miss. 882, 161 So. 399, (1937) 179 Miss. 188, 173 So. 431.
For the enforcement of other state compensation laws by ordinary courts,
see: Zurich, etc., Ins. Co. v. Brunson, (C. C. A. 9th, 1926) 15 F. (2d) 906;
American Mut. Liability Ins. Co. v. McCaffrey, (C. C. A. 5th, 193o) 37 F. (2d)
87o; Esteves v. Lykes Bros. S. S. Co., (C. C. A. 5th, 1934) 74 F. (2d) 364;
Employers' Liability Assur. Corp. v. Warren, (1938) 172 Tenn. 403, 112
S. W. (2d) 837.
7
Johnson v. Employers Liability Co., (1936 Tex. Civ. App.) 99 S. W. (2d)
979·
8
United Dredging Co. v. Lindberg, (C. c. A. 5th, 1927) 18 F. (2d) 453·
"Walpole v. Canadian Northern R. Co., [1923] A. C. 113.
10
McMillan v. Canadian Northern R. Co., [1923] A. C. 120.
11
See above, section 2.
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ince because acts which, under the law of the place where they
were done, merely gave rise to a claim for compensation, were,
in a highly technical sense, "justifiable." In rationalizing their
inclusion in that category of acts giving rise to a claim for
compensation, their lordships laid some stress upon two characteristics of the factual situations there presented: (a) that
the acts were not shown to form a possible basis for a criminal
action against the defendants; (b) that, in McMillan's case,
the defendant would not have been subject to a civil action
prior to the enactment of the compensation statute. Hence
the question is patently left open whether or not the absence
of these somewhat fortuitous circumstances would really produce a different result, a matter not left in any doubt at all
by the more simple and comprehensive solution of the American courts. It is interesting to note that that solution was
adopted in Walpole's case by the Saskatchewan Court of Appeal notwithstanding the lack of any suggestive discussion
in either the English precedents or textbooks. 12

SECTION
WORKMEN's

COMPENSATION

47

ACTS:

STATUTORY

PROVISIONS

BARRING ALTERNATIVE CLAIMS OR REMEDIES

Workmen's compensation laws are characteristically exclusive. The power to obtain compensation is usually given in
lieu of the employee's common-law power to sue for damages,
which is expressly abolished. In some compensation acts the
clauses barring alternative remedies are phrased in language
broad enough to include not merely common-law rights but
also such claims as might be available under the compensation
12

See Walpole v. Canadian Northern R. Co., [1921] 15 Sask. 75·
See also the opinions of Bigelow, J., in the McMillan case [1921] r W. W. R.
51; Walpole case [1921] r W. W. R. 1232..
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statutes of other states. Such a provision contained in the
statute of the state of injury or in that of the state of hiring
may be pleaded by an employer as a defence to either (a)
a common-law suit or (b) compensation proceedings, at the
forum. Should the court of the forum obey the command of
the foreign statute and dismiss the suit for damages or the
claim for compensation? As might be expected, the answer to
this question will depend upon the nature of the contacts
which the facts make with the states involved and upon considerations of policy. Let us consider in order the various
problems of this kind which may arise.
Suppose A, a workman, is hired and injured in state X.
The statute of that state would allow him compensation but
no common-law remedy. He cannot bring a common-law action in state X. If he attempts to do so in some outside jurisdiction, a reference to the law of the plac~ of wrong will
show that it denies him a right of action in common-law
courts. That law gives him only a special claim which the
foreign court could not conveniently assist him to enforce. 1
An alternative reference to the law of the place of contracting
would reach the same result. 2
Johnson v. Carolina, etc., R. Co. 3 is a peculiar decision.
Plaintiff employee was hired and injured in Tennessee. He
brought a common-law action for damages against his em1

At least, this is the normal situation. See above, section 46.
Pendar v. H. & B. American Mach. Co., (I9I3) 35 R.I. 32I, 87 Atl. I;
Wasilewski v. Warner Sugar Refining Co., (I9I4) 87 Misc. I56, I49 N. Y.
Supp. I035; Magnolia Petroleum Co. v. Turner, (I933) I88 Ark. I77> 65
S. W. (2d) I (semble).
It has been expressly decided that the mere fact of the forum having adopted
workmen's compensation legislation does not render obnoxious to its policy a
common-law suit by an employee based on injuries received in another state
and not compensable at the forum. Reynolds v. Day, (I9I4) 79 Wash. 499, 140
Pac. 68I,
8
Johnson v. Carolina, etc., R. Co., (1926) 191 N.C. 75, 131 S. E. 390.
A similar decision was given by a Quebec court in Johansdotter v. Canadian
Pac. R. Co., (r9I4) 47 Queb. S. Ct. 76.
2
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ployer in North Carolina. The employer argued that this
common-law action was forbidden by the Tennessee Workmen's Compensation Act. The court refused to recognize
the Tennessee law and dealt with the case according to
the common law of North Carolina. The decision would appear to be open to attack upon constitutional grounds. 4
More difficult problems arise when the contract of employment is made in one state and the injury occurs in another.
Suppose A is hired in state X and injured in state Y. The
law of state Y would allow him compensation but purports
to exclude all other remedies. State X has no workmen's
compensation statute; the common law is in force there. As
we have seen, there is some authority for the view that the
employee could bring an action for breach of contract based
upon the common law of state X, which would be alternative
to any claim he might have under the law of state Y. 5 An attempt to enforce this common-law contractual right of action
would bring the laws of the two states into conflict with one
another. If the suit were brought in state Y, it would probably
be dismissed. If brought in state X, its fate would be more
dubious. There is some authority supporting the view that
the courts of the state of hiring (state X) ought to waive its
interest in favour of the state of injury's aspiration to provide
an exclusive remedy of a more modern character. 6
The situation would be different if the state of hiring had
established a compensation law under which the employee
was entitled to an award. It is very unlikely that the courts
of the state of hiring would stay compensation proceedings
there in deference to the law of the state of injury. And the
Supreme Court has indicated that the Constitution does not
compel them to do so. In Alaska Packers Association v. In• See the ensuing discussion regarding the effect of the "full faith and credit"
clause,
• See section 44, above.
6
Johnson v. Nelson, (1915) 128 Minn. 158, 150 N, W. 6zo.
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dustrial Accident Commission of California 7 the claimant
employee was hired in California for services wholly to be
performed in Alaska. His contract stipulated that the parties
should be subject to, and bound by, the Alaska compensation statute. Having suffered injuries in Alaska, he filed a
claim for compensation under the California act. Both statutes
purported to exclude all other remedies. But the California
courts granted an award and the Supreme Court upheld them
in doing so:
"Prima facie," said the court, "every state is entitled to
enforce in its own courts its own statutes, lawfully enacted.
One who challenges that right, because of the force given
to a conflicting statute of another state by the full faith and
credit clause, assumes the burden of showing, upon some
rational basis, that of the conflicting interests involved those
of the foreign state are superior to those of the forum. It follows that not every statute of another state will override a
conflicting statute of the forum by virtue of the full faith and
credit clause; that the statute of a state may sometimes override the conflicting statute of another, both at home and
abroad; and, again, that the two conflicting statutes may each
prevail over the other at home, although given no extraterritorial effect in the state of the other."
Having reviewed the facts, the court decided that the interest of Alaska was not superior to that of California. In
reaching this conclusion they laid stress upon two circumstances: ( r) the form~tion of the contract in California, ( z)
the possibility of the injured workman's becoming a public
charge to the state of California.
To produce another variation on our original problem,
let us suppose that state X (the state of hiring) has enacted compensation legislation which covers A's injury in
7
Alaska Packers Association v. Industrial Accident Commission of California,
(1934) 1 Cal. (2d) 250, 34 Pac. (2d) 716, aff'd (1935) 294 U.S. 532, 547, 55
Sup. Ct. 518. See also Daggett v. Kansas City Structural Steel Co., (1933) 334
Mo. 207, 65 S. W. (2d) 1036; Sims v. Truscon Steel Co., (1939) 343 Mo.
1216, 126 S. W. (2d) 204.
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state Y and denies him any alternative form of relief.
State Y (the state of injury) has no compensation act; the
common law is in force there. Here again the policies of
the two states may clash. Although the law of the state of
injury gives the workman a common-law right to damages,
the law of the state of contracting forbids its enforcement.
Some compensation acts govern the parties' relations only
in the absence of an express disaffirmance. If the state of
hiring has one of these acts, its provisions may be compared to
an ordinary contract limiting the employer's liability. But this
analogy is at best a thin one and, in the case of a compulsory
act, it vanishes entirely. The real issue is between the desires of
the two states to protect the workman .and his family 8 in whatever manner they may see fit. If he were to bring an ordinary
suit in state X, the courts there would probably prefer their
own law and dismiss the action. 9 And there are cases in
which courts other than that of the state of hiring have
recognized the law of that state as an effective bar to a
common-law action based upon the law of the place of
wrong. 10
8
Where the employee is killed and an action brought for his death under
the death statute of the state of injury, it might be argued that the compensation
act of the place of contracting should not be allowed to affect the rights of the
beneficiaries. They are not partie.s to the employment contract; why should
they be subjected to the law of the place where it was made? But if the death
statute of the law of the place of wrong gives a right of action to the beneficiaries only in the event that the deceased, had he lived, would have had one, a
compensation statute of the place of contracting which would bar him, will
bar them also. See Barnhart v. American Concrete Steel Co., (1920) 227 N.Y.
531, 125 N. E. 675.
9
Anderson v. Miller Scrap Iron Co., (1919) 169 Wis. 1o6, 170 N. W. 275,
171 N. W. 935; Hockmuth v. Perkins, (1937) 55 Ga. App. 649, 191 S. E.
156.
10
An elective act in force at the place of hiring was held to bar suit elsewhere in Barnhart v. American Concrete Steel Co., (1920) 227 N. Y. 531,
125 N. E. 675; Wasilewski v. Warner Sugar Refining Co., (1914) 87 Misc.
156, 149 N.Y. Supp. 1035; Scott v. White Eagle Oil & Refining Co. (D. C.
Kan., 1930) 47 F. (zd) 615; Bradford Electric Light Co. v. Clapper, (1932)
286 U. S. 145, 52 Sup. Ct. 571.
For the effect of a compulsory act, see Walpole v. Canadian Northern R. Co.
[1923] A. C. 113; Schweitzer v. Hamburg-Amerikanische, etc., (1912) 78
Misc. 448, 138 N.Y. Supp. 944·
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The Supreme Court has discussed the bearing of the
"full faith and credit" clause upon the solution of this problem. In Bradford Electric Light Co. v. Clapper 11 the facts
were as follows: Leon Clapper was engaged by the defendant
company in Vermont to serve as a linesman in Vermont and
New Hampshire. His duties required him to go into New
Hampshire only for temporary and specific purposes. Both
parties resided in Vermont, where the company had its principal place of business. They elected to be bound by the Vermont vVorkmen's Compensation Act. While replacing some
fuses in Vermont, Clapper was killed. To an action by his
administrator in a federal court, the company pleaded the
exclusionary sections of the Vermont act. The court held that
this section was opposed to the public policy of New Hampshire and gave judgment for the plaintiff. This decision was
reversed by the Supreme Court on the ground that there was
no basis for the assumption that a New Hampshire state
court would not give effect to the Vermont statute. The Supreme Court also held that, irrespective of New Hampshire
policy, full faith and credit to the Vermont act would require the action to be dismissed. In the subsequent case of
Pacific Employers Ins. Co. v. Industrial Accident Commiss-ion of California 12 the court appears to have withdrawn from
this position. The opinion in the latter case clearly suggests
that a New Hampshire court would have been free to disregard the Vermont statute if it were deemed obnoxious to
New Hampshire policy.
We have still to consider the situation where an exclusionary section in the compensation law of the state of hiring
is pleaded as a defence to compensation proceedings in the
Bradford Electric Light Co. v. Clapper, (193z) z86 U. S. 145, sz Sup.
Ct. 571. See also Ohio v. Chattanooga Boiler & Tank Co., (1933) z89 U. S.
439, 53 Sup. Ct. 663.
12
Pacific Employers Ins. Co. v. Industrial Accident Commission of California,
(1939) 306 U.S. 493, 59 Sup. Ct. 6z9, aff'g (1938) 10 Cal. (zd) 567, 75
Pac. (zd) 1058.
11
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state of injury. If the courts of the state of injury felt that
their statute was designed to cover the case in hand, they
would be most reluctant to allow this defence. But prior to
the decision in Pacific Employers Ins. Co. v. Industrial Accident Commission of California 13 it was necessary to consider the effect of the Clapper case. The crucial facts in the
Clapper case were: (I) the contract of hiring was made in
Vermont; (2) both parties resided in Vermont; (3) the employee was required to make only occasional and temporary
excursions out of Vermont. The Supreme Court held that,
in view of these facts, the Vermont statute barring alternative
remedies was entitled to absolute recognition everywhere. In
other cases where the same factors connected the circumstantial pattern to a single state, the courts of the state of injury enjoined their local boards from proceeding. 14 Where
one of the parties did not reside in the state of hiring, the
Clapper case has been distinguished. 15
In Pacific Employers Ins. Company v. Industrial Accident
Commission of California 16 both employer and employee resided in Massachusetts, the state of hiring. The employee was
injured while working temporarily in California. The Supreme Court of California upheld an award of compensation
made by the California Industrial Commission. Taking their
keynote from the Alaska Packers' case, the court argued
that California had a sufficient interest in the affair to justify
13
Pacific Employers Ins. Co. v. Industrial Accident Commission of California,
(1939) 306 U.S. 493, 59 Sup. Ct. 629, a:ff'g (1938) 10 Cal. (2d) 567, 75
Pac. (2d) 1058.
14
Weiderho:ff v. Neal, (D. C. Mo., 1934) 6 F. Supp. 798; Cole v. Industrial
Commission, (1933) 353 Ill. 415, 187 N. E. 520.
15
Esau v. Smith Bros., (1933) 124 Neb. 217, 246 N. W. 230; State ex rei.
Weaver v. Missouri Workmen's Compensation Commission, (1936) 339 Mo.
150, 95 S. W. (2d) 641; United States Casualty Co. v. Hoage, (1935) 64 App.
D. C. 284, 77 F. (2d) 542.
lll Pacific Employers Ins. Co. v. Industrial Accident Commission of California,
(1938) 10 Cal. (2d) 567, 75 Pac. (2d) 1058, a:ff'd (1939) 306 U.S. 493,
59 Sup. Ct. 629.
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the application of California law because an injured employee
might easily become a public charge there. 17 They also pointed
out that if the local commission could not dispose of the case,
the hospitals and doctors who had supplied the employee with
medical services might have to go to Massachusetts to collect their claim. The decision of the California court was
affirmed by the Supreme Court of the United States. As a
decision upon the obligatory effect of the full faith and credit
clause, the Clapper case would appear to have been overruled.
We have considered the situation in which the statutory
provision barring all claims (other than a claim for compensation at the forum) forms part of the law of the state
in which the employee was injured. We have also considered
the problems which arise when the statutory provision barring
all claims (other than a claim for compensation at the forum)
forms a part of the law of the state of hiring. A third situation
(unusual but possible) suggests itself. A statutory provision
of the type under consideration forms a part of the law of a
state in which the employee has been employed. Part, at least,
of his work has been performed there; that state (we may
call it state Z) is a "state of employment." Yet neither the
contract of hiring nor the actual injury to the employee have
occurred in that state. The employee has been hired in state
X, injured in state Y. But under the coverage theory entertained by the court of state Z (the state of employment) his
injuries are compensable there.
The problem presents itself in the usual variant forms.
We first assume that state X (the state of hiring) and state
Y (the state of injury) each give the employee a common-law
claim for damages. If he brings an action in state Z (the state
of employment) to enforce either of these claims, he is not
17
Stress was laid upon this fact in United States Casualty Co. v. Hoage,
(1935) 64 App. D. C. 284, 77 F. (2d) 542.
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very likely to succeed. The courts there will tell him that his
remedy is before the state Z compensation tribunal; his
common-law action is barred by the local statute. 18 If he brings
his action in state X or state Y, his chances of success are
dubious. As we have seen, there are several cases in which
courts have dismissed a common-law suit on the ground that
the law of a foreign state (which was the state of hiring or
the state of injury) barred the action. The same recognition
might be given to a statutory prohibition contained in the law
of a state of employment.
The problem would be different if state X or state Y gave
the employee a claim for compensation and proceedings were
taken in either state to secure an award. The statutory bar of
state Z would probably be disregarded. The covrt of the
forum (state X or state Y) would probably carry on with the
compensation proceedings. Would the full faith and credit
clause permit it to do so? According to the excerpt quoted
above from the Supreme Court's opinion in Alaska Packers
Association v. Industrial Accident Commission of California, 19
the answer would depend upon the extent of the forum's interest in the problem. If state X (the state of hiring) was the
forum, this case would lend considerable support to the argument that the forum had a sufficient interest to justify the application of its law. If state Y (the state of hiring) was the
forum, Pacific Employers Ins. Co. v. Industrial Accident
Commission of California 20 would go a long way to justify the
application of state Y's law.
Let us attempt to summarize the principal trends in the
18

Severson v. Hanford Tri-state Airlines, (C. C. A. 8th, 1939) 105 F. (2d)

622.
10
Alaska Packers Ass'n v. Industrial Accident Commission of California,
(1935) 294 U.S. 532, 55 Sup. Ct. 518, aff'g (1934) I Cal. (2d) 250, 34 Pac.
(2d) 716.
00
Pacific Employers Ins. Co. v. Industrial Accident Commission of California,
(1939) 306 U.S. 493, 59 Sup. Ct. 629, aff'g (1938) ro Cal. (2d) 567, 75
Pac. (2d) 1058.
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judicial treatment of our problem. We start with the fact that
most workmen's compensation statutes purport to give an
exclusive remedy and to bar alternative proceedings. So far
as such a prohibition affects common-law suits, it will probably be recognized and enforced by the courts of other jurisdictions. But so far as it attempts to stop compensation
proceedings in other states it will probably be disregarded.
Pronouncements of the Supreme Court indicate that the court
of a state which has a sufficient interest in the protection of
an injured employee may award compensation to him
although the laws of another state purport to prohibit such
an award. But the Clapper case, though overruled, still
signifies the power of the Supreme Court to prevent a state
from extending its law to cases in which it has not a sufficient
interest.

SECTION

48

WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION ACTS: CONTRACTS LIMITING THE
EMPLOYER'S LIABILITY, RELEASES, AND PRIOR JUDGMENTS

Bargains between employer and employee limiting the employer's liability for injuries are deprived of legal validity
by most compensation acts. Such a contract might be made
in a state whose laws upheld it and then pleaded as a defence
to compensation proceedings in a forum whose laws avoided
it. If the court of the forum believed that the forum had a
sufficient interest in the case to entertain compensation proceedings, it would probably reject the contractual defence as
contrary to local public policy. 1 A similar problem has frequently arisen in suits against carriers who have attempted
to limit their liability. In such cases some courts declined to
1
See Carl Hagenbeck, etc., Show Co. v. Ball, (1920) 75 Ind. App. 454, 126
N. E. 504.
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recognize the limitation if the factual pattern was significantly
connected to the forum. 2
Contracts made after the event releasing the employer
from liability for injuries are also invalid under most compensation acts. In a few states they are permitted to take
effect when their terms comply with certain statutory requirements. Cases have arisen in which employers tried to
defend themselves against compensation proceedings at the
forum by pleading a release signed in some outside state,
valid under its laws but void under the statute of the forum.
The courts have given scanty consideration to the parties' desire to arrange a binding settlement of their dispute. Stressing
instead the policy of the forum which disapproved such releases, the courts have uniformly treated such foreign releases as void. 3 But if the employer or his insurer has paid
sums of money to the employee under the terms of the release,
these sums are usually credited to them in the compensation
proceedings at the forum. 4
Questions are sometimes raised in the course of compensation proceedings regarding the effect of a prior judgment rendered in some other state. The "double recovery"
problem has been the subject of several judicial decisions.
Suppose that an employee's injuries are compensable under
the statute of state X. He takes appropriate proceedings in
state X and receives an award. Then he discovers that the
same injuries are compensable under the statute of state Y.
Being dissatisfied with the award obtained in state X, he
~ See above, p. 2oo.
3
Jenkins v. Hogan & Sons, (1917) 177 App. Div. 36, 163 N.Y. Supp. 707;
Norwich Union Indemnity Co. v. Wilson, (1929 Tex. Civ. App.) 17 S. W. (2d)
68; McLaughlin's Case, (1931) 274 Mass. 217, 174 N. E. 338; Anderson v.
Jarrett Chambers Co., (1924) 210 App. Div. 543, 206 N. Y. Supp. 458
(semble); Migues' Case, (1933) 281 Mass. 373, 183 N. E. 847.

'See Jenkins v. Hogan & Sons, (1917) 177 App. Div. 36, 163 N.Y. Supp.
707; McLaughlin's Case, (1931) 274 Mass. 217, 174 N. E. 338; Migues' Case,
(1933) 281 Mass. 373, 183 N. E. 847.

228

TORTS IN THE CONFLICT OF LAWS

initiates proceedings in state Y to obtain an award under its
statute. In these latter proceedings the employer pleads that
the matter has already been conclusively settled by the compensation tribunal of state X. That body has investigated the
merits of the employee's claim and made an award. Its disposition of the case ought to be regarded as final.
The court of state Y is now called upon to decide whether
or not it will make a second award in respect of the same injuries. It is very desirable, of course, that the litigation in
respect of these injuries should be brought to an end, once
and for all, and not protracted unnecessarily. The prime
object of all workmen's compensation is to provide a cheap,
speedy, and effective means of handling industrial accident
cases. Consecutive proceedings in two different states respecting the same accident are scarcely consistent with this
objective. In many states the compensation statutes provide
that an award shall be given in lieu of all other alternative
claims or remedies. We may assume that state X has the same
rule; thus the employee may be said to have received his
award there on condition that he accept it as complete satisfaction and that he refrain from taking further proceedings.
These various factors in the problem have led some courts to
forbid compensation proceedings based upon injuries for
which compensation has already been awarded in another
state. 5
6
Minto v. Hitchings & Co., (1923) 204 App. Div. 661, 198 N.Y. Supp.
61o; De Gray v. Miller Bros. Const. Co., (1934) 106 Vt. 259, 173 Atl. 556;
Di Carvallo v. DiNapoli, (1935 N.J. Dept. of Labor) 180 Atl. 488; Hughey
v. Ware, (1929) 34 N. M. 29, 276 Pac. 27; Tidwell v. Chattanooga Boiler
& Tank Co., (1931) r63 Tenn. 420, 43 S. W. (2d) 221, rehearing denied 163
Tenn. 648, 45 S. W. (2d) 528. This last decision proceeds upon the theory that
the acceptance of compensation in Ohio constituted a breach of the statutory
terms of the contract imposed by the law of Tennessee where the contract of
employment was made. This breach excused the employer from his duty to
pay compensation under the Tennessee statute.
In Texas an employee who has collected compensation in another state is
barred by statute from making a claim in the local tribunals. See Vernon's Ann.
Civ. St. (1925) 1940 Supp., art. 83o6, § 19c.
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On the other hand, it is always possible to argue that, notwithstanding the previous award in another state, the policy
of the forum requires that the case be disposed of according
to its laws. The statute of the forum might allow greater
compensation to the injured employee. Taking this view of
the matter, several courts have held that the court of the
forum ought to make a second award according to its own
laws. 6
In those states where a foreign award does not prevent
the employee from making a further claim, the courts usually
credit the employer or his insurer with all sums paid under
the prior judgment. 7 But the employee still retains the advantage of being able to try for a larger sum in the second
proceeding.
It has been suggested that the full faith and credit clause
may have some bearing upon the solution of the doublerecovery problem. If the court of a sister state has obtained
proper jurisdiction of the parties, and has given a judgment
in favour of the plaintiff, that judgment will be recognized
in other states as a conclusive adjudication upon all issues of
law or fact which it purports to dispose of. Should a question
be raised in another state as to whether a particular issue of
law or fact has been dealt with by such a judgment, it will
be referred to the law of the state in which the judgment was
rendered. This general choice-of-law rule is supposed to be reinforced by the constitutional obligation of the full faith and
credit clause. 8 But it does not dispose of our problem concern• Interstate Power Co. v. Industrial Commission of Wisconsin, (1931) 203
Wis. 466, 234 N. W. 889; Texas Employers' Ins. Ass'n v. Price, (1927 Tex.
Civ. App.) 300 S. W. 667 (semble); Salvation Army v. Industrial Commission,
(1935) 219 Wis. 343, 263 N. W. 349; Gilbert v. DesLauriers Column Mold
Co., (1917) 180 App. Div. 59, 167 N.Y. Supp. 274.
7
Gilbert v. DesLauriers Column Mold Co., (1917) 180 App. Div. 59, 167
N. Y. Supp. 274; Salvation Army v. Industrial Commission, (1935) 219
Wis. 343, 263 N. W. 349; see also American Mutual Liability Ins. Co. v.
McCaffrey, (C. C. A. 5th, 1930) 37 F. (2d) 87o.
8
See FREEMAN, JuDGMENTS, Ed. 5 (1925) Vol. 3, § 1394; CONFLICT OF
LAWS RESTATEMENT (1934) § 450 and comment f.
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ing two awards in the workmen's compensation field. The first
judgment, given by the compensation tribunal in state X, may
be said to have conclusively determined the rights of the employee under the statute of state X. But it does not touch the
question of what rights are conferred upon him under the
statute of state Y. In the normal case it could not do so because, as we have seen, the rights conferred by compensation
statutes can rarely be enforced except in their state of origin.9
If the court of state Y where the second claim is put forward
orders a second award, that award will be based upon an application of legal rules which the first court could not have
made. In other words, the employee, when injured, had two
causes of action, one created by the law of state X, the other
created by the law of state Y. Either state could render an
award according to its own rules of law. This state of affairs
is quite compatible with the obligation of the full faith and
credit clause. When the court of state X gives the first judgment, it finally disposes of the cause of action created by the
law of state X. The cause of action, the claim to compensation,
is merged in the judgment. But the cause of action created
by the law of state Y remains unaffected by that judgment.
Hence the cause of action created by the law of state Y may
properly form the subject of a second adjudication by the
court of that state. 10
The double award problem arose in Interstate Power Co.
v. Industrial Commission of Wisconsin. 11 The first award was
made under the Iowa statute by an Iowa court; proceedings
were then taken in Wisconsin to obtain a second award under
the Wisconsin statute. The court approved a second award
saymg:
celt is contended by the appellant [employer] that the disposition of this case in Iowa has the force and effect of a
9

See section 46, above.
See FREEMAN, JuDGMENTS, Ed. 5 (1925) Vol. 3, § 1395.
11
Interstate Power Co. v. Industrial Commission of Wisconsin,
Wis. 466, 478, 234 N. W. 889.
10

(I 9 3 I)
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judgment, to which this court must give full faith and credit.
This might be a valid argument provided the Iowa court had
any jurisdiction to effect proceedings under the Wisconsin
act. We think it has not such jurisdiction. We concede the
jurisdiction of the Iowa Commission to determine the rights
of the parties under the Iowa act, and we claim the jurisdiction
of the Wisconsin Commission to determine their rights under
the Wisconsin act."
Like other species of adjudications, a judgment which
terminates workmen's compensation proceedings may be introduced in the course of subsequent litigation to show that,
as between the parties, a particular issue of fact or law has
been conclusively determined by a competent tribunal. In
Chicago etc., R. Co. v. Schendel 12 an action was brought in
Minnesota under the Federal Employer's Liability Act to
recover damages for the death of an employee. Such a suit
necessarily proceeded upon the theory that the employee was
engaged in interstate commerce. The employer defendant set
up the prior judgment of an Iowa court affirming an award
of compensation under the Iowa compensation statute upon
the ground that the deceased was engaged in intrastate commerce only. The parties to the Minnesota suit had all been
parties to the prior proceedings in Iowa. The employer contended that as between himself and the plaintiff beneficiaries
the question of the character of the deceased employee's employment had been conclusively determined. This contention
was upheld by the Supreme Court of the United States. That
court held that by virtue of the full faith and credit clause, the
decision of the Iowa court that the deceased employee was engaged in intrastate commerce must be recognized in Minnesota. Hence the proceedings there, which were based upon a
12

Chicago, etc., R. Co. v. Schendel, ( r 926) 270 U. S. 6r r, 46 Sup. Ct. 420,
In the Schendel case the Iowa compensation proceedings had terminated in a
final judgment by an ordinary court. But it has also been held that a finding
of fact by an administrative board, which is not open to review, is res judicata.
Williams v. Southern Pac. Co., (r92r) 54 Cal. App. 571, 202 Pac. 356.
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contrary theory, could not be maintained. The Supreme
Court's opinion clearly indicated that, in the converse situation, a determination by a court that the deceased was engaged
in interstate commerce would preclude further proceedings
under a state compensation act.
SECTION

49

WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION ACTS: A STATUTORY ASSIGNMENT
OF THE EMPLOYEE's RIGHTS AGAINST A THIRD
PARTY TORTFEASOR TO THE EMPLOYER

So broad is the scope of some workmen's compensation
statutes that an employer may find himself compelled to compensate an employee in respect of injuries caused by the negligence of some third party but received by the employee in the
course of his employment. Some statutes provide that where
an award is made under these circumstances the employer
shall be subrogated to the rights of the employee against the
third party tortfeasor. The acceptance of compensation is made
to constitute an assignment by the employee to the employer
of his claim against the tortfeasor. Usually the statutory assignment is limited to the amount of the compensation award
which the employer has paid to the employee. The employee
is then entitled to any damages in excess of that sum for which
the tortfeasor is liable.
Provisions of this kind give rise to an interesting modern
instance of concurrent reference to two legal systems. Any
tort cause of action which an injured employee may have
against someone other than his employer will be defined and
governed by the law of the place of wrong. If the employee
accepts compensation in some other state whose laws in that
event assign his cause of action to his employer, the effect of
those laws upon the employee's original cause of action will
have to be determined. We have seen that where a claim for
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damages in tort accrues in one state and is assigned in another
state the spheres of influence appropriate to the respective laws
of these two states are by no means clearly defined. 1 In dealing with these statutory assignments by acceptance of compensation, the courts have generally given very full play to the
law of the state where the award was accepted. Several opinions indicate, however, that the modification of the employee's
right of action by that law must not run counter to any settled
rule or policy of the state where the tort was committed. 2
Thus the law of the state where the employee had accepted
an award has been permitted to determine the following
points:
(I) That the employee might, notwithstanding his acceptance of an award, maintain an action against the third
party tortfeasor to recover his interest in the partially assigned
cause of action. 3
( 2) That the employer might intervene in a suit brought
by the employee or his dependents in order to recover his
interest in the partially assigned cause of action. 4
(3) That an employee who had already collected damages
at the forum from the third party should be forced to share
them with his employer. 5
1

See section 4 3, above.
"Betts v. Southern R. Co., (C. C. A. 4th, 1934) 71 F. (2d) 787; Rorvik v.
North Pacific Lumber Co., (1920) 99 Ore. 58, 190 Pac. 331, 195 Pac. 163;
Saloshin v. Houle, (1931) 85 N.H. 126, 155 Atl. 47·
8
Personius v. Asbury Transp. Co., (1936) 152 Ore. 286, 53 Pac. (2d)
1065; Smith v. Arkansas Power & Light Co., (1935) 191 Ark. 389, 86 S. W.
(2d) 41 r (here the employer's insurer had waived its interest in favour of
the employee); Solomon v. Call, (1932) 159 Va. 625, 166 S. E. 467; Scott v.
Missouri P. R. Co., (1933) 333 Mo. 374, 62 S. W. (2d) 834.
•Reutenik v. Gibson Packing Co., (1924) 132 Wash. 108, 231 Pac. 773;
Betts v. Southern R. Co., (C. C. A. 4th, 1934) 71 F. (2d) 787; Saloshin v.
Houle, (1931) 85 N.H. 126, 155 Atl. 47; Sloan v. Appalachian Electric Power
Co., (D. C. W.Va., 1939) 27 F. Supp. 108.
• Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co. v. Chartrand, (1924) 239 N.Y. 36, 145
N. E. 274; General Accident, etc., Co. v. Zerbe Const. Co., (1935) 269 N. Y.
227, 199 N. E. 89; Re Hertell's Estate, (1929) 135 Misc. 36, 237 N.Y. Supp.
6 55 (here the employee's administrator had collected a sum of money as
damages in another state but it had come under tire control of the court in
administration proceedings.)
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Where the injury to the employee has resulted in death,
the award of compensation to persons who would be entitled
to damages under the law of the place of wrong has been
recognized as efFecting an assignment of their rights to the
employer. 6 But it has been held that the acceptance of an
award by one beneficiary should not be permitted to afFect
the rights of others who have not received compensation. 7
The law of the place of wrong gives them a common-law cause
of action for damages against the third party tortfeasor. This
common-law cause of action they are entitled to enforce unless
and until they accept compensation on terms which require
them to assign their cause of action. The acceptance of compensation upon these terms by one of the beneficiaries should
not afFect the position of the others.
In Foster v. Denny Motor Transfer Co. 8 the court had to
deal with a rather peculiar statutory assignment provision
contained in the Illinois compensation act. The provision in
question was directed to a situation in which both the employer
and the third party tortfeasor were operating under the Illinois compensation act and the employee's injuries were compensable under that act. It purported, in these circumstances,
to assign the employee's entire claim against the third party
tortfeasor to the employer, whether the employee obtained
an award under the act or not. In Foster v. Denny Motor
Transfer Co. the plaintifF employee was injured in Indiana.
He apparently made no attempt to obtain compensation in
Illinois but brought a common-law action against the defendant third party tortfeasor in an Illinois federal court. The
defendant third party tortfeasor argued that since both it and
"Re Hertell's Estate, (1929) 135 Misc. 36, 237 N.Y. Supp. 655; Reutenik
v.GibsonPackingCo., (1924) 132 Wash. 108,231 Pac. 773; Bettsv. Southern
R. Co., (C. C. A. 4th, 1934) 71 F. (2d) 787; Saloshin v. Houle, (1931) 85
N. H. 126, 155 Atl. 47·
7
Betts v. Southern R. Co., (C. C. A. 4th, 1934) 71 F. (2d) 787; Anderson
v. Miller Scrap Iron Co., (1922) 176 Wis. 521,182 N. W. 852, 187 N. W. 746.
8
Foster v. Penny Motor Transfer Co., (C. C. A. 7th, 1938) xoo F. (2d)
6 5 s.
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the plaintiff's employer were operating under the Illinois
compensation act, and the plaintiff's injuries were compensable
under that act, the plaintiff's claim had been assigned to his
employer. Hence the plaintiff could not maintain the present
action. The court rejected this argument and allowed the
action to proceed. Although the reasoning of the opinion is
somewhat obscure, the decision seems sound. The law of the
place of wrong, Indiana, gave the plaintiff a cause of action
against the defendant third party tortfeasor. Illinois law gave
him a claim for compensation against his employer. Since he
made no attempt to collect this latter claim, it is difficult to see
why Illinois law should be allowed to interfere with his
Indiana cause of action.

SECTION

50

ACTIONS BETWEEN SPOUSES

The ancient common-law rule that a husband and wife may
not bring suit against one another has come up for classification in several recent cases. In Buckeye v. Buckeye 1 the plaintiff was injured in Illinois while riding as a passenger in defendant's automobile. After the commencement of proceedings
the parties were married, Wisconsin, the forum, becoming
their matrimonial domicile. Under its internal law such an
action was maintainable, under that of Illinois it was not. The
Wisconsin court admitted the general proposition that "with
respect to the legal consequences of marriage both as to the
status of the parties and as to all their property interests, except
interests in land, the law of the matrimonial domicile gov-"
erns." But they refused to accede to the plaintiff's contention
that the question whether the marriage extinguished her
power to sue her husband should be determined by Wisconsin
law. Instead, they permitted the law of Illinois to supply a
1

Buckeye v. Buckeye, (1931) 203 Wis. 248,234 N. W. 342.
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conclusion upon this issue, thereby barring the plaintiff's
action.
It is submitted that such an all-inclusive reference to Illinois law was unnecessary. The Illinois theory of legal identity
to spouses might well have been classified as a rule relating
to the marital status or property rights of the parties. The
purposes of the common-law incapacity are no doubt obscure
and antiquated, but if it can be regarded as a means to the
preservation of domestic harmony, that is clearly a matter of
little concern to Illinois when the spouses reside in Wisconsin. 2 The same result has been reached in several other
cases where the facts were similar except that the marriage
preceded the injury. 3 Thus there may now be said to exist
an established jurisprudence upon the point, which, although
not immune to criticism, probably ought to be followed for the
sake of consistency and predictability.
In l'vf.ertz v; Mertz 4 the New York Court of Appeals appears to have taken the view that the common-law prohibition
of actions between spouses in force in that state should be
assigned to the department of procedure. They refused to
permit a wife to sue her husband in New York for injuries
received in Connecticut. Such a holding is quite inconsistent
with the modern view that the category of procedure ought
to be restricted as much as possible. 5 The court also maintained that the New York rule in question embodies the public policy of that state. 6
2

See STUMBERG, CONFLICT OF LAWS (I937) 186.
• Dawson v. Dawson, (193I) 224 Ala. 13, 138 So. 4I4; Howard v. Howard,
(193I) 200 N.C. 574, 158 S. E. IOI; Gray v. Gray, (1934) 87 N.H. 82,
I 74 Atl. 508.
• (1936) 27I N.Y. 466, 3 N. E. (2d) 597· Some slight stress is laid upon
the fact of the plaintiff wife's residence in New York.
• See section I 3, above.
6
To the same effect, see Poling v. Poling, (I935) II6 W.Va. I87, 179 S. E.
6o4; Kircher v. Kircher, (I939) 288 Mich. 669, 286 N. W. 120.
Actions between spouses upon foreign judgments were dismissed as contrary
to the law of the forum in Metzler v. Metzler, (I93o) 8 N.J. Misc. 8:1.1, 151
Atl. 847; Weidman v. Weidman, (193I) :1.74 Mass. II8, 174 N. E. :1.06.
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SECTION

5I

VICARIOUS LIABILITY OF AUTOMOBILE OWNERS

At the present day there are important variations between
the laws of different states governing the liability of automobile owners for damage occasioned by the use of their automobiles. This state of affairs has produced some interesting
conflict of laws problems. For example; A entrusts his car to
B in state X. B drives the car into state Y and, while driving
it there, injures C. The law of state Y makes an automobile
owner responsible for all injuries caused by persons using his
car with his consent. The law of state X where the car was
lent is not so strict. Which law should govern A's liability to
C? State Y ought to have the right to regulate the use of
automobiles within its boundaries. But A did not bring his
car to state Y. A may not have authorized B to take the car
to state Y. Under these circumstances there might seem to
be some hardship to A in charging him with liability under the
law of state Y. The decided cases appear to indicate that before A can be so charged, it must be shown that he gave an
express or tacit consent to the use of his car in state Y. 1
In Young v. Masci 2 the Supreme Court of the United
States considered the constitutional aspects of this problem.
In New Jersey Young gave possession of his car to a friend
who injured Masci while driving the car in New York. New
York imposes the strict liability upon automobile owners. A
New Jersey court applied New York law. Young appealed to
the Supreme Court on the ground that a reference to New
York law under these circumstances was so unfair to him as to
'Masci v. Young, (1932) 109 N.J. L. 453, 455; 162 Atl. 623; Kernan v.
Webb, (1929) so R.I. 394, 148 Atl. 186, 188; Scheer v. Rockne Motors Corp.,
(C. C. A. 2nd, 1934) 68 F. (2d) 942.
See also O'Connor v. Wray, [1930] Can. L. R. 231, [1930] 2 Dom. L. R.
899·
2
Young v. Masci, (1933) 289 U.S. 253, 53 Sup. Ct. 599, aff'g Masci v.
Young, (1932) 109 N. J. L. 453, 162 Atl. 623.
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amount to a denial of due process of law. Emphasizing the
fact that Young permitted his car to be used in New York, the
Supreme Court held that the New Jersey court's choice of law
was perfectly proper.
To vary the problem, let us suppose that state X, in which
the car is lent, imposes strict liability upon the owner. The
law of state Y, where the injury occurs, is more lenient. An
alternative reference to the law of state X has been suggested.
The government of state X may desire to make owners who
lend their cars there responsible for harm caused by the
operation of those cars in other states. The application of the
law of state X might be explained in terms of the tort choiceof-law theory. This would mean that state X was regarded
as the "place of wrong." But a state, in order to qualify as a
"place of wrong," is usually expected to be the scene of actual
harm to the defendant. No harm has occurred in state X.
Hence a second theory has been brought forward. The bailment of the car has taken place in state X. The law of state
X might be regarded as imposing a semi-contractual, relational duty upon A to insure the public against injury by B.
It would be adopted as the law of the place where the contract
or relationship of bailment was entered into.
This theory was adopted by the court in Levy v. Daniels'
U-Drive Auto Renting Co. 3 The defendant company rented
a car in Connecticut to Sack, whose negligent driving in Massachusetts occasioned the plaintiff's injury. A Connecticut statute provided that "any person renting or leasing to another
any motor vehicle owned by him shall be liable for any damage to any person or property caused by the operation of such
motor vehicle while so rented or leased." The action was
brought in Connecticut and the court there applied the statute
in question. "The statute," said the court, "made the liability
"Levy v. Daniels U-Drive Auto Renting Co., (1928) 1o8 Conn. 333, 143
Atl. 163.
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of the person renting motor vehicles a part of every contract
of hiring of a motor vehicle in Connecticut. The statute did
not create the liability, it imposed it in case the defendant
voluntarily rented the automobile. Whether the defendant
entered into this contract of hiring was its own voluntary act;
if it did, it must accept the condition upon which the law permitted the making of the contract." Following out the contract analogy, the court described the plaintiff as a third-party
beneficiary for whose benefit the contract was made. 4
The question has been raised whether the choice-of-law
principle of Levy v. Daniels' U-Drive Co. might be extended to cases in which the automobile owner did not rent his
car for hire but merely lent it to the bailee. In Cherwien v.
Geiter 5 the defendant owner lent his car to a friend in New
York who drove it into New Jersey and injured the plaintiff.
A New York court declined to refer the owner's liability to
New York law. 6
SECTION

52

LIABILITY OF TORTFEASOR'S INSURER TO INJURED PARTY

A number of American states have passed legislation giving
an injured person direct recourse against the wrongdoer's
insurer. Under an ordinary contract of public liability auto• If analogies be wanted, the owner's liability to the injured third party is
not unlike that of a telegraph company to an addressee who has suffered a loss
by reason of the company's failure to deliver a telegram. See section 42, above.
5
Cherwien v. Geiter, (1935) 244 App. Div. 814, 279 N.Y. Supp. 553· See
also Note, (1936) 21 CoRN. L. Q. 303.
"The case of Burkett v. Globe Indemnity Co., (1938) 182 Miss. 423, 181 So.
316, raises a problem similar to that canvassed in this section. A, an automobile
repairman, was commissioned by B to repair his automobile in New Orleans. A
left the car in such a dangerous condition that it ran off the road in Alabama
and injured C. The court appears to have referred the question whether C could
recover from A to the law of Louisiana. The case might be explained by saying
that the effect of the contract for repairs made between A and B was governed
by Louisiana law. That law imposed a contractual liability upon the repairman
in favour of third parties who suffered injury by reason of his neglect to perform the contract properly.

240

TORTS IN THE CONFLICT OF LAWS

mobile insurance, the insurer undertakes to discharge any liability incurred by the insured in the use of his automobile.
Legislation of the type in question provides that, under certain
circumstances, a person damaged by the insured may bring an
action directly against the insurer, who shall be liable to him
for any loss within the coverage of the policy. The statute
gives the injured person an enforceable third-party interest
in the performance of the insurance contract.
Such statutes have important conflict of laws aspects. Suppose B makes a contract of insurance with the A company in
state X. The company undertakes to discharge any liability
incurred by B in using his automobile. B, driving his automobile in state Y, injures C. There is a statute in force in
state X (where the insurance contract was made) making insurers directly responsible to injured third parties. Can C,
who has been injured in state Y, bring action directly against
the A company relying upon the terms of this statute? Since
the statute is primarily designed to protect injured persons
by enabling them to recoup themselves more effectually, it
might be thought that state X should have little or no interest
in the application of its statute to cases of injury in state Y.
The statute can be regarded, however, as imposing a semicontractual liability in respect of all insurance contracts made
in state X. It governs the contract between Band the A company which was concluded in state X and gives C an enforceable interest in the performance of that contract. Taking this
view of the matter, some courts have under such circumstances
allowed the injured party to bring action directly against the
insurer. 1
When a court deals with insurance legislation in this way,
it may have to make concurrent references to two bodies of
1
Cormier v. Hudson, (1933) 284 Mass. 231, 187 N. E. 625 (dealing with
statute of forum); Myers v. Ocean Accident & Guarantee Corp., (C. C. A. 4th,
1938) 99 F. (zd) 485; Farrell v. Employers' Liability Assurance Corp., (1933)
54 R.I. 18, 168 Atl. 911.
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law. The law of the state where the insurance contract was
made will determine whether the injured party can bring
suit directly against the insurer. If such a suit is permitted, the
injured party is entitled to recovery against the insurer only
in the event that he could have recovered against the insured
tortfeasor. To ascertain the liability of the tortfeasor, the
court must refer to the law of the place of wrong.
To produce a different problem, let us suppose that no
special legislation has been enacted in state X where B and the
A company have made their contract. State Y, the scene of
the injury to C, has the special legislation. Can C bring suit
against the company, relying on the law of state Y? No doubt
state Y has an interest in extending the protection of its law
to C. But such an extension might be unjust to the A company.
They have done nothing in state X and are not responsible
for the occurrence of the accident there. On the other hand, it
might be argued that, by promising to indemnify B against
liability, the company has encouraged him to use his car in
state Y and elsewhere. They have given him a confidence and
assurance which he might not otherwise have had. Perhaps the
analogy of the owner who lends his car for use in another state
is not too remote. However, there is some authority for the
proposition that, in the situation stated, to subject the company
to the law of state Y would be wrong. 2 On the other hand we
have the case of Kertson v. J ohnson.3 Here the injury occurred in Wisconsin, whose law authorized direct recourse
against insurers. A Minnesota court allowed the injured person to bring suit directly against the tortfeasor's insurer, say"Riding v. Travelers' Ins. Co., (1927) 48 R.I. 433, 138 Atl. 186; Martin
v. Zurich General Accident, etc., Co., (C. C. A. 1st, 1936) 84 F. (2d) 6;
Lowery v. Zorn, (C. A. La. 2d., 1934) 157 So. 826.
In Coderre v. Travelers' Ins. Co., (1927) 48 R.I. 152, 136 Atl. 305, the
court refused to apply the statute of the forum when neither the contract of
insurance nor the injury were located in the forum.
3
Kertson v. Johnson, (1932) 185 Minn. 591, 242 N. W. 329. See also
Burkett v. Globe Indemnity Co., (1938) 182 Miss. 423, 181 So. 316.
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ing that the Wisconsin law ought to be enforced "as part of
every contract in force in that state." The court emphasized
the fact of injury in Wisconsin exclusively; the opinion does
not even mention the place of contracting. It therefore affords
a basis for suggesting that the law of the state of injury should
be allowed to fix an obligation upon a tortfeasor's insurer in
favour of injured third parties.
In McArthur v. Maryland Casualty Co. 4 a Mississippi court
offered a peculiarly undesirable solution for the instant choiceof-law problem. The injury occurred in Louisiana, which has
a statute imposing direct liability upon insurers. The injured
person brought an action against the tortfeasor's insurer in
Mississippi. The Mississippi court refused to enforce the
Louisiana statute upon the ground that it was a law of a
remedial character, affecting only a matter of procedure. The
court did not say where the insurance contract was made.
If it was not made in Louisiana, the propriety of applying the Louisiana statute to the case in hand might be considered debatable as a question of choice-of-law policy.
But it is impossible to see how the Louisiana statute could be
classified as a rule of procedure for conflict of laws purposes.
Such a classification should only be made where the rule in
question cannot be conveniently implemented by the court of
the forum. 5 If this element of inconvenience is not present,
there is no sufficient justification for disregarding the choiceof-law policies which require that rights vested under a proper .
law should be enforced, so far as is possible, in all other jurisdictions. The Mississippi court did not suggest that the Louisiana law would be hard to enforce; it had already been enforced in a previous Mississippi decision. 6 The Mississippi
court argued that the Louisiana statute was remedial because
4
McArthur v. Maryland Casualty Co., (1939) 184 Miss. 663, r86 So. 305.
• See above, section I 3.
8
In Burkett v. Globe Indemnity Co., (1938) 182 Miss. 423 181 So. 316.
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the Louisiana courts had held it to be remedial for constitutional law purposes. The connection between the constitutional
law problem and the conflict of laws problem is not explained.
Obviously there is none; the word "remedial," like many
other words, has different meanings in different contexts. By
a process of mechanical reasoning, the Mississippi court
reached a speedy solution of the case before it which cannot
be commended.
Statutes giving direct recourse against insurers sometimes
provide that the injured party must obtain a judgment against
the tortfeasor and attempt to execute it before seeking his
remedy against the insurer. To a student of conflict of laws,
such a provision will suggest the possibility of obtaining a
judgment against the tortfeasor in one state and bringing suit
against the insurer in another. In Continental Auto Insurance
Underwriters v. Menuskin 7 the plaintiff who had been injured obtained a judgment against the tortfeasor in Tennessee.
Being unable to obtain satisfaction of it, he brought suit against
the tortfeasor's insurer in Alabama, relying upon an Alabama
statute which authorized direct recourse against insurers upon
the conditions which we have outlined. The contract of insurance had been made in Alabama. The Alabama court held
that in order to comply with the statutory requirement of a
prior unsatisfied judgment against the tortfeasor, the injured
party must obtain such a judgment in the courts of Alabama.
A Tennessee judgment against the tortfeasor would not be
sufficient. Nevertheless the Alabama court was able to allow
the injured party to recover against the tortfeasor by virtue
of the express terms of the insurance contract. A further question suggests itself: Would the result be different if the suit
against the insurer were brought in some other state? Since
the cause of action against the insurer would be based upon
• Continental Auto Insurance Underwriters v. Menuskin, (1931) 222 Ala.
370, 132 So. 883.
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Alabama law, the courts of other states ought to adopt the
conditions laid down by the Alabama courts. To do otherwise
would be to impose a burden upon the insurer which the proper
law of his obligation did not authorize.

SECTION

53

LEGAL EFFECT OF A PARTY'S DEATH

Vestiges of the maxim, actio personalis moritur cum persona,
still survive in many common-law jurisdictions. What law
should determine the extent to which the rights and duties
of the parties are affected by the death of (I) the plaintiff and
( 2) the defendant?
Let us consider the problem of the defendant's death first.
Employing a purely theoretical technique we might work out
four possible solutions. (I) Survivability could be regarded
as an attribute of the obligations created by the law of the
place of wrong. If that law did not give the plaintiff a surviving cause of action, no suit would be permitted after defendant's death. ( 2) We might say that the question to be decided
is whether or not the plaintiff's claim survived as a liability
of the defendant's estate. Such a matter ought to be referred to
the law of the defendant's domicile. (3) We could also say
that, since one result of our deliberations might be to order the
deceased's personal representative to pay damages over to
the plaintiff, the question was one of administration, to be governed by the law of the forum. ( 4) Rules denying or allowing
recovery against a decedent's estate might be classified as procedural. In that case they would likewise be adopted only from
the law of the forum. 1
Both the third and fourth theories lead us to the internal
1
See per Redfield, J., in Burgess v. Gates, (1848) 20 Vt. 326 at 330: "I
think the demise of the action with the person may be treated as of the remedy
perhaps, and so not affect a mere transitory cause of action."
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law of the forum. If either of them is followed, the plaintiff's
success will depend upon the law of the place where he is
able to bring his action. Each of the first two theories indicates a single proper law which will produce a uniform result
no matter where the action is brought. They would appear to
be preferable for this reason. If, for this reason, we eliminate
the last two theories from consideration we are left with the
first two theories from which to make a selection. We can
choose either the law of the place of wrong or the law of the
defendant's domicile. There is, however, a serious objection
to making the validity of the plaintiff's claim depend upon the
law of the defendant's domicile. The plaintiff has no control
over the defendant's conduct in selecting a domicile. There
would be an element of unfairness in allowing the defendant's
selection of a domicile, after the harm had been inflicted, to
alter the plaintiff's rights. It would be strange if the defendant
could protect his estate from liability in this way. Hence it is
submitted that the most satisfactory rule would be to refer the
effect of the defendant's death to the law of the place of
wrong.
The first theory, applying the law of the place of wrong,
has been most generally adopted by the courts. In Ormsby v.
Chase 2 the plaintiff, who had been injured on an elevator in a
New York office building owned by the defendant, sued his
estate in a Pennsylvania federal court. Since New York retained the common-law rule that a right of action for personal
injuries abates upon the death of the wrongdoer, the Supreme
Court on appeal gave judgment for the estate. "Assuming
Ormsby's negligence as alleged," said the court, "the New
York law upon the happening of the accident gave plaintiff
a right of action. But the same law limited the right and made
it to end upon the death of the tortfeasor." Other courts have
reached the same result when the law of the place of wrong
•ormsbyv. Chase, (1933) 290 U.S. 387,54 Sup. Ct. 211.
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made no provision for survival of liability. 3 Conversely it has
been held that, when the law of the place of wrong has abrogated the common-law rule and created a surviving claim,
the defendant cannot rely upon a contrary rule prevailing at
the forum. 4
The third theory, referring to the law of the defendant's
domicile, has not gone entirely unrecognized. In Whitten v.
Bennett 5 the defendant executor's deceased was charged with
malicious prosecution and false imprisonment in Massachusetts where such claims survived. But the plaintiff's suit was
dismissed by a Connecticut federal court on the ground that
the law of Connecticut, where deceased died domiciled, caused
his liability to terminate with his death.
Herzog v. Stern/ a decision of the New York Court of
Appeals, appears to favour a reference to the law of the forum
where the deceased wrongdoer's estate is being administered.
The action arose out of an automobile accident in Virginia.
By the laws of that state the defendant's liability survived his
death; the Decedent Estate Law of New York restates the
common-law rule. The Court of Appeals, by a majority, gave
judgment in the defendant's favour, saying:
"This State has undoubted power to determine the devolution of the property of a deceased resident and how such prop• Orr v. Ahern, (I 92 8) I 07 Conn. I 74-, 13 9 Atl. 69 I; Stratton's Independence v. Dines, (C. C. Colo. I904-) I26 Fed. 968; Potter v. First National
Bank, (1930) 107 N.J. Eq. 72, 151 Atl. 54-6; Friedman v. Greenberg, (1933)
noN. J. L. 4-62, r66 Atl. 119; Sumner v. Brown, (1933) 312 Pa. 124, 167
Atl. 315; Rathgeber v. Sommerhalder, (1934) 112 N.J. L. 54-6, 171 Atl. 835.
• Chubbuck v. Holloway, (1931) 182 Minn. 225, 234 N. W. 314, 868; Burg
v. Knox, (1933) 334 Mo. 329, 67 S. W. (2d) 96; Kertson v. Johnson, (1932)
185 Minn. 591, 242 N. W. 329·
5
Whitten v. Bennett, (C. C. Conn., r896) 77 Fed. 271. See STUMBERG,
CoNFLICT OF LAWS (1937) 186.
"Herzog v. Stern, (1934) 264 N.Y. 379, 382, I91 N. E. 23. Previous New
York decisions on the point were in conflict. See Re Killough, (1933) 148
Misc. 73, 265 N.Y. Supp. 301; Domres v. Storms, (1932) 236 App. Div. 63o,
z6o N.Y. Supp. 335·
See also Gray v. Blight, (C. C. A. roth, 1940) 112 F. (2d) 696; Woolen v.
Lorenz, (1938) 68 App. D. C. 389, 98 F. (zd) 261.
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erty shall be administered. It determines upon what claims
a suit may be brought against the representatives of the decedent, and payment be enforced out of the assets of the
estate. . . . The rights and obligations of executors and
administrators appointed by our courts are defined by our law
and our courts are without jurisdiction to grant a judgment
binding on the executors or administrators appointed here
unless our law makes provision for such actions against executors and administrators."
The judgment does not dispute the propriety of a reference
to the law of the place of wrong but insists that the law of
the state of administration should also be consulted. In effect,
it imposes upon the plaintiff the burden of concurrent reference
to both laws. As an alternative ground, the court also held that
a recovery by the plaintiff would offend New York's public
policy.
Let us now consider what law determines whether the claim
of the party wronged continues after his death. To find an
answer for this question we might apply, mutatis mutandis,
each of the four theories outlined above for the problem of a
deceased defendant. 7 But for the same reasons, the theory
which refers the question of survivability to the law of the
place of wrong is the most satisfactory. Generally speaking,
the courts have leaned toward the law of the place of wrong
as the best source for a controlling principle. Where that law
decrees that the plaintiff's claim is extinguished at his death,
a series of cases supports the principle that it cannot be collected anywhere. 8 The converse proposition, that a claim sur7
Where the deceased party is the one on whose behalf the action is brought,
the state of administration will not always coincide with the forum. The action
might be brought by an administrator appointed in some other state.
8
Needham v. Grand Trunk R. Co., (r 865) 38 Vt. 294; Hyde v. Wabash,
etc., R. Co., (r 883) 61 Iowa 441, 16 N. W. 351; Davis v. New York, etc., R.
Co., (r887) 143 Mass. 301, 9 N. E. 815; Mexican Cent. R. Co. v. Goodman,
(1898) 20 Tex. Civ. App. rog, 48 S. W. 778; O'Reilly v. New York, etc.,
R. Co., (r889) r6 R. I. 388, 17 Atl. 171, 17 Atl. go6, 19 Atl. 244;
Sanders' Adm'x v. Louisville, etc., R. Co., (rgor) 49 c. c. A. (6th) s6s, I I I
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viving by the law of the place of wrong can be enforced
anywhere, has been accepted, apparently without dispute, in a
number of decisions. 9
The idea that the law of the dead plaintiff's domicile should
in some respects control the transmission of a tort chose in
action to his personal representative has found expression in
two decisions of a federal judge. 10 He did not deny that the
law of the place of wrong should be recognized as authoritative to settle the issue of survivability. But where that law
failed to specify the administrator to which the claim should
go, he argued that it could only pass to the domiciliary administrator. Decisions upon the question of the proper administrator to enforce death statutes were distinguished because they did not purport to transmit an accrued right but
conferred a new one. There do not appear to be any other decisions discussing the incidence of surviving delictual rights
of action as among a number of administrators. This state of
affairs contrasts strangely with the mass of case-law which has
clustered about the question of the proper administrator to enforce death statutes. 11
One of the most important types of surviving claims in tort
is that which arises out of the wrongful death of the deceased.
Such claims differ from those based upon ordinary death
statutes with respect to the basic theory employed in estimating damages. ·A death statute aims to compensate the deceased's dependents for their loss; survival statutes simply
transmit the same cause of action which the deceased would
Fed. 708 (here the law of the place of wrong was applied to determine whether
the claim of a beneficiary under a death statute would, upon his death, pass
to his estate).
"Petrusha v. Korinek, (I927) 237 Mich. 583, 2I3 N. W. 188; Davis v.
Gant, (I923 Tex. Civ. App.) 247 S. W. 576; Anderson v. Miller Scrap Iron
Co., (1921) I76 Wis. 52I, 182 N. W. 852, 187 N. W. 746; Larue v. Kershaw
Contracting Co., (I9I2) I77 Ala. 441, 59 So. ISS·
10
Stockwell v. Boston, etc., R. Co., (C. C. Vt., I 904) I 3 I Fed. 153; Lyons v.
Boston, etc., R. Co., (C. C. Vt., 190I) I07 Fed. 386.
11
See above, p. 126.
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have had, had he lived to enforce it. Where it is transmitted
by the terms of the law of the place of wrong to designated
individuals, they are, of course, entitled to share the proceeds
of the action. 12 Where it passes to the deceased person's estate,
the proceeds are divided, like other personalty, according to
the terms of his will or the intestacy laws of his domicile. 13
The foregoing principles for deciding the effect, in conflicts cases, of the death of either party have been held, in a
series of decisions inspired by the Supreme Court, to have no
application to the situation where the action was commenced
before death occurred. These decisions hold that the law of the
forum, rather than the law of the place of wrong, should determine the effect of the party's death upon the continuation
of a lawsuit. In the case of Martin's Adm'r v. Baltimore & 0.
R. Co. 14 the Supreme Court had to deal with an action brought
in a West Virginia federal court for personal injuries received
in Maryland. During the prosecution of the suit the plaintiff
died. It was held that the action could not be continued by
his administrator because, by the law of West Virginia, his
action died with him. Speaking for the majority, Mr. Justice
Gray said:
"The question whether a particular cause of action is of
a kind that survives for or against the personal representative
of a deceased person is a question not of procedure but of right.
. . . But in the case at bar, the question whether the administrator has a right of action depends upon the law of
West Virginia, where the action was brought and the administrator appointed."
Despite the directness of this language, it may be doubted
whether the learned judge meant to decide the conflict of
laws question. Now here does it appear from the report that
12

As in Davis v. Gant, (1923 Tex. Civ. App.) 247 S. W. 576.
Hartley v. Hartley, (1905) 71 Kan. 691, 81 Pac. 505.
'"'Martin's Adm'r v. Baltimore & 0. R. Co., (1894) 151 U.S. 673, 692, 14
Sup. Ct. 533·
18
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anyone argued or even suggested the relevance of Maryland
law as that of the place of wrong. Moreover, at a later point in
the opinion, decisions of the Maryland Court of Appeals are
quoted to show that there too, as in West Virginia, a right to
compensation for personal injuries died with its owner. Hence
even assuming that the conflict of laws problem was present
to the learned judge's mind, his opinion was, on his own showing, clearly unnecessary to the decision of the case.
A $Omewhat brief but much more articulate decision upon
the point was given by the same court in Baltimore & 0. R.
Co. v. J oy/ 5 where, however, the effect of the law of the
forum (Ohio) was to preserve the plaintiff's cause of action,
that of the law of the place of wrong (Indiana) to extinguish
it. Mr. Justice Harlan, speaking for the court, resolved the
conflict in the following words:
"It is scarcely necessary to say that the determination of the
question of the right to revive this action in the name of Hervey's personal representative is not affected in any degree by
the fact that the deceased received his injuries in the State of
Indiana. The action for such injuries was transitory in its
nature, and the jurisdiction of the Ohio court to take cognizance of it upon personal service or on the appearance of the
defendant to the action cannot be doubted. Still less can it be
doubted that the question of the revivor of actions brought in
the courts of Ohio for personal injuries is governed by the
laws of that State, rather than by the law of the State in which
the injuries occurred."
Hence the plaintiff's administrator was permitted to revive the
action begun by his deceased, contrary to the law in force at the
place of wrong. Upon similar facts, the same conclusion has
been reached by other tribunals. 16
15

Baltimore, etc., R. Co. v. Joy, (I 899) I 73 U. S. 226, 23 r, I9 Sup. Ct. 387.
Martin v. Wabash R. Co., (I9o5) 73 C. C. A. (7th) 646, I42 Fed. 65o;
Page v. United Fruit Co. (C. C. A. rst, I925) 3 F. (2d) 747; Gordon v. Chicago, etc., R. Co., (I9I2) I54 Iowa 449, I34 N. W. 1057; Austin's Adm'r v.
Pittsburgh, etc., R. Co., (r9o6) I22Ky. 304, 9I S. W. 742.
16

SPECIFIC MULTIPLE CONTACT PROBLEMS

251

The theory that revivor of actions is governed by the law
of the forum has also been invoked in the case of the defendant's death. In Clough v. Gardiner 17 the defendant died while
the suit was pending. The law of the place of wrong would
have allowed it to be continued against his estate; the law of
the forum would not. The court followed the rule of the
forum.
The Joy case seems to sound a note of discord in modern
conflicts doctrine. Where the law of the forum, in contrast
with the law of the place of wrong, favours a survival the
plaintiff gains an advantage over the defendant due solely to
his selection of a forum. Where the law of the forum, in contrast with the law of the place of wrong, extinguishes the cause
of action, a most peculiar result ensues. The mere fact that the
action was begun before the death of one of the parties puts the
plaintiff in a worse position than he would have occupied if the
action had been commenced later. The doctrine has been explained as a particular instance illustrating the general principle that matters of procedure are governed by the law of
the forum. 18 It may be doubted, however, whether the application of an outside law in this connection would entail sufficient inconvenience to justify such a classification. With
reference to the question of convenience, there does not appear
to be any sound reason for distinguishing between the revival
of an existing action and the prosecution of a new one.
SECTION

54

MISCELLANEOUS MULTIPLE CONTACT PROBLEMS

In this section are collected together a number of miscellaneous multiple contact problems, none of which are suf17Clough v. Gardiner, (I920) III Misc. 244, I82 N.Y. Supp. 803. See also
Orr v. Ahern, (1928) 107 Conn. 174, 139 Atl. 691.
18
See Annotation, (1933) 87 A. L. R. 86o; Austin's Adm'r v. Pittsburgh, etc.,
R. Co., (I9o6) 122 Ky. 304, 91 S. W. 742; Orr v. Ahern, (1928) 107 Conn.
174, 139 Atl. 69r.

252

TORTS IN THE CONFLICT OF LAWS

ficiently important to deserve a separate section. Most of them
have been solved in terms of a single choice-of-law theory.
Suppose A in state X sets in motion some physical force
which injures B in state Y. The law of state Y is usually
adopted. 1 In Connecticut Valley Lumber Co. v. Maine Cent.
R. Co. 2 an employee of the defendant company, operating
one of its engines in Quebec, set fire to a bridge owned by the
plaintiffs. The bridge, which extended into New Hampshire,
was completely burned. The plaintiffs brought action in New
Hampshire. The court held that the defendant's liability
should be governed by New Hampshire law with respect to
the part of the bridge burned in that state, and by Quebec law
with respect to the part burned there. A New Hampshire
statute imposed strict liability upon railroad companies for
damage by fire. But the court decided that this statute of the
forum was not intended to cover damage caused by the operation of trains in another jurisdiction.
The general problem of interstate libel or slander has received very little judicial discussion. A few cases have been
litigated in which the defendant wrote a libel in one state and
sent it into another where it was read. These cases support the
view that the law of the state where the libel was read ought
to controP
In Connecticut Valley Lumber Co. v. Maine Cent. R. Co. 4
the court carried the place of injury theory so far as to hold
1
Otey v. Midland Valley R. Co., (I9ZI) I08 Kan. 755, I97 Pac. zo3; Dallas
v. Whitney, (I936) rr8 W.Va. Io6, I88 S. E. 766; Cameron v. Vandegriff,
(I89o) 53 Ark. 38I, I3 S. W. Io9z; Connecticut Valley Lumber Co. v. Maine
Cent. R. Co., (I9I8) 78 N.H. 553, Io3 Atl. 263.
"Connecticut Valley Lumber Co. v. Maine Cent. R. Co., (I9I8) 78 N.H.
553, I03 Atl. Z63.
3
See Haskell v. Bailey, (I 894) 25 U. S. App. 99, 63 Fed. 873; Evans & Sons
v. Stein & Co., (I904) 42 Scottish L. R. Io3. There are two English cases in
which the materiality of the law of the place of publication seems to be assumed
though not explicitly affirmed. See Isaacs & Sons v. Cook, [I9Z5] z K. B. 39I;
Thoene v. Lockwood, (I 9 I I) Times, April r r.
•connecticut Lumber Co. v. Maine Cent. R. Co., (I9r8) 78 N.H. 553,
ro3 Atl. 263.

SPECIFIC MULTIPLE CONTACT PROBLEMS 253
that when injury occurs in two states, each state's law should
govern with respect to the harm done there. Suppose A, in
state X, broadcasts slanderous remarks by radio which are
heard in states X, Y, and Z. It might be very difficult to determine how much harm to A's reputation was inflicted in each
state and to apply the law of each state with respect to the
harm done there. For the sake of convenience it might be
better to apply the law of state X to the entire transaction.
In Le Forest v. Tolman 5 a dog, kept by the defendant in
Massachusetts, wandered into New Hampshire and bit the
plaintiff there. Under the common law in force in New
Hampshire the plaintiff had to prove scienter; he therefore
argued for a reference to a Massachusetts statute which apparently abolished this defence. The court did not reject his
plea upon any general principle but considered the aims and
effect of the Massachusetts statute in question.
"It does not declare the owning or keeping of a dog to be
unlawful, but that if the dog injures another person, the owner
or keeper shall be liable, without regard to the question
whether he had or had not a license to keep the dog. The
wrong done to the person injured consists not in the act of the
master in owning or keeping, or neglecting to restrain, the dog,
but in the act of the dog for which the master is responsible."
Since the "act of the dog" was executed in New Hampshire,
the statute was held to be inapplicable; but it seems to be
clearly implied in the opinion that, had the statute by its terms
been directed against the negligent control of animals, the
plaintiff might well have succeeded.
The line of the A railroad company runs from state X into
state Y. At a point in state X, one of the company's trains is
negligently inspected by the company's employees so that B,
who is riding on the train, is injured in state Y. By a number
5

Le Forest v. Tolman, (r875) 117 Mass. 109, no. See also Fischl v. Chubb,
(1937) 30 Pa. D. & C. 40. See Note, (1938) 51 HARV. L. REv. 738.
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of courts the company's liability has been referred to the law
of Y. 6 In 1-.iike v. Lian 7 an automobile accident in Ohio resulted from failure properly to inspect the tires at the commencement of the trip in Pennsylvania. Only the law of Ohio
was applied.
In Burkett v. Globe Indemnity Co. 8 an automobile repairman in New Orleans left a car in such a dangerous condition
that it ran off the road in Alabama and injured the plaintiff.
The plaintiff was a guest of the owner riding in the car at the
time of the accident. He brought suit against the repairman.
The court appears to have determined the liability of the repairman according to the laws of Louisiana. This case might be
explained upon the theory that Louisiana was the "place of
wrong." It could also be explained upon the theory that
Louisiana law governed the contract for repairing, and was
therefore allowed to impose a contractual liability upon the
repairman in favour of third parties who suffered injury by
reason of his neglect. 9
In Reed & Barton v. Maas, 10 a coffee urn, which had been
defectively constructed in Massachusetts by the defendant was
sold by him to a caterer in Wisconsin. The urn, while in use
by the caterer, spilled hot coffee upon the plaintiff in Wisconsin. Wisconsin law was allowed to define the legal position of
the manufacturer-defendant.
6
E1 Paso, etc., R. Co. v. McComas, (I 903 Tex. Civ. App.) 72 S. W. 629;
Cincinnati, etc., R. Co. v. McMullen, (I889) II7 Ind. 439, 20 N. E. 287; Kansas City, etc., R. Co. v. Becker, (1899) 67 Ark. 1, 53 S. W. 406; Chicago, etc.,
R. Co. v. Doyle, ( 1883) 6o Miss. 977; Alabama, etc., R. Co. v. Carroll, (1892)
97 Ala. 126, 11 So. 803; Nashville, etc., R. Co. v. Foster, (1882) 78 Tenn. 351.
See also Hoodmacher v. Lehigh Valley R. Co., ( 19 o 7) 2 I 8 Pa. 2 1, 6 6 Atl. 9 75
(law of state where negligence and death but not actual injury occurred,
applied).
7
Mike v. Lian, (1936) 322 Pa. 353, 185 At1. 775·
8
Burkett v. Globe Indemnity Co., (I 9 3 8) 1 8 2 Miss. 42 3, 1 81 So. 3 16.
9
See section 51, above.
10
Reed v. Maas, (C. C. A. tst, 1934) 73 F. (2d) 359· See also Hunter v.
Derby Foods, (C. C. A. 2d, I940) Ito F. (2d) 970.
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A injures Bin state X so that he dies in state Y. An action
is brought against B on behalf of A's estate or A's dependents.
State X's interest in the affair is obvious; it has been held that
the law of the place of injury may confer a cause of action
notwithstanding the circumstance of death having occurred
elsewhere. 11 State Y's interest, on the other hand appears
rather small. Since A was not responsible for B's presence in
state Y at the time he died, it might not be fair to judge A's
conduct by the laws in force there. Under such circumstances a
number of courts have refused to make any reference to the
law of the place of death. 12
A curious case, apparently sui generis, is Buckles v. Ellers/ 3
an action for seduction in which the defendant was proved to
have had sexual intercourse with the plaintiff, first in Illinois
and then in Indiana. An Indiana court held that his liability
should be governed by Illinois law, saying: "The illicit intercourse testified to as having occurred in this state did not
constitute a new and independent case of seduction as contended for by the appellee, but was merely consequential to
the alleged seduction which had previously taken place."
A multiple contact problem involving a husband's vicarious
liability for his wife's torts arose in Siegmann v. Meyer. 14
The defendant's wife assaulted the plaintiff in Florida. The
plaintiff argued that under Florida law the defendant was
liable for his wife's torts. It might be questioned whether a
rule of this kind ought to be adopted from the law of the place
11

Van Doren v. Pennsylvania R. Co., (r899) 35 C. C. A. (3d) 282,93 Fed.
26o; Crane v. Chicago, etc., R. Co., (r9o8) 233 Ill. 259, 84 N. E. 222; Centofanti v. Pennsylvania R. Co., (r9r4) 244 Pa. 255, 90 Atl. 558.
12
De Ham v. Mexican National R. Co., (r893) 86 Tex. 68, 23 S. W. 381;
Louisville, etc., R. Co. v. Williams, (r897) 113 Ala. 402,21 So. 938; Derr v.
Lehigh Valley R. Co., (1893) 158 Pa. 365, 27 Atl. roo2; Melton's Adm'r
v. Soutlrern R. Co., (1930) 236 Ky. 629, 33 S. W. (2d) 690. But see Hoodmacher v. Lehigh Valley R. Co., (r9o7) 218 Pa. 21, 66 Atl. 975 (law of state
where negligence and death but not actual injury occurred, applied).
lll Buckles v. Ellers, ( r 8 8o) 72 Ind. 220.
"Siegmann v. Meyer, (C. C. A. :md, 1938) roo F. (2d) 367.
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of wrong. Perhaps the vicarious liability of a husband for his
wife's torts ought to be regarded as an incident of the marital
relationship and referred to his domiciliary law. But the court
did not take up this point. It ruled out the law of Florida
upon another ground. The husband was not in Florida and
was not responsible in any way for his wife's presence there.
There was no causal relation between any act of his and the
fact that the assault occurred in Florida. Hence the court held
that it would be unfair to subject the husband to liability under
Florida law.
Legal rules governing marital property and delictual liability were distinguished for conflicts purposes in Williams v.
Pope h1anufacturing Co. 15 The plaintiff, a married woman,
being domiciled and resident in Mississippi, was wrongfully
imprisoned by the defendant's agents in Louisiana. She instituted an action in her own name in the Louisiana courts. It
was contended for the defendant that any claim which the
plaintiff might have must be litigated by her husband, because
under Louisiana law a husband and wife held their property
rights in common, under the control of the husband. The Supreme Court of Louisiana held that the provisions of Louisiana
law referred to did not affect a right of action for tort belonging to a married woman domiciled outside Louisiana. Although the cause of action for the tort arose under Louisiana
law, the wife was allowed to sue upon it alone.
:Ill Williams v. Pope Manufacturing Co., (19oo) 52 La. Ann. 1417, 27 So.
851.
See also Texas, etc., R. Co. v. Humble, (1901) 181 U.S. 57, 21 Sup. Ct. 526;
Traglio v. Harris, (C. C. A. 9th, 1939) 104 F. (zd) 439·
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INTRODUCTION: THE GENERAL MARITIME LAW CONCEPT

T

HE next five sections of this study are devoted to a
discussion of maritime torts in the conflict of laws.
We are not concerned (except incidentally) with the
internal law of any state or nation relating to maritime torts.
Our interest lies only in the application of choice-of-law principles by the courts of the United States and the British Empire. Hitherto we have been accustomed to thinking of the
various states of the United States as individual units in the
conflict of laws, each having its own internal law. But in dealing with maritime torts we shall find it necessary, at times, to
abandon this approach and to think of the entire United States
as a single unit having a uniform internal law. Since maritime
torts fall within the admiralty jurisdiction, the national government has, under the Federal Constitution, almost complete power to prescribe their legal consequences. 1 In recent
years Congress has, in the exercise of this power, introduced
soine important modifications in the American law of maritime torts.
It is still possible, however, for an individual state to make
a very limited contribution to this body of law. In the view
of the Supreme Court there is a class of matters which are
"maritime but local" in nature. If Congress has not dealt with
a maritime but local matter, a state legislature may legislate
effectively with regard to that matter. A state statute can only
1
For further discussion of the power granted to Congress by the Federal Constitution to deal with maritime torts, see RoBINSON, ADMIRALTY (1939) 8, 27.
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operate in cases appropriately connected with the state in
question. State legislation is applied to such cases upon ordinary choice-of-law principles. Subsequent congressional legislation will, of course, supersede all state laws. Of matters
maritime but local the outstanding example is wrongful death
upon state territorial waters. Though such a tort is obviously
maritime, the deceased man's dependents may base an action
for his death upon the death statute of the state in which the
fatal injury was inflicted. 2
Another factor which complicates the approach to a study
of mitritime torts is the concurrence of admiralty jurisdiction
with that of the ordinary common-law courts. In a non-federal
state, such as England, an action for a non-maritime tort could
be brought only in the ordinary common-law courts. But a
dispute arising out of a maritime tort might be litigated in
either the common-law courts or the court of admiralty.
Within a very broad field, and especially in matters of procedure, each court would apply different rules. The differences
between these rules might, in some cases, be of considerable
practical significance. In the United States, the jurisdictional
situation is even more intricate. A maritime tort, like any other
tort, may be litigated in ( r) a state common-law court or ( 2)
a federal common-law court, if there is diversity of citizenship.
Because of its maritime character it could also be litigated in
(3) a federal court of admiralty. Any one of these courts
would, of course, be bound to follow the general maritime law
of the United States or, in an appropriate case, the law of a
state of the United States or of a foreign country, applied according to choice-of-law principles. But upon points of "procedure" each court would adopt its own rules and these might
diverge considerably. Difficult questions are not infrequently
raised as to whether a particular dispute is within the jurisdic• See below, p. 263.
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tion of the admiralty tribunals. But the demarcation of admiralty jurisdiction is a topic outside the scope of the present
work.
Maritime law has a tradition of international uniformity.
Like the law merchant, it is supposed to have its roots in
ancient rules and customs common to all nations. As the law
merchant epitomized the custom of merchants of every nationality, so the general maritime law represented the usages
of mariners in all parts of the world. The survival of admiralty
courts has helped to preserve this tradition in the United
States and the British Empire. At the present day the uniformity of maritime law as it is administered in the various
countries of the world is not impressive. Even between England and the United States there have been serious divergencies on certain doctrinal issues. Much of the maritime law administered in these countries is laid down by local statutes.
There is no uniform world-wide law of the sea.3
It is still possible, however, to secure a reasonable degree of
uniformity in the maritime field, as in other branches of law,
by adherence to uniform choice-of-law principles. Differences
between English and American marine law do not matter,
if English and American courts can agree upon the demarcation of the spheres of authority within which these two bodies
of law shall operate~ There is a certain theoretical antipathy
between the ancient conception of a uniform sea law for the
whole world and the application of choice-of-law principles.
The application of choice-of-law principles presupposes the
existence of differences between the maritime laws of the
"See The Milford, (r858) Swabey 362, r66 Eng. Rep. II67, in which Dr.
Lushington, a great admiralty lawyer of his time, seems to admit that the
so-called general maritime law is really nothing more than internal law of the
forum. See also Lloyd v. Guibert, (r865) r Q. B. II5, 123-125.
The classic criticism of the general maritime law theory as fictitious and misleading is that of Westlake. See his PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW, Ed. 7
(1925) 290·
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various nations. The ancient tradition of uniformity may move
an admiralty judge to say, "I will not apply some particular
foreign law to this case; I will apply the general maritime law,
as I understand it." Admiralty courts have, generally speaking, accepted the idea that the law of the place of wrong should
govern in matters occurring there. But a thoroughgoing application of this principle has sometimes been impeded by the
ancient tradition.
Most of the problems with which we shall be concerned in
the next four sections of this book are multiple contact problems. They arise because a ship is more than a mere chattel;
it is, in some respects, like a floating island. As it moves about,
from one country to another, it carries on board a community
of persons. For their convenience, it is desirable that the ship
be governed by some system of legal rules. Moreover, most
ships are associated, by registration, with the nation of which
their owners are citizens. They are part of its merchant
marine; they fly its national flag. The government of that
country has usually a certain interest in the ship, in the conduct
of those on board her, and in the legal consequences of acts
and events in which she may become involved. For these
reasons, it is sometimes advisable, in cases whose facts are
connected with a ship, to apply the law of the ship's flag. But
one ship may collide with a ship which belongs to another
country whose law is different and then we have to take two
laws into consideration. Or one ship may sail into the territorial waters of another state. Here a collision or an injury on
board will produce fresh multiple contact problems.
In the next four sections we shall have occasion to discuss
the tort aspects of certain relations: passenger and carrier,
employer and employees (seamen, stevedores, etc.). No attempt will here be made to deal with the contractual or quasicontractual aspects of such relationships which might involve
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additional choice-of-law principles. These have already been
discussed in earlier sections; 4 to introduce them here would
only intensify the complexity of problems already complicated.
To say precisely to what country a ship belongs is not always
easy. The flag, as we have suggested, is a prima facie symbol.
But it does not always indicate who really controls the ship.
In some instances the citizenship of the shipowner is more
significant. The latter test has been adopted by the United
States Seaman's Act of 1920. 5 An American court will apply
that act to actions brought against their employers by seamen
employed on vessels owned by American citizens, even though
the vessel has been registered under a foreign flag. There may
be other cases in which a vessel ought to be regarded as belonging to one nation although she flies another's flag. 6
SECTION
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MARITIME TORTS IN TERRITORIAL WATERS
INVOLVING A SINGLE SHIP

In this section we are concerned with the multiple contact
problems which arise from an injury occurring in territorial
waters in which only a single ship is involved. For instance,
one of the ship's officers assaults a member of the crew, or the
ship itself sinks, resulting in the death or injury of persons on
board. Collision cases are reserved for another section. To
make a multiple contact problem, we suppose that the law
• Above, section 42, 44·
41 Stat. 1007, c. 250, § 33 (192o), 46 U. S. Code (1934) § 688. See
Gerradin v. United Fruit Co., (C. C. A. 2nd, 1932) 6o F. (2d) 927, (1932)
287 U.S. 642,53 Sup. Ct. 92; Torgersen v. Hutton, (1934) 243 App. Div. 31,
276 N.Y. Supp. 348, aff'd (1935) 267 N.Y. 535, 196 N. E. 566.
6
See the judgment of Lord Justice Brett in Chartered Mercantile Bank of
India v. Netherlands, etc., Co., (1883) 10 Q. B. D. 521. See also Grand Trunk
R. Co. v. Wright, (C. C. A. 6th 1927) 21 F. (2d) 814, in which a vessel of
American registry, owned by an American corporation, was held to be governed
by Canadian law with respect to an injury to an employee on board. The vessel
was under charter to a Canadian corporation at the time of the injury.
5
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of the ship and the law of the territorial waters are different.
The possibility of applying either one or both is thus presented. The state of the territorial waters will no doubt be
concerned with the legal consequences of any acts or events
occurring within its boundaries. But the state of the ship's flag
may also have a similar interest in whatever occurs on board
the vessel and the application of its law may in some instances
be more convenient for all persons concerned. It is not surprising therefore to find that American courts have sometimes
adopted the law of the waters, and, at other times, the law of
the ship. The general theory appears to be that the law of the
waters should control unless the dispute concerns only the internal economy of the ship.
Let us consider first the situation of a foreign vessel within
the territorial waters of the United States. Uravic v. Jarka
Co./ a Supreme Court decision, affords a good point of departure. Uravic, a stevedore, was killed while working on
board a German vessel in New York harbour. Overruling a
previous decision of the New York Court of Appeals, 2 the
Supreme Court ruled that his dependents could maintain an
action based upon the law of the United States. "There is
strong reason," said Mr. Justice Holmes, "for giving the same
protection to the person of those who work in our harbours
when they are working upon a German ship that they would
receive when working upon an American ship in the next dock,
as is especially obvious in the case of stevedores who may be
employed in unloading vessels of half a dozen different flags
in turn." The litigation was disposed of in accordance with
the terms of an appropriate federal statute. 3
In Western Fuel Co. v. Garcia 4 the factual pattern was
1

Uravic v. Jarka, ( 193 r) 282 U.S. 234, 51 Sup. Ct. r r r.
Resigno v. Jarka Co., (1928) 248 N.Y. 225, r62 N. E. 13.
3
In this case, the court applied the Seaman's Act (r92o) or Jones Act (1920)
41 Stat. roo7, c. 250, § 33,46 U.S. Code (1934) § 688.
At the present day the appropriate American statute would be the Harbor
Workers Act (1927) 44 Stat. 1424, c. 509, 33 U.S. Code (1934) §§ 901-950·
•western Fuel Co. v. Garcia, (1921) 257 U.S. 233,42 Sup. Ct. 89.
2

MARITIME TORTS
identical with that of Uravic v. Jarka. Manuel Souza, a stevedore, was killed at work on board the "Tancred," a Norwegian
ship anchored in San Francisco Bay. It does not seem to have
been doubted that the case should be governed by United
States law. But at the time when it arose, the federal statute
applied in Uravic v. Jarka had not been enacted. The Supreme
Court held that, in default of federal legislation, the deceased
man's dependents might base their action upon the death
statute of the state of California. The case illustrates the point,
which we have already mentioned, that while the maritime
law of the United States is controlled and prescribed by the
federal government, it is possible for the several states to
make a limited contribution to that body of law in the absence
of federal action. The legal consequences of a wrongful death
occurring in American territorial waters are frequently referred to the law of the state of wrong. 5 The federal government has, however, enacted special statutes dealing with the
death or injury of seamen and harbour workers. 6 To this extent the state laws have been superseded.
So much for the situation in which the law of the territorial
waters controls. Let us now turn to the cases in which the law
of the ship's flag has been adopted. These decisions do not announce any clear and definite theory. But they are all concerned with injuries received on board a foreign ship in American waters by a member of the crew. It will be remembered
that in Uravic v. J arka, the leading case in which the law of
the waters was adopted, the injured man was not a seaman
but a stevedore, temporarily present on the ship. When a
member of the crew or some person more permanently at" See Western Fuel Co. v. Garcia, (1921) 257 U.S. 233, 240, 42 Sup. Ct. 89.
In the absence of a state or federal statute the maritime law of the United States
does not allow any action for wrongful death. The Harrisburg, (1886) 119
U. S. 199, 7 Sup. Ct. 140.
"The Seaman's Act (1920) 41 Stat. 1007, c. 250, § 33,46 U.S. Code (1934)
§ 688; The Harbor Workers Act (1927) 44 Stat. 1424, c. 509, 33 U.S. Code

§§ 901-950.
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tached to the ship is injured, American courts usually concede the application of the :flag law. 7 But the United States
has an undeniable interest in the conduct of persons on board
foreign ships in American waters. If the foreign law were
shown to be peculiarly harsh or unjust, the case would be an
apt one for the application of American law, even to the extent of conferring a cause of action where the law of the :flag
gave none. No doubt it is desirable, so far as possible, to
follow a uniform choice-of-law principle which will select a
single law. But there are other conflict of laws situations in
which the courts permit an alternative reference to the laws of
either one of two states, because the factual pattern is connected with both of them.
We have still to consider the cases involving a conflict b~
tween the law of a single ship and the territorial waters law of
some state other than the United States. There is some authority for the view that the law of the territorial waters
ought to prevail. 8 But in a number of cases the law of the ship
has been enforced on the ground that the dispute merely
7
The Hanna Nielsen, (D. C. Wash., I928) 25 F. (2d) 984 (here, however,
the law of the ship was presumed, in the absence of contrary proof, to be the same
as that of the forum); Heredia v. Davies, (C. C. A. 4th, I926) I2 F. (2d) 500
(here the law of the ship was presumed to be the same as that of the forum; the
effect of the decision is obvious); Clark v. Montezuma Transp. Co., (I926) 2I 7
App. Div. IJ2, 2I6 N.Y. Supp. 295; The Magdapur, (D. C. N.Y., I933)
3 F. Supp. 97I; The Seirstad, (D. C. N.Y., I928) 27 F. (2d) 982; The Pinar
Del Rio, (C. C. A. 2nd, I927) I6 F. (2d) 984; Grand Trunk R. Co. v.
Wright, (C. C. A. 6th, I927) 2I F. (2d) 8I4 (injury resulting in death suffered by employee on board train ferry in American territorial waters; the ferry
was of American registry but had been chartered to defendant railroad, a
Canadian corporation; court held case governed by Canadian law).
Contra: Shorter v. Bermuda, etc., Co., (D. C. N.Y., I932) 57 F. (2d) 313;
The Apurimac, (D. C. Va., I925) 7 F. (2d) 74I; The Navarino (D. C. N.Y.,
I925) 7 F. (2d) 743·
The Supreme Court left the point open in Plamals v. Pinar Del Rio, (I928)
277 U.S. I5I, 48 Sup. Ct. 457; Uravic v. Jarka Co., (I93I) 282 U.S. 234,
5 I Sup. Ct. I I r.
8
Geoghegan v. Atlas S. S. Co., (I893) 3 Misc. 224, 22 N.Y. Supp. 749
(death of a member of the crew) ; The Cuzco, (D. C. Wash., I 9 I 5) 225 Fed. I 69
(injury to a stevedore); Wingert v. Carpenter, (I894) I or Mich. 395, 59
N. W. 662.
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affected the internal economy of the vessel. Thompson Towing and Wrecking Ass'n v. Mcgregor 9 is the classic authority
for this theory. In that case a member of the crew of an
American ship was killed by a boiler explosion while the
vessel was in Canadian waters. Applying American law, the
court allowed a recovery by his dependents. With reference
to the choice-of-law problem the court said:
"So far as this question is concerned, the ultimate basis of
the decree was that the explosion of this boiler was a matter
which did not directly involve the peace, dignity, or tranquility of the Canadian government but rather involved the
internal discipline and management of the ship."
This principle has been adopted in subsequent cases where
a seaman on board an American ship has been injured or killed
in foreign territorial waters. 10 There seems to be no reason
why it should not also be applied in cases where both the ship
law and the water law are foreign. 11
In Carrington v. Panama Mail Co. 12 a stevedore was in• Thompson Towing & Wrecking Ass'n v. McGregor, (I 913) I 24 C. C. A.
(6th) 479, 207 Fed. 209.
10
Wenzler v. Robin Line S. S. Co., (D. C. Wash., I92I) 277 Fed. 8I2;
Bennett v. Connelly (I923) I22 Misc. I49, 202 N.Y. Supp. 568; Cain v. Alpha
S. S. Corp., (C. C. A. 2nd, 1929) 35 F. (2d) 717.
The Supreme Court applied United States law to a seaman's injury received
on board an American ship in a Venezuelan harbour in Alpha S. S. Corp. v.
Cain, (I93o) 281 U.S. 642, so Sup. Ct. 443·
American courts apply American law relating to seamen's injuries to all
cases of such injuries occurring on a ship owned by an American citizen,
whether or not it is a ship of American registry. See the Seamen's Act, I 7 Stat.
277, c. 322, § 65 (I 872 ), 46 U.S. Code ( 1934) § 713; Gerradin v. United Fruit
Co., (D. C. N.Y., 193I) 51 F. (2d) 417.
11
But the cases are somewhat inconclusive. See The Hanna Nielsen, (C. C. A.
2nd, 192I) 273 Fed. 17I; Bonsalem v. Byron S. S. Co., (C. C. A. 2nd, 1931)
so F. (2d) II4; Geoghegan v. Atlas S. S. Co., (I893) 3 Misc. 224, 22 N.Y.
Supp. 749; Rainey v. New York, etc., Co. (I914) IJ2 C. C. A. (9th) 509, 2I6
Fed. 449·
See Dupont v. Quebec S. S. Co., (I 896) I I Queb. S.C. I 88, a case of death on
board a British ship in Trinidad harbour. The Quebec court applied English, not
Trinidad, law.
12
Carrington v. Panama Mail Co., (I929) 136 Misc. &so, 241 N.Y. Supp.
347·
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jured while working on board an American ship in a port of
the Panama Canal Zone. The court applied United States law
rather than the law of the Canal Zone. The decision has been
criticized by Robinson 13 because the court did not apply the
law of the Canal Zone. He argues that since the injured man
was not a member of the crew but a stevedore, temporarily
engaged on the vessel, the dispute was something more than
a mere matter of the ship's internal economy and the water
law ought to have governed the litigation. In support of the
decision it may be said that the United States has a certain
interest in the treatment of stev~dores upon American ships,
even in foreign harbours. But the application of American law
under such circumstances would seem to be justified only if
the law of the territorial waters appeared to be extremely
harsh or inequitable.
'

SECTION
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COLLISION IN TERRITORIAL WATERS

In discussing the proper law to govern collisions in territorial waters it seems desirable to set apart rules of navigation from other types of legal rules. We shall first address
ourselves to the rules affecting legal liability which are in
no sense rules of navigation. Within this limited field, the
general tendency of both English and American courts is to
accept the guidance of the rules of the territorial law, irrespective of the law or laws of the ships involved. It might be
thought that the laws of the ships concerned would be entitled to some consideration. But there is little evidence of such
an idea in the reported decisions. In one case, the ship's law
was expressly rejected by an English court. 1 However, there
is no great plethora of precedents. It cannot be said that a ref18

ROBINSON, ADMIRALTY (I939) I48.

'TheM. Moxham, (I875) I P. D. 43; (I876) I P. D. Io7.
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erence to the law of one ship (or both, if they had a common
law) is beyond the range of possibility.
Smith v. Condry,2 decided by the Supreme Court in 1843,
is the leading American case. It arose out of a collision between two American vessels in the port of Liverpool. Speaking for the court, Chief Justice Taney said:
"The collision having taken place in the port of Liverpool, the rights of the parties depend upon the provisions of
the British statutes, then in force; and if doubts exist as to
their true construction, we must of course adopt that which is
sanctioned by their own courts."
,
The defendant argued that at the time when it struck the
plaintiff's vessel, his vessel, the Tasso, was under the control
of a compulsory pilot. British law compelled the defendant to
allow this pilot to take charge of his vessel. But according to
the decisions of the British courts, the owner of a ship was
not liable for damages which were inflicted by it while it was
under the control of a compulsory pilot. Applying this principle of British law to the case in hand, the Supreme Court
exonerated the defendant.
In Robinson v. Detroit & C. Steam Nav. Co. 3 a federal
circuit court of appeals adopted the law of foreign territorial
waters upon several points. The case, which was litigated in
admiralty, arose out of a collision in the Canadian waters of
the Detroit river between the steamer City of Mackinaw and
the tug Washburn. Two men on board the Washburn were
2

Smith v. Condry, (I843) I How. (42 U.S.) 28, 33·
See also Standard Oil Co. v. Tampico Nav. Co., (D. C. N.Y., I92I) 2I F.
(zd) 795; Royal Mail Steam Packet Co. v. Companhia de Navegaco Lloyd Brasileiro, (D. C. N.Y., I928) 3I F. (zd) 757; The Eagle Point, (I9o6) 73
C. C. A. 569, I42 Fed. 453; The Mandu, (D. C. N.Y., I936) IS F. Supp. 627.
8
Robinson v. Detroit & C. Steam Nav. Co., (I 896) 43 U. S. App. I 90, 20
C. C. A. (6th) 86, 73 Fed. 883.
Wrongful death in a collision on American territorial waters is governed by
the law of the littoral state. The federal death statute [4I Stat. 538, c. I u, § 7
(I92o), 46 U.S. Code (I934) § 767] does not apply to deaths in American
territorial waters. See RoBINSON, ADMIRALTY (I939) I44, rsz.
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drowned. Their dependents filed libels in rem against the
City of Mackinaw. The court dismissed these libels because
the Canadian law (in this instance, the law of Ontario) did
not authorize proceedings against the ship. Then the owners
of the steamship alleged that, under Ontario law, the negligence of those persons in charge of the tug would be imputed to all persons on board her, and so prevent them from
recovering damages against the owners of the steamship.
The court considered the Ontario law on this point carefully.
It was finally decided that the Ontario authorities did not
support any such rule of "imputed negligence." An in personam decree was accordingly rendered against the owners of
the steamship.
As Robinson points out, 4 there is one situation in which an
American court would be very likely to apply a ship's law
with respect to a collision in territorial waters. Suppose a
seaman is injured as a result of a collision in foreign territorial
waters. He brings suit in an American court against his employers. The court would probably hold that the relation of
the seaman to his employers was a problem of the ship's internal economy and apply the ship's law to the seaman's action. But to determine whether the ship was properly navigated or not, the court might have to refer to the navigation
rules of the territorial waters. A reference to the law of the
ship with respect to the seaman's claim against his employers
would be especially probable if the ship were owned by American citizens.
English decisions show the same tendency to apply the
law of the territorial waters. In The Arum 5 a collision oc4
5

ROBINSON, ADMIRALTY (1939) 147·
The Arum, [1921] P. 12.

In Owners of S. S. Reresby v. Owners of S. S. Cobetas, (1923) Scots L. T. 719
a Scottish court refused to apply the law of foreign territorial waters to a
collision which occurred there. The foreign law excused the defendant from
liability, but the court rendered a judgment against him on the ground that
the case ought to be decided by the general maritime law as administered at the
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curred in the harbour of Gibraltar. Action was brought in an
English court which found that the collision was due to the
negligence of a pilot whom the port authorities had placed in
charge of the offending vessel. Under the English Pilotage
Act of I 9 I 3 the owners of the offending vessel would have
been responsible, under such circumstances, for the resulting
damage. But the court held that its decision must be governed
by the common law of Gibraltar, which exonerated the owners from any liability for the acts of a compulsory pilot. The
action was therefore dismissed.
Where, however, the foreign law creates a liability which
English internal law would not recognize under the same
circumstances, the first rule of Phillips v. Eyre 6 will prevent
an English court from enforcing the foreign law. The famous
case of The Halley/ upon which this rule was based, arose
out of a collision in Belgian waters. The Privy Council refused
to enforce the Belgian law because, contrary to English common law, it made the owners of the offending ship liable for
the acts of a compulsory pilot.
In the case of TheM. Moxham 8 an unsuccessful attempt
was made to induce an English court to apply the law of a
ship in a collision case. The ship in question was of British
registry; it had demolished a pier in Spanish waters. The
shipowners alleged in their pleading that they were not liable
for this injury, under Spanish law, because it was due to the
negligence of the ship's crew. The owners of the pier argued
that, under these circumstances, British law should be allowed
to impose liability upon the owners, no matter what the rule
of Spanish law might be. They cited cases in which British
forum. The decision is, from a conflict of laws point of view, highly objectionable, and has been criticized in DICEY, CoNFLICT OF LAWS, Ed. 5 (1932) 987.
See generally JESSUP, THE LAW OF TERRITORIAL WATERS AND MARITIME
JURISDICTION (1927) 135·
6
Phillips v, Eyre, (r 87o) L. R. 6 Q. B. 1.
'The Halley, (r868) L. R. 2 P. C. 193.
"TheM. Moxham, (r875) r P. D. 43, (r876) r P. D. 107.
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criminal law had been applied to conduct on board British
ships in foreign waters. Sir Robert Phillimore accepted this
choice-of-law theory, but he was reversed by the Court of Appeal. That court held that the shipowners must be liable under
Spanish law or not at all.
Several cases have come before the English courts in which
the defendant had seized the plaintiff's goods in foreign territorial waters. If the seizures were justified under the law
of the place of wrong, the actions were dismissed. 9
Let us consider now the position of legal rules governing
navigation in territorial waters. These rules must be obeyed
by all ships entering the territory, regardless of what law they
carry with them. It would be most unfair not to decide all
questions of responsibility for collisions in the territory by reference to those rules. Hence English courts in dealing with
collisions in foreign waters usually apply the foreign rules of
navigation. 10 Doubtless American courts would follow the
same practice. 11
Moreover, foreign navigation rules are exempt from the
exclusionary effect of the first rule in Phillips v. Eyre. An
English court will impose liability in respect of an act done in
foreign waters which would have been perfectly innocent if
it had been done in English waters. All that is necessary is to
show that the act constituted a breach of a foreign rule of
navigation. This exception to the first rule in Phillips v. Eyre
stems from the Privy Council's opinion in The Halley 12 upon
which the first rule in Phillip v. Eyre was based. The passage
is as follows:
"Dobree v. Napier, (I836) 2 Bing. N.C. 78I, I32 Eng. Rep. 301; Carr v.
Fracis Times & Co. [I902] A. C. I76.
10

See the RussianS. S. Yourri, (I88s) L. R. IO App. Cas. 276; The Talabot,
(I89o) IS P. D. 194; The Diana, [1894] A. C. 625.
11

See The New York, (I 899) I 7 5 U.S. I 87, 20 Sup. Ct. 67; The Lansdowne,
(D. C. Mich., I9oo) Ios Fed. 436.
"'The Halley, (x868) L. R. 2 P. C. I93> 203.
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"It is true that in many cases the Courts of England inquire
into and act upon the law of Foreign countries, as in the case
of a contract entered into in a Foreign country, where, by
express reference, or necessary implication, the Foreign law
is incorporated with the contract, and proof and consideration
of the Foreign law therefore become necessary to the construction of the contract itself. And as in the case of a collision
on an ordinary road in a Foreign country, where the rule of
the road in force at the place of collision may be a necessary
ingredient in the determination of the question by whose fault
or negligence the alleged tort was committed."
SECTION
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MARITIME TORTS ON THE HIGH SEAS INVOLVING A SINGLE SHIP

Selecting a proper law for an alleged wrong on board a
ship on the high seas is not a difficult matter. The law of
the ship appears to be the obvious choice. The leading authority is the Supreme Court's decision in The T itanic. 1 The Titanic, a British ship on her maiden voyage, struck an iceberg
on the high seas and sank with great loss of life. The Supreme
Court held that her owners might limit the amount of their liability under American law. But in delivering the court's opinion Mr. Justice Holmes clearly indicated that the liability
of the owners for the many wrongful deaths in the catastrophe
would be governed by British law.
In a few cases the somewhat whimsical theory has been
advanced that if a man on board a vessel on the high seas is
thrown into the water and drowned, the place of wrong is not
the vessel but the sea. 2 Therefore the law of the vessel cannot
be applied. Excluding the law of the vessel, two alternative
1
The Titanic, (I 9 I 4) 2 3 3 U. S. 7 I 8, 34 Sup. Ct. 754· See also The Lamington, (D. C. N.Y., 1898) 87 Fed. 752.
"Lindstrom v. International Nav. Co. (C. C. N.Y., 1902) II7 Fed. 170;
Davidsson v. Hill [I901] 2 K. B. 6o6, 6I7; Rundell v. La Compagnie Generale
Transatlantique, (19oo) 40 C. C. A. (7th) 625, 1oo Fed. 655.
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theories remain. (I) There is no law in force on the high seas
and so the man's dependents recover nothing. ( 2) The high
seas are governed by the general maritime law. The first of
these alternatives is obviously objectionable. The second is
plausible but it rests upon a doctrine which, however hoary
and respectable, frustrates all choice-of-law policies. In Lindstrom v. International Nav. Co. 3 the law-of-the-waters theory
was expressly rejected. It cannot be reconciled with The Titanic nor with the Supreme Court's decision in LaB ourgo gne, 4
a collision case.
In 1920 Congress passed a statute to give a uniform remedy
for wrongful death on American ships on the high seas. 5 Prior
to that date, the question of liability for wrongful death on an
American ship had been referred to the law of the American
state with which the ship was appropriately connected. 6 The
new statute, usually called the Federal Death Act of 1920,
changes the internal American law in this respect and also
epitomizes the choice-of-law principle. Section 4 provides
"that whenever a right of action is granted by the law of any
foreign state on account of death by wrongful act, neglect or
default occurring upon the high seas, such right may be
maintained in an appropriate action in admiralty in the courts
of the United States." In The V estris 7 this section was discussed and applied to a single ship disaster involving a British
ship. Since the British law gave a right of action for wrongful
death, the American court enforced it.
The law of the ship has also been applied to seamen's deaths
and injuries. As we have pointed out, the American Sea"Lindstrom v. International Nav. Co. (C. C. N.Y., 1902) rr7 Fed. 170.
'La Bourgogne, (r9o8) 210 U.S. 95, 140, 28 Sup. Ct. 664.
5
41 Stat. 537, c. rrr, § r (r92o), 46 U.S. Code (1934) § 76r. This statute
was applied to wrongful death as an American ship on the high seas in Salla v.
Hellman, (D. C. Calif., 1925) 7 F. (2d) 953·
6
See Lindstrom v. International Nav. Co., (C. C. N.Y., 1902) rr7 Fed. 170;
The Hamilton, (r9o7) 207 U.S. 398, 28 Sup. Ct. 133.
'The Vestris, (D. C. N.Y., 1932) 53 F. (2d) 847.
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man's Act 8 governs seamen's claims against their employers
with respect to injuries on all American-owned vessels. 9 But
this statute has been held to have no application to American
seamen who are injured on board a vessel of foreign ownership.10
English authority upon the precise problem of this section
is scanty, being confined to a few stray dicta in criminal cases. 11
The case of Madrazo v. Willes 12 (I 820) would appear to
be relevant although its incidents belong to a bygone era.
The defendant, a captain in the royal navy, had seized a ship
loaded with slaves, the property of the plaintiff, on the high
seas. The plaintiff, a Spaniard, brought an action for damages
in England. The English court appears to have referred the
legality of the seizure to Spanish law, as the law of the ship.
Since Spanish law permitted traffic in slaves, the seizure was
held to be improper and judgment given in the plaintiff's
favour.
SECTION

59

COLLISION ON THE HIGH SEAS

In discussing collisions upon the high seas we must distinguish rules of navigation from other types of legal rules
affecting liability. In navigation upon the high seas, the ships
of all nations are governed by the International Rules. A
British or American court would look to these rules for guidance in any collision case, irrespective of the nationality of the
8

4I Stat. Ioo7, c. 250, § 33 (I92o), 46 U.S. Code (I934) § 688.
Above, pp. 26I, 265.
See Harris v. Pennsylvania R. Co., (C. C. A. 4th, I93I) 50 F. (2d) 866.
111
Hogan v. Hamburg American Line, (I934) I 52 Misc. 405, 272 N. Y.
Supp. 690.
usee also Canadian Nat. Steamships Co. v. Watson, [I939] Can. L. R. I,
I Dom. L. R. 273, holding that an injury to a seaman on board a Canadian ship on
the high seas should be governed by the law of the port of registry.
12
Madrazo v. Willes, (I82o) 3 Barn. & Ald. 353, Io6 Eng. Rep. 692.
9
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ships concerned. Since these rules are part of the law of every
sea-going nation, no conflict-of-laws question can arise 1 within
the field which they cover.
But outside the field of navigation rules there is no such
uniformity. These rules give us a criterion for deciding which
ship is at fault. But they do not determine the legal consequences of fault. Upon questions of this kind the laws of other
sea-going nations often differ from those of England or the
United States. Different laws regarding the effect of wrongful death are common in the American cases. There may also
be important differences regarding the measure of damages
and vicarious liability.
When a ship becomes involved in a collision, the claims
which may be brought against her or her owners fall into two
distinct categories. The first of these categories consists of what
may be called internal or carrying claims, claims with respect
to cargo on board the ship which has been lost or injured and
claims with respect to persons on board her who have been
injured or killed. The second category includes what may be
called external or non-carrying claims, which originate with
the other ship involved in the collision. These may be claims
for damage to the other ship, claims for loss or injury of
cargo on board the other ship, or claims in respect of persons
who were on the other ship and have suffered in the collision.
Let us deal first with the internal claims. The country to
which the carrying ship belongs has a certain interest in these
claims and its law is a convenient one for the parties. There
is little connection, however, between these claims against
the carrying ship and the non-carrying ship. The country to
1

American courts apparently apply the International Rules to the ships of
foreign nations which have adopted them upon choice-of-law principles. See
The Scotia, (1871) 14 Wall. (81 U.S.) 17o; The Belgenland, (1885) 114
U. S. 355, 5 Sup. Ct. 86o.
Courts of tlxe British Empire apply the International Rules to foreign ships
in obedience to statutes and orders-in-council. See MARSDEN, CoLLISIONS AT
SEA (1934) 288.
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which the non-carrying ship belongs can have little concern
with the relations of the carrying ship to its passengers, crew,
and cargo owners. So far as these relations are concerned the
situation is not unlike a single ship disaster. In dealing with
internal or carrying claims it should be possible to exclude
altogether the law of the non-carrying ship. This appears
to have been the course taken by the Supreme Court of the
United States in the case of La Bourgogne. 2
So much for internal or carrying claims. Let us consider
now the choice-of-law problem raised by the external claims
brought in respect of the other vessel, its cargo, or the persons
on board it. In this connection it is well to take a diversity
between two possible situations: ( r) where the ships involved
belong to the same country and ( 2) where the ships involved
belong to different countries.
Where both ships involved in the collision belong to the
same nation, the choice-of-law problem need not, as Robinson
points out, be any more difficult than that of a wrong involving
a single vessel. The nation to which the two ships belong has
the greatest interest in ruling upon the controversy, and the
owners of the vessels should not complain of being judged by
their own law. There can be little doubt that in case of a collision between two ships of the same nation, an American
court would apply the law of that nation. But actual precedents for this practice are scanty.8
"La Bourgogne, (r9o8) 210 U.S. 95, 28 Sup. Ct. 664. This decision apparently overrules Rundell v. La,Compagnie Generale Transatlantique, (19oo)
40 C. C. A. (7th) 625, roo Fed. 655, holding that death claims against the carrying ship arising out of a collision ought to be governed by the general maritime
law.
8
For dicta, see The Scotland, ( r 88 r) r o 5 U. S. 24, 3 r ; The Belgenland,
(r885) 114 U.S. 355 1 369,5 Sup. Ct. 86o.
See also The Hamilton, (r9o7) 207 U.S. 398 1 28 Sup. Ct. 133 where, however, the two ships were connected with the state of Delaware. The Hamilton
struck and sank the Saginaw; both vessels were at fault. Claims were filed against
the Hamilton in respect of several persons who, being on board the Saginaw,
had been drowned. At this time there was no federal statute dealing with wrongful death on the high seas. The Supreme Court held that, in the absence of
federal legislation, the claimants might rely upon the Delaware death act.
Under the maritime common law, they would have had no cause of action. The
Harrisburg, (r886) 119 U.S. 199, 7 Sup. Ct. 140.
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In The Eagle Point 4 British law was applied in a case of
collision between two British vessels, the Eagle Point and
the Biela. Both vessels were to blame for the accident. The
owners of cargo aboard the Biela claimed damages against the
Eagle Point for the full value of their cargo, to which they
would have been entitled under American law. But the court
decided that the case ought to be governed by British law instead. The British rule in such a case limited the Eagle Point's
liability to half the value of the cargo and it was so ordered.
English courts incline to a different view of the matter.
They cling steadfastly to the principle that all collisions upon
the high seas ought to be adjudicated according to the law
maritime, as understood and applied by English courts. No
exception to this general doctrine is recognized even though
the ships involved share a common law and nationality. The
problem was squarely raised and resolved in Chartered Mercantile Bank of India v. Netherlands SteamNav. Co. 5 where
the facts were similar to those in The Eagle Point. The vessels involved, the Crown Prince and the Atjeh, were both
Dutch. Each was partly at fault. The action was brought by
the owners of cargo on the Crown Prince against the owners
of the Atjeh. What their position under Dutch law would
have been is not clear, but the court refused to consider Dutch
law. It held that the cargo owner's claim should be determined
by the general maritime law. This meant, of course that t~e
cargo owner's claim was controlled by the ordinary English
rule which the American court followed in The Eagle Point.
Since the Atjeh was partly to blame, her owners were liable
to the Crown Prince cargo owners for half damages.
A much more difficult problem is presented when noncarrying claims are brought against one of two ships which belong to different countries, governed by different laws. Among
•rhe Eagle Point, (r9o6) 73 C. C. A. 569, 142 Fed. 453·
"Chartered Mercantile Bank of India v. Netherlands, etc., Co., (r883) ro
Q. B. D. 521. See also The Johann Friederich, (r839) r W. Rob. 35, r66 Eng.
Rep. 487.
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the English and American materials of dogmatic authority
support may be found for the application of no less than three
different laws, viz: (I) the law of the ship against which the
claim is made, the non-carrying ship; ( 2) the law of the carrying ship; (3) the general maritime law as interpreted by the
forum. Let us consider the propriety of a reference to each of
these laws, in order.
The law of the non-carrying ship against which claim is
made is obviously connected to the factual pattern. It is in the
interest of the government of the country to which that ship
belongs to regulate the conduct of those who own and control
her and to prescribe their liability for mismanaging her. If, for
example, the laws of that country make shipowners liable for
wrongful death caused by negligent navigation, those laws
may properly be applied in a case where the death is suffered
by persons on a foreign vessel. Effect was given to this view of
the matter by Judge Learned Hand in The James McGee, 6
where a vessel owned by a New Jersey corporation sank a
vessel owned by the United States. Both ships were at fault.
The facts occurred before Congress passed the Federal Death
Act of I 920. Judge Learned Hand allowed the dependents
of men drowned on the government ship to base their claims
against the New Jersey ship upon New Jersey law. This decision has been followed in two cases of international conflict
of laws. 7
The second law whose relation to an international collision
on the high seas has been judicially discussed is the law of the
carrying ship, the ship on which the injury has been sustained.
The nation to which this ship belongs has also a certain interest in the controversy. It may quite properly desire to establish the rules of compensation for injury to its vessels or to
"The James McGee, (D. C. N. Y., 1924) 300 Fed. 93· See, apparently,
contra, The Middlesex, (D. C. Mass., 1916) 253 Fed. 142.
• The Aquitania, (1924) Am. Mar. Cas. 1440; Powers v. Cunard S. S. Co.,
(D. C. N.Y., 1925) 3Z F. (2d) 72.0.
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those on board them. The interest of a state in determining
the legal significance of acts which, though done in another
state, take effect upon persons or things within its borders has
always been recognized in conflict of laws. If a state may
properly impose criminal or civil liability in respect of extraterritorial acts which take effect inside its boundaries, why
should it not do so with respect to those which take effect on
board its ships?
The relevancy of the carrying ship's law was recognized
in The Windrush,S although the decision proceeds upon the
theory that the court applied the general maritime law. The
carrying vessel was the American Windrush, the defending
vessel, the Spanish Buenos Aires. Apparently the Buenos
Aires was entirely to blame for the disaster. With regard to
claims against the Buenos Aires for men drowned off the
Windrush it was argued that the liability of the Buenos Aires
and her owners must be defined by Spanish law. According to
Spanish law the owners were personally liable for the deaths
but no maritime liens were created against the Buenos Aires.
The court rejected this argument, however, and applied
American law, to wit, the Federal Death Act of 1920, which
was interpreted as giving a lien. American law was not invoked
as the law of the carrying ship, but as the general maritime
law, seen through the eyes of the forum.
There remains the third of the three choice-of-law theories
which we set out to investigate: the reference to the general
maritime law. For all its unreality, this doctrine goes undisputed in British courts. As we have seen, its scope extends to
collisions between two ships which belong to the same country.9 Its application to collisions between ships with different
"The Windrush, (D. C. N.Y., 1922) 286 Fed. 251, (C. C. A. 2nd, 1924)
5 F. (2d) 425. See contra, The Sagamore, (r9r7) 159 C. C. A. (rst) 6or, 247
Fed. 743·
• Above, p. 276.
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10

laws is illustrated by The Leon. This action was brought by
the owners of the British Harelda to recover damages from
the owners of the Spanish Leon which had sunk the Harelda
on the high seas. The owners of the Leon contended that
their personal liability depended on Spanish law, and that
according to Spanish law they were not vicariously liable for
the negligent navigation of their servants, the master and
crew. Sir Robert Phillimore declined to be controlled by
Spanish law and held that "the law which is applicable here
and governs the liability of the defendants in this case is the
general maritime law as administered in this country."
In the United States the general maritime law of the forum
theory is supported by various dicta of the Supreme Court.11
Moreover, as we have seen, it was expressly adopted in The
Windrush. 12 There the court applied American law to claims
respecting persons drowned off an American ship sunk by a
Spanish ship. In speaking of the Federal Death Act of I 920
as embodying the general maritime law the court was a little
embarrassed by the implication that Congress had apparently
altered the maritime law of the world. 13 So the court emphasized the fact that numerous other maritime nations had
recognized a cause of action for wrongful death too.
Notwithstanding the language used by the court in The
Windrush and other opinions, there are substantial reasons for
thinking that the general maritime law theory will not prove
acceptable to American courts. This theory, as we have indicated, is based upon a fiction. There may be interesting similarities between the maritime laws of various nations. But
there is no uniform maritime law. There is no reason why a
10

The Leon, (1881) 6 P. D. 148.
See The Scotland, (1 881) 105 U. S. 24, 31; The Belgenland, (1885)
114 U. S. 355, 369, 5 Sup. Ct. 86o.
See also CONFLICT OF LAWS RESTATEMENT (1934) § 410.
12
The Windrush, (D. C. N.Y., 1922) 286 Fed. 251, (C. C. A. 2nd, 1924)
5 F. (2d) 425.
18
The same problem came before a British court in Davidsson v. Hill [1901]
z K. B. 6o6.
11
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collision between a French and a British ship ought to be adjudicated according to American law upon the pretext that
it is "general maritime law." In the maritime field, as elsewhere, uniformity in all courts and other choice-of-law ideals
can best be achieved by the thorough-going application of
choice-of-law principles. It is true that the general maritime
law theory has been adopted in England. But English courts
are notoriously indifferent to choice-of-law policies. American
lawyers and judges understand these policies better because
the diversity of internal jurisdictions in the United States has
forced the courts to consider them. Some American writers
disapprove of the general maritime law theory. 14 A solution
of the problem upon a choice-of-law basis would be much
more in keeping with the American conflict of laws tradition.
The problem created by a collision of two ships governed
by different laws is not unique in the conflict of laws. It is
simply another example of a factual situation significantly
connected with two states which have different internal laws.
Similar problems have arisen in connection with railway carriage, telegrams, workmen's compensation, etc. Sometimes the
courts have struggled to establish a uniform rule selecting
one system of law to the exclusion of the other. But usually
they have recognized the interests of both jurisdictions by permitting an alternative reference to the internal law of either
one. The collision problem might well be treated in the same
fashion. If we consider all the American cases together we
may say that it has been so treated. Of course it is possible
that a case may arise in which the policies of the two laws concerned conflict with one another. Then the court of the forum
will have to choose between them. 15
,.. For discussion of the dispute between conflict-of-laws writers and admiralty
lawyers on this point, see RoBINSON, ADMIRALTY (1939) 836. See also BEALE,
CoNFLICT OF LAWS (1935) vol. z, § 410.1; Magruder and Grout, "Wrongful
Death Within the Admiralty Jurisdiction," (1926) 35 YALE L. J. 395, 413,
note 79·
15

See above, section 3 8.
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multiple contact cases, I 8 I.
Characterization, see Classification.
Chose in action, see Assignment.
Classification, as substance or procedure, 6 5 ; in multiple contact
cases, I 8 3; primary and secondary, I 89.
Comity theory, 3 I.
Contributory negligence, burden of
proof, I63, I66, I68; "comparative negligence," I I 2; "discovered peril," I I I ; in general, I I o;
specific rules, I I I •
Courts, admiralty, 2 58 ; federal, apply state laws, 4-3; federal, burden
of proof, I68; federal, general
law theory, 50; federal, in conflicts cases, 4-4-; federal, special
procedure, 4-4-·

Damages, divided in case of contributory negligence, I I 2; double,
I I 8; fixed sums, I I 8 ; in general,
IJ3, II?; limitation of, II6,
I I 9; periodical payments, I I 4-;
punitive, I I 7; to cargo-owners,
I I 5, 276.
Death, pending suit, 24-9; of defendant, 24-4-; of plaintiff, 24-7;
retroactive revival statute, 29;
transmission of claim, 24-8.
Death actions, beneficiaries, I 2 5 ;
formal plaintiff, I 26; local statute
not applied to foreign cases, 2 3 ;
Mexican law, So.
Dogs, 253·
Domicile, at death, 24-5, 24-8; of
spouses, affecting wife's right to
sue husband, 2 3 5 ; of spouses, affecting wife's right to sue in her
own name, 256.
Due process, in relation to automobile owner's liability, 2 3 7; in relation to choice of law generally,
4-0.
Employer's liability, at common law,
20 5 ; fellow-servant rule, 206;
injuries on board ship, 262.
Fellow-servant rule, 206.
Fire, 252.
Foreign judgments, as affecting insurer's liability, 24-3; for defendant, s6, 78; for workmen's
compensation, 227; in suit by
different formal plaintiff, I 29.
Full faith and credit, affecting
choice of law, 38; in relation to
workmen's compensation, 2I9,
222, 223; to foreign award of
compensation, 227; to foreign
rule barring suit, 2I9, 222, 225;
to foreign rule localizing suit,
I02.
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Immoveables, conversion of minerals, 99; conversion of timber, 99;
injury to, 2, 95; Louisiana rule,
96; Quebec rule, 96; title to, 96.
Insurance, insurer's liability to injured party, 239·
Joint obligation, of tortfeasors, I09,
J32.
Judgment, see Foreign judgments.
Jury, ancillary character, I49i contributory negligence, ISO, I 52;
in general, I48 ; matter of procedure, IS 2.
Justification doctrine, function, 7;
in recent cases, 20; not adopted
in United States, 22; origins, 6.
Liability limited by contract, carrier's, 200; employer's, 226.
Liens, see Maritime liens.
Limitation of actions, "condition of
the right," IH; "extinguishing
the right," I36; in general, 69,
I3 2; residence, I 38; second suit,
effect upon, I3 9; special cause of
action, I34. See also Notice before action.
Limitation of liability, see Damages.
Manufacturer's liability, 2 54·
Maritime liens, collision in territorial waters, 269; collision on
high seas, 2 79; distinguished
from power to arrest, J4.2; for
contractual claims, I4-5; for injury or death, I4-5; foreign liens,
I4-7i in general, I42; part of universal maritime law, I43; procedure, I46.
l\1arried woman, suit against husband, 235; suit in husband's
name, 2 56; torts of, husband's liability for, 2 55.

Negligence, causing harm in another state, 2 52; duty of care,
10 5 ;
gross negligence, 10 5 ;
"guest" rules, I04-; specific ru1es,
106.

Notice before action, I4I.
Obligation doctrine, 8, 3 I.
Penal laws, in general, 93·
Presumptions, see Burden of proof.
Procedure, different meanings of,
68; in general, 63.
Public policy, affirmative application
rare, 58, 86; claims against estate,
24-7; early cases, 26; English ru1e
and navigation, 2 70; English rule
in torts, 8; in general, 84; retroactive statute, 29; similarity doctrine, 27; suits between spouses,
236.
Release of tort cause of action, in
general, 204-; of workmen's claim
for compensation, 2 2 7.
Retroactive laws, 9, 29.
Revival of actions after death, 24-9·
Survival of actions, see Death.
Telegrams, liability for non-delivery,
I95; limitation of liability, 200.
Torts, committed in two states, 2 5 I.
See also Causation; Contributory
negligence; Negligence.
Trespass to land, see Immoveables.
Vested rights theory, 33·
Workmen's compensation, commonlaw suit barred, 2I 7 ; constitutional limitations, 2I9, 222, 225;
double recovery, 227; in general,
208; not a transitory action, 2I3;
place of employment, 2I2; place
of hiring, 210; place of injury,
209.

